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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the history of New Brighton in the context of Port Elizabeth's political 
economy. This port city was essentially an entrep6t until primary industrialisation commenced 
after the First World War. Jobs in the footwear and motor assembly plants were the preserve 
of unskilled white (Afrikaans-speaking) workers recently arrived from the city's hinterland. 
A relatively stable African population grew in the absence of influx controls, and provided a 
large pool of unskilled labour. A fairly large Coloured population made it more difficult for 
Africans to acquire employment and skills. With the spurt in industrial growth from the mid-
1940s, Africans were increasingly employed in the manufacturing sector. But the majority of 
the African workforce still performed unskilled work at or below the minimum wage. Port 
Elizabeth's African population was amongst the most fully proletarianised but the poorest in 
the country. 
The changing labour needs of Port Elizabeth's employers meant that the powerful commercial-
cum-industrial lobby sought to influence the City Council to ignore influx control measures 
introduced in the 1930s. Instead, routine control of New Brighton residents was dependent on 
a 'location strategy' which included the issue of registration cards as the key to obtaining 
houses and beer brewing privileges. The Advisory Board provided a channel for patronage 
dispensed by the Superintendent and a means of co-opting prominent residents and their 
supporters. The usual litany of social ills such as grinding poverty, overcrowding and 
breakdown of family structures led to the growth of a subculture of violence amongst some 
of the youth from the late 1940s. This fed into the simmering discontent caused by the 
Council's insistence on rent increases and the heightened political expectations caused by the 
defiance campaign, which irrupted 'in the 1952 riots. 
Meanwhile, a realignment of political forces in the local state had changed the balance of 
power in favour of those groups which advocated a tighter rein on labour regulation and the 
political activities of local Africans. Pressure from this source and the central state in the 
aftermath of the riots, was more telling than that of the 'liberal' lobby and business interests 
on the PECC. The combination of state repression and the Council's hastily introduced curbs 
on political activities reduced the likelihood of ANC-led resistance to the imposition of passes. 
In 1953 the Council finally jettisoned its 'liberalism' and introduced influx control measures 
and labour registration. It applied the full force of the law against New Brighton residents 
whose reputation for being a law-abiding community had served to vindicate the Council's 
'progressive' policies towards Africans in the first place. 
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Port Elizabeth is a city of many different images. These include the 'friendly city' of current· 
tourist propaganda and the 'progressive' city of the past. A song entitled eBhayi penned in the 
c - __.... 
1940s, celebrates the absence pass laws in Port Elizabeth. It exploits the pun suggested by its 
'--Xhosa naine;-the --;imilar-sounding ibhayi whi~hmeans blanket. Thus eBhayi the city, is 
declared to be a haven; a place that in comparison to other cities where harassment is 
commonplace, offers ·solace, strength and warmth - in short, the comfort of a metaphorical 
ibhayi:' 
Nam, nantsi k 'eyam, nantsi 
Nam, nalik elam, nali · 
Nali, nali pha - eBhayi pha 
Ungathetha nge Monti 
Ungathetha nge Rauti 
Ndithetha nge Bhayi -
hayi nge Bhayi 






Kodwa lon' asingubo 
Yindawo nje. 
Wakufii«J eBhayi 
Moba uvel' e(lonce 
Wakufii«J eBhayi 
Pha eBhayi pha 
Ligaphel' ixhale 
Kuvel' kubone 
Kuzalile e Bhayi pha. 
-··. ·~-" 
eBhayi 
Me too, here's mine, here it is 
Me too, here's mine, here it is 
Here, here it is, here in PE 
You can talk about East London 
You can talk about Jo'burg 
I am talking about PE -
no about PE 
Here in PE here! 
There are no passes 
It is honey and thick milk 
Here in PE 
You can even discard your blanket 
It's hot in PE 
But it's not a blanket 
It's just a place. 
When you arrive in PE 
Even from King Williamstown 
When you arrive in PE 
Here in PE here 
Your anxiety disappears 
The you can see 
It is quiet in PE. 
Remembered now only by the older generation, they recount the lyrics with a mixture of 
nostalgia and cynicism. But it has to be asked whether this ambivalence comes with the 
advantage of hindsight, or whether such a song reflected a view of eBhayi which enjoyed 
1 C. Ballantine, Marabi Nights: Early South African Jazz and Vaudeville (Johannesburg, 
1993), p. 92. A recording of the song by Snowy Radebe and Company is to be found 
on the accompanying Cassette (Track #10). The lyrics were provided by Henry Johnson 
and translated by P. Mtuze. 
2 
considerable currency at the time? If songs can be said to communicate popular 
consciousness, 2 an answer to this question might provide some insight into common 
perceptions about the city. 
An image is a representation of reality_. Just_ as the images on the television screen do not 
exhaust the 'real world' (as it used to be called), so the images represented in the song do not 
constitute Port Elizabeth's past in its entirety. It is not my purpose to examine -the origins or 
development of such images here. That is beyond the scope of this thesis and best left to those 
with a different agenda who have embraced postmodemism as a critical theory - if it can be 
regarded as such. Instead of a discursive analysis of fragmentary images, I will attempt to 
construct a conventional narrative history of chosen themes in Port Elizabeth's and New 
Brighton's past. 
My starting point is that economic shifts and accompanying structural changes play a 
fundamental role in shaping the history and character of any region or city. I accept that the 
structural situation and concomitant social relationships define objective conditions. Although 
mine is a historical materialist paradigm, I take exception to the structuralists insistence that 
individuals are subsumed by the larger social formation and incapable of making their own 
history. I would wish to assign an important role to human agency and regard experience as 
intrinsic to the contingent relationship between structure and agency. In other words, there is 
a need for a historically specific rather than an axiomatic answer to the problem of relations 
between agency and structure.3 Paul Maylam has expressed the need for a discerning approach 
as follows: 
The practitioner of urban social history is obliged to tread a careful path hetween the __ 
theoretical and the empirical, maintaining a sense of structure while at the same time 
keeping an eye on the human actors; [he/she must achieve] a balance: to capture and 
convey something of the lived experience of ordinary people, but also to delineate the 
structures that shaped or constrained that experience. 4 
Belinda Bozzoli has identified consciousness, culture and ideology as key concepts for 
understanding how individuals or groups relate objective conditions to the subjective 
2 V. Erlmann, African Stars. Studies in Black South African Performance (Chicago, 
1991), p. 12. 
3 P. Anderson, Arguments within English Marxism (London, 1980), p. 21. 
4 P. Maylam, 'Aspects of African Urbanisation in the Durban Area before 1940' in R. 
Haines and G. Buijs (eds.), The Struggle for Social and Economic Space: Urbanization 
in Twentieth-Century South Africa (Durban, 1985), p. 41. 
3 
experiences of everyday life. 5 Whilst Bozzoli herself has made an invaluable contribution to 
the elaboration of such concepts in social history (sometimes used interchangably with 'history 
from below'), much of it unfortunately suffers from a lack of theoretical rigour. 
Mike Morris has decried the tendency of social historians to stress subjective experience as 
opposed to objective, abstract generalisation. He charges that social historians usually avoid 
explicit theorisation by reconceptualising the categories of analysis in the South African 
historical debate. He regards social history as a return to the discredited empiricism of earlier 
liberal historians and a departure from Marxist concepts, categories and modes of explanation. 6 
Tim Keegan has responded to these criticisms by arguing that microstudies have prevented 
social historians from succumbing to the temptation of reducing historical reality to a set of 
ill-defined processes. He writes that, "[t]he smaller the scale of investigation, the more likely 
it is that the intricacies and complexities of social interaction will stand revealed, stripped of 
schematic abstractions". 7 Whilst mindful of the dangers of empathy and 'creeping empiricism' 
noted elsewhere by Keegan, 8 I, too, believe that useful comparisons and meaningful 
generalisations are only valid on the basis of detailed investigation. At the same time, I 
recognise that unless studies focusing on the local communities retain a concern for the wider 
processes of social formation, capital accumulation and state strategy, they will degenerate into 
the anecdotal and the parochial.9 
A leading exponent of the genre, Charles van Onselen, has lamented the tendency whereby 
social history has become uncoupled from "relations of production, instruments and tools of 
production, .and the way they are appropriated by certain groups, the way that they struggled 
about them". As a self-proclaimed historical materialist, he would wish to "draw a very radical 
distinction between Marxist and non-Marxist social historians". 10 Similarly, Bozzoli and Peter 
5 B. Bozzoli, 'History , Experience and Culture' in B. Bozzoli (ed.), Town and 
Countryside in the Transvaal (Johannesburg, 1983), pp. 1-35. For a critique of this 
position, see G. Minkley, 'Re-examining Experience: the New South African 
Historiography', History in Africa, 13 (1986), pp. 269-281. 
6 M. Morris, 'Social History and the Transition to Capitalism in the South African 
Countryside', Africa Perspective (New Series), 1, 5 & 6 1987), pp. 9-13. 
7 T. Keegan, Rural Transformations in Industrializing South Africa: the Southern 
Highveld to 1914 (Johannesburg, 1987}, p. xvii. 
8 T. Keegan, 'Mike Morris and the Social Historians: a response and a critique', Africa 
Perspective (New Series), 1, 7 & 8 (1989), p. 11. 
9 Bozzoli, Town and Countryside, p. 35. 
10 Cited in H. Bradford, 'Highways, Byways and Culs-de-Sac: the Transition to Agrarian 
Capitalism in Revisionist South African History', Radical History Review, 4617 
4 
Deli us have recently attempted to distance themselves from the designation 'social 
historians' .11 But in wishing to detach 'social history' -and thereby much of the work which 
has been associated with the Wits History Workshop - from the 'radical' tradition of South 
African historiography, they have sought to reconstitute that tradition on their own tenns. 
Social history, in Helen Bradford's words, has been "forged by eclectic intellectual traditions" 
and "emerged as a loosely defmed school that straddles paradigms". 12 In my view, social 
history has not misappropriated the 'radical' tradition as Bozzoli and Delius aver. It has, 
instead, given it a vitality which the work of the structuralists lacked. Certainly, the pervasive 
influence on this work - both conceptually and methodologically - is social history. 
***** 
An important trend in South African historical writing in the past fifteen years or so has been 
a concern with the social history of local communities. Studies with an urban focus have 
proliferated. These have ranged from the large cities through to the smaller towns and dorps, 
townships and peri-urban squatter settlements. But unlike Britain and the United States of 
America, a distinctive school of urban historians has never emerged in this country. There is 
no readily identifiable corpus of South African historical writing wherein the urban factor is 
regarded as an explanatory variable or dynamic in the historical process as has been the case 
overseas. 13 If works with "an urban focus and concerned with the specifically urban 
(Winter, 1990), p. 83. 
11 B. Bozzoli and P. Delius, 'Radical History and South African Society', Radical History 
Review, 4617 (Winter 1990), p. 43 n. 82. 
12 Bradford, 'Highways, Byways and Culs-de-Sac', p. 73. Bradford would appear to part 
company with her editors on this point. 
13 Although British and American historians have not agreed whether urban history is a 
distinct field of study or not, nor whether it has a distinctive methodology, there has 
emerged an immense volume of work with an urban focus which has been accorded the 
status of a sub-discipline. In Britain, the body of work has been referred to as the 
'Dyos phenomenon' on account of the inordinate influence of that doyen of urban 
historians, Jim Dyos. See, for example, H.J. Dyos (ed.), The study of urban history 
(London, 1968); D. Cannadine & D. Reeder (eds.), Exploring the urban past 
(Cambridge, 1982); D. Fraser & A. Sutcliffe (eds.), The Pursuit of Urban History 
(London, 1983); D. Fraser, 'The Urban History Masquerade: Recent Trends in the 
Study of English Urban Development' (Review Article), The Historical Journal, 21, 
1 (1984), pp. 253-264, In the United States, there has emerged the 'new urban history' 
movement with its practitioners like Steven Thernstrom pioneering the use of an 
interdisciplinary approach and statistical methods. For some representative literature, 
seeP. Hauser & L. Schnore (eds.), The Study of Urbanisation (New York, 1965); L. 
Schnore, L. (ed.) The New Urban History (Princeton, 1985); T. Herschberg, 'The New 
Urban History: Towards an Interdisciplinary History of the City', Journal of Urban 
History, 5, 1 (1978), pp. 3-40. 
5 
experience" are to qualify as 'urban history', 14 then this amounts to little more than the 
(spatial) delimitation of the historian's field of study. In fact, the dominant appoach in this 
country has been to simply regard the urban environment as a context wherein social 
transformation occurs; one which might exercise a formative influence on but is not necessarily 
a microcosm of the wider historical process. Most writers whose subject matter is situated in 
the urban context are, first and foremost, social historians. Because of the specific setting of 
their work, they might be termed urban social historians. 
In South Africa, very few practitioners in the field of urban studies have reflected on the 
nature of their inquiry. Of those who have, 15 it has been assumed that urban history is more 
than a field of study but is a sub-discipline with its own distinctive methodology. Saunders, 
however, has conceded that much of the methodology employed by urban historians "is 
common to all historical research". 16 Certainly, practices such as an inter-disciplinary 
approach or statistical analysis do not qualify as 'distinctive'. Urban history has a pluralistic 
rather than a distinctive methodology precisely because it borrows from all sub-disciplines 
(especially social history). It also makes use of testimony and other sources pioneered by oral 
historians. The essential difference between so-called 'urban history' and (urban) social history 
is that the former claims an affmity to scientific practice which aspires to objectivity and is 
purportedly non-ideological, whilst the latter is politically committed to rescuing the 
underclasses from oblivion. In worst case scenarios, urban history can fall into the trap of 
antiquarianism (viz. the simple investigation of the past for its own sake) whereas (urban) 
social history - in the guise of people's history - can be reduced to 'activistic' history (viz. a 
history which seeks to use the past to change the present). 
**** 
Port Elizabeth's public history has been constructed primarily by amateurs steeped in 
parochialism and the notion of 'history for it's own sake' (sic). Such antiquarianism is a 
For a more extensive bibliography, consult C. Saunders, Writing History: South 
Africa's urban past and other essays (Pretoria, 1992), pp. 53-58. 
14 Saunders, Writing History, p. 4. 
15 Apart from Saunders, Writing History, pp. 1-68 these include: M. Swanson, 
'Reflections on the Urban History of South Africa' in H. Watts (ed.), Focus on Cities 
(Durban, 1970), pp. 142-149; E.J. Carruthers, 'Some Problems in the Writing of 
Contemporary Urban History', Kleio, 14 (1982), pp. 79-87; G. Pirie, 'South African 
Urban History' in Urban History Yearbook (1985), pp. 18-29; F.A. van Jaarsveld, 
Verstedeliking in Suid-Afrika (Pretoria, 1985). 
16 Saunders, Writing History, p. 5. 
6 
feature of Looking Back, the journal of the Historical Society of Port Elizabeth, which has 
been in existence for over thirty years. The subject matter of articles are typical of the 
concerns of 'local history': the histories of buildings, families or genealogies, well-known 
personalities, and so on. The only two full-length histories of Port Elizabeth are largely 
anecdotal in approach and do not meet the standards of scholarly history. 17 This history of 
the 'Friendly City' has been reproduced in publications by the Municipality and the PE 
Publicity Association, commemorative brochures and pamphlets by business and industry, and 
special supplements in the local press. Such 'potted' local histories have contributed to 
perpetuating the myth of pioneering British settlers and their descendants who have made a 
wholly positive contribution to the development of the Eastern Cape.'8 Port Elizabeth's public 
history has assigned workers and women- black and white alike- to the 'condescension of the 
past' (to borrow E.P. Thompson's well-worn phrase). As such, it constitutes part of a 
hegemonic discourse. 
The silences of public history are in themselves indicators of which groups have prevailed in 
, making the world in their own image. Port Elizabeth's Councillors, who were supposed to be 
in a position to make informed decisions relating to the city's African population did not often 
venture into the Location. 19 Their decisions were based on the reading of the reports 
submitted by Location Superintendents, Medical Officers of Health, and other officials. The 
'facts' contained in such reports constituted a body of knowledge which, in the Foucauldian 
fnse, defined the parameters of power relations between the rulers and the ruled. Ordinary 
~,,  jhite residents invariably had little ftrst-hand knowledge or experience of the world of 
j/\\ ) Ajfricans. Most would have encountered Africans as employees or subordinates, either in their 
(' :)J otvn homes or at the workplace. But apart from the handful of officials and traders who lived 
· ·,,-........_ i# the Location, Whites seldom set foot in New Brighton. The 'invisibility' of Africans has 
I 
I r number of dimensions: the denial of their agency' the engineering of spatial 'otherness' I through the creation of locations, and the extension of this 'otherness' into the culture of the c /locations."' One of the concerns of this thesis is to rescue the history of Port Elizabeth's 
17 J.J. Redgrave, Pon Elizabeth in Bygone Days (Wynberg, 1947); E.K. Lorimer, 
Panorama of Pon Elizabeth (Cape Town, 1971). 
18 C. Crais, 'White Supremacy and Black Resistance in Pre-Industrial South Africa: The 
Making of the Colonial Order in the Eastern Cape (Ph.D. Thesis, John Hopkins 
University, 1988), pp. xi-xiv. 
19 A. Campbell, The Hean of Africa (London, 1954), p. 42. 
20 G. Minkley, 'Race, Class and Space in the early Industrialization of East London', 
Unpublished Paper, History Department, University of the Western Cape, 1993, p. 13. 
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~lation and of_the New Bri~~!o~mun_ity in_p!:lJ:(:icular from the silences of 
public history__:__ 
When I commenced research for this study about five years ago, Port Elizabeth's 
historiography was in its infancy. Although the output on the city's history still does not match 
that of other major centres like Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg, and nor is it ever 
likely to (for reasons which I have suggested elsewhere),21 an increasing number of scholars 
are engaged in researching aspects of Port Elizabeth's history. These scholars include not only 
historians but also economic historians, historical/political geographers and industrial 
sociologists. I do not propose here to update a survey of Port Elizabeth's historiography 
attempted in 1991. 22 However, some recently completed studies warrant special mention and 
discussion because they are invaluable contributions to Port Elizabeth's historiography and will 
be frequently referred to in the course of this thesis. 
An aspect of Port Elizabeth's history which has received considerable attention has been the 
development of residential segregation/apartheid. 23 A dissertation by the American historian, 
j
, Joyce Kirk, describes how the African community resisted repeated attempts by the Town 
Council to remove it from predominantly white residential areas and municipal/private 
locations in the late nine_t~nQI century. 24 She adds depth to our understanding of the situation 
21 See my Report on the Conference on 'Port Elizabeth's Place in South African History 
and Historiography', Vista University, Port Elizabeth, 24 and 25 September 1992 in 
Kronos, 20 (1993), pp. 136-7. 
22 See iny 'Port Elizabeth's Place in South African Historiography', Paper presented to 
the Eastern Cape Historical Organisation, King Williamstown, 13 April 1991. 
23 See W .J. Davies, Patterns of Non-White Population Distribution in Port Elizabeth with 
special reference to the application of the Group Areas Act (Port Elizabeth, 1971); A.J. 
Christopher, 'Race and Residence in Colonial Port Elizabeth', South African 
Geographical Journal, 69 (1987), pp. 3-20, 'Apartheid Planning in South Africa: the 
Case of Port Elizabeth', The Geographical Journal, 153, 2 (1987), pp. 195-204, 
'Formal segregation and population distribution in Port Elizabeth', Contree, 24 (1988), 
pp. 5-12; J. Nel, Port Elizabeth, die apartheidstad: 'n Geografiese analise van die 
impak van die sentrale regering en die wet op Groepsgebiede (Port Elizabeth, 1988); 
G. Baines, 'The control and administration of Port Elizabeth's African population, 
c.1834-1923', Contree, 26 (1989), pp. 13-21 and 'The origins of urban segregation: 
Local Government and the Residence of Africans in Port Elizabeth, c.1835-1865', 
South African Historical Journal, 22 (1990), pp. 61-81; B. Taylor, Controlling the 
Burgeoning Masses: Removals and Residential Developments in Port Elizabeth's Black 
Areas, JBOOs-1990 (Institute for Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, 
Grahamstown, 1991). 
24 J .F. Kirk, 'The African Middle Class, Cape Liberalism and Resistance to Residential 
Segregation at Port Elizabeth, 1880-1910' (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
8 
by explaining the inability of the African middle class leadership to withstand such pressures 
against the background of the waning influence of liberalism in Cape colonial politics. In the 
period in which our work overlaps, namely 1903-1910, Kirk is more concerned with resistance 
to the removals to New Brighton and why Africans preferred to relocate to Korsten, than with 
the New Brighton community per se. Therefore, our work is complementary. 
Jennifer Robinson's thesis explores the use of state power and spatial organisation in effecting 
racial domination in South African cities through a case study of Port Elizabeth. 2S Her 
theoretical approach is informed by a rigorous critique of (the mainly 'structuralist') writings 
on the nature of the South African state, as well as postmodernists like Foucault whose insights 
into the nature of power relations are only beginning to be appreciated and applied by South 
African historians. Robinson's work also provides useful insights into the nature of the 
relationship between the central and local states, as well as the character and operation of the 
! 
latter. It evinces a a profound sense of change though time and provides an indispensable 
framework for much of this study. I have drawn extensively on Robinson's thesis, together 
with Glenn Adler's work in progress, 26 in my analysis of Port Elizabeth's political economy. 
Janet Cherry has recently completed a study of the making of Port Elizabeth's African working 
class. 27 She has made a valuable contribution to our understanding of how the changing labour 
process and relations of production affected the levels of worker consciousness and the 
potential for organisation. Empirically, she has charted the course of unionisation amongst 
African workers in the period between approximately 1930 and 1960. In so doing, she has 
1987). The thesis has spawned two articles: 'Race, Class Liberalism and Segregation: 
the 1883 Native Strangers' Location Bill in Port Elizabeth', International Journal of 
African Historical Studies, 24, 2 (1991), pp. 293-321 and 'A "Native" Free Stale at 
Korsten: Challenge to Segregation in Port Elizabeth, 1901-1905', Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 17, 2 (1991), pp. 309-336. 
25 J. Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid: Territoriality and State Power in South African 
Cities- Port Elizabeth 1923-1972' (Ph.D., Cambridge University, 1990). A batch of 
articles and papers have been based on the thesis. See bibiliography for details. 
26 The draft thesis is entitled: '"The Factory Belongs to All Who Work in It•: the 
Organization of Non-racial Trade Unions in the South African Motor Car Industry, 
1968-1983' (Ph.D., Columbia University). A paper based on the thesis was presented 
to the Conference on 'Port Elizabeth's Place in South African History and 
Historiography', Vista University, Port Elizabeth, 1992 as 'From the "Liverpool of the 
Cape" to the "Detroit of South Africa": the Automobile Industry and Industrial 
Development in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage Region'. 
27 J. Cherry, 'The Making of an African Working Class: Port Elizabeth 1925-1963" 
(M.A., University of Cape Town, 1992). 
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provided useful insights into the conditions in the workplace of African workers, many of 
whom were residents of New Brighton. Thus her work also complements my own. 
**** 
As with most of the recent work on Port Elizabeth's history, this thesis is concerned with the 
African population, and the New Brighton community in particular. Jeffrey Butler has 
~ommented that it might be "legiti.utate to write the history of only a part of a totaJ 
--~~~--- ------- - -----==-----=----=----~ 
<:omm~ty, but the intention to do so must be clearly set out and defended". 28 When poor 
white Afrikaners, for instance, are studied without reference to Port Elizabeth's wider 
society, 29 tl.!._~n we are simply pursuing the apartheid agenda. There can be no objection in 
P_~~ip!e _!o _!he_ ~~y _of a particular seg~e!lt~~ ~ort Eliza~~ ~!Y provided_it___caxunake_ 
'}( a_ contribution to our understanding of the ~tota~ hi~t~ry Qf the_cjty. I believe that a holistic 
'approach in which the New Brighton community is portrayed in relationship to other social 
groups in the city can be fully justified. Only a greater appreciation of our people's shared past 
can contribute to the development of a non-racial historiography. But until such time as we are 
in a position to synthesise the history of all groups in society, we shall have to make do with 
partial histories of Port Elizabeth. 
It is necessary to delineate clearly_ the geographical area where the community which is the r\ 
, subject of this thesis lived. ~~fi~ WhiC_h is situated ap~XiD_Iate!y _ten kilometres to r· l 
~\ ~ 
\' t!J.e north of Port Elizabeth's CBD, consists of seven housing schemes constructed in the ... 
v following phases [see Figure 1.1]: 
(a) Red Location 1902-3; 
(b) Newtown or White Location 1925-8; 
(c) McNamee Village 1938-43; 
(d) K waford 1948-51; 
(e) Boastville 1948-9; 
(f) Elundini 1951-4; 
(g) Thembalethu 1962-3. 
A more detailed description of the expansion of New Brighton will be provided in Chapter 3. 
It~hould be assumed that the-teriD-N.ew_ :Qrig~t!>n includes all the areas in existence at any 
28 J. Butler, Review of P .H.R. Snyman, Olifantshoek in South African Historical Journal, 
19 (1987), p. 248. 
29 Implied as a criticism of the work of H.O. Terblanche. See his 'Die Armblanke-
vraagstuk in Port Elizabeth, 1916-1934: 'n Verkennende studie', Contree, 33 (1993), 
pp. 1-11 and 'Die Afrikaner in Port Elizabeth, 1902-1937: 'n Kultuurhistoriese 
Ondersoek' (D.Phil., University of Port Elizabeth, 1993). 
Figure 1.1 NEW BRIGH TON TOWNSHIP DE 1902/3-1952/3 VELOPMENT, 
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given point in time, unless a specific area is identified. Because the thesis is confined to the 
first fifty years of New Brighton's history, this obviously means that Thembalethu is excluded 
from its purview . 
. The. demarcation_ of fifty_ years for. this study was not determined by a wish .for a tidy--·-
periodisation. It commences with the establishment of New Brighton in 1903 and closes in 
1953. Robinson has shown that the latter year was a watershed as far as Port Elizabeth's 
policies towards Africans in the city were concerned. Following the riots of the previous year, 
the reput~y 'progressive' PE City Council adopted measures to curb political activities in the 
township_andJmpleJ!)_ent influx controls.]0 The choice of period thus hinges on administrative 
and political decisions which affected the lives of the people of New Brighton, the subject of · 
this thesis, substantially. But it is necessary also to situate the history of New Brighton within 
the context of structural changes in Port Elizabeth's political economy. 
! 
I 
30 · Robinson, 'Power of Apartheid', esp. pp. 247-263. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PORT ELIZABETH, c.l903-1953 
\ This chapter commences with an outline of the~mic development of Port Elizabeth. The 
\ m~hases thereof have been represented somewhat schematically by the epithets: the 
~ of the Cape' and the ~oit of South Afri_:.a' _, Essentially, this depicts a 
progression from a merchant base in the mid-nineteenth century when trade (primarily wool) 
u:c:::::: ----
~~ ~~~ou!h~tu nufactures (e~pecially motor 
ehicles) provided an industrial base. There has been a tendency to replicate phases in the ---onomic development of the Witwatersrand in the secondary regions in this country. But rather 
than employing specious similes or likening the development of the local economy to that of the 
the country's industrial hub, it is more useful to identify its own regionally specific features. 
Each economic phase also had particular implications for the labour process and relations of 
production in Port Elizabeth. The demographic profile of the town's workforce- its numbers, 
racial composition and distribution of skills -changed. We will be concerned primarily with 
the African population. Because they are treated as statistics and something of a monolithic 
group in the records, there are difficulties in constructing a comprehensive social geography. 
During our period the Municipality assumed responsibility for the majority of the local African 
population- w~orporation of New Brighton i~d Korsten in 1931. And seldom 
is there any attempt to identify which Africans lived and worked where. Therefore, we cannot 
always differentiate between residents of one area and another. But this chapter provides 
essential background information for understanding the conditions of reproduction and social 
relations in New Brighton. 
The analysis of the local economy and state will provide a framework for understanding Port 
Elizabeth's politics and the policies of the Council towards its African population. The Council 
fashioned a 'native' administration for which it earned a 'progressive' reputation. Robinson has 
contended that this reputation, which rested on the absence of influx controls, was not·entirely 
warranted. Instead of the type of regulation envisaged in the urban areas legislation, steps were 
taken to control and monitor New Brighton residents by means of spatial organisation, close 
1 G. Adler, 'From the "Liverpool of the Cape" to the "Detroit of South Africa": the 
Automobile Industry and Industrial Development in the Port.Elizabeth-Uitenhage Region' 
(Paper presented to the Conference on Port Elizabeth's Place in South African History 
and Historiography, Vista University, Port Elizabeth, 1992). 
\ 
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supervision and surveillance. But the efficacy of this 'location strategy' depended on the extent 
to which Africans could be forced to reside therein. The 'location strategy' and influx control 
measures were two sides of the same coin; different methods of achieving social control of the 
African population in order to ensure white political domination. 2 In the final section we will 
focus on influx control for it allows us to examine the relationship between the central state, the 
local state and capital/employers. It will be shown, contrary to what has previously been 
asserted, that the PECC did implement influx control measures in the 1930s. A question that 
needs to be answered, then, is why did it not enforce these mechanisms and allow them to fall 
into disuse? 
Port Elizabeth's Economic Development to the 1950s 
\., Port Elizabe ' GQ!!Q!!l!<:_ gr~~ ~~n~~- ~m_ tp~ development of.c.QJilJ!!etcialwgel farmiftg -r 
in the eastern districts of the Cape Colony which coincided with a boom in the British textile 
industry. The town was also well situated to take advantage of a rapidly expanding transit trade 
comprising angora hair, hides and ostrich feathers. In spite of inadequate harbour facilities and 
la.bour disputes, Algoa Bay's export trade eclipsed th .. at of Table Bay b.y the late. 1850s. Port ~ 
Eti~~eth became known as the 'Liverpogl gfJ:Iu~. ~ap§ for she was tbe...premier oort of the 
~ --·- ~ ~- -----
Colony by the mid-nineteenth century. 3 She also became a financial centre as two major 
....____:_. --- -
imperial banks established their Cape headquarters in the town during the early 1860s.4 
Initially, the failure to raise sufficient local capital created a dependency on imperial sources. 
But London-based investments promoted the growth of local sources of capital, 
Port Elizabeth's incorporation into the world capitalist system meant that the town's economy 
became subject to the cycle of boom and bust. s In the mid-1860s depressed wool prices and 
contracting markets caused a recession in the Cape economy. However, the opening up of the 
Kimberley diamond fields renewed investor confidence and the consequent recovery provided 
a fresh stimulus to diverse economic activities. Many of Port Elizabeth's merchants branched 
2 J. Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid: Territoriality and State Power in South African 
Cities- Port Elizabeth 1923-1972' (Ph.D. Thesis, Cambridge University, 1990). 
3 E.J. Inggs, 'Liverpool of the Cape: Port Elizabeth Harbour Development, 1820-1870' 
(M.A. thesis, Rhodes University, 1986) pp. 99-129 and 'Liverpool of the Cape: Port 
Elizabeth Trade, 1820-1870', South African Journal of Economic History, 1 (1986), pp. 
83-98. 
4 A. Mabin, 'Concentration and Dispersion in the Banking System of the Cape Colony, 
1837-1900', South African Geographical Journal, 61 (1985), pp. 146-7. 
5 A. Mabin, 'The Rise and Decline of Port Elizabeth, 1850-1900', International Journal 
of African Historical Studies, 19 (1986), pp. 275-298. 
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into the diamond business whilst others invested in property or the production of a wide range 
of commodities for this new market. Despite being physically closer to the diggings than Cape 
Town, the poor harbour facilities and inadequate rail network favoured the Mother City in the 
competition for the traffic. As the seat of the Colony's Parliament and bureaucracy, Cape 
Town's interests were better served. Port Elizabeth was poorly placed to influence government 
appropriations for harbour works and other infrastructures such as railways and roads.6 
The exploitation of the Witwatersrand's gold contributed further to Port Elizabeth's 
underdevelopment. As the transit trade to and from the Reef outstripped the export value of 
pastoral products from it's hinterland during the 1880s, the town increasingly assumed the role 
of an entrep()t. Despite the growth of the service sector and the local market, commercial 
concerns diverted capital from the retail trade to the gold fields. In fact, the reorientation of 
colonial capital to the interior hampered the diversification of industry and productive activity 
in all sectors of the Cape economy. Consequently, Port Elizabeth's small-scale manufacturers 
remained undercapitalised and her commercial position was increasingly eroded. In 1885-6, the 
value of commodities imported through Table Bay surpassed Algoa Bay for the first time in over 
three decades, and many of the banks also began to relocate to Cape Town. 7 Port Elizabeth lost 
her standing as the commercial and financial capital of the Cape Colony. 
Port Elizabeth's limited industry was based on primary production and still in its infancy by the 
end of the nineteenth century. This is suggested by the mixed character of economic activity. 
Processing industries included tanneries and wool washeries, whilst factories made goods such 
as soap, candles, matches, cigarettes and leather goods. Local producers of confectionaries, food 
and beverages also made some inroads into the expanding consumer market. These enterprises 
were usually individually owned, labour-intensive employing many craftsmen alongside a large 
number of unskilled workers. But trade and commerce remained the backbone of the local 
economy. 
Like other colonial ports, Algoa Bay handled an increased volume of traffic during the South 
African War (1899-1902). Employment opportunities were created in the transport services and 
6 A. Mabin, 'Class as a Local Phenomenon: Conflict between Cape Town and Port 
Elizabeth in the Nineteenth Century', Paper presented to the Wits History Workshop, 
1984; Adler, 'Automobile Industry', p. 6. 
7 A. Mabin, 'The Making of Colonial Capitalism: Intensification and Expansion in the 
Economic Geography of the Cape Colony, 1854-1899' (Ph.D. thesis, Simon Fraser 
University, 1983), pp. 106-126. 
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local industry. Between 1891 and 1904, Port Elizabeth's total population increased by about 
83%, the number of Africans more than doubled. 
TABLE 2.1 
Population of Pon Elizabeth 1855-19118 
Year. .. Whites Africans Coloureds . Asians Total 
1855 3 509 
1865 6 940 
1875 8 728 
1891 13 297 
1904 22 336 




















The burgeoning African population included a considerable number of migrants from Port 
' 
Elizabeth's rural hinterland who were hired on a contractual basis. These "casual Natives were 
mostly raw and uneducated ... from the large tribal locations on the Border and across the Kei 
[River]" .9 Many of these migrants failed to have their contracts renewed and were recruited to 
work on the mines. 10 During the economic hardships after the War, not many resident Africans 
could rely on the support of kin groups and 'home boy' networks. As the Assistant Resident 
Magistrate remarked, 
the ordinary Native labourer in Port Elizabeth is not the raw Native who has come from 
the Transkei in search of work here, but has been born and bred in one or other of the 
many Locations that have existed here for many years. 11 
The greater distance of Port Elizabeth than, say, East London from the reserves made for a 
more stable African population. Port Elizabeth's African population has rightly been 
8 Sources include the following census reports: Cape of Good Hope Parliamentary Papers, 
A.14 - 1857, G.42 - 1876, G.6 - 1892, G.19 - 1905; Union of South Africa 
Parliamentary Papers. U. G. 32 - 1912. The exclusion of New Brighton and Kor:;ten as 
from the 1904 census arbitrarily reduced the size of Port Elizabeth's black population. 
Accordingly, I have adjusted official figures so as to include these peri-urban areas. Cf 
A.J. Christopher, 'Race and Residence in Colonial Port Elizabeth', South African 
Geographical Journal, 69 (1987), p. 5, Table 1. 
9 Select Committee Repon on Native Reserve Location Bill, A. 22- 1902, Appendix A, . 
Supplementary Report, p. ix. See also Cape Archives Depot (CAD): Native Affairs (NA) 
623 f1965, Information collected for and by SANAC, recorded that the number of 
migrants to Port Elizabeth in 1902 reached 10 077 and came from the following districts: 
Albany, Peddie, King Williamstown, and Victoria East. · 
10 Cape of Good Hope Parliamentary Papers, Blue Books on Native Affairs, G. 24,. 1908, 
p. 41; G. 19- 1909, pp. 67-9. 
11 Cape of Good Hope Parliamentary Papers, Blue Book on Native Affairs for 1904, G. 12-
1905, p. 116. 
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characterised as the most fully proletarianised in the country. 12 
By far the majority of Port Elizabeth's Africans were unskilled workers. Apart from a few who 
did manual work in factories, most of the men worked for the Municipality, Harbour Board and 
merchant stores. The Harbour Board recruited from the large pool of casual labourers according 
to demand which fluctuated seasonally. With the decline in the woolwasheries, very few women 
were employed in industry by the 1900s. Those not engaged as domestic servants resorted to 
informal economic activities such as beer brewing, laundering and hawking in order to 
supplement family incomes. A small African middle class consisted of teachers, ministers clerks, 
interpreters, nurs~s, a few petty traders, and property owners. 
Employment by sector in Port Elizabeth in 1911 was as follows: 
TABLE 2.2 
Employment in Pon Elizabeth in 191 P3 
Whites Blacks 
Sector Male F~male Total Male Female Total 
Professional 533 354 887 89 58 127 
Domestic 200 5319 5519 823 7186 8009 
Commercial 3216 295 3513 2821 14 2835 
Agricultural 222 7 229 805 21 826 
Industrial 2631 609 3240 4014 81 4095 
Totals 6804 6584 13388 8552 7360 15892 
It would seem that these figures do not include the considerable number employed by the 
Municipality, SA Railways & Harbours (formerly Harbour Board) and other employers in the 
service sector. The majority of white women and a fairly large number of black women in the 
domestic category were probably mothers and housewives rather than domestic servants. Port 
Elizabeth did not have the relatively large numbers of black male domestic workers that Durban 
and Johannesburg had. It is significant that workers in industry already outnumbered those 
employed in the commercial sector and that they comprised about a quarter of the economically 
active population. 
12 J. Cherry, 'The Making of an African Working Class: Port Elizabeth 1925-1963'(M.A. 
Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1993), p. 144. 
13 Union of South Africa Parliamentary Papers, Repon of the 1911 Census, U. G.32d -
1912, pp. 886-9, Table XXI. 
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Further impetus to the growth of Port Elizabeth's infant industrial sector resulted from the First 
World War. Small scale manufacturers were able to expand under the stimulus of natural 
protection afforded by the War. 14 Between 191617 and 1920/21 the number of industrial 
establishments increased by 29 (or about 16%) and the workforce by an average of six 
employees per establishment. Unit .Production increased about 78%, whilst the value of total 
output nearly doubled. The city's average annual growth rate of more than 20% in industrial 
employment between 1915/6 and 1919/20 was higher than the national average of 11% per 
annum. 15 The increase in the number of black workers employed in secondary industry during 
the war years exceeded whites by 80%, and was caused not so much by a drain of skilled white 
manpower but the creation of new openings in industry. 16 In 1918/9 the average per capita 
annual wage of £132 earned by white workers was well below the national average, whereas 
the £50 earned by blacks was somewhat higher than the national average of £35. This was 
possibly because wages in certain scheduled occupations in Port Elizabeth's manufacturing sector 
complied with the minimum determined by the Wage Board in terms of the Factories Act of 
1918. 17 
The largest industrial employers in Port Elizabeth at this time were the boot and shoe 
manufacturers. Some 19 tanneries and leatherware factories employed in excess of 1 000 hands 
in 191617. A contemporary brochure which advertised the advantages to industry of locating in 
Port Elizabeth claimed that the city was responsible for more than half of national production, 
and as the pre-eminent local manufacturer of footwear should be dubbed the 'Northampton of 
South Africa'. 18 The importation of new machinery, technology and skills enabled the industry 
to negotiate .the transition from 'bespoked' to mass production and, consequently, to fulfil large 
military contracts and meet increased local demand caused by the war-time disruption of 
14 B. Bozzoli, 'The Origins, Development and Ideology of Local Manufacturing in South 
Africa', Journal of Southern African Studies, 1 (1975), p. 196. 
15 Union of South Africa, Office of Census and Statistics, Special Repon Series: Repon of 
Industries in Pon Elizabeth, 1915116 to 1922123 (Pretoria, 1924?), pp. 1, 2, 11. 
16 A. Grundlingh, Fighting Their Own War: South African Blacks and the First World War 
(Johannesburg, 1987), p. 154. 
17 Central Archives, Pretoria (CeA): Mines and Industries (MNW) 548 3431120, 
Memorandum re Conciliation and Arbitration between Employers and Employees in 
South Africa, Dec. 1920; Union of South Africa, Official Year Book, No.5 -1921, S.P. 
22 - 1922 (Pretoria, 1922), p. 305; Repon of the Economic and Wage Commission, U. G. 
14- 1926, p. 12. 
18 B. Sankey and T.C. White (eds.), The Industrial Facilities and Advantages of Pon 
Elizabeth (Port Elizabeth, 1917), p. 45. 
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imports. 19 In the leather industry certain machines were operated by Coloured labour but skilled 
work that required an apprenticeship was done by Whites. 20 As a rule, skilled and semi-skilled 
positions were occupied by Whites and 'Coloureds' in the manufacturing sector. Port Elizabeth's 
manufacturers preferred a stable workforce which could acquire skills, although it did not 
always pay wages commensurate with these skills. 
The city's merchants were not unqualified supporters of industrial development. They welcomed 
the establishment of primary industry which exploited the country's mineral and other resources, 
but reckoned that Port Elizabeth should remain a trading centre as secondary industry was 
regarded as uneconomical. The merchants were fierce advocates of free trade and had 
disapproved of tariff barriers since increased local production reduced their potential market for 
imports. 21 In 1919, the President of the PE Chamber of Commerce (PECoC) and general 
manager of the merchant firm Mosenthals, H.J. Harraway, criticised the government's 
protectionist policy for having the effect of fostering competition between traders and 
manufacturers. He argued that it was detrimental to the continued progress of the latter and 
appealed, instead, for some sort of partnership between the sectors. He suggested that 
manufacturers should utilise the available storage facilities and distribution networks of 
merchants in marketing their products. 22 Although this statement might be construed as a 
conciliatory gesture, it underlines the unease merchants felt with the increasing competitiveness 
of local manufacturers. Thus, Bozzoli's contention that merchant and manufacturing capital 
constructed a solid partnership during the War appears unfounded in the case of Port 
Elizabeth.23 If anything, the War heightened the level of conflict between these two 'fractions' 
of local capital. 
The revival of commerce after the War threatened to eliminate a number of undercapitalised and 
less competitive businesses in Port Elizabeth. Even the fairly well established industries, such 
as leatherware manufacturers, found themselves hard pressed to compete with the flood of cheap 
European merchandise. The volume and value of imports via Algoa Bay between 1919/20 and 
19 H. Schauder, 'An Economic History of the Boot and Shoe Industry in South Africa', 
South African Journal of Economics, 3 (1935), pp. 518, 523-7. 
20 UNISA, Documentation Centre for African Studies, MIC 5849-53, Abdurahman Papers, 
Evidence of T.C. Whyte to Schweizer Commission, p. 114. 
21 D.J. Conradie, 'Port Elizabeth as Industriesentrum' (Ph.D. thesis, Stellenbosch 
University, 1942), pp. 543-6. 
22 Eastern Province Herald (EPH) 10 June 1919. 
23 B. Bozzoli, The Political Nature of a Ruling Class (London, 1981), pp. 144-6. 
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192011 increased by about 60% and 142% respectively. With the saturation of the local mark..;t 
by imports, manufacturers campaigned for protection of the infant industries developed during 
the War. They developed an ideology which equated manufacturing with patriotism and 
progress, using their political clout to further their economic objectives.24 The newly-
established Board of Trade and Industries (BTl) drafted a new Customs Tariff Act which was 
enacted in 1925 and has been regarded as the high water mark of protectionist legislation. 25 
With protectionist measures designed to encourage local manufacturing and import substitution, 
Port Elizabeth's merchants were forced to rethink their strategies of survival in an increasingly 
regulated market. Robinson notes that: 
... in the 1920s their horizons shifted from promoting local conditions facilitative to their 
own activities to the active encouragement of industrial investment in the town. This new 
policy initiative was obviously also in the merchant's own interests because import and 
export trade would increase with industrial growth, as would local retail demand, 
marketing opportunities and so on. 26 
The consensus about the need of capital investment in the local economy suggests that various 
'fractions' of capital had become interdependent. Parochialism was placed above sectional 
interests and priority was given to industrial development. This Robinson has termed 'place 
entrepreneurialism'. The PECC commissioned the Publicity Association to advertise the 
advantages of industries locating in the city and offered incentives such as a ready supply of 
labour, well situated land, cheap electicity and gas. In 1936 the PECC established a new 
standing committee, the Industrial Development Committee, "whose primary function it is to 
communicate with prospective purchasers of industrial sites, and to offer every assistance in the 
establishment of such enterprises". 27 
Port Elizabeth's claim to be the pre-eminent industrial centre of the future was founded on the 
establishment of motor vehicle assembly plants by the American multi-national companies, Ford 
and General Motors in the mid-1920s. Both expanded from disused wool warehouses to larger 
premises within a few years. By 1929, the combined production of vehicles reached a record 
high and sales peaked at over 20 000 units before the onset of the depression. The motor 
24 Bozzoli, 'Ideology of Local Manufacturing in SA', p. 201. 
25 R. Christie, "'Slim Jannie" and the Forces of Production: South African Industrialization 
1915-1925', University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Seminar Series 
on Southern Africa, V. 8, No. 22 (1976-7), p. 105. 
26 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', p. 168. 
27 Pon Elizabeth: Useful Information and Statistics (1939), p. 14; Conradie, 'PE as 
Industriesentrum', p. 463. 
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companies prided themselves on being able to market vehicles assembled wholly by white 
labour. Although hourly wages were above the minimum levels laid down by the Wage Board, 
average incomes tended to be relatively low due to the the instability of work. With the 
exception of the few skilled workers (eg. mechanics), the non-automated local plants offered 
primarily unskilled or semi-skilled jobs to the increasing number of whites who had left white-
owned farms in Port Elizabeth's hinterland since the beginning of the decade.28 
Port Elizabeth boasted the highest rate of urbanisation in the country during the 1930s.29 The 
population nearly doubled between 1921 and 1936. 
TABLE 2.3 
Population of Port Elizabeth, 1921-195130 
~ Whites Africans CQioureds Asians -IQtal 
1921 24 718 11 448 12 627 1 319 50 112 
1936 48 600 25 800 21 898 2 396 98 694 
1946 58 273 43 699 26 873 3 503 132 348 
1951 65 507 57 737 22 934 3 618 149 796 
Further evidence that the city's African population was considerably more permanent than other 
major urban centres is provided by sexual ratios. By the 1920s the ratio of men to women in 
Port Elizabeth was virtually 1:1 compared to the national average of less than 20% females in 
the urban areas. The pattern of male migrancy in the city did not resemble mining towns like 
Johannesburg nor ports like Durban. 31 Migrants made up a relatively small proportion of the 
population. -The growth rate of Africans for the thirty year period shown in Table 2.3 far 
exceeded that of other populations. Despite this, Africans only became the largest group in the 
city's population during the 1950s when opportunities for employment in the industrial sector 
increased significantly. Whites thus remained the largest population group in Port Elizabeth 
during our study period. 
28 Adler, 'The Automobile Industry', pp. 14-16. 
29 Cherry, 'The Making of an African Working Class', p. 8. 
30 Sources include the following: Census Report for 1923, U.G. 37-1924, and the Returns 
of the Electoral Officer, PE for 1946 and 1951 in Intermediate Archives Depot (lAD): 
PE Town Clerk's Files, 25/196, Census and Statistics, No. 3 (Aug. 1938- May 1955); 
Robinson, 'Power of Apartheid', p. 285 Table 8.1. 
31 Cf. figures for PE, Cape Town, Durban and the Reef in Census Reportsfor 1911, pp. 
89-93 Table XVII, Return of Population: Urban Centres; 1921, U.G. 15 - 1923. J. 
Wells, We Now Demand! The History of Women's Resistance to Pass Laws in South 
Africa (Johannesburg, 1993), p. 23. 
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It has been shown that of South Africa's major industrial centres, Port Elizabeth had the highest 
percentage of white labour between the mid-1920s and -1940s. The percentage of white 
labourers in industry rose from 52% in 1925/6 to 65% in 1935/6 and then declined to 49% in 
1945/6- as opposed to the national average of 36%, 40% and 32% for the same years.32 The 
most dramatic growth during the depression years was of white women. By the mid-1930s, 
women comprised about 37% of the white workers and 22,5% of the total workforce in the 
factories. The relatively high percentages of white workers in industry reflected a broader 
demographic trend that was changing the composition and character of Port Elizabeth's 
population. The number of Afrikaans-speakers increased from 20% in 1918 to 36,4% in 1936, 
and had reached 38,7% of the total white population by 1946.33 The perception of factory 
owners that as much as 90% of their labourers were Afrikaans-speakers was not far off the 
mark. 34 Most of these were employed as unskilled workers in the motor and footwear 
industries. As the 'heartland of poor whiteism in the Cape Midlands' (to borrow Freund's 
phrase),35 Port Elizabeth provides a good example of the workings of the 'civilised labour 
policy'. 
The drought in Port Elizabeth's hinterland in the early 1930s caused a massive influx - of 
Whites and Africans alike - to the city. However, only the former were partly cushioned from 
the ravages of the Depression. Whites were often employed in jobs previously held by Africans, 
albeit at low wages. Africans were precluded from any government or divisional council relief 
work. A total of 644 out of 2 131 adult able-bodied New Brighton male residents were 
unemployed in 1931.36 In the entire district area an estimated 2 000 were out of work. Given 
the existiing levels of dependency, a total of at least six times that were without any means 
whatsoever. Pauper rations were provided by the Cape Provincial Administration and distributed 
by the local Magistrate to 'deserving cases'. 37 Private aid to ameliorate the widespread distress 
took the form of a food kitchen in New Brighton and the work of the Bantu Relief Committee 
32 Cherry, 'The Making of an African Working Class', p. 25. 
33 H.O. Terblanche, 'Die Armblanke-Vraagstuk in Port Elizabeth, 1916-1934', Paper 
presented to the Conference on 'Port Elizabeth's Place in South African History and 
Historiography', Vista University, Port Elizabeth, 1992, pp. 4-14 and Robinson, 'The 
Power of Apartheid', p. 252, Table 7.5. 
34 Conradie, 'Port Elizabeth as Industriesentrum', p. 271. 
35 W. Freund, 'The Social Character of Secondary Industry in South Africa, 1915-1945' 
in A. Mabin (ed.), Organisation and Economic Change (Johannesburg, 1989), p. 111, 
n. 81. 
36 PE Municipality, Mayors' Minute 1931, p. 9. 
37 CAD: 3/PEZ 1/1634, Letter from TC, PE to Prov. Sec. 18 May and reply of 26 May 
1931; Minutes of the NAC, 10 July 1931. 
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sponsored by the PE Joint Council. 38 During 1931-2, the PECC provided ad hoc relief work 
for little more than a hundred Africans at rates which were half the current minimum wage. 39 
Typically, the sum voted for unemployment relief was charged to the Native Revenue Account, 
which was already in deficit, rather than to General Rates. 40 The PECC claimed that it was 
already hard pressed to assist with Government-subsidised unemployment schemes for Whites 
and Coloureds. It rejected the repatriation of Africans to their rural homes as a11. impractical and 
inadequate long-term solution to the unemployment problem. 41 
After the Depression, investor confidence in the local economy was revived following the 
expansion of the motor and ancillary industries. The location of both local and international 
manufacturers of component parts like tyres and glass in the city boosted production in an 
increasingly competitive vehicle market. Investment was considered safe and the margins of 
profit on capital outlays reportedly good. Foreign capital still purportedly accounted for more 
than half of the investment in local industry. Apart from the American motor companies, and 
British investment in assorted food, drink, confectionary establishments, an increasing amount 
of local capital was being reinvested in further industrial development. 42 The estimated total 
fixed capital investment for ground, buildings, machinery and fixtures in 193617 amounted to 
£2 957 660. From a pre-Depression high of £113 182 000, Port Elizabeth's gross industrial 
production fell to £90 948 000 in 1932/3, but rose to a record £175 765 000 in 193617!3 The 
price of land and services, and scale of investment in overheads, made Port Elizabeth's 
industries relatively cost effective and profitable compared to other centres. 44 Yet, Port 
Elizabeth's share amounted to a mere 3, 8% of national capital investment in industry in the late 
1930s. 
Port Elizabeth's variegated pattern of employment, and especially the non-dependence on cheap 
38 University of the Witwatersrand, Rheinallt Jones Papers, AD 1433 Cp 5.1, Letter from 
Sec. PE Joint Council to Rheinallt Jones, 12 Aug. 1932. 
39 CAD, 3/PEZ 111280, Reports of the Loc. Supt., 24 Sept. 1931 and 17 March 1932; 
3/PEZ 111634, Minutes of Finance Committee, 19 Feb. and Departmental Circular No. 
317, 25 Feb. 1932. 
40 CAD: 3 PEZ 111280, Report of the Location Superintendent, 30 June 1032. 
41 CAD: 3/PEZ 113/2/5/6, Letter from Asst. Native Commissioner to TC, PE, 27 July 
1932 with comments by Location Superintendent, 3 Aug. 1932. 
42 Conradie, 'PEas Industriesentrum', pp. 539-543, 550. 
43 Union of South Africa, Official Yearbook, No. 20 (Pretoria, 1938), p. 915. 
44 Conradie, 'PEas Industriesentrum', pp. 534-7. 
22 
African labour, made it fairly typical of this early phase of secondary industrialisation. 45 Less 
than half the city's registered employees were involved in manufacturing. Nearly 60% of these 
were Whites, with Africans and Coloureds comprising 21% and 18% of the workforce, 
respectively. The largest employer, the motor assembly plants, had a total of 2 139 workers, 
of whom a staggering 92% were white. Relatively high numbers of Coloured workers were 
employed in factories producing foods and drinks, leather goods and clothing. But aside from 
these and a number of semi-skilled Coloured workers, the racial division of labour in Port 
Elizabeth's industries was little different from the rest of the country. The following Table 
shows the occupations of all Africans under 18 years of age in 1938. 
TABLE 2.4 
OCCUPATIONS OF AFRICANS IN PORT ELIZABETH 193/r 
Occupation Resident within PEM Resident outside PEM 
Males Females Males Females Imal 
Professional 52 22 
Clerical 15 
Trade & industry 3 885 16 
Domestic service 887 3 091 
Municipal 1 546 17 
Railways 1 350 26 
Self-employed 176 35 
Scholars 1 828 2 072 
Unemployed 3 528 7 599* 
Others 225 33 
13 561 12 885 

















The majority of economically active Africans were employed in the service sector - if this 
category is taken to include those employed by the Municipality and SAR&H, as well as 
domestic service. The distribution of Africans in the various industrial sectors of the economy 
is unknown. The unemployment rate appears high, but this category probably included 'casual' 
workers. The local authority provided no indication of what it deemed to be the 'reasonable' 
45 Freund, 'Social Character of Secondary Industrialisation', pp. 79-80; Cherry, 'Making 
of an African Working Class', p. 16. 
46 lAD, 251196 No. 3, Occupational Statistics (Form 'C'), Oct. 1938. 
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labour requirements of the Port Elizabeth area. 47 
At the end of the Second World War, Port Elizabeth was still the country's premier commercial 
wool centre. It exported 37% of the annual wool clip, most of which was not processed on 
account of the absence of wool combing, spinning, weaving and production plants. The 
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) sought to promote import substitution by developing. 
manufacturing processes locally. At this time, European textile firms were looking to relocate 
production facilities from high-labour cost areas and the IDC was prepared to subsidise joint 
ventures with foreign investors. Port Elizabeth was an obvious site for the establishment of the 
wool processing industry. One such enterprise, Industex, an industrial fabric producer owned 
by South Africans and Belgians, established a plant in 1949. Within five years, an entirely new 
industrial sector had developed in Port Elizabeth. 48 
Meanwhile, Port Elizabeth continued to attract investment in ancillary and vehicle component 
manufacturing industries. In 1947 General Tire (sic) opened a new factory on the edge of New 
Brighton. This together with expansion at Firestone, made Port Elizabeth the largest tyre and 
rubber manufacturing centre in the country. In addition, the two glass manufacturers, 
Shatterprufe and Armourplate, both moved into much larger premises with greater productive 
potential the following year. Even more important to the development of the local economy was 
the continued expansion of the motor industry itself. In the post-war boom, both Ford and GM 
acquired new plants and launched major expansion programmes following the introduction of 
conveyor belts and other automated features. Adler dismisses the assertion that the motor 
industry pioneered the transition from manufacture to machinofacture, 49 and describes the local 
assembly lines as labour-intensive operations. Unlike their American counterparts where the 
system of mass production was based on the strict division between technical and manual labour, 
'Fordist' production techniques were only adopted from the 1950s and this coincided with the 
erosion, rather than the strengthening of the white monopoly on employment. 50 
The transformation of the labour process increased the regularity and routinisation of 
employment in the motor industry. The improved supply of knocked-down (CKD) kits and an 
47 lAD, 25/196 No. 3, Report of Supt. NBL, 22 Oct. 1938 and Minutes of NAC, 25 Oct. 
1938 and 27 Nov. 1939. 
48 Adler, 'The Automobile Industry', pp. 18-19. 
49 R. Davies, Capital, State and White Labour in South Africa, 1900-1960 (Brighton, 
1979), pp. 203-208. 
50 Adler, 'The Automobile Industry', p. 42 n. 64. 
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increasing range of models with built-in obsolescence ironed out some of the irregularities in 
production. Workers were expected to clock up 40 to 46 hours for a 5-day week, with an annual 
paid vacation over the Christmas period, when the industry shut down. These changes 
necessitated a shift in the type of labour required in the industry. Where previously labour needs 
could be met by the large supply of seasonal white labour from farms in Port Elizabeth's 
hinterland, in the post-war period the steady all-year round flow of production required the 
constant engagement of workers. Improved opportunities and the availability of technical 
training made it possible for white workers to obtain supervisory or skilled positions, rather than 
have to work on the assembly lines. By contrast, employment in automobile plants rated as the 
highest paid industrial work available to blacks. Although racial categories of employment were 
not legislated, informal job reservation had been practised in Port Elizabth. In the 1950s, 
however, the established pattern whereby the motor industry had been the virtual preserve of 
Whites (especially males) had begun to break down, as was the case in other manufacturing 
sectors.51 
Cherry has argued that Port Elizabeth's early emphasis on white industrial labour, and the later 
preference for coloured labour, meant that Africans were only integrated into semi-skilled and 
skilled positions from the 1950s, and to a lesser extent than elsewhere. Yet, at the same time, 
the stable nature of the African working class made possible ·certain gains in wage levels, 
especially in those industrial sectors which were reliant on unskilled labour. The textile industry, 
for instance, changed from a preponderantly white to coloured workforce, with a small number 
of Africans employed in semi-skilled positions. The food and canning industry began to employ 
a significant number of Africans - including a considerable proportion of women. But these 
were the exceptions to the general race/skills division in Port Elizabeth's industries. By and 
large, Africans were employed in unskilled positions, particularly in the service sector during 
the period under review. In short, the workforce was divided fairly rigidly into skilled and semi-
skilled white and Coloured labour, and unskilled African labour. 52 
The Local State in Port Elizabeth and its Policy towards Africans 
It is not my intention to attempt a general exposition of the nature of the South African state nor 
of relations between the central and local states. Suffice it to say, I do not regard the central 
state as an instrument of specific capitalist interests, nor the local state simply an agent of urban 
51 Adler, 'The Automobile Industry', pp. 24-25. 
52 Cherry, 'The Making of an African Working Class', pp. 17, 29-30. 
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capital. 53 It is necessary to analyse and disaggregate the various interest groups in order to 
understand the influence they brought to bear on decision-making by local authorities. This 
entails examining the "locally dominant classes, their political configurations and alliances, and 
their economic interests" .54 Precisely because the local state was not a monolithic power bloc, 
the interests of the Subordinate classes should also be taken into account. The changing character 
of the local state was a major determinant of the PECC's policies towards the African 
population. 
Port Elizabeth was upgraded from a town to a city in 1913. Before the 1920s, the Council was 
. ,...-
dominated by merchants and PECoC had been a powerful lobby. Thereafter, this position was 
challenged by a new alliance between commercial and manufacturing capital. The Midland 
Chamber of Commerce (MCC) and the Midland Chamber of Industries (MCI) lobbied for their 
respective sectors but often spoke with one voice. Although the Council was always dominated 
._.:_ ----,_- ---~-·-
by businessmen with independent means, more and more professionals won election from the 
1940s. Perhaps the best known of this group· was Mrs May Holland. 55 She served alongside 
me~~hants such as J.S. ~OuJ:!_g,. and Adolf Schauder, industrialists like T.C. White, and other 
stalwarts of the Council. The election of trade unionist, Mrs Katie Gelvan (nee Viljoen) and two 
Communist Party members, M.M. Desai and E.T. Dietrich, in the 1940s reflected the 
emergence of a sizeable working class constituency. They represented w~ds which consisted 
mainly of unskilled white workers, Coloureds, Indians and Africans. But while white workers 
obtained a greater say in Council matters, black people were increasingly excluded. 
/ 
The local state had to negotiate the competing pressures of all parties with an interest in policies 
towards Port Elizabeth's African population. These comprised functionaries of both the local 
authority (municipal officials, location administrators, etc.) and of the central state (magistrates, 
the police, etc.) based in the town. Given the dualism in the administration of urban Africans 
[see Chapter 4 for more details], the former were answerable to both the local and central states. 
As employees of an elected council, municipal officials had also to be responsive to the interests 
53 There has been little theoretical work on the local state in the South African context. An 
exception is P. Wilkinson, 'The 'Local State' as a Conceptual Problem: An Exploration 
of Some Recent Marxist Work', Paper presented to the Workshop on African Urban Life 
in Durban in the Twentieth Century, University of Natal, Durban, 1983. 
54 B. Bozzoli, 'Introduction' to B. Bozzoli (ed.), Town and Countryside in the Transvaal 
(Johannesburg, 1983), p. 39. 
55 See PE Publicity Association, Pon Elizabeth: City of Industry (Port Elizabeth, 1934) and 
Appendix C for biographical sketches of CUrs mentioned in this paragraph. 
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of white ratepayers and local industrial or commercial concerns. 56 The Council, too, had its 
own institutional interests. For instance, it had a vested interest in retaining direct control over 
the number of workers accommodated and employed within its area of jurisdiction which did 
not necessarily correlate with that of local capital. Thus, the divergence of interests between 
local state institutions and locally dominant classes went some way to ensuring that policy 
towards Africans in Port Elizabeth was not shaped by a single party. 
The PECC had at least two identifiable 'factions' during our period: the self-styled 
'humanitarians' and the 'budget watchdogs'. 57 Spokespersons for the latter group included Cllrs 
Young and White. They advised financial stringency and contributed to the PECC's reputation 
for parsimoniousness, especially in respect of its management of the NRA. The former were 
represented by Cllrs Schauder and Holland who dominated the Native Affairs Committee (NAC) 
during the 1940s. These representives of the local 'liberal' ideology set the tone of Council 
' 
policy with respect to 'native affairs'. Their 'liberalism' was more of th6 pragmatic than 
principled type. In the popular imagination, 'liberalism' was regarded as being synonomous with 
such qualities as a sense of 'fair play' and justice. These typically British characteristics 
constituted part of the colonial legacy of Port Elizabeth. Demographic factors and active 
propaganda ensured that local English speakers retained strong ties and identified as much with 
Britain, usually referred to as 'home', as their country of adoption. This was reflected in the 
composition and workings of Council. Proceedings and all correspondence was conducted in 
English until the 1960s. Although the majority of Port Elizabeth's white population throughout 
our period were English speakers, the changing composition of the city's population had 
important consequences for the political character of the Council. 58 
We have seen that Afrikaans-speaking poor whites moved to Port Elizabeth in growing numbers 
from the 1920s. Many were housed in racially-mixed slums before obtaining Council housing 
in Kensington, Holland Park, Sidwell and Southdene. 59 Whilst these white Afrikaners acquired 
..... ·- ·- - -- - _........ .. ~ -· 
the municipal franchise, Colol!r¢s were deprived thereof. The conversion from monthly to 
weekly tenancies in Schauderville, the Council housing scheme, effectively deprived Coloured 
occupants of the vote. 60 By the late 1940s, the number of Afrikaans-speaking ratepayers had 
56 Posel, Making of Apanheid, p. 263. 
57 Evening Post 27 Feb. 1953. 
58 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', p. 250-1. 
59 Anon., 'New Life for 30 000 Slum-dwellers', SA Panorama, 2, 1 (1957), pp. 4-5. 
60 Kramer v. Port Elizabeth Revision Court, 30 November 1945; Cape Times 1 Dec. 1945 
('Voting Rights of Municipal Tenants'). 
27 
increased sufficiently to represent voting blocs in certain wards. The local pro-Nationalist 
Afrik:aans-language newspaper, Die Oosterlig, became a daily by 1948,61 and the city had its 
first Afrikaans-speaking mayor in 1950. By this time, the balance of power within the Council 
was beginning to shift away from the group representing the local 'liberal' ideology. 62 
_ Councillors with a more conservative mindset challenged the previous consensus with regard to 
'native affairs'. 
Council elections were not fought on party lines although the political affiliations of certain 
candidates were common knowledge. The outcome of Legislative Assembly elections provides 
some indication of the state of local politics. Voting by Port Elizabeth's white population tended 
to be along lines of language and class. The Unionist Party- with its English support base- won 
seats in all the elections before the merger with the South African Party (SAP) in 1921. Labour 
Party candidates usually made a reasonable showing in the two urban constituencies as they had 
' some working class support. The Nationalist Party (NP) only contested PE North (later Three 
Rivers), a partly rural and working class constituency which included North End, Karsten, New 
Brighton and the farming districts to the north of the city. All three constituencies were fairly 
safe SAP seats between the 1921 and 1934. In the 1938 Election, the 'Purified' NP was runner-
up to the United Party in the PE North and PE District seats - which together corresponded 
roughly to the former Three Rivers constituency. 63 Although the UP remained politically 
ascendant in Port Elizabeth until1953, there was growing support for the NP amongst the local 
electorate. 
Port Elizabeth's black voters tended to vote with their more liberal English-speaking 
counterparts. Although the city had more registered African voters than other Eastern C:!pe 
towns,64 they comprised less than 10% of the local electorate. The extension of the vote to 
white women in 1930 dramatically reduced the percentage of black voters, with the 1 065 
African voters in the city comprising 4,5% of the total voters in 1932. 
61 A. Appel, Die Oosterlig 1937-1948: 'n pershistorie studie (Port Elizabeth, 1985). 
62 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', pp. 251-2, Table 7.5. 
63 This synopsis of voting patterns based on election results in H.O. Terblanche, 'Die 
Afrikaner in Port Elizabeth, 1902-1937: 'n Kultuurhistoriese ondersoek' (D.Phil. thesis, 
UPE, 1993), passim. · 
64 V. Klein, 'African responses in the Eastern Cape to Hertzog's Representation of Natives 
Bill' (B.A. Hans. Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1978), Appendices A and B. 
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TABLE 2.5 
PORT ELIZABETH VOIERS 1930 AND 193z» 
PE North PE Central PE South 
..... -- --. ·--- .. -· -- ----- 123Q 1232. 1230 1232 123Q 1932 
White males 1 817 2 596 3 908 3 822 3 374 3 849 
White females 2 403 4 199 3 952 
Africans 2 066 830 140 91 250 144 
Indians 25 27 83 72 101 97 
Malays 2 4 10 13 78 111 
Coloureds __jJ!J. 422 _3M 301 538 _ill 
Total 4 482 6 352 4 360 8 584 4 341 8 664 
The Native Representative Act of 1936 removed African voters from the Cape's common roll. 
Only 1 449 out of an estimated 25 000 Africans in the city were eligible to vote in terms of the 
Act in 1942.66 Port Elizabeth was a portion of a large constituency embracing the entire Eastern 
Cape. Although the representative, Margaret Ballinger was an able and high profile liberal, she 
fought valiantly but unsuccessfully in Parliament to safeguard the interests of the region's 
African population. 67 
Fewer Port Elizabethans of all races were· registered on the municipal than the national voters 
rolls. I have no statistics which provide a racial breakdown of municipal voters but Africans 
were clearly in the minority. Although the Cape municipal franchise was colour-blind, it 
stipulated that voters had to either own property with a rateable value in excess of £100 or 
occupy property to the value of £200. The Korsten removals which commenced in the late 
1930s, deprived the last remaining African property owners in Port Elizabeth of the vote. As 
municipal tenants, New Brighton residents did not qualify because the value of dwellings was 
insufficient. 68 Calls to accord Africans direct representation on the PECC by the granting of 
65 Government Gazettes of 21 Feb. 1931 and 23 Sept. 1932; Terblanche, 'Die Afrikaner 
in Port Elizabeth', pp. 484, 493. 
66 Government Gazette, No. 3080, 24 July 1942, p. 172; CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/11, Memo 
Supt. NBL to NAC, 20 Nov. 1943. 
67 M. Ballinger, From Union to Apanheid (Johannesburg, 1969), pp. 147-8; F. Mouton, 
'Margaret Ballinger, Opponent of Apartheid or Collaborator?', SA Historical Journal, 
23 (1992), pp. 136-153. 
68 E. Hellman, 'Urban Areas' in Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa (Cape Town, 
1949), p. 265. 
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seats to one or more members of the Native Advisory Board were to no avail. 69 As at national 
level, Port Elizabeth's Africans became increasingly powerless as they were denied 
representation on the local authority. 
The fact that the UP was politically ascendant in Port Elizabeth did not necessarily translate into 
co-operation with the UP Government before 1948. Attempts by the central state to enforce 
greater uniformity with respect to urban African administration met with little co-operation from 
the PECC. Humphries has argued that while there was a large degree of consensus between 
municipal officials and the Native Affairs Department, there was conflict between the larger, 
UP-controlled municipalities and the N AD over aspects of policy towards urban Africans in the 
1940s. After 1948, the NP Government claimed that UP controlled municipalities were more 
interested in satisfying the labour needs of industrialists than in implementing state policy. 70 
Conflicts between the local and central states over urban policy were not simply the outcome 
of the former identifying with opposition party political positions. Robinson holds that such 
conflicts can best be explained with reference to the fragmented nature of the South African 
state, to conflicts between and within state institutions, and between local and central state 
apparatuses. 71 
Local authorities were accorded considerable autonomy with respect to 'native affairs'. The 
~ its role in urban areas principally as a facilitator between these authoriti";; and their 
African populations. Ye.t. in some respects, local authorities served as a~n~f the NAD: firs!, 
the ~pted r~sponsihility_tQ_prmddeits . .AJric~ ~pulation with ~ential se~ 
housing and. financial management in common with its responsibility to render such services tO-
call rate~ers; sec~lYJ:.-a se)2arate_municipal department assum~ . . . r township ·-----adl!l_inistratiotnrfiolabour regulation. The provision of services such as water, sewerage, refuse 
removal, roads, transport, and health care were assigned to the relevant municipal departments. 
In addition, a specific municipal department assumed responsibility for the provision of housing 
in townships under its jurisdiction. The municipal treasurer was required to keep a separate 
Native Revenue Account (NRA) that comprised all income and expenditure relating to 'native 
affairs' . 72 
69 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/8, Minutes of the NBAB, 12 December 1933; EPH 4 June 1940. 
70 R. Humphries, 'The Origins and Subsequent Development of the Administration Boards' 
(M.A. Thesis, Rhodes University), pp. 66, 69-70. 
71 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', p. 145. 
72 S. Bekker and R. Humphries, From Control to Confusion: The changing role of 
Administration Boards in South Africa, 1971-1983 (Pietermaritzburg, 1985), pp. 16-17. 
r--.... 
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The NAD had no cause to assume direct responsibility for urban Africans after 1923 nor any 
reason to challenge the autonomy of local authorities. Instead, it sought to implement central 
state policies by securing the consent or acquiescence of at least three key sets of actors: 
employers of urban African labour; Africans living and seeking work in the cities; and the 
municipal administrators of its policy. 73 Any opposition by the first two parties to government 
policy could be defused. Although there was conflict between the NAD and the municipalities 
over specific issues, it was not of the order to suggest that interests were irreconciliable. The 
reasons for this were threefold: First, the NAD arguably lacked the capacity to ensure effective 
control of urban Africans without the co-operation of the municipalities. Secondly, the 
municipalities had discretionary powers in administering African townships, albeit subject to 
broad policy guidelines from the NAD established in legislation and stipulated in circulars. 
Thirdly, relations between the local authorities and the NAD gave the latter no reason to end 
municipal jurisdiction. 74 Only in the 1950s when balance of power between the central and 
' 
local state shifted in favour of the former, did it intervene in order to ensure compliance with 
its policies. 
The development of coherent policies towards urban Africans by local authorities was 
determined largely by the appropriation of the ideology of segregation. Dubow characterises 
segregation as "primarily a defensive strategy aimed at consolidating white supremacy in the 
face of the challenge posed by the emergence of an African proletariat" .75 The principal 
function of state ideology is to legitimate the exercise of power. Thus the ideology of 
segregation was concerned to legitimate white supremacy and preserve the racial character of 
the South African state. In Port Elizabeth, the implementation of an administrative ideology of 
urban segregation was not wit.iout its contradictions. 
~During the first two decades of this century the ideology of segregation became a dominanf 
discourse. Public health concerns found expression in the rhetoric of the 'sanitation syndrome r 
y.'~ch held the proximity of los:ations tg_whit~_r~sLde.ll.ticd_jtfeas to be a JlOk(ny.i~l heal_th ha~ .·• 
_Pressure was brought to bear on the authorities to relocate location residents. Such concerns 
-c ~ -- I 
were amplified by periodic outbreaks of contagious diseases such as bubonic plague (1901-2), 
+ ' ' 
73 D. Posel, The Making of Apanheid, 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise (Oxford, 
1991), p. 149. 
74 Bekker and Humphries, From Control to Confusion, p. 2. 
75 S. Dubow, Racial segregation and the origins of apanheid in South Africa (Basingstroke, 
1989), p. 180. 
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1 
nfluenza ( 1918), as well as the wid~~re_ad..pr_evalence of tuberculosis. Swanson has suggested \ __ _:_ -~ ---- . 
afin the first instance unreasonablrle~rs- were orchestrated by the propertied class to secure 1 
e relocation of Africans to the locations of Ndabeni and~_ Brighton, Q!!!IDde of Cape Tawn 
i 
{~Port Elizabeth respectively. 76 Although undertaken at tbe_ltehest of e central state , the 
\l_ocal tate - counci rs as_well a · · al and health officials - wa 
t movals. =------------1 
(i Responses to the threat posed by disease were two-fold: pre~tive measur.es to contain its 
j{ \ spread and intet:y_~ntionist measures authorising local health officers to d · . ){f!\ 
•· ' • ) ~ants ~unsuitable dwellings. The first of these measures was embodied in the PutitJc . 
H~hempo~e~red~th~e~ce~rnL~~~~~~~~QU~~~~ 
~~~Jrnwru~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~LM~XW~~LY~~~ 
bqdg~ The Housing Act of 1920 and the Slums Act of 1934 made the municipaliti s 
~ 
/ responsible for the_pro.Y~sing_for those..reseU}ed, for which they could obtain Centra: 
i ..Ho.using..B~funds. These provisions were seldom inv~ because th~ __ enormous fina~ 
; burden on the municipalities caused considerable.PJ2VQSition theJ:ettt; The PECC, however, was 
to avail itself of these provisions and undertake extensive suh::economic housing schemes for all 
. -
~Chapter for details]. 
~~920s and the 1950s, the ideology of segregation attained hegemony amongs~ thry 
. ~white ruling classes and the concern for social control became paramount within tfie ~ 
There were two major poles of thinking vis-a-vis the urban African during these years. These 
were not diametrically opposing ideologies as both started from the premise that white 
domination was non-negotiable. Rather, they amounted to competing strategies for solving 'the 
urban problem'. On the one hand, there was the view that urban Africans were 'temporary 
sojourners' in the white man's cities for as long as their labour was required. Known as 
'Stallardism', 78 it propounded the view that Africans should not have an unconditional right to 
live in urban areas. On the other hand, it was argued that the demands of industrialisation meant 
that Africans had to be accepted as permanent residents. First propounded by the Inter-
Departmental Pass Laws (Godley) Committee in 1922, it was given its fullest expression in the 
76 M. Swanson, 'The sanitation syndrome: bubonic plague and urban native policy in the 
Cape Colony, 1900-1909', Journal of African History, 18 (1977}, pp. 387-410. · 
77 My periodisation is based on P. May lam, 'The Rise and Decline of Urban Apartheid in 
South Africa', African Affairs, 89, 354 (1990), pp. 57-84. 
78 Shorthand for the principles annunciated by the Transvaal Local Government 
Commission, 1921, TP 1/1922, chaired by Colonel C.F. Stallard. 
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Fagan Report of 1948 which proposed that labour bureaux should be created in order to co-
ordinate and regulate the flow of labour to the towns.79 
f 
Th.e key legislation for this period was the 1923 Natives (Urb. an Areas.) Act, and its subsequent 
1 
;:tmendments._80 Because jt was enabling legislation, _municipalities were able _to apply_ its _. 
,., provisions in toto or in part. In 1924 the NAD had drawn up a set of 'Model Regulations' for 
the administration of locations based on the provisions of the Act. In a circular to urban local 
authorities which accompanied these regulations it was stated that: 
There will . . . be no objection to the introduction into the model a series of such 
amendments, additions or modifications as the local authority may deem necessary to 
meet local conditions which will be carefully and sympathetically considered by the 
Department in the scrutiny of regulations. 81 
The Location Superintendent preferred uniformity in location administration to the 'local option' 
which he described as "each Municipality seemingly being a law unto itself". 82 He saw the 
i 
legislation making a considerable improvement in the condition and administration of 'native 
affairs' in general. But the Superintendent and the Council itself wished to continue with certain 
irregular administrative features in New Brighton such as the system of domestic beer brewing 
[described in Chapter 6]. Their determination to achieve this end caused considerable delay in 
obtaining the Government approval for proposed regulations. Although conforming broadly to 
the Urban Areas Act, New Brighton's administration retained some peculiar features [see 
Chapter 4]. 
The PECC embraced a 'Faganist' rather than a 'Stallardist' version of the ideology of 
. segregation and guarded its autonomy from the central state rather jealously. This_ is apparent 
on a number of counts. For one thing, the objections of the PECC to certain provisions of the 
Urban Areas Act which delayed its implementation for nearly a decade suggests a reluctance to 
embrace its terms unreservedly. Secondly, the erection of housing schemes in New Brighton in 
79 Posel, Making of Apanheid, p. 49; A. Stadler, The political economy of modem South 
Africa (Cape Town, 1987), pp. 91-2. 
80 This has been extensively discussed in the literature. See T.R.H. Davenport, 'African 
Townsmen? South African Natives (Urban Areas) Legislation through the Years', African 
Affairs, 68, 271 (1969), pp. 95-109; 'The Triumph of Colonel Stallard: The 
Transformation of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act between 1923 and 1937', SA Historical 
Journal, 2 (1970), pp. 77-96; 'The Beginnings of Urban Segregation in South Africa: 
the Natives (Urban Areas) Act and its Background', ISER, Rhodes University, 1971. 
81 CAD, 3/PEZ 11725, NAD Circular No. 2111313 re Urban Areas Act, 21 July 1924. 
82 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/1, Memo of Loc. Supt. re Urban Areas Act, 27 Jan. 1927; 
Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', p. 207. 
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the late 1920s and 1930s implied recognition of the permanency of the African population. 
Although security of tenure was not granted, the frequent debates in Council indicates that the 
'liberal' lobby regarded it as a serious proposal. Thirdly, key municipal officials in Port 
Elizabeth regarded the Native Advisory Board as a possible step in the direction of self-
government for New Brighton residents. And, fmally, the PECC showed an unwillingness to 
implement influx control measures for reasons which will be examined in some detail below. 
Influx control in Port Elizabeth, c.l934-1953 
We noted in the Introduction the existence of a Xhosa song which celebrated the absence of pass 
laws in Port Elizabeth. This possibly reflected popular perceptions amongst the local African 
populace. The seemingly steadfast pursuit of an independent course of action with respect to 
influx control by the PECC won acclaim from visitors to the city. In 1947 the Rev. H.P. Junod 
of the Penal Reform League observed that: 
Port Elizabeth is an island in an ocean of petty repression that is the rest of the Union. 
You have no pass laws, no registration and you are providing your Natives with model 
housing.83 
Not only visitors, but the PECC congratulated itself on its exemplary treatment of its African 
population. In 1951 the Chairman of the NAC was reported to have remarked that "since Port 
Elizabeth is the only big city without passes for Africans, we are really an object lesson to the 
world". 84 This view persisted until the 1952 New Brighton riots, when the combination of 
coercion from the central state and the changing balance of power in the Council itself, caused 
the PECC to abandon its previously 'progressive' standpoint on influx control. 
The central state's intervention in the labour market, aimed at overriding the logic of supply and 
demand so as to ensure adequate supplies of labour to agricultural and mining sectors, came to 
be opposed by industry. Hindson has queried the emphasis of the revisionists on urban 
industry's long-standing dependence on cheap, unskilled labour. With the growth of a more 
capital intensive manufacturing sector, employers experienced an additional and growing need 
for a stable and semi-skilled African workforce. Accordingly, he has argued that the 
differentiated demand for African labour was reflected in state policy which increasingly became 
geared towards balancing the requirements of different capitalist sectors for either stabilised or 
migrant labour. Thus, influx control is explained as a means of satisfying urban industrialists' 
83 Cited in South Africa Outlook, 1 December 1947, p. 188. 
84 The Guardian, 15 March 1951, p. 4 ('PE Rejects Pass Laws for Africans'). 
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interest in the reproduction of differentiated forms of African labour power in the cities. 85 Pml!l 
reckons that explaining the differentiated labour market solely in terms of the interests of 
manufacturing capital and state institutions amounts to an instrumentalist view of the state. It 
presumes that local authorities had no institutional self-interests, ignores that they may have 
applied influx control measures in such a way to meet regionally specific labour demands, and 
also fails to consider how African resistance may have shaped the implementation of influx 
control. 86 
We have already seen that in the case of Port Elizabeth, urban capital constituted a powerful 
pressure group in influencing local state policy. Lobbies such as the MCI frequently let it be 
known that they were opposed to regulation of the labour market. On the other hand, there were 
interest groups who opposed unrestricted access of Africans to the city for fear that this would 
be accompanied by an increase of unemployment and its attendant social evils. These included 
(white) ratepayers associations; the law enforcement authorities, especially the SA Police; and 
municipal officials. In the face of these contradictory pressures, the PECC's response vacillated 
during the two decades under discussion. The policies with respect to influx control were far 
more ambiguous than has previously been depicted. 
Davenport holds that control over African influx was not an important feature of the Urban 
Areas Act, and no special machinery was provided for enforcing it. 87 It did, however, make 
provision for the implementation of rudimentary mechanisms of influx control through the issue 
and inspection of registration certificates. The PECC introduced these provisions in tandem with 
the application of the Urban Areas Act. As from 1 March 1934, workseekers in Port Elizabeth 
were to be in possession of either a temporary residence permit or a work permit obtainable 
from the local Magistrate. In the event that neither was granted, they had recourse to the council 
and, failing that, to the Minister of Native Affairs. 88 
It soon became apparent that the provisions could only be enforced in New Brighton where the 
necessary administrative apparatus and personnel existed. Thus about two-thirds of Port 
Elizabeth's African population were effectively excluded from the purview of these measures. 
85 D. Hindson, Pass Controls and the Urban African Proletariat in South Africa 
(Johannesburg, 1987). 
86 Posel, Making of Apanheid, pp. 15-18 and passim. 
87 T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History (Johannesburg, 1987), p. 555. 
88 Government Gazette, Proclamation No. 25, 1934. 
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In his evidence to the Young-Barrett Committee in 1935, the city's Superintendent of Natives 
expostulated, 
The difficulty here in Port Elizabeth is in enforcing the provisions of that section [i.e. 
5(6) of Act 21 of 1923] and it is also difficult to visualise just how any further laws 
created to control influx; could be enforced without introducing the pass system of the 
northern provinces. The Cape natives are not likely to stafid for that system. _ 
He recommended, instead, the creation of a labour bureau under the supervision of Native 
Commissioners to be administered in conjunction with the NAD. The bureau should iiaise with 
the relevant authorities in order to correlate the labour requirements of the city with the numbers 
granted work permits by magistrates in the reserves. The bureau should give preference to the 
employment of urbanised, rather than semi-urbanised and rural Africans.89 The implementation 
of a labour bureau system was deferred, but the administration in New Brighton already served 
as an informal labour bureau as it kept records on the unemployed. The practice of rounding 
up the unemployed for relief work which had commenced during the Depression had become 
established. It was not unusual for the administration to despatch workers upon request to local 
employers. 
The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937 increased the obligation upon local authorities to 
restrict the entry of Africans deemed 'surplus' to the 'reasonable labour requirements' of the 
area. It allowed work-seekers fourteen days in which to find employment in the town or face 
repatriation to the reserves, and put the onus on them to prove that they were not 'redundant'. 90 
But it presented the PECC with a dilemma: although not obliged to furnish statistical returns 
in respect of the labour requirements of the city, if it failed to do so, the Minister of Native 
Affairs could cause them to be completed at the Council's expense. It was the view of the 
Location Superintendent that it would be impossible for the Council to r.ender such returns until 
such time as an enlarged Native Administration Department had been established to regist~r 
service contracts and the bulk of the African population was residing at New Brighton.91 
Meanwhile, the PECC sought exemption from providing statistical returns until the African 
population had been relocated and a feasibility study could be made with respect to the 
establishment of a labour bureau. This was not granted. 
89 CAD, 3/PEZ, 113/2/15/9, Report of the Superintendent, NBL to the Committee on 
Natives in Urban Areas, 25 Sept. 1935. 
90 Davenport, 'African Townsmen?', pp. 102-103; Maylam, 'Urban Apartheid', p. 67. 
91 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/11, Report to NAC ofLoc. Supt. re Conference on Native Laws 
Amendment Act, 22 Oct. 1937. 
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In 1938 the conditions governing the right of African workseekers to enter the urban area of 
Port Elizabeth promulgated four years previously were re-enacted.92 The reasons for this are 
unclear as, once again, the PECC chose not to apply these provisions despite the urging of the 
Location Superintendent and th~ Magistrate to do so. It was argued that in failing to do so, Port 
_ El~zabeth was out of step with most major urban centres and was likely to attract more than its 
fair share of workseekers. The newcomers and migrants would undercut the wages paid to the 
resident workforce. And the continued influx would hamper slum elimination.93 But the 
Council was unwilling to exercise its prerogative to register Africans entering the city. 
As was the case with Cape Town, the PECC appeared reluctant to be seen to be taking the 
initiative in implementing influx controP4 In terms of the (amended) Urban Areas Act, the 
government could issue a proclamation restricting the entry of Africans into an urban area, and 
the NAD assume responsibility and revenue accruing for the registration of contracts. Whilst 
Cape Town was eventually compelled to comply with these strictures, the PE~C was wary that 
it might encounter opposition to the their implementation as had been the case in both 
Grahamstown and East London. Under the circumstances, the PECC resolved in February 1940 
that "consideration on the question of the registration of Native service contracts be deferred 
sine die". 95 This was essentially a delaying tactic and the stock response of a Council not 
convinced that the advantages of registration contracts outweighed their disadvantages. 
In 1941 the Medical Officer of Health- (MOH) added his voice to those calling for the 
implementation of influx control in Port Elizabeth. The Housing & Slum Elimination Committee 
required no convincing that it was necessary to restrict entry into the city for in the space of five 
years an additional 4 783 Africans had had to be relocated from Korste~to New Brighton. It 
recommended to the NAC that steps be taken to institute the registration of Africans in 
accordance with the labour needs of the city, otherwise there would be no end to the municipal 
housing schemes. 96 The NAC proposed that instead of a system of registration, a labour bureau 
be established. 97 There was, however, no provision in the legislation whereby registration at 
92 Government Gazette, Proclamation No. 210 of 30 Sept. 1938. Port Elizabeth was listed 
in a Schedule attached thereto. 
93 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1282 Report ofLoc. Supt., 8 Jan. 1938 and 1/3/2/15113, Magt. S. Craig 
Bain to TC, PE, 11 May 1939. 
94 Cape Times, 6 May 1939 ('City Council May Act "as Ordered"). 
95 PE Municipality, Mayor's Minutes for 1941, p. 27. 
96 CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/1/121, Minutes of the H&SEC, 21 Jan. 1941. 
97 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1846, Minutes of the NAC, 22 June 1941. 
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such a bureau could be made compulsory. 98 The Location Superintendent reckoned that the 
registration of service contracts would safeguard the permanent urban resident from 
unscrupulous employers who could exploit a labour surplus by taking on migrants prepared to 
work for lower wages. He believed that preference should be given by employers to the hiring 
of workers permanently resident in the city. In his opinion, registration was in the best interests 
of this category of person. 99 Some Advisory Board members saw the merits of the Location 
Superintendent's argument. But the majority regarded service contracts as a form of pass and 
therefore an infringement on their liberty. 100 Again, the PECC equivocated on the matter of 
implementing the registration of service contracts. 
The difficulties of supervising influx control and the extraordinary wartime demand for labour 
resulted in the temporary suspension of the pass laws in 1942. 101 Whilst pressure from local 
authorities caused the NAD to attempt to close loopholes in existing legislation, the PECC 
' 
refrained from introducing service contracts because the wartime industrial expansion demanded 
an increased supply of unskilled labour. Numerous interested parties made representations to the 
PECC- for and against- service contracts. The EP Trades Council put its case as follows: 
... it has always been to the credit of the PECC that it has resisted government and other 
pressure... to introduce the registration of natives in this city, and we feel that this 
tradition of liberalism towards the native community should be strengthened and 
enhanced by the PECC and that no concession should be granted to those powerful 
elements in our community who are now urging the introduction of this retrogressive and 
reactionary regulation. 102 
Whether impressed by this somewhat obsequious and self-serving statement or not, the PECC 
rejected implementing a system of registration. 103 This decision taken early in 1946 and 
regularly reappraised in the years that followed, was not to be overturned for seven years. 
By the late 1940s the UP and NP - while they diverged on the appropriate response to African 
urbanisation - agreed on the need for a far more interventionist state with the means to tackle 
the problems of labour distribution, low productivity and high labour turnover. But effective 
influx control measures depended on a scale of administrative intervention beyond the existing 
98 CAD, 3/PEZ 111846, SNA to TC, PE, 12 Aug. 1941. 
99 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15115, Report of Loc. Supt., 28 June 1941. 
100 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15115, Minutes of the NBAB, 17 July 1941. 
101 Posel, Making of Apanheid, p. 44. 
102 lAD, 25/279 No. 1, President (W. Meyer) and Sec. (K. Viljoen) ofEP Trades Council 
to TC, PE, 26 Sept. 1945. 
103 lAD, 25/279 No.1, Minutes of the NAC 11 Sept. and 4 Dec. 1945; Minutes of the 
PECC, 27 Sept. 1945 and 31 Jan. 1946. 
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capacities of the central and local states. 104 The passage of legislation in 1952 obliged 
municipalities to enforce influx control measures. It accorded the central state the wherewithal 
to intervene in the regulation of African labour by municipalities. 105 And unlike its 
predecessors, the NP government showed itself to be less prepared to make concessions to meet 
particular local needs, and more determined to achieve a greater measure of centralisation and 
standardisation in urban policy. Port Elizabeth finally instituted influx control measures in 1953 
(in circumstances which shall be examined in chapter 9). 
Conclusion 
The determinants of policy towards Port Elizabeth's African population were linked to the 
dynamics of the local political economy and the changing character of the local state. In 
Robinson's opinion, this "changed from a paternalistic, liberal administration to a bureaucratic, 
distant and overtly repressive regime". 106 Although she fails to chart this process thoroughly, 
and is apparently unaware of the PECC's flirtation with influx control measures during the 
1930s, the overall trajectory is accurate. Certainly, the ambivalence towards passes in the 1930s 
gave way to a defmite unwillingness to implement influx controls in the 1940s which was 
largely due to the industrial growth and concomitant increase in demand for unskilled labour. 
By the early 1950s, the balance of power in the local state had changed in favour of the 
proponents of influx control. The factors responsible for this state of affairs included: the extent 
to which the ideology of segregation/apartheid had become hegemonic at the level of the 
national and local states; the erosion of local autonomy and the greater conformity to central 
state policie-s; the increasing pressure brought to bear on the PECC by white ratepayers and 
other interest groups which favoured social control and the regulation of labour supplies; the 
loss of influence by the lobbies representing urban capital; and the limited degree to which the 
African population itself was able to influence decision-making by the PECC. 
104 P. Bonner, P. Delius and D. Posel, 'The Shaping of Apartheid: Contradiction, 
Continuity and Popular Struggle' in Apanheid's Genesis (Johannesburg, 1993), pp. 5, 
26-27. 
105 Posel, Making of Apanheid, pp. 104, 206. 
106 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', p. 145. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ESTABLISHMENT AND EXPANSION OF NEW BRIGHTON, c.l903-1953 
A number of locations were established in Port Elizabeth during the nineteenth century. 1 The 
Stranger's Location (established 1855) was situated to the north of the cemetery abutting 
Hyman's Kloof or Russell Road, as it has become. The origin of its Xhosa name, Emaxambeni 
(meaning that the houses were constructed with sugar pockets filled with sand), remains 
obscure. Stranger's Location spilled over into Cooper's Kloof in the 1860s and became a 
separate municipal location in 1877. The Reservoir Location off Mount Road was established 
by the Municipality in 1883 and was called kwaNtamobomvu (literally, 'place of the rooinek' 
which possibly denoted that an Englishman may have previously owned the land). The largest 
privately-owned location situated in present-day Mill Park, Gubbs Location, was established in 
the 1860s and known to its predominantly 'blanket' population by the far more descriptive name 
of kwaMpundu (literally, 'place of nakedness'). 2 A case of bubonic plague in Gubb's Location 
in 190P set in motion a train of events which led to the closure of these locations and the 
creation of New Brighton. These events are described in the first section of this Chapter. 
The second section examines the growth of New Brighton and Korsten, both of which were 
initially situated outside the municipal boundaries. When the Port Elizabeth City Council 
(PECC) assumed control of New Brighton in 1923, the inclusion of Korsten within the 
municipality was left in abeyance. During the 1920s the city experienced an acute housing 
crisis. The incorporation of Korsten within the PE Municipality in 1931 exacerbated the housing 
1 For the history of Port Elizabeth's early locations, see A.J. Christopher, 'Race and 
Residence in Colonial Port Elizabeth', South African Geographical Journal, 69, 1 
(1987), pp. 3-20; G. Baines, 'The Origins of Urban Segregation: Local Government and 
the Residence of Africans in Port Elizabeth, c.1835-1865', South African Historical 
Journal, 22 (1990), pp. 61-81; J. Kirk, 'The African Middle Class, Cape Liberalism and 
Resistance to Residential Segregation at Port Elizabeth, 1880-1910' (Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1987) and B. Taylor, Controlling the Burgeoning 
Masses: Removals and Residential Development in Pon Elizabeth 's Black Areas 1800s -
1990 (Grahamstown, 1991), pp. 16-40. 
2 These names and their meanings have been gleaned from a number of sources, the most 
important of which were communications from G. Soya Mama of New Brighton and Dr 
C.J. Skead of Summerstrand; M. de Jongh, 'Interaction and Transition: A study of 
conciliar behaviour in a Black South African township (Ph.D. Thesis, Rhodes University, 
1979), p. 4; J. McLaren, A New Concise Xhosa-EnglishDictionary (Cape Town, 1963), 
p. 182. 
3 Eastern Province Herald (hereafter EPH), 17 April 1901 ; Christopher, 'Race and 
Residence', p. 11. 
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problem but also offered a means of eradicating the "worst slum in the world" .4 The provisions 
of the 1934 Slums Act empowered the PECC to rehouse residents whose abodes were deemed 
unfit for human habitation. As had been the case with the bubonic plague after the turn of the 
century, another outbreak of the disease provided the pretext for the Korsten removals in the 
late 1930s. 
In order to accommodate those Africans evicted from properties in Korsten, the PECC 
undertook an extensive sub-economic housing scheme in New Brighton between 193.8.-and 1942. 
The third section of this~eCribeSnre--Kurst n removals and the establishment of 
McNamee Village. Named after the then Location Superintendent, it was feted as a 'model'. 
The final section of the chapter outlines the post-war housing schemes which were established 
in New Brighton to house Port Elizabeth's burgeoning African population. The main events 
described in this chapter have been outlined elsewhere/ but my account focuses more closely 
on conditions in New Brighton itself. It is obviously impossible, though, to describe the 
establishment and expansion of New Brighton without relating these to developments within the 
entire city. 
The closure of Port Elizabeth's inner locations and the creation of New Brighton, c.1901-10 
Port Elizabeth recorded a total of 105 cases - 21 Whites and 84 Blacks - of bubonic pia e- in 
190 . _ ~_dis~~e-wa~~":a~~i~~in ward~~ the town_than_in the locations.6 When 
the frrst case had been reported, the Colonial Secretary mooted the possibility of a single 
)!>..cation being establisbed_outside the town being established_t.Ul.Q.~gov~L~ 
once the necessary legislation-had been enacted.7 Location residents endorsed the proposal at 
a public meeting. Apart from having greater faith in the bona .fides of the Colonial Government 
4 Korsten was described as such by Sir Edward Thornton, the British Minister of Social 
Welfare and Housing during a visit to Port Elizabeth in the 1930s. Cited in G. Begg, 
'Sub-Economic Housing in Port Elizabeth', The South African Architect (Nov. 1940), p. 
306 and Anonymous, 'Impressions of the McNamee Township at New Brighton', The 
South African Outlook (March 1941), p. 46. 
5 J. Cherry, 'Blot on the Landscape and Centre of Resistance: A Social and Economic 
History of Korsten' (B.A. Hons. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1988); J. Robinson, 
'The Power of Apartheid: Territoriality and State Power in South African Cities- Port 
Elizabeth 1923-1972' (Ph.D. Thesis, Cambridge University, 1990), pp. 199-209; B. 
Taylor, Controlling the Burgeoning Masses: Removals and Residential Development in 
Pon Elizabeth's Black Areas lBOOs-1990, Institute of Social and Economic Research, 
Rhodes University, Working Paper No. 51, 1991 , pp. 41-65. 
6 Cape of Good Hope Parliamentary Papers, Repon on Public Health for 1903, G. 35-
1904, p. 91. 
7 EPH 23 April 1901. 
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than the PE Town Council, the central state also had greater resources at its disposal. But 
because the plague never reached epidem!~ proportions, the Colonial Government appeared to 
hesitate in implementing its undertaking to assist the Town Council in resettling location 
residents. The Mayor commented sardonically that the procrastination of the Government 
seemed to suggest that they Q.!_Ust c b:'~~~ th~ague..in..ord~:=r~to~h~av~~~~~~;gWl£:00.~~ 
Meanwhile, the specially constituted Plague.Hoard-,-whieh-conststed of representatives of the 
local authority and public health officials, embarked on a campaign to eradicate the disease in 
Port Elizabeth. Although merchant stores were infested with rats and were the probable breeding 
ground for the disease, there were no municipal regulations to enforce the fum!gatiOi} of these 
-- ----------
premises. The-Boat:d-oon-demnoo-dwellings_which it considered insanitary although demolition 
could only be undertaken with the approval of the Council. 9 Certain Councillors who were 
'slumlords' were not above using their offices to hinder the proper implementation of sanitation 
measures, 10 nor the demolition of dwellings declared unfit for human habitation. 11 However, 
the Chairman of the Health and Location Committee rejected allegations that the Town Council 
could not press ahead with its work because of vested interests. 12 Few dwellings owned and 
occupied by Whites were amongst those condemned by the Plague Board and expropriated by 
the Town Council. By contrast, location residents complained of personal harassment, arbitrary 
inspections and the destruction of homes without prior waming. 13 In the end, demolished 
houses numbered over 325 were in the town proper and over 950 in the locations. 
The clamour to remove the existing locations in the town was fuelled by unreasonable white 
~~~~--------~~~~--~~~~~-=~~~~-------f~~t _i!!_ey_p.osed a iliteat_JQ_ P._ublic health. 14 T-his objective, however, could not be 
immediately realised because the Plague Board was not empowered to effect the removal of 
people from properties not condemned as insanitary nor order the wholesal~ 
locatioos-In terms of existing public health legislation, Africans could be forced out of town 
but not neces~~ly into a_ location. The removals contemplated by the authorities were made 
possible by the passage of the Native Reserve Location Act (40 of 1902), which effectively 
8 EPH 19 Sept. 1901, p. 3 ('Town Council/The Removal of Natives'). 
9 Select Committee on the Native Reserve Location Act, A. 15 - 1903, pp. 97-101, 
Evidence of C.H. Mackay, Chairman of Health & Location Committee and member of 
the Plague Board. 
10 Report on Public Health for 1901, G. 66- 1902, pp. 93-4. 
11 Report on Public Health for 1902, G. 66 - 1903, p. 118. 
12 A. 15- 1903, pp. 100-1. 
13 A. 15- 1903, pp. 97-99, 103. 
14 Report on Public Health for 1905, G. 39- 1906, pp. xxix-xxx. 
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translated emergency public health measures into permanent urban locations legislauon. 
Proposed in order to regularise the actions of the Cape Town Municipality in expropriating 
property from Africans in the town and relocating them to Ndabeni, ~~t~l~Q_~~ 
means for the local authorities in Port Elizabeth to consolidate the ~o_gr~mme of mass evictions_ 
and slum cleara~15 ---
The establishment of New Brighton was facilitated by the Colonial Government's purchase of 
the farms known as Cradock Place and Deal Party for the sum of £20 000. 16 The portion set 
the town on 
~~~~~~~~~~USlDa.LilJWll~!S.JlL.l~Lte.J:eli~~lai-Qevdopment. 17 ~~ 
of a site for New Brighton outside the municipaLboundari~s was detenujge£L.QQly.-partly-by~ 
public ~oncems The fact that the administration of the Location would be assumed by 
e Cape Government was another consideration. Equally important 'Yas_thaLI.esioontial 
. ..--------
segre!@tion provided the authorities with the_capaeity-roeffect social control of the town's -- - - -- --
African population. 
Residents of the municipal locations wished to obtain a guarantee of security of tenure before 
they moved voluntarily to New Brighton. Although none of the site holders or occupiers in the 
municipal locations held title to their lots, the PETC had previously agreed to grant title when 
planning their removal to the new (i.e. Race Course) Location and compensate them for their 
old dwellings. 18 The removals to the Race Course Location had never occurred on account of 
the outbreak of the South African War but residents expected a similar undertaking to be made 
in the case of New Brighton- irrespective of whether the Government or the PE Municipality 
assumed responsibility therefore. Accordingly, in July 1902 a deputation representing location 
residents interviewed the Civil Commissioner and made application for the grant of titles to land 
15 M. Swanson, 'The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in the 
Cape Colony, 1900-1909', Journal of African History, 18 (1977), pp. 387-394. 
16 See correspondence in Cory Library, MS 14,477 G.L. Galpin Papers, from Thos. 
Stevenson (Galpin's agent) to Galpin, 10 May and to the Sec. of the South African 
Association, 12, 16 and 22 July 1901; A. Mabin and M. Conradie (eds.), The confidence 
of the whole country: Standard Bank repons on economic conditions in Southern Africa 
1965-1902 (Johannesburg, 1988), p. 515. 
17 Cape of Good Hope, Repon of the Select Committe on the Native Reserve Location Bill, 
A. 22- 1902, Appendix A: Report re the matter of establishing a large 'native' location 
in or near Port Elizabeth, pp. iii-iv. 
18 Cape Archives Depot (hereafter CAD), Native Affairs (NA), Vol. S27 File No. 516, 
Actg. TC, PE to RM, PE, 8 April 1902; A. 22- 1902, p. 298, Appendix vide PETC 
Minutes, 26 June 1896. 
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in New Brighton. The official indicated that the Native Affairs Department (NAD) was not 
prepared to alienate land or grant title in the proposed location as this would then necessitate 
different regulations for property and non-property owners. 19 But it was suggested, instead, that 
prospective New Brighton residents with the means to do so might be afforded the opportunity 
to build their own homes on leasehold plots. The SNA proposed that "only the simplest 
accommodation should be provided by the Government but facilities be given to the Natives to 
erect better class dwellings for themselves under the supervision of the Government, and subject 
to the carrying out of definite conditions as regards manner of construction, size, position and 
sanitary requirements". 20 This did not meet with the approval of other state officials. The 
Secretary of the Public Works Department (PWD) insisted that for the sake of a uniform system 
of administration in Native Reserve Locations, Africans should remain simply as tenants paying 
a monthly rental which would cover service charges as was the case in Ndabeni. 21 Section 
11 (3) of the Native Reserve Location Act made provision for regulating the erection and 
occupation of private dwellings, but not for the grant of freehold title. 
Applications for title to sites in New Brighton by a number of mission churches which held title 
deeds in the municipal locations were adamantly refused by the Prime Minister (J. Sprigg) 
himself. Having refused to alienate land in Ndabeni for the purpose of erecting churches, he did 
not see why New Brighton should be any different. 22 He ignored the fact that churches in Cape 
Town for Africans had not been nearly as substantial as those in Port Elizabeth. Nor was due 
consideration given to the fact that church authorities would be unable to obtain loans for 
building purposes without having title to their sites. In asking the Prime Minister to reconsider 
his decision; it was pointed out that the trustees of the Congregational Union of South Africa 
(CUSA) were unlikely to agree to the re-erection of church buildings unless the property was 
secured by title, and that if clergy were alienated they might use their influence to sway their 
flocks against the authorities. 23 In spite of persistent approaches to the Colonial Government, 
it categorically denied title to churches and siteholders were to have the right of occupation 
only. 
19 CAD, NA Vol. 527 File No. 516: Report of CC, PE to SNA, 10 April; Schedule of 
Asst. SNA to Prime Minister, 22 April 1902. 
20 CAD, NA V734 f348, SNA to PM, 10 Dec. 1902. 
21 CAD, NA Vol. 734 File No. 348, Memo of Conference held in office of CC, PE, 28 
July; Sec. PWD to SNA,? Sept.; Chief Inspector PWD to Sec. PWD, 28 Oct. 1902. 
22 CAD, NA 527 f516, Rev H. Newell to Rev W. Dower, 24 March 1902; Schedule 
submitted by Asst. SNA to PM, 22 Apr. 1902; SNA to Rev W. Dower, 26 Apr. 1902. 
23 CAD, NA 527 f516, Rev. H. Newell, Minister Edwards Memorial Church, to SNA, 20 
May and extract from untitled NAD Report, 28 Feb. 1903. 
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Churches were allocated sites in New Brighton according to the date when they had established 
h 
missions amongst the local African population - unlike Ndabeni wJ,ere they were allocated by 
drawing lots. 24 Thus, the first choice of site was given to CUSA, the successor of the London 
Missionary Society which had established the earliest mission to Africans in the Bay. A further 
9 sites were allotted to: the Basuto Independent Church (affiliated to CUSA); the Wesleyan . 
Methodist Church (x2); the Church of the Province of South Africa (i.e. Anglican); the Roman 
Catholic Church; the United Free Church of Scotland (i.e. Presbyterian); the SA Baptist 
Missionary Society; the Salvation Army; and the Bishop of Grahamstown on behalf of the Order 
of Ethiopia25 [see Appendix C]. The grant of a site to the Order of Ethiopia was not at first 
countenanced because it was regarded as a branch of the Anglican Church and not a distinct 
body. 26 Representations from the minister of St Stephen's Mission Church appear to have 
convinced the authorities of the merits of granting a site to the Order. These portrayed the 
Ethiopians as a group which would serve to counter the influence of the American Methodist 
' 
Episcopalians who were 'becoming a danger to the state'. It was argued thai the Order had a 
strong claim to a site at the new location for three reasons: the existence of its local 
congregations prior to its admission into union with the Anglican Church; the fact that these 
congregations were distinct from those of the Anglican mission; and its numerical strength 
which was estimated at about 600 members. 27 Other 'Ethiopian' churches - which had seceded 
from mission churches but whose doctrines and liturgies did not differ markedly from the 
mother church - were also granted sites if accorded recognition by the Government. 
Accommodation for individuals in New Brighton was allotted on a first-come-first-serve basis. 
The Government initially planned to rehouse only about 1 500 people in the Location even 
though estimates suggested that about three times that number of Afric~ns resided in the town's 
locations and slum areas, and that a similar number lived outside the municipal boundaries. 
Accordingly, it was proposed to erect a roughly equal number of blocks of huts for three 
different classes of would-be resident: one and two-bedroomed family accommodation for 





B. MacQuarrie (ed.), Stanford's Reminiscences, V.2 (Cape Town, 1962), pp. 213-4. 
CAD, NA 527 f516, Minute 2/2771 in terms ofSection 13, Act 40 of 1902, Schedule 
A, 10 Sept. 1903. 
CAD, NA527f516, Rev A.T. Canon Wirgman to CC, PE, 19Juneand 16Aug.l903, 
and Rev. S.W. Cox toCC, PE, 23 June 1903. The founder of the Order of Ethiopia, the . 
Rev James Dwane made similar statements before the Lagden Commission. See South 
African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-05, V. 2, p. 710ff. 
CAD, NA 527 f516, CC, PE to SNA, and reply 11 June 1903. 
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be known as Class 'A', 'B' and 'C' huts respectively. Towards the end of 1902, the 
Government approved the purchase of wood and iron huts from the dismantled concentration 
camp at Uitenhage in order to rehouse greater numbers and reduce costs. 28 These were 
subsequently converted into Class 'C' huts for about 2 800 'single' men or migrants. The 
subsequent decision to reduce the number of Class' A' and 'B' huts meant a shortage of suitable 
family accommodation.29 
For the want of experienced personnel to oversee the New Brighton removals, a Senior 
Inspector was seconded from Ndabeni to take charge of the operation. 30 His instructions suggest 
that the Government's modus operandi was designed to pre-empt any resistance. 
It is not desired that the Natives should be removed en masse, but that they should be 
transferred in batches sufficiently small to allow their being easily and effectually 
manipulated. 
Eviction notices were to be served on location residents by the Police acting under the direction 
of the Civil Commissioner and Magistrate. 31 The Stranger's Location - which was situated on 
prime real estate - was earmarked as the first site to be cleared of its residents. A number of 
these residents moved to New Brighton before the deadline for the Municipality's general 
eviction notice had expired on 1 June 1903, which was the date upon which the Native Reserve 
Location Act came into force. 32 Most residents, however, remained until evicted and all the 
huts in Stranger's Location were cleared and razed to the ground during June [see Illustrations 
3.1].33 Cooper's Kloof Location experienced a similar fate three months later.34 The expulsion 
notice issued to residents of both locations stipulated that they should proceed to New 
Brighton. 35 But because the Native Reserve Location Act applied only to the municipality itself, 
the authorities did not have the means to force those Africans who relocated to Korsten and 
other areas on the periphery of the town into New Brighton [see Figure 3 .1]. 
Private locations within the Port Elizabeth Municipality (PEM) were also subject to the 
28 CAD, NA V734 f348, Chief Inspector to the Secretary for Public Works, 20 Dec. 1902. 
29 CAD, NA V734 f348, Sec. PWD to SNA and reply, 16 Dec. 1902; PE Town Clerk's 
Files, 3/PEZ 1/3/1/2/1, Minutes of Health & Location Committee, 27 Oct. 1903. 
30 CAD, NA V602 f1616, SNA to PM, 23 March 1903. 
31 CAD, NA V602 fl616, SNA to Allman, Ndabeni, 3 April 1903. 
32 Cape Daily Telegraph, 23 June 1903; A. 15- 1903, pp. 72-3. 
33 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/1/2/1, Minutes of Health and Location Committee, 5 and 18 June 
1903. 
34 EPH 29 Sept. 1903. 
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2 Cooper's Kloof 1903- ...... 
3 Gubb's 1903 ---
4 Reservoir 1909 -- -
GeoCart R.U. 
Figure 3.1 THE CLOSURE OF PORT ELIZABETH'S LOCATIONS AND THE 
RESETTLEMENT OF RESIDENTS, 1903-1909 
Illustration 3. 1 Burning of huts in Strangers ' Location, June 1903. 
(Private collection of T .S. Bodill) 
Illustration 3.2 Original huts in the Red Location, 
New Brighton, c.1990 (Weekend Post). 
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provisions of the Native Reserve Location Act. The syndicate which owned Gubbs Location 
sought to exact compensation from the Government for the loss of income which would follow 
the eviction of African tenants forced upon them by the legislation. This was turned down on 
the grounds of the enormous profits that the company had made from its tenants to date and the 
amount it was likely to secure upon sale of its site to the Municipality or property developers. 
The syndicate complied with its obligations without further demur and gave residents - in terms 
of their lease conditions - three months notice before evicting them without compensation. They 
commenced relocating in June 1903. As with the municipal locations, few of the residents of 
Gubbs Location moved to New Brighton. Many owners of huts chose to dismantle andre-erect 
them either in Korsten or even the Reservoir Location. 36 
Many former residents of the inner locations chose to use their compensation payments from 
the PETC to hire or purchase plots from speculators in Korsten and Dassieskraal. 37 The hiring 
or leasing of property in such areas was a lucrative source of revenue, and landlords welcomed 
new tenants. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that slumlords encouraged the disaffected 
African community to resist relocation to New Brighton. But ultimately they exercised a choice 
in the matter; or as Odendaal has put it, 'voted with their feet' to go to Korsten instead of New 
Brighton. 38 By the end of 1903 the population of New Brighton was 2 125 [see Table 3.1] 
which fell far short of the projected figure of 6 000, 39 whereas more than twice that number 
of Africans had relocated to Korsten. 40 
For many Africans, Korsten provided an alternative, and in some ways preferable, place of 
abode to New Brighton. Perhaps the primary advantage of living in Korsten was that Africans 
;.vere entitled to-own property and build their own houses. Kirk has ~!sc suggested L~at the 
option of choosing one's area of residence or neighbourhood was important as many Africans 
complained of being separated from their friends in New Brighton.41 On the other hand, there 
were certain disadvantages to residing in Korsten. It was administered by the Divisional Council 
36 CAD, NA V734 f348, Sec. Mill Park Estate & Land Co. Ltd. to SNA, 3 Feb. and 
Magt., PE to SNA, 27 June 1903. 
37 CAD, NA Vl57 97/19/f348, RM, PE to SNA, 18 April 1903. 
38 A. Odendaal, 'African Political Mobilisation in the Eastern Cape, 1880-1910' (Ph.D., 
Cambridge University, 1983), pp. 198-9. 
39 Cape of Good Hope, Debates of the House of Assembly for 1904, p. 224. 
40 CAD, Colonial Office (CO) V8765 f78c, Magt. PE to Under Colonial Secretary, 29 
April 1904; Christopher, 'Race and Residence', p. 13. 
41 Kirk, 'Residential Segregation in Port Elizabeth', p. 236 tabulates the 
advantages/disadvantages of Korsten over New Brighton. 
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which did not have the means to collect rates and provide essential services. By contrast, New 
Brighton had its own water supply and sanitation, as well as medical services which were 
included in the costs of rentals. The failure to guarantee Africans exclusive trading rights in 
New Brighton limited entrepreneurial opportunities and discouraged the small African middle 
class from relocating. Others objected to the irksome restrictions which forbade domestic beer 
brewing and provided for close surveillance, including police searches for the possession of 
illegal liquor which were conducted at all hours. Workers, especially those who commuted to 
town on a daily basis, objected to the distance and cost of rail fares which amounted to 6s. per 
month. Rents in New Brighton of between 20s. and 30s. per month for family quarters and 8s. 
per month for single quarters were exhorbitant. By comparison, the charges for site rent and the 
provision of water, sanitation and refuse removals in the existing municipal location had been 
fixed at £1.2.6 per annum. 42 The rents charged by slumlords in Korsten were not nearly as 
high as those in New Brighton. For all or some of the above reasons, many Africans opted to 
live in areas which lay outside the municipal boundaries and the ambit of the Native Reserve 
Location Act. 43 
In any event, the shortage of accommodation in the location made the enforcement of the Native 
Reserve Location Act impractical. Consequently, the implementation of the Act had to be 
temporarily suspended during 1904 and the relocation of Reservoir Location residents to New 
Brighton stayed. In fact, many people took the opportunity to leave the location and the 
population reached a new low late in the year [see Table 3.1].44 But following a short:diyed 
recrudescence of the plague, 45 the ublic health · a bid to 
remove African iding_il.k all within the PEM. In December 1904, a Notice was proclaimed 
(in terms ofthe Public Health Act of 1897) which empowered the Colonial Secretary to direct 
non-exempt Africans in the Port Elizabeth magisterial district to remove to New Brighton. 46 
A rigorous effort was made to enforce these provisions despite the 'truculent' and 'obstinate' 
(terms employed by the magistrate) attitude of the Africans. They were threatened that they 
would be deprived of compensation if they did not move voluntarily. 47 Whilst the SNA saw 
42 CAD, 3/PEZ, 1/311/211, p. 24, Minutes of the Health and Location Committee, 20 Feb. 
1903. . 
43 Swanson, 'Sanitation Syndrome', pp. 402-3. 
44 CAD, NA V607 f1677, TC, PE to SNA, 8 Oct. 1904; NA V517 f371, ARM to SNA, 
28 July 1904; Swanson, 'Sanitation Syndrome', p. 404. 
45 CAD, 3/PEZ 1130, Treasurer to Mayor, PE, 22 July 1904. 
46 Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette, Notice No. 1337 of 19 Dec. 1904. 
47 CAD, NA V607 1677, RM, PE to SNA, 20 March, 23 March and 18 April 1905. 
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the necessity for the presence of the police when enforcing the removals, he warned that it 
would he wise to 
avoid as far as practicable any show of compulsion which would have a disturbing effect 
on the Native mind and thus hamper the movement. 48 
The steady increase of New Brighton's population during 1905 from 1 197 to 4 516 was due 
either to the success of a strategy of intimidation employed by the authorities in effecting the 
removals, or to the inflation of population returns [see below]. 
TABLE 3.1 
NEW BRIGHTON POPULATION RETURNS, 1903-1910 
Month 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 l2Q8 12Q2 1910 
Jan 3007 1791 4363 3735 3794 2150 3156 
Feb 3487 2350 4395 3694 3807 2214 3187 
Mar 2554 2602 4357 3710 3747 2253 3187 
Apr 2612 3313 4376 3657 3776 2333 3182 
May 254 2081 3805 4294 3603 3771 2479 3193 
June 965 1960 4198 4163 3614 3681 2570 
July 1239 1925 4232 4047 3574 3598 2721 
Aug 1387 1807 4067 3948 3591 3426 2836 
Sept 1434 1283 4133 3903 3539 3367 2972 
Oct 1517 1310 4222 3850 3551 1994 3080 
Nov 1573 1309 4441 3849 3724 2022 3106 
Dec 2125 1411 4516 3812 3773 2099 3105 
Despite the increase of New Brighton's population during 1905, the authorities were nowhere 
near to removing all unexempted Africans from Port Elizabeth. The special dispensation granted 
~ R..? the SAR&H to maintain a compound for its workers in close proximity to the harbour 
established a precedent for ignoring the Native Reserve Location Act. 49 The Council itself 
turned down applications by other employers who sought exemption from the provisions of the 
Act on behalf of their African workers but granted exemptions to numerous individual property 
48 CAD, NA V607 f1677, SNA to CC, PE, 31 March 1905 . 
49 CAD, 3/PEZ 1 /3/1 /2/1 , Minutes of Health & Location Committee, 2 July 1903. 
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owners or lessees whose premises were declared to be sanitary. 5° Convinced, too, that the 
threat to public health formerly posed by the existence of locations in the town was merely 
being relocated to its periphery, the PETC considered extending its boundaries so as to include 
Korsten and enforce its own bye-laws and regulations. Although negotiations on the matter with 
the Government reached an advanced stage and the necessary legislation was drafted, 51 the 
authorities opted instead for an amendment to the Native Reserve Location Act (8 of 1905). This 
boundaries and, thereby brought Korsten under its scope.52 This legislation finally accorded the 
authorities the powers to compel non-exempt Africans in Korsten to move to New Brighton. The 
decrease in the African population of Korsten between from 4 943 in 1904 to 2 344 in 1911 [see 
Table 3. 1] can be ascribed largely to the extension of the scope of the amended Act. 
Nonetheless, the authorities still employed a strategy which combined intimidation and co-option 
to achieve the objectives of the Native Reserve Location Act. 53 Section 7(18) of the amended 
Act provided for "the lease or grant under title of building lots to any Native residents desirous 
of erecting their own dwelling places within the Reserve Location". 54 This made possible (in 
theory, at least) the implementation of a proposal which sought to induce 'respectable and better 
class natives' to resettle in New Brighton. Property owners in Korsten were to be given a plot 
of equal size in New Brighton and pay 4s. per month for services. Further plots would be 
demarcated for residents to erect their own dwellings provided these conformed with certain 
minimum building specifications. The plots would be leased at 1s. plus an additional 4s. per 
month services or acquired for a single payment of the equivalent of twenty-one years rent in 
advance. 55 The authorities found a willing partner in this scheme in the person of Rev James 
Dwane, the founder of the Order of Ethiopia, who convinced over one hundred of his followers 
to avail themselves of the offer of plots in New Brighton. Dwane led prospective buyers to 
believe that a building society would be formed and that the Government would lend financial 
assistance. 56 However, the scheme collapsed and Dwane was discredited because, by his own 
50 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/1/2/1 , Minutes of Health & Location Committee, 13 and 18 Aug. 
1903; 3 and 25 Feb. 1904; 7 July 1904 and 4 Jan. 1906. 
51 CAD, CO V8765 t78c, unsigned report, 30 Sept. 1904; Cape of Good Hope Government 
Gazette , Proclamation No . 422, 14 Dec. 1904. 
52 Repon on Public Health for 1905, G. 39- 1906, p. A-77 . 
53 Kirk , 'Residential Segregation in Port Elizabeth ' , pp . 324-332. 
54 Cape of Good Hope, Blue Book on Native Affairs for 1905, G. 46- 1906, p. 74 . 
55 CAD, NA V734 f348 , ARM, PE to SNA, 13 Dec. 1904. 
56 CAD, NA 587 f1435 , Actg. CC, PE to SNA , 13 May 1905 and ARM, PE to SNA, 13 
Nov . 1906. 
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admission, he had been co-opted. 57 However, the Order of Ethiopia, along with the vther 
churches originally allotted sites in New Brighton, were eventually granted title to these sites 
subject to the condition that "when no longer used or required for the purposes of grant, the 
land shall revert to the Government" . 58 It would appear that the Colonial Government took 
cognisance of the fact that the grant of title to the churches provided a means of social control. 
In argumg the merits of individual tenure, the SNA suggested that it was preferable to 
encourage Africans to purchase property in the locations than outside, and that it was in line 
with the policy of segregation approved by Parliament. 59 He also suggested that the provision 
of title "would provide an object lesson to local bodies which are as a rule averse to granting 
security of tenure to natives" .60 Nonetheless, regulations stipulating the terms for granting title 
to individuals in the Native Reserve Locations were never promulgated. The Government's 
Legal Adviser and the Attorney-General were of the opinion that such regulations would conflict 
with the Statute Law of the Colony with respect to the transfer of property. It was agreed that 
"it would be wiser and safer" to allow Africans to have only occupation and not freehold rights 
in the locations. 61 However, a subsequent legal opinion on this matter contradicted this view. 
It was held that because Sections 7 and 11(18) of the amended Native Reserve Location Act 
expressly authorised the Governor to issue regulations whereby leases or grants of land may be 
made within a Reserve Location, this overrode the general provision as to the disposal of 
Government property in Section 6 of Act 26 of 1891. In other words, Parliamentary sanction 
was not deemed necessary for residents of New Brighton to be granted title. 62 In the event, the 
Colonial Government ignored the subsequent ruling. Thus the state could be seen to have 
dishonoured a pledge given by the PETC to grant title and permission to Africans to erect their 
own homes in the new location.63 With their inflexible approach to the question of property 
57 Central Archives, Pretoria (CeA), Native Affairs (NTS) 156 1703/f348, Various 
correspondence: Dwane to ARM, NB, 10 Aug. 1905; ARM, NB to SNA, 16 Aug. 1905; 
Dwane to ARM, NB, 26 Sept. 1905; ARM, NB to SNA, 27 Sept. 1905; Dwane to 
ARM, NB, 7 Oct. 1905. The quote is from the first letter. 
58 Cape of Good Hope, Votes and Proceedings of the House of Assembly 1906 (Cape Town, 
1906), p. 889. The entry dated 20 Aug. 1906 includes a Schedule of the Lots granted to 
the nine denominations. 
59 CeA, NTS V178 1703/f348, SNA to Surveyor-General, 22 Feb. 1907. 
60 Central Archives Depot, Pretoria (CeA), Native Affairs (NTS) V178 1703/f348, Memo 
of SNA to PM, March 1908. 
61 CeA, NTS V156 1703/f348, SNA to PM, 21 Aug. 1908. 
62 CAD, Justice Department (JUS), V86 t21876, Sec. for Law Dept. to SNA, 16 Nov. 
1909. 
63 A. 15- 1903, pp. 30 and 37; Kirk, 'Residential Segregation in Port Elizabeth', p. 203. 
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rights and tenure, the state ignored class distinctions and served to decrease the physical and 
social distance between the African middle and working classes. Kirk has suggested that New 
Brighton was established primarily to control the latter but, in treating the former no differently, 
the state alienated a group which might have co-operated with it.64 
In 1909 Port Elizabeth's Resident Magistrate (RM) lamented that the local authorities did not 
"take more active steps to encourage the removal and segregation of Natives residing in the 
urban area to the Reserve Location". 65 Consequently, the last of the town's old locations was 
closed when the PETC reached an agreement with the Colonial Government that provision 
would be made for siteholders in the Reservoir Location to receive compensation for the 
demolition of their dwellings and be allotted accommodation in New Brighton.66 As a result 
of these removals, the population of New Brighton increased from 2 099 to 3 I 05 between 
December 1908 and 1909 [see Table 3. 1]. The 1 644 Africans still resident within the 
municipal boundaries included voters and other groups such as domestic servants who were 
exempt from removal in terms of the Native Reserve Location Act. The 375 estimated to be 
living in the town in contravention of the Act was probably well short of the actual figure .67 
The Town Council prided itself in having removed virtually the entire non-exempt African 
population from the town and its peripheral areas to New Brighton.68 In fact, Port Elizabeth 
was one of the most highly segregated towns in the country at the time of Union.69 
If the population returns are to be believed, New Brighton's population fluctuated quite 
extensively before 1910. This was for a number of reasons. In the first place, the closure of the 
locations occurred in two stages: Stranger's, Cooper's Kloof and Gubb's Locations during the 
second half of 1903 and the Reservoir Location during 1909. Secondly, the shortage of 
accommodation in New Brighton and the lack of effective means to preclude location residents 
from going to Korsten before the passage of Act 8 of 1905. Even then, many Africans not 
exempt from the Native Reserve Location Act still managed to avoid having to relocate to New 
Brighton. Thirdly, the location was not popular amongst the 'respectable and better class 
64 Kirk, 'Residential Segregation in Port Elizabeth', pp. 206-7 and 330-1. 
65 Blue Book on Native Affairs for 1908, G. 19- 1909, p. 67 . 
66 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/141, SNA to TC, PE, 10 July 1909; Mayor's Minutefor 1909, p.4. 
67 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/177, Report of Sanitary Inspector to PETC, 28 July 1911. 
68 PE Municipality, Mayor's Minutesfor 1909, pp. 4 and 89 and Mayor's Minutes for 1910, 
p. 58. 
69 A.J. Christopher, 'Roots of urban segregation: South Africa at Union, 1910', Journal 
of Historical Geography, 14 (1988), pp. 165-7 and 'Formal segregation and population 
distribution in Port Elizabeth', Contree, 24 (1988) , p. 6. 
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natives' for numerous reasons, but especially on account of there being no provision for the 
purchase or long-term lease of land. Fourthly, the sizeable number of migrants and the 
economic recession meant that there was a constant coming and going of residents. Nonetheless, 
there was an increasing demand for family accommodation as the population became more 
permanent and stable in character. 
The growth of New Brighton and Korsten, c.1910-1933 
By 1910, New Brighton was said to be overcrowded despite the fact that the population 
numbered some 1 500 less than at the end of 1905.70 Apart from the closure of the Reservoir 
Location, improved trade and economic prospects in Port Elizabeth caused an influx of people 
to the Location. 71 The increased demand for family accommodation was due partly to the 
decrease of rents from between 25s. and 30s. in 1903 to between 5s. and 8s. in 1909 [see 
Chapter 5]. Accordingly, many of the single mens' quarters (SMQ) or kwaNdokwenza were 
converted into family units, whilst kitchens were converted into quarters for single men. 72 
Single persons were placed five in each room and included a number of unmarried women with 
babies. The following Table shows exactly how the available accommodation was being utilised: 
TABLE 3.2 
ACCOMMODATION IN NEW BRIGHTON 1910 
Dwellings occupied by families 
Dwellings occupied by single persons 
Dwellings occupied by officials 
Dwellings occupied by paupers 
Vacant dwellings 







*There were no empty dweUings as such, but accommodation for 5 families or 25 single persons 
was available if rearrangements were to be made. In addition, 13 kitchens were rented out for 
70 An explanation for the discrepancies in the figures given for population returns in New 
Brighton would seem to be that figures between 1905 and Sept. 1908 were inflated so 
as to convince the NAD of the effectiveness of the local officials in applying the 
provisions of Act 8 of 1905 to remove Africans from Korsten to New Brighton. A census 
taken in Oct. 1908, revealed that the population return showed 1 394 persons too many 
(or, as that included 41 absconders, 1 353). See CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, CC, PE to 
SNA, 10 Feb. and Supt. NBL, to RM, PE, 12 Feb. 1910. 
71 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, CC, PE to SNA, 23 Dec. and SNA to Sec. for Finance, 30 Dec. 
1910. 
72 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, SNA to Sec. for Finance, 31 Dec. 1910. 
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use as churches, schools and eating houses. Many families also took in lodgers who helped pay 
rents but added to the congestion. Thus New Brighton was in dire need of additional 
accommodation. 73 
In 1910 the Magistrate - acting without due authorisation - approved a scheme to erect 25 
traditional style huts (i.e. rondawels) as an interim measure to alleviate the overcrowding in 
New Brighton. However, the African builder who was awarded the contract was unable to 
complete the job as he was declared insolvent. A white contractor eventually finished the work, 
but not before there had been a considerable hold up. 74 The following year, the NAD 
authorised the construction of a row of 11 semi-detached galvanised iron dwellings to house 22 
families75 [see Illustration 3.3]. But the demand for accommodation in New Brighton 
exceeded the supply. All additional accommodation was immediately filled upon completion and 
many applications were turned down. The Superintendent reported having a waiting list of 
families living in town and Korsten wanting accommodation in New Brighton. 76 This demand 
for accommodation in New Brighton was more out of necessity than choice. Pressure from 
white ratepayers for the strenuous application of the law that provided for the expulsion of 
unregistered Africans from the town following a 'black peril' incident in 1911 had increased the 
demand for the erection of additional accommodation in New Brighton. 
In 1911 the Location Superintendent proposed and the NAD endorsed a scheme to advance loans 
to the 'respectable classes' of Africans to erect dwellings for themselves on sites in New 
Brighton allotted for the purpose. It was regarded as "a much more economical alternative to 
the erection of quarters by Government" for it would be at their own expense. 77 However, the 
scheme was not implemented. Instead, further funds were voted for the construction of more 
accommodation in New Brighton which would be rented to residents. After considerable delay 
caused by squabbling between the Departments of Native Affairs, Finance and Public Works 
over tite funding and suitability of the dwelJings provided, 78 provision was made for over 200 
73 CeA, NTS 2442 11291, SNA to Prime Minister, 14 Feb. and Memo to Minister of 
Native Affairs, Dec. 1910. 
74 CeA, NTS 2442 11291, Internal NAD memo, Dec. 1910. 
75 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, SNA to MNA, 30 Dec. 1910; SNA to Sec. for Public Works, 
30 Jan. and District Engineer to SNA, 13 Feb. 1911. 
76 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, Supt. NBL to RM, PE, 14 June 1911. 
77 CeA, NTS 156 1703/f348, Inspector NBL to RM, PE, 29 May and Actg. SNA to Sec. 
for Finance, 10 Oct. 1911. 
78 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, Minister of Finance to Minister of Native Affairs, 19 Sept.; 
Minister of Public Works to MNA, 9 Nov.; MNA to SNA, 22 Nov.; Medical Officer, 
-
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Illustration 3. 3 Semi-detached huts erected in New Brighton, 
April 1912 (Central Archives , Pretoria). 
Illustration 3.4 Entrance to the House of the Superintendent, 
New Brighton (SAP Museum Archives , Pretoria) . 
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'single' men and 25 families. However, this additional accommodation provided no more than 
an outlet for the overcrowding at New Brighton itself. And the provision of further 
accommodation was put on hold because the question of whether the state or local authority 
should bear the responsibility was being thrashed out. 79 Meanwhile, the NAD found itself in 
the awkward position of having to refuse Africans, who were obliged to live in New Brighton, 
admission to the Location. 80 A raid on 33 houses in the early hours of a morning in June 1911 
revealed 124 persons residing illegally in the town. It was estimated that at least three times that 
number of Africans lived within the Municipality in contravention of the Native Reserve 
Location Act, but that the Police and Sanitary Department were reluctant to evict them on 
account of the inadequate accommodation in New Brighton. 81 
In 1912 a member of the Advisory Board noted that "many people wish to come to New 
Brighton to live", and that outsiders regarded it as a good place in which to live. 82 The 
apparent greater willingness of Africans to reside in New Brighton, according to the 
Superintendent, reflected shifting perceptions about the Location. He reckoned that the attitude 
of the Africans toward the Location had changed for they were now "as eager to get into it now 
as at one time they were eager to get out of it". This may have had something to do with the 
fact that the curfew was enforced in town, including peripheral areas like Korsten, but not New 
Brighton. The Superintendent also reckoned that the greater number resident in Korsten would 
move to New Brighton voluntarily, and only those "who have a good deal to fear from strict 
supervision would require compulsion". 83 The Resident Magistrate, W.C. Scully, made known 
his view that it was impossible under the circumstances to compel people to reside in New 
Brighton. H{)wever, he made an exception and found room for any known 'bad character' or 
professional criminal because of the machinery which existed in the Location for exercising 
control. 84 He claimed more than his fair share of credit for overcoming the objections of the 
'respectable Natives' to residing in New Brighton.85 From 3 604 in 1911, the population 
NB to SNA, 25 March 1913. 
79 CeA, NTS 156 1703/f348, Actg. SNA to Sec. for Finance, 4 Jan. 1912. 
80 CeA, NTS 2442 11291, Actg. SNA to Actg. Sec. for Finance, 3 Aug. 1911. 
81 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, Report by Chief Sanitary Inspector to PETC re 'Natives in 
Town', 28 Aug. 1911. 
82 CeA, NTS 156 3575/12/f348, Minutes of the NBAB, 18 June 1912. 
83 CeA, NTS 2442 11291, Supt. NBL to Magt., PE, 9 May 1912. 
84 CeA, NTS 2442 11291, CC and RM, PE to SNA, 23 May 1912. 
85 W.C. Scully.' My Reminiscences' (unpublished manuscript), Ch. XVI, p. 2 cited in J. 
Marquard, 'A Neglected Pioneer in South African Literature: W.C. ScuJJy' (Ph.D. 
Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1984), p. 103. 
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peaked at 5 378 in 1913 before declining to 4 114 the following year. Thereafter, New 
Brighton's population increased steadily and reached 4 711 in 1918.86 
Persistent appeals by local officials and the Advisory Board to the Government to alleviate the 
acute shortage of accommodation in New Brighton were to no avaiL 87 The possibility of the 
imminent transfer of New Brighton to the control of the PE Municipality ruled out this 
possibility [see Chapter 4]. And the delay in effecting the transfer only served to exacerbate the 
problem of congestion and the generally deplorable living conditions in New Brighton. 88 Whilst 
the PECC accused the Government of shirking its responsibility by not providing sufficient 
accommodation in the Location, 89 it had itself shown similar neglect and parsimony in 
--pftw.iding housing an~Ls~rvices for its own poorer classes.Jhe Influenza Epidemic Commission 
~ recommended that immediate attention be given to poor housing and s urn conditions in Port 
By the end of the decade, the housing shortage had reached critical proportions owing to the 
influx of both Africans and 'poor whites' caused by the drought in Port Elizabeth's hinterland. 
It was estimated that there were in excess of 1 200 Africans residing illegally in the city .91 The 
Housing Committee Report of 1920 reckoned that apart from New Brighton, there was a 
shortage of over a thousand housing units in Port Elizabeth. The Committee also singled out 
Port Elizabeth as "the most insanitary town they visited". The Chief Sanitary Inspector's only 
saving grace was that he had been away on active service for the duration of the First World 
War. His deputy had been unable to withstand the vested interests of slumlords in the PECC 
and obtain the necessary authorisation for the demolition of dwellings condemned as unfit for 
human habitation. In this regard, the Housing Committee commented that municipal officials 
and prominent citizens who "should be looked to to give a lead in bettering the living conditions 
in the town" were exploiting the shortage of available housing for their own ends.92 And the 
86 Report of the Native Affairs Department for the years 1913 to 1918, U.G. 7- 1919, p. 
88, Annexure G. 
87 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, Supt. NBL to Magt., PE, 23 Jan. and Minutes of NBAB, 4 Feb. 
1919. 
88 EPH 6 June 1919 (Letter from 'Straightforward'); CeA, NTS 2443 4/291 Supt., NBL 
to Magt., 16 June and Minutes of the NBAB, 19 June 1919. 
89 PEA 3 April 1920 ('Natives Forced into Town'). 
90 Report of the Influenza Epidemic Commission, U. G. 15 - 1919, cited in EPH 7 Aug. 
1919. 
91 CeA, NTS 2442 1 /291 , Supt. NBL to Magt., PE, 30 Oct. 1919 and Chief Sanitary 
Inspector to Chairman of the Public Health Committee, 28 Apr. 1920. 
92 Report of the Housing Committee, U.G. 4- 1920, pp. 14-17. 
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provisions of the Housing Act of 1920 which authorised the central government to assist local 
authorities in funding sub-economic housing schemes were of no consequence insofar as 
lmlleVifatllng_coa:~~EI-U¥Ul~g-cc:ooD.Indwi.tltiDJons-iR-New Brig~ton lalas CQ~ed. In the first place, thes 
. funds were not available for African housing and, secondly, the PECC did not have jurisdiction 
ver New Brighton. 
When the PECC assumed control of New Brighton, accommodation was at a premium. A 
number of families were residing in kitchens attached to the dwellings in the location. The 
Municipality decided to regularise the situation and convert these into makeshift dwellings. 
Accommodation was available in the following types and quantities:93 
Married Quarters 
TABLE 3.3 
ACCOMMODATION IN NEW BRIGHTON, 1924 
Grade A : 2 rooms and kitchen with verandah 
Grades B and F : 2 rooms and kitchen without verandah 
3rd Grade : partitioned into 2 rooms with outside kitchen 










Grade C: partitioned into 2 rooms with outside kitchens _.62 
1.J.ll 
Third Grade and Grade C were the same type of structure, utilised for families and 'single' 
men, respectively. The allocation of these units depended on current demand. Although the 
SMQ accommodated little over 600 people, it was estimated that there were as many as 2 250 
people in this category, of whom 1 530 were males, living in New Brighton. Thus the majority 
of adult singles actually lodged with families in the married quarters. At least half the tenants 
of these dwellings had lodgers. And in many cases these lodgers were not single persons, but 
families. The adult population numbered 4 800, which comprised about 2 250 couples. With 
a population of 3 400 children under the age of 16 years, this meant that the average household 
had more than seven occupants. And bed (or, in some cases, space) occupancy was little 
different in the married and the single quarters as there was an average of 4,5 persons per room. 
93 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1276, Supt. NBL to TC, PE, 29 Aug. 1924. 
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The total population of about 8 200 was therefore far in excess of the optimum number of 
residents for which there was accommodation in New Brighton.94 
Robinson has recounted how publicity given to the appalling living conditions in New Brighton 
by two clergymen sparked a controversy in 1925.95 In order to alleviate the congestion in the 
Location, the PECC erected a total of 60 'better class' three- and two-roomed brick cottages in 
1926.96 Preference was given to those tenants who were considered capable of paying the 
relatively high rent, and applications from Africans resident in the city and Korsten were, with 
few exceptions, turned down. 97 A further 250 houses and a hostel to accommodate 244 'single' 
men were constructed thereafter. There was considerable resistance on the part of 'single' men 
to move into the SMQ when it was opened in January 1929. The principal objection was having 
to pay a rent of 9s. per month which was three times the fees charged for previous 
accommodation for 'single' men.98 In order to compel them into the new SMQ, the 
administration resorted to setting a standard rent for 'single' men wherever they lived in the 
Location.99 In addition to the badly needed accommodation, two eating houses, three shops, 
an administration block, and charge office and police barracks were erected. 100 The entire 
scheme became known as 'Newtown' or more colloquially as the 'White Location'. These 
structures were erected with a view to greater permanency than those in the 'Red Location', but 
also at a significantly greater cost because of the use of unskilled white labour in accordance 
with the Government's 'civilised' labour policy. 
The erection of 'Newtown' and the departure of a considerable number of migrants from New 
Brighton during the Depression temporarily relieved the congestion in the Location. 
TABLE 3.4 
NEW BRIGHTON'S POPULATION, 1928-1933 
.1228 1929 1930 1931 1.232 1933 
Males 4 079 3709 3 918 3 742 3 225 3 338 
Females 3 315 3 438 3 409 3 291 3 332 3 369 
Total 7 394 7 147 7 327 7 033 6 557 6 707 
94 PE Municipality, Mayor's Minute for 1924, pp. 28-9. 
95 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', pp. 164-5. 
96 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1276, Supt. NBL to NAC, 4 May 1927. 
97 CAD, 3/PEZ 111277, Report of Supt. NBL, 14 June 1928. 
98 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1277, Reports of the Supt. NBL to the NAC, 24 Jan. and 21 Feb. 1929. 
99 For a fuller account of this episode, see Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', pp. 181-3. 
100 PE Municipality, Mayor's Minute for 1928, City Engineer's Report, p. 53. 
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Figure 3.2 LAYOUT PLAN OF THE OLD LOCATION, NEW BRIGHTON 
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The Table shows that while the number of males decreased quite significantly, the numLcr of 
females remained fairly constant. By 1930, there were as many as three to four hundred 
vacancies in the SMQ (including the hostel). 101 It is possible that many of the migrants did not 
depart the city itself, but moved to Korsten and Dassieskraal which was wedged between the 
city proper and New Brighton. In 1933 New Brighton's population comprised only about a third 
of Port Elizabeth's total African population of 20 549. 102 The majority lived in Korsten which 
had recently been incorporated within the PE Municipal boundaries. 
The Korsten removals and the establishment of McNamee Village, c.1934-1943 
The inclusion of Korsten within the PE Municipality had been on the cards ever since New 
Brighton had been incorporated. The PECC had initially baulked at this suggestion because it 
foresaw that the elimination or upgrading of slum areas would require extensive capital 
investment. And the Council's reluctance to tackle the housing problem is illustrated by the fact 
that during the 1920s the Municipality had built only 409 (economic) houses for Whites and 
Coloureds, 72 houses for Whites under the Assisted Housing Scheme, and 310 (economic) 
houses for Africans in New Brighton. 103 Thus Port Elizabeth was faced with a general housing 
crisis of significant proportions. But a Commission appointed to investigate the proposed 
extension of Port Elizabeth's municipal boundaries was swayed by arguments that the 
incorporation of Korsten and other areas on the periphery of the city under a single 
administration would facilitate the creation of segregated areas in the name of slum 
clearance. 104 Conditions of overcrowding and poor sanitation with their attendant health risks 
for the city at large, as well as increasing lawlessness and demands for land :t'ofindustrial 
increased pressure for municipal interventio . 
Korsten was incorporated within the PE Municipality in 1931 and the Medical Officer of Health 
(MOH) lost no time in advocating the removal of Africans to New Brighton. He pointed out that 
if the Urban Areas Act was to be enforced, then notices would have to be served on individuals 
requiring them to move; in other words, there could be no 'blanket' removals. Moreover, 
accommodation would have to be provided for those dislodged from dwellings declared 
101 CAD, 3/PEZ 111279, Minutes of the NAC, 17 Oct. 1930. 
102 CAD, 3/PEZ 111634, Return of TC, PE to NAD, 29 Nov. 1933. 
103 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', p. 197. 
104 Mayor's Minutes for 1927, Annexure entitled Report of the Port Elizabeth Municipal 
Boundaries Extension and Redistribution of Wards Commission, p. 16-23. 
105 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', pp. 199-210. 
59 
'insanitary'. 106 In terms of Proclamation No. 272 of 1933 issued under Section 5 of the Urban 
Areas Act, the PECC had the power to enforce the segregation of Africans in the urban area, 
and under the 1934 Slums Act the power to remove them from Korsten as part of a slum 
clearance programme. The PECC delayed applying the provisions of this legislation until July 
1935, when the MOH was instructed to notify Korsten residents whose dwellings had been 
singled out for demolition. 107 
As the PECC obtained the approval of the Central Housing Board (CHB) and NAD to effect 
the Korsten removals as a slum clearance programme, it qualified for loans on a sub-economic 
basis. The refusal of the Government to accede to an application for the use of non-union (i.e. 
unskilled African) labour in constructing the housing scheme in New Brighton created immediate 
concern about the viability of the scheme. 108 The Council consequently declined to avail itself 
of sub-economic loans from the Government as this would have entailed an equal loss ( 1 ,25%) 
by both parties and a departure from its previous policy not to subsidise African housing from 
ratepayers funds. The PECC was eventually constrained to accept the necessity for borrowing 
0,75% loans with the loss shared at a ratio of 2:1 in favour of the Municipality. 109 But this 
was not before it had explored cheaper alternatives for providing housing for Africans. One such 
proposal was the creation of a freehold 'Native Village' which would have involved the Council 
in no cost whatsoever. Another was the establishment of such a Village on a leasehold basis 
with municipal assistance. The first of these propositions was received far more favourably by 
the Advisory Board and the 'respectable classes' than the first, and both were endorsed by the 
Superintendent who argued that there was scope for them under the provisions of the Urban 
Areas Act. Eventually the NAC determined that the Native Village would be superseded by a 
sub-economic housing scheme. 110 
A Housing and Slum Elimination Committee was constituted by the PECC to oversee the 
programme. Initially it was planned to erect a scheme consisting of only 500 houses in New 
Brighton so as to remove pockets of Africans from insanitary dwellings in areas such as South 
106 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/5/5, MOH to NAC, 24 June 1931. 
107 CAD, 3/PEZ 111630, Minutes of the NAC, 10 March 1933 and 19 July 1935; Minutes 
of the Health Committee, 4 Feb. and of the PECC, 13 Feb. 1935. 
108 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/9, Memo re 'Housing in Relation to Slums Act 1934' by TC for 
NAC, 18 July 1935. 
109 CAD, 3/PEZ 111630, TC, PE to Native Commissioner, PE, 20 Feb. 1936; Robinson, 
'The Power of Apartheid', p. 210. 
110 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/10, Memo by TC, PE for NACre 'Proposed Establishment of 
Native Village', 16 July 1936. 
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End, Central and North End which were predominantly white. 111 But when it became apparent 
that there were considerable benefits to be had from a large-scale programme of slum 
elimination - such as the releasing of well-situated land for industrial development - it was 
decided to make a more thorough assessment of the situation in Korsten. In April 1935, the 
MOH completed a preliminary housing survey in which he estimated that Korsten's population 
of23 758 persons comprised 5 138 Whites, 5 082 Coloureds, 362 Asiatics and 12 456 Africans. 
There were 2 424 houses and 5 002 separately occupied yard-rooms, i.e shacks, comprising a 
total of 8 632 rooms. The average number of occupants per house was 6,89 persons and 1,43 
persons per shack. It was reckoned that only 297 of the houses were 'reasonably fit' for human 
habitation; 1 063 required minor alterations or repairs to bring them up to the same standard; 
941 required major repairs (requiring the houses to be vacated) before they could be made 
habitable; while 123 houses were incapable of repair or not worth repairing. As far as the 
shacks were concerned, it was recommended that 4 183 should be demolished. These figures 
indicate that more than 6 800 people would have to be removed from dwellings deemed 'unfit 
for human habitation' . 112 It was eventually decided to scale up the programme but downgrade 
the quality of workmanship: 
The plans finally adopted were the outcome of an endeavour to keep down costs to an 
absolute minimum so that the rentals would fall within certain prescribed limits [i.e. 16s. 
per month stipulated by the NAD] and yet all the essential requirements would be 
provided. 113 
The scheme, to be known as McNamee Village in honour of the Location Superintendent, was 
to consist of 3 000 houses and was commenced in November 1937. 114 
At the time,. New Brighton accommodated 7 715 persons. An estimated 1 356 dwellings were 
used as family quarters and 33 buildings as single quarters. The addition of the new dwellings 
would mean that the projected population of McNamee Village would be nearly three times that 
of the existing Location. The size of the undertaking was nearly ten times that of 'Newtown'. 
It was part and parcel of a larger and comprehensive scheme to build 5 000 houses in five years 
at a cost of £1 500 000. The amount was to be repaid over 40 years at an interest rate of 
0, 75%. All in all, the new housing scheme was a bold step by the PECC which became 
convinced that it might solve its housing problem and enforce residential segregation in one go. 
111 CA, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/8, Memos of TC and MOH to joint meeting of NAC and Health 
& Markets Committee, 26 June 1934. 
112 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/9, Report of MOH referred by Health & Markets Committee to 
NAC, 29 April 1935. 
113 G. Begg, 'Sub Economic Housing in Port Elizabeth', SA Architect (Nov. 1940), p. 306. 
114 EPH, 23 Nov. 1937. 
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Bubonic plague was discovered in Karsten after the completion of 100 houses of the McNamee 
Village scheme. As had been the case in the early 1900s, the discovery of about 25 cases of 
plague in 1938 provided the authorities with a post hoc justification for the removals. Because 
most of the deaths occurred in J(orsten, residents were subjected to a rigorous programme to 
combat its spread. The anti-plague measures included the removal of a victim to the Lazarett<? 
and anyone suspected of contact with the victim was isolated, their possessions and persons 
disinfected, their homes demolished and they were ultimately removed to New Brighton.m 
Cherry has pointed to the gulf between the perceptions of the local authority and former African 
residents of Karsten as to the circumstances in which the removals in the late 1930s 
occurred.''6 Unlike much of the oral testimony in which the removals are recalled as act of 
brutality, the authorities perceived that there was those who were not at all averse to moving 
to New Brighton. A leading liberal Councillor, Mrs E.M. Holland contended that" ... when it 
was known that plague contacts were being moved into the new houses after q~arantine, Natives 
crowded into plague houses in order to be eligible for one of the new houses" .117 And 
according to the MOH, other slum dwellers moved into houses in Karsten that had been 
earmarked for demolition a few days before the occupants were scheduled to be moved to the 
Location. He expressed concern that without proper registration of those scheduled for 
relocation, that there would be no way of ensuring that only bona fide Karsten residents would 
be removed. 118 It followed that if this practice was allowed to continue unabated then the 
original estimates for the number of people to be removed, as well as the number of houses 
needed in New Brighton would have been grossly under estimated. For whatever reasons, the 
total of those removed from Karsten was far greater than had been expected, and there was no 
concerted resistance to the removals. 
Another factor complicating the removals was that a considerable number of Africans owned 
propc:;rty in Karsten. Many still owed landlords money as they had not completed hire purchase 
115 D. Ferguson, Civilization for Africa (Port Elizabeth, 1981), pp. 26-27; Cherry, 'Blot on 
the Landscape', pp. 42-58; Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', pp. 200-1. 
116 Cherry, 'Blot on the Landscape', pp. 46-58, cites from the transcripts of numerous 
interviews conducted by Vista University students in 1987 (in my possession) which were 
not supervised or monitored. My own perception is that this testimony has to be treated 
with some caution as there is a tendency to confuse the removals of the late 1930s and 
late 1950s so that the qualitative experience of the one colours the other. 
117 E.M. Holland, 'An Experiment in Slum Clearance', Race Relations, 7, 4 (1940), p. 71. 
118 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/215/14, Memo of MOH re 'Influx of natives where slum clearance is 
taking place', 12 April 1940. 
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payments. A total of 483 lots with a valuation of nearly £47 000 were owned by Africans in the 
Municipality .119 Both the Advisory Board and the Vigilance Committee recommended that if 
freehold title was to be given in New Brighton in exchange for lots in Korsten, then the same 
facilities should be accorded to Location residents. 120 A proposal was made that those with title 
. should be expropriated and compensated, and given the opportunity of acquiring a piece of land 
to the west of New Brighton (i.e. Cradock Place) in lieu of their existing property in exchange 
on the basis of either freehold or leasehold title as may be mutually agreed upon. 121 Two years 
passed before the PECC invited African land owners in Korsten to notify it if they were 
interested in exchanging their land for a site in the proposed Relton Village, New Brighton. 
Dwellings could be constructed under an assisted housing scheme. The scheme was conditional 
on obtaining the necessary consent of the CHB and the CPA; if housing funds were available; 
and if a sufficient number of approved applications was received. 122 There were apparently no 
applicants but Advisory Board members claimed that not many residents had seen the 
advertisement. 123 At a subsequent meeting between the Board and the NAG: the Committee 
ruled out any chance of freehold being granted but it was decided to allow the Board to canvass 
New Brighton residents to ascertain whether there was a sufficient number (i.e. fifty) of 
residents interested in acquiring leasehold sites and building their own houses to make such a 
scheme viable. 124 As with the earlier proposal for a Native Village, the names of sufficient 
interested parties were not obtained and the scheme was abandoned. 
The fact that Korsten residents were given preference to new houses in McNamee Village 
aroused resentment from many quarters. The PECC's decision that lodgers in the old location 
would not be allowed to obtain houses in McNamee Village led to the Advisory Board 
recommending that additional houses should be erected to house such families. This was coupl~d 
to another recommendation that accommodation should be found in Schauderville for Coloureds 
occupying houses in New Brighton. 125 Residents of 'Newtown' who were paying considerably 
more rent than that paid by McNamee residents for houses of similar quality, also believed tbat 
119 Intermediate Archives Dept, Port Elizabeth (lAD), 25/196 No. 3, Return of Immovable 
Property in the Urban Area of Port Elizabeth owned by Natives (Form 'D'), Oct. 1938. 
120 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1282, Minutes of the NBAB, 22 April 1937 and 30 June 1938. 
121 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/12, Minutes of joint meeting of the Housing & Slum Elimination 
Committee and NAC, 6 July 1938. 
122 EPH 2 April 1940, Municipal Notice No. 66 of 1940. 
123 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/14/14, Minutes of the NBAB, 31 Oct. 1940. 
124 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2115/15, Minutes of meeting of NAC and NBAB, 10 March 1941. 
125 CAD, 3/PEZ 111282 and 1/3/2115/12, Minutes of the NBAB, 10 Feb. and 30 June 1938. 
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they had grounds for dissatisfaction. 126 A compromise proposal was made that the Council 
should approve the removal of as many single men as possible from Korsten to the brick houses 
in 'Newtown', while families already living in these houses should be afforded the opportunity 
to occupy the new dwellings in McNamee Village. As far as the PECC was concerned, this was 
. preferable to having to reduce the rents of the brick cottages in order to bring them in line with 
rents charged for the new sub-economic houses. 127 The City Treasurer, however, argued that 
such an arrangement was contrary to terms of the Slums Act whereby sub-economiC loans were 
granted by the CHB for the express purpose of clearing slums and not providing alternative 
housing to existing residents of locations. 128 But in 1940 a public meeting passed a resolution 
that long-standing residents and lodgers should be afforded the opportunity of acquiring better 
homes at reduced rates. This resolution was endorsed by the Advisory Board, with one member 
expressing the opinion that it was "unjust to give accommodation to newcomers and neglect the 
old residents" .129 The PECC, however, stood by its earlier decision that only former Korsten 
' 
residents would be rehoused in McNamee Village. ! 
By July 1941, a total of 2 568 houses had been constructed by private building contractors and 
handed over to the PE Municipality. The MOH reported that the number of houses occupied 
at McNamee Village exceeded the number of families transferred from Korsten by his 
Department. He implied that the discrepancy was not due to any· shortcoming on the part of his 
Department but on account of the administration's practice of allocating houses to existing New 
Brighton residents to relieve overcrowding in the older parts of the Location in defiance of the 
PECC's decision to make the elimination of the Korsten slum its first priority .130 In response, 
the Acting Superintendent, D.B. Naude, pointed out that most of these dwellings had actually 
been utilised for headmen, nurses, schools,- traders and members of the SA Police. He added 
that only in cases where tenants from Korsten had been found to be 'undesirable' were they 
evicted (and sometimes 'repatriated') and the vacant houses offered to lodger families from New 
Brighton. Naude expressed his concern that there were probably as many as one thousand lodger 
families already in the Location in need of their own dwellings. However, he gave the assurance 
that in future the Health Department would be informed whenever houses were vacant so that 
126 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/12, Joint Meeting of the NAC and NBAB, 27 June 1938. 
127 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/12, Minutes of the PECC, 10 Nov. 1937. 
128 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15112, Report re 'Assisted Housing for Natives' by City Treasurer 
to TC, PE, 25 April 1938. 
129 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/14, Minutes of the NBAB, 1 Feb. 1940. 
130 CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/11334, Reports of the MOH 12 June and 8 July 1941. 
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they might proceed with the slum clearance programme. 131 And upon return from leave, 
McNamee gave the added assurance that the Council's policy in regard to the letting of houses 
in McNamee Village would be "rigidly adhered to" .132 
The rate of construction of houses in McNamee Village depended very much on the availability 
of funds and building materials. In 1940, an average of about 150 families were being rehoused 
each month. From the second half of 1941, the rate of rehousing slowed down considerably to 
less than 70 families per month. By the end of 1942, the sum spent on McNamee Village 
amounted to more than half of the total of £1 276 138 spent on sub-economic housing 
altogether. The figure of £718 163 was considerably greater than the £570 100 originally 
budgeted but did not include a sum of £200 000 set aside for the expropriation of land in slum 
areas and compensation for demolished dwellings. 133 
The sum put at the disposal of the PECC by the Government for expropriation purposes in slum 
elimination was never utilised for that purpose. The PECC reckoned it was under no obligation 
to pay compensation to Korsten residents or slumlords as the latter, especially, had "made their 
capital over and over again by extortionate rents" . 134 The reasons for the PECC being able to 
evade paying compensation to owner occupiers of property condemned at Korsten under the 
Slums Act were: first, the phrase 'owner occupier' was interpreted in such a way that those who 
occupied part of the house themselves but let out rooms to others did not qualify; and secondly, 
it was not prepared to compensate persons who proposed to rebuild the condemned property at 
Korsten. The merits of these arguments and the imperious nature of the PECC's course of action 
occasioned considerable debate in the columns of the Eastern Province Herald. 135 Nonetheless, 
the money was diverted into the building programme for the erection of more houses in 
McNamee Village. 136 
The PECC suspended all sub-economic building activities in mid-July 1942 for six months, 
seriatim. Later in the year, the H&SEC decided to review the situation and ascertain the number 
131 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/15, Report of the Supt. NBL, 19 July 1941. 
132 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/15, Report of the Supt. NBL, 12 Aug. 1941. 
133 CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/1/122, Report of City Treasurer re Sub-Economic Loan Moneys 
Available for Native Housing, 19 April and Minutes of the H&SEC, 11 May 1943. 
134 University of the Witwatersrand, A.D. Rheinallt Jones Papers?, R.P. Hannam to 
Rheinallt Jones, 10 Aug. 1937 cited in Cherry, 'Blot on the Landscape', p. 57. 
135 Correspondence in the EPH 23 Aug. (From 'Korstenite'), 28 Aug. (From 'Citizen', 
NBV) and 2 Sept. 1941 (From W.W. Jabavu). 
136 EPH 16 July 1941 and 13 March 1942. 
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of houses still needed to rehouse the remaining occupants of insanitary dwellings in Korsten. 
They extended the brief to include an assessment of the extent of overcrowding in New Brighton 
itself and the number of houses needed to rehouse lodger families and those living in the tin 
kitchens. 137 The Superintendent reported that there was a shortage of 180 houses in New 
Brighton but that priority should be given to completing the programme of slum elimination. 
The Acting MOH calculated that about 1 824 Korsten families had still to be re-housed, and the 
Housing Committee requisitioned another report from the Engineers Department to investigate 
the possibility of departmental building of sub-economic houses employing black artisans at 
reduced wage scales. 138 The Report of the City and Water Engineer rejected this proposition 
on grounds that there was no merit in reversing the Council's previous policy of constructing 
buildings by means of awarding tenders to private contractors and that it was not expedient to 
pay wages below the standard rate. 139 
The central state also provided obstacles in the way of the PECC's bid to prevent further delay 
in or the discontinuance of building operations altogether. The CHB refused to sanction the loan 
of further funds for building sub-economic homes until municipalities had met certain 
preconditions. The principal requirement was that plans for such dwellings should conform to 
specifications of experimental houses of the type introduced in Brakpan. It also insisted that 
these be built under the supervision of the City Engineer and by municipal labour rather than 
by private contractors. 140 Only when the CHB reduced its demand to the erection of a 
minimum number of experimental houses and the City Engineer reluctantly agreed to supervise 
the operation, was the PECC in a position to authorise further building activities in McNamee 
Village. These were, however, on a relatively small scale involving the sum of £8 800. Apart 
from the eight experimental houses, additional houses for the poor aged, shops, market stalls, 
and public facilities were to be built. The remainder of the abovementioned amount of £200 000 
was put aside for additional houses after the experimental houses had been built. 141 
Escalating costs and a shortage of building materials during the latter stages of World War Two, 
137 CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/1/122, Minutes of the H&SEC, 13 Oct. 1942. 
138 CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/111/122, Report of Supt. NBL re 'Housing Accommodation- New 
Brighton', 11 Nov.; Report of Actg. MOH, 23 Nov. and Minutes of H&SEC, 24 Nov. 
1942. 
139 CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/1/122, Report of the City & Water Engineer to the H&SEC, 26 Jan. 
1943. 
140 CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/11122, Minutes of the H&SEC, 3 Nov. and PECC, 12 Nov. 1942. 
141 CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/11122, Minutes of the H&SEC, 26 Jan. 1943; EPH 6 Feb. 1943 
('New Housing Projects'). 
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as well as the non-availability of funds, threatened to curtail the PECC's housing programme 
still further. The costs of the sub-economic housing scheme exceeded the original estimates by 
an amount of £275 223 or nearly 19% over and above the budget. The contract price of Type 
'A.B' Houses had actually dropped from £163.10.1 per house in November 1937 to as little as 
£139.0.3 in September 1939. But following the outbreak of hostilities, the price had risen quite 
steeply to £208.4.1 per unit in April 1942.142 This represented an increase of nearly 50% in 
building costs over a period of less than three years. In these circumstances, the City Treasurer 
recommended that the PECC await the fall in building costs - of both labour and material -
which he expected to accompany the cessation of the War. He also warned that further building 
operations would be liable to increase the deficit on the NRA and the consequent contribution 
from the (white) ratepayers which he estimated would amount to half a penny in the£ when the 
present sub-economic schemes had been completed. 143 Heeding the City Treasurer's advice, 
the PECC decided to reject the recommendation of the H&SEC that 50 economic houses be 
erected as an experiment in assessing building costs. Instead, it deferred housing schemes for 
a further six months at the end of 1943.144 
The frrst phase of the PECC's sub-economic housing programme lasted five years. During this 
period, the number of persons removed from slum properties and allocated houses was as 
follows:-
TABLE 3.5 
SLUM DWELLERS REHOUSED IN PORT ELIZABETH, 1938-42'-45 
Ay~. size 
Families Persons of famil~ 
Whites 552 2 482 4,5 
Coloureds 2 220 10 877 4,9 
Africans 3 322 15 613 4,7 
Total 5 936 28 249 
By far the majority of those relocated were living in Korsten, and the majority of these were 
142 CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/1122, Report of City & Water Engineer to H&SEC, 15 Feb. 1944. 
143 CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/111/122, Report of the City Treasurer re 'Necessity for Additional 
Housing: Preliminary Considerations', 29 Sept. 1943. 
144 EPH 24 Dec. 1943 ('PE Housing Problem'); The Guardian 30 Dec. 1943 ('Housing 
Problem'). 
145 D.L. Ferguson,' A Notable Housing Undertaking', SA Medical Journal (Apr. 28, 1943), 
p. 128. 
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Africans who were relocated to McNamee Village. When complete, McNamee Village 
comprised 3 506 two-, three- and four-roomed brick dwellings with iron or asbestos roofs which 
were supplied with electricity and water-borne sewerage. 
An anonymous contributor to The South African Outlook who had paid a series of visits to 
McNamee Village in the 1940s described the semi-detached houses as being of uniform 
construction but with sufficient diversity and variety so as to not to give a monotonous 
appearance. Each house had its own garden in which residents grew grass lawns and flowers 
or cultivated vegetables, and was fenced in by trim hedges. There was every indication of "a 
wholesome house pride" and a "self-respect and standard of living that were almost 
unbelievable". A Sunday afternoon stroll throught the streets, evinced no drunkenness or 
rowdiness, but rather a general atmosphere of contentment and friendliness. The writer 
commented that "one could imagine oneself in an English country town". 146 The impression 
was almost idyllic. A contemporary water-colour painting by the artist, George Pemba, who is 
known as the 'father of township art' and whose work is renowned for its realism, depicts a 
scene not unlike that described above [see Illustration 3. 7]. In the view of Cllr Adolf 
Schauder, a prime mover behind the scheme, it was "a spontaneous tribute to the European 
authorities who have provided comfortable and attractive housing for Natives as a substitute for 
their former primitive accommodation". 147 Even if one ignores the patronising and paternalistic 
attitude of Schauder, there seems to be no reason to doubt that Pemba himself had a favourable 
impression of the Village. 
With the construction of McNamee Village, the PECC claimed that New Brighton was a 
'model' location and that they were 'uplifting' the city's African population. By this time, as 
many as a third of Port Elizabeth's population was living in municipal houses. The PECC went 
to considerable lengths to publicise its achievement and thereby propagate a 'liberal' and 
'progressive' reputation. 148 It also received many accolades for its sub-economic housing 
scheme from visiting dignitaries. In July 1941 the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Native Affairs had described Port Elizabeth's "gigantic social achievement" as "the closest 
146 Anonymous', 'Impressions of the McNamee Township at New Brighton', The South 
African Outlook, V. LXXI (1 March 1941), pp. 46-48. 
147 A. Schauder, 'Generous Housing for South Africa's Natives', Optima, 3, 4 (1953), p. 
2 note. The painting (which is in the possession of the Schauder family) is reproduced 
between pp. 2 and 3 of the article. 
148 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', pp. 180-188; 210-225. 
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Illustration 3.5 Henen's Trading Store, New Brighton. 
(SAP Museum Archives, Pretoria) . 
.. 
Illustration 3.6 Houses in McNamee Village (Lantern). 
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Illustration 3.7 Scene in McNamee Village. Water-colour painting 
by George Pemba, c.1944 (Optima). 
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approach to a municipal miracle I have seen". 149 And during a ceremony the following month 
to mark the erection of the 3 OOOth house of the scheme, the Minister of the Interior and Public 
Health had pronounced it "a model for the whole country" .1so 
Post World War Two Housing Schemes in New Brighton, c.1944-1953 
In March 1944, the Government proposed a new scheme for the provision of sub-economic 
housing because many local authorities - including the PECC - were not prepared to undertake 
further building for fear of incurring financial losses. Essentially, the proposals would have 
involved the transfer of the land required for housing schemes from the local authorities to the 
Governor-General in trust. Local authorities would be paid for the land, the cost of which would 
be charged against the housing scheme. Capital costs would thus include the cost of building 
and land, as well as all services rendered. The land and the properties, thereafter, would be 
vested in the Union Government and local authorities would become agents of the latter in 
respect of housing. They would implement housing schemes subject to the approval of the 
Government, which would acquire funds required at whatever rate was payable at the time on 
Government loans. tst The PECC was not alone amongst the municipalities which did not 
favour the transfer of housing schemes to Government ownership as it constituted "a negation 
of the principle of local autonomy". 152 The proposals were unequivocally rejected by the PECC 
because in its view the loss on sub-economic housing borne by local authorities should not 
exceed 1,25%, and because the principle of differential rentals - to be determined according to 
wage levels - was considered unsuitable to South African conditions. 153 At the end of June, 
the matter came up for discussion again when it became known that the Government intended 
making a s1,1m of £8 000 000 available for a programme of national housing in the twelve 
months commencing 1 July 1944. But the two-thirds vote necessary to rescind the April 5th 
resolution was not forthcoming and, consequently, the PECC adhered steadfastly to its position 
that it would not erect further houses under prevailing conditions. 154 
149 EPH 28 July 1941. 
150 EPH 13 Aug. 1941 ('City Housing of Africans'). 
151 Synopsis of this scheme is based on two documents in CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/1/122, re 
Government's Proposals for National Housing Schemes by Cllrs J.S. Young and J.S. 
Neave, 22 March and the City Treasurer, 23 March 1944. 
152 CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/11122, TC, Cape Town to TC, PE, 25 March and Minutes of 
H&SEC, 28 March 1944; EPH30 March 1944 ('Union Plans for Housing Unacceptable 
to Municipalities'); EPH 31 March 1944 ('Government's Housing Plan Criticised'). 
153 EPH 6 April 1944 ('New Housing Proposals Rejected by the City Council'). 
154 EPH 30 June 1944 ('Union Housing Proposals/No Alteration of Council's Policy'). 
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The Housing Amendment Act of 1944 conferred on the National Housing and Planning 
Commission (NH&PC)- the successor to the Central Housing Board- the authority to institute 
building programmes. But the Government had no intention of taking over this responsibility 
from the municipalities. It would only provide housing when local authorities did not have the 
.... ____ means and would sustain financial losses if they used funds borrowed at market rates._ Unable 
to own land itself, the NH&PC would build on municipal land at reasonable prices fixed by 
negotiation. In the case of Port Elizabeth, the NH&PC undertook to build 300 houses as its 
contribution to alJeviate the housing shortage in the city. However, the Government would not 
interfere with building schemes initiated by private enterprise or the PECC. 155 Despite the 
PECC's previous record in providing sub-economic housing, its insistence that the construction 
of housing should take place only on its terms exacerbated the city's already acute housing 
shortage. With the cessation of the Second World War and the return of demobilised soldiers 
seeking accommodation, the need for housing for all sections of the community became 
acute. 156 ! 
Karsten's total population had nearly halved in ten years (from 28 057 in 1936 to 15 473 in 
1946). Although the African population had declined in real terms, it had actually increased as 
a proportion of the total population and numbered 10 344. By 1946 the population of New 
Brighton had reached 26 387, of which 8 517 and 17 870 were resident in the old Location and 
McNamee Village, respectively. These trends are indicative not of the failure of the Korsten 
removals as such, but rather of the rapid influx of Africans into Port Elizabeth between 1936 
and 1946. The African population resident in the city and its periphery increased from 25 702 
to 37 789 during this period, an increase in excess of 85%. 157 
In order to cater for the burgeoning African population, the PECC eventually authoiised the 
construction of 'austerity' houses, as well as timber dwellings from old motor car packing cases 
in areas adjacent to McNamee Village. The 'austerity' houses were the first in the city to be 
built with unskilled African labour. The scheme was named Boastville, after the then Manager 
of Native Administration. It consisted of 312 two- and three-roomed brick houses with iron 
roofs. 158 The latter scheme was known as Kwaford and derived its name from the fact that the 
155 lAD, 251169 No. 4, Interview with Director of Housing, 7 Aug. 1945. 
156 See, for example, reports in the EPH 5 June 1946 ('City's Need in Housing') and 12 
March 1948 ('City Housing Problem'). 
157 lAD, 25/196 No. 3, Census Returns showing Population of Municipal Housing Schemes 
and other Suburbs within Wards 6 and 7, 1946. 
158 EPH 24 Feb. and 21 May 1948. 
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wooden crates were donated by the Ford Motor Company. When completed, it consisted of a 
total of 974 two- and three-roomed wooden houses with asbestos roofs. 159 But unlike the 
earlier sub-economic housing schemes, these projects did not have as their object the immediate 
elimination of slum dwellings and neither did they represent a major attempt to alleviate the 
housing shortage for Africans. Rather, they were viewed as stop-gap measures to arrest the 
housing shortfall while the question of who should be responsible for African housing was 
resolved. 160 
In 1951 the PECC obtained a loan of £209 651 from sub-economic national housing funds for 
a scheme of 900 houses at Elundini. The municipal labour unit which had worked on the 
Boastville scheme was employed to build a number of houses on an experimental basis in order 
to ascertain likely costs. It was found that dwellings could be constructed at the cost of £171 
per unit using unskilled African labour, whilst white labour would add at least £60 to the cost. 
But when tenders from private building contractors were called for the 2 700 house scheme, the 
lowest received was for £45 222 or about £275 per unit. And the PE Master Builders estimated 
that it would be impossible to build the type of house designed for Elundini at less than £310 
per unit. 161 The first phase of Elundini was completed during 1952-3 when approximately 300 
squatter families were removed from the Dassieskraal and Korsten areas. 162 The scheme 
eventually comprised a total of2 502 two-, three- and five-roomed brick under asbestos houses. 
It included a small hostel which provided quarters for 540 'single' men. 
By 1953 New Brighton consisted of an assortment of housing schemes; from the fifty-year old 
dilapidated wood and iron structures of the 'Red Location' to the brick dwellings of McNamee 
Village and the timber 'austerity' homes of Kwaford. Although administered as a single unit, 
the township accommodated a cross-section of the African community whose social conditions 
varied considerably. 
159 EPH 5 and 10 June 1948. 
160 lAD, 25/196 No. 3, City Treasurer to TC, PE, 20 Aug. 1948. 
161 Evening Post 14 Aug. 1951 ('Native Houses at £310 Estimate'). 
162 Repon of the Native Affairs Depanmentfor the years 1952-3, U.G. 48- 1955, p. 31. 
Illustration 3.8 New Brighton residents present Adolf Schauder with 
portrait of himself as Mayor by George Pemba (Jewish Affairs). 
Illustration 3 _ 9 K waford house built from packing cases donated by 





THE ADMINISTRATION OF NEW BRIGHTON, c.l903-1953 
The constitutional position of Africans in the 1909 South Africa Act was ambiguous. Section 
85, read with Section 81 , vested the control of the local authorities in the Provincial 
administrations, while Section 147 reserved to the Governor-General-in-Council (i.e acting on 
the advice of the Cabinet) the control and administration of 'native affairs' throughout the 
Union.' As Supreme Chief of all Africans in the country, the Governor-General was granted 
the authority to legislate by proclamation in respect of African affairs. A Native Affairs 
Department was established and the Minister assumed responsibility from his predecessors in 
the four colonies. But the Union N AD's jurisdiction over Africans resident in areas administered 
by local authorities was ill-defined. There was uncertainty as to whether an arm of the central 
state should be granted powers of interference beyond those specified by Acts of Parliament. 
The Minister of Native Affairs retained the right to intervene in respect of regulations 
promulgated by municipalities. On the other hand, the principle that urban local authorities were 
responsible for Africans within the municipal boundaries was upheld in the principal legislation 
pertaining to urban Africans. 
Only in the Cape Colony had there been exception to the principle that local authorities should 
assume responsibility for urban Africans. The Colonial Government established two locations 
under the Native Reserve Location Act (40 of 1902). These were Ndabeni and New Brighton 
outside of Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, respectively. This chapter will first examine the 
workings of the administrative system of New Brighton in terms of regulations passed under the 
Native Reserve Location Act and its amendme . hereafter, it_ ~ill discuss the ~an_sf:~ o~-~e~ _r 
, Brighton to the control of the Municipality in .?3. T~m:t-Eliza9eth..Ci~ (PECC) \ 
took a_Qecade t~ apply- ili{;t:JrbaJi-Areas Act-::to_New- Brighton. Thus the Location was/} 
administered for thirty years in terms of the Native Reserve Location Act: for twenty by th1J 
central state- the Cape Colonial and Union Governments in succession- and for a further ten 
by the PECC. Dualism remained a feature of the administration of New Brighton during this 
time. 
Although the local authority bore direct responsibility for New Brighton from 1923, the Minister 
of Native Affairs and the NAD was capable of some degree of intervention in the administration 
I Report of the Native Laws (Fagan) Commission, U.G. 28- 1948, p. 3. 
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of the Location. The final section of the Chapter will describe the system of administration 
practised by the PECC. Some comparison will be made between regulations enacted in 1933 
when the Urban Areas Act was applied and those existing previously. This account of the 
administration of New Brighton will, therefore, give attention to the changes and continuities 
between that of the central and local states. 
The administration of New Briehton by the central state, 1903-23 
Before Union, similar but by no means identical legislation pertaining to urban Africans existed 
in the former colonies and ex-republics. Municipalities controlled and administered locations 
either in terms of municipal by-laws or through legislation passed by the central governments. 2 
But neither the powers granted by statute to the local authorities, nor the practices of the central 
governments in the erstwhile colonies and republics were easily reconciled. Some had sought 
to restrict the actions of local authorities, whilst others had allowed "every latitude in the control 
of the Native population". 3 Only the Cape Colony experimented with the idea that central 
government should assume responsibility for urban Africans. The Native Reserve Location Act 
provided for the creation of locations outside of municipal boundaries under state supervision. 
As already mentioned, only two such locations were established. Thus even in the Cape Colony, 
state control of urban Africans remained the exception rather than the rule. 
The Native Reserve Locations were subject to the dual control of the Departments of Justice and 
Native Affairs. Administratively, the location was under the supervision of the Inspector and 
later Superintendent of Natives (or more commonly the Location Superintendent) who was 
appointed by the NAD. In matters of law, the Superintendent was directly answerable to the 
Resident Magistrate (RM) whose authority was at first delegated to an Assistant Resident 
Magistrate. The ARM presided over the weekly periodical court at which residents charged with 
petty criminal offences and contravention of location regulations appeared. In 1905, the office 
of ARM was abolished on account of financial constraints and the Superintendent was accorded 
the powers of a special justice of the peace with the powers to dispose of all minor cases.4 
Although he served as an officer of the court, the Superintendent was not vested with unfettered 
legal powers. The Resident Magistrate (or his designate) exercised effective judicial authority 
2 T.R.H. Davenport, 'The Beginnings of Urban Segregation in South Africa: the Natives 
(Urban Areas) Act of 1923 and its Background', ISER Paper, Rhodes University, 1971, 
pp. 1-6. 
3 Report of the Native Affairs Department for the years 1913 to 1918, U. G. 7- '19, p. 14. 
4 Cape Archives Depot (CAD), Native Affairs (NA) 602 f1594, ARM, NBL to SNA, 23 
Nov. 1905. 
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over the Location/ and so dual control continued. 
The fact that the principle of single control gave residents a definite 'head' or figure of authority 
was something in it's favour. The control of New Brighton was virtually a 'one man job' 
performed by the Location Superintendent. 6 As his designation implies, he was responsible for 
the general supervision and administration of the Location. He was assisted by an administrative 
and maintenance staff which included clerks, interpreters, sanitary workers, general labourers, 
and so on. They were expected to keep the books, complete returns of revenue and expenditure, 
process and deliver mail, maintain buildings, etc. The Superintendent and other white officials 
lived in quarters in the Location which meant that they were always in touch with the situation 
and well acquainted with many of the residents. 
Many of those appointed as Location Superintendents had experience in the military or police, 
and others had been in the employ of the Justice Department. Such backgrounds invariably 
produced officials who were strong on discipline. But their major qualification for the job was 
usually the accumulated expertise from lengthy service in the NAD.7 During the period of 
central state control, only one of the incumbents served long enough to stamp his personal 
authority over the administration. Evelyn Grattan was appointed Acting Inspector in 1908 and 
obtained a permanent position the following year with the recommendation of the Chief 
Magistrate, W.C. Scully, who was obviously impressed by his abilities. He called Grattan 'a 
tower of strength' and reckoned that if given his due, he would one day hold an important 
position. 8 In 1923 he requested a transfer within the NAD rather than accept service in the 
employ of the PECC for reasons which are not quite clear.9 We do not know much about his 
career, let alone his private life. He once offered.to.gi¥e a. series oflectures on 'Native' history 
5 Central Archives, Pretoria (CeA), Native Affairs (NTS) 156 1905/12/£348, SNA to Sec. 
for Justice, 17 May 1912. 
6 CeA, NTS 2442 11291, Supt. NBL to Magt., PE, 5 Sept. 1922. 
7 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', p. 161. 
8 CAD, NA 734 £348, Magt., PE to SNA, 9 Feb. and 3 June 1909. 
9 Grattan accepted a parallel move to Herbert in the Transkei where he acted as 
Superintendent of Natives. He later claimed to have made the decision on account of the 
unsuitability of Port Elizabeth's climate for his wife's health. She either made a 
remarkable recovery within two years or he appeared to have regretted this decision and 
made enquiries about the possibility of reinstatement as Superintendent at New Brighton. 
This did not occur because he admitted to having published letters under a pseudonym 
in which he criticised the administration of New Brighton by his successor. He retired 
to Port Elizabeth where he died in July 1929. See CeA, NTS 2442 11291, Grattan to 
USNA, 12 May 1923; CAD, 3/PEZ 113/15/2/3, Minutes of NBAB, 25 July 1929. 
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to New Brighton residents. Whether he fancied himself or was regarded by others as an 'expert' 
in this field is impossible to say. 
Initially, the Superintendent and his staff of African constables were responsible for the 
maintenance of law and order. They could obtain assistance from the South African Police 
(SAP) in the performance of their duties, but the latter generally undertook only criminal 
investigation work. In 1918 these constables were attested to the SAP, and a white non-
commissioned officer was placed in charge of the New Brighton police station. However, this 
arrangement appears to have caused some friction between the Superintendent and the NCO, as 
well as considerable dissatisfaction amongst residents. It also amounted to the introduction of 
dualism with regard to the policing of New Brighton. Within the space of little more than a 
year, the Superintendent resumed overall responsibility for the policing of the location. 10 One 
Native Sergeant and 13 Constables were under his jurisdiction. Of these, the Sergeant and 7 
Constables were deployed in police work proper, whilst the remaining Constables were known 
as W ardsmen of Headmen and performed other duties in assisting the Superintendent and SAP 
maintain control in the Location. 
The Headmen were placed in charge of wards and were responsible for ensuring that all 
residents were in possession of registration cards, paid their rents, and for conducting daily 
inspections and reporting all cases of sickness, death, and so on. 11 But their duties went far 
beyond their primary function of seeing that regulations were observed. They were expected to 
help uphold law and order. To this end, they were appointed as peace officers in terms of Act 
31 of 1917 (as amended) and, as such, had powers of arrest. They were expected to assist the 
police when necessary, especially in conducting raids for illegal liquor and beer brewed in 
contravention of the regulations. They were also- required to settle minor disputes between 
residents of their wards according to custom, and even intervene in domestic disputes when 
necessary. They served as the 'eyes and the ears' of the Superintendent, through their 
surveillance of and passing on of information about residents to the authorities. Drawing on 
Foucault's analysis of the relationship of knowledge and power, Robinson has suggested that 
10 CeA, NTS V178 1177/1914/f435, Evidence to and Report of the Committee of Enquiry 
into the System of Controlling the Police at New Brighton Reserve Location, PE, 9 and 
10 Dec. 1919. See also CeA, NTS 2443 4/291, Minutes of the NBAB, 18 Dec. 1919. 
11 CAD, NA 635 b2196, ARM to SNA, 26 Jan. 1904; Union of South Africa, Reports of 
the Native Affairs Departments for 1911, U. G. 10 - 1913, p. 12 and Report of the Native 
Affairs Department for the years 1913 to 1918, U.G. 7-1919, p. 17; CeA, NTS 2442 
1/291, Supt. NBL to Magt., PE, 5 Sept. 1922. 
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the New Brighton administration was able to subject residents to strict control. She regards this 
as a vital aspect of what she terms Port Elizabeth's 'location strategy' .12 
The abovementioned registration cards, which were passes by another name, constituted a vital 
component of the 'location strategy'. In terms of Section 11(15) of the Native Reserve Location 
Act the Colonial Governor was empowered to prescribe and regulate "the issue of passes to 
natives entering or leaving any Native Reserve Location", and provide for "the registration of 
all such natives". Consequently, regulations were promulgated for this purpose and applied to 
New Brighton. 13 These registration cards served a threefold purpose: determine eligibility to 
vote in Advisory Board elections, provide a record of rent payments and a means of restricting 
access to and from New Brighton. The location was fenced off and people entering had to report 
their presence to the Superintendent within 24 hours or were liable to be prosecuted. Registered 
New Brighton residents had to carry their cards with them at all times as it had to be produced 
on demand. Early morning raids to flush out unregistered (and non-paying) residents were a 
commonplace occurrence. Rents were, at this time, to be paid in advance on a monthly basis 
and failure to do so could lead to eviction. There was, however, no 'effective deterrent' to non-
payment of rents until an amendment to the Native Reserve Act made provision for the 
prosecution of absconders (who could be traced). 14 All in all, the 'location strategy' ensured 
an extraordinary degree of regimentation in the daily lives of New Brighton residents. 
At first, New Brighton had its own Resident Medical Officer. However, this post was made 
redundant in the late 1910s and the District Surgeon served as the Medical Officer instead. He 
paid three routine visits to the Location per week and was also expected to attend emergency 
cases when required. The day-to-day medical supervision and treatment of residents was the 
responsibility of the District Nurse. Stock medicines could be obtained from the dispensary 
every day. Cases of infectious diseases and serious illnesses were admitted to the Location 
Hospital. If more specialised treatment was required, residents could be admitted to the 
Provincial Hospital. All attendance, medicines and hospital treatment were free of charge. 
Strictly speaking, residents paid a nominal fee of 6d. per month as part of the service charges 
and which comprised a proportion of the rent. 15 
12 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', pp. 161-7. 
13 CeA, NTS Vl78 1703/f348, Memo of SNA to Prime Minister, Mar. 1908. 
14 Cape of Good Hope, Blue Book on Native Affairs for 1904, G. 12- 1905, p. 70. 
15 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, Supt. NBL to Magt., PE, 5 Sept. 1922. 
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After Union, the charges for sanitary and maintenance services were transferred from the budget 
votes of the N AD to the PWD. This meant that the latter Department took over these functions 
and employed the personnel to carry them out. This led to frequent differences between these 
PWD and administrative (i.e. NAD) staff as to the measures necessary to improve sanitary 
conditions, especially in New Brighton. In 1918 it was proposed to return to the previous system 
whereby the NAD had complete jurisdiction over the Native Reserve Locations in order to avert 
problems associated with dual control. Another reason for favouring control by a single 
government department was that it would simplify the keeping of the Location accounts and 
enable calculations to be made to ascertain whether the NRA was self-supporting or not. 16 
The Transfer of New Brighton to the PE Municipality 
The administration of the Native Reserve Locations by the central state became increasingly 
anomalous and anachronistic. It had become apparent that the central state lacked the capacity 
to implement a policy to ensure the effective control of urban Africans without the co-operation 
of the local authorities. 17 But owing to the possible change in administration procedures 
envisaged in the Natives (Urban Areas) Bill whereby municipalities would assume control, the 
Government proved reluctant to make changes.'8 Neither could the central state claim that the 
administration of Ndabeni and New Brighton was something on which local authorities should 
model their own systems. In an internal NAD memorandum, it was conceded that the 
administration of Ndabeni and New Brighton was far from exemplary. It stated: 
The territorial separation of races is the cornerstone of the Government's native policy 
and the compulsory residence of natives in a location is one of the main provisions of the 
Natives (Urban Areas) Bill. Where carrying out of this policy is already in the hands of 
the Government it is therefore necessary, not only as an earnest of the sincerity of its 
expressed policy but as an example to the local authorities which it wishes to see assume 
the responsibility, that the Government should undertake_ the duties involved in the 
application of the principle in no niggardly spirit. 
The self-indictment went further: 
During the past few years the NAD has taken every opportunity of impressing upon local 
authorities what is due from them in the interests of black and white alike to their Native 
population and it is felt that we should be able to point to locations for which we are 
responsible as modyls of what ought to be rather than have them cast in our teeth as 
proof of our own ineptitude to practice what we preach. 19 
16 CeA, NTS 2443 8/291, Sec. PWD to SNA, 12 Jan. 1918. 
17 Robinson, 'A perfect system of control', pp. 29 and 36. 
18 CeA, NTS 2443 8/291, NAD Internal Memo, 18 Jan. 1918. 
19 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, Memo of SNA to the MNA, 31 Jan. 1919. 
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This amounted to an admission on the part of the N AD that central government control of urban 
Africans had proved a failure. Nor was it in keeping with the direction of urban state policy. 
In actual fact, the 1918 Urban Areas Bill included contradictory objectives. On the one hand, 
it was committed the principle of local option and, on the other hand, "to give the Government 
larger power of control over local authorities in regard to_native administration". 20 Unlike the 
Cape, the Union Government accepted without reservation the principle of municipal 
responsibility for Africans in the Urban Areas Act. 21 
With the Urban Areas Act still having to be finalised, the Native Reserve Location Act was 
amended (by Act 49 of 1918) to facilitate the transfer of Ndabeni and New Brighton to-their-
respective municipalities. In both instances the transfer was delayed. In the case of Cape Town, 
on account of the intention of the City Council to first close Ndabeni and establish a new 
location (to be known as Langa); and in the case of Port Elizabeth, in order to allay the fears 
of the Council and residents as to the ramifications of the transfer of control/ The local press, 
meanwhile, accused the Government of having abdicated its responsibility for the town's African 
population, and took the lead in campaigning for the incorporation of New_ Brig_hton.--inttfthe 
~
The possibility of the imminent transfer of New Brighton to the control of the PE Municipality 
caused the NAD to place on hold "any large scheme of improvements involving heavy capital 
expenditure" .23 The PECC was itself troubled by the fmancial implications of assuming 
responsibility for New Brighton. Certain Councillors expressed the view that the city would be 
inheriting an economic millstone from the central state because the Location was in drastic need 
of upgrading, a cost which would have to be borne-by the Council and-was likely to meet with 
stiff opposition from white ratepayers. 24 A deputation which met the Prime Minister obtained 
a gurantee that all land and buildings which comprised the New Brighton grant and which was 
valued at about £50 000, would be transferred at no cost to the Municipality.25 Nonetheless, 
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adequate accommodation, and improvements to the sewerage, water supply and roads. A request 
that these matters be attended to before transfer took place was turned down by the NAD. 26 A 
second PECC deputation sent to interview the SNA in December 1921 was also informed that 
the Government was not prepared to provide additional accommodation nor repair existing 
buildings. 27 However, the Government agreed that if the PECC took over New Brighton as it 
stood, then it would hand over the farm Cradock Place and Deal Party on condition that: 
(a) an area of 1 500 morgen would be reserved for the purpose of a Native location; 
(b) any portion of the 1 500 morgen under (a) not immediately required for location 
purposes may be leased temporarily to Europeans provided that any revenue accruing in 
respect of such leases shall be paid into the Native Revenue Account; 
(c) the remaining 977 morgen could be disposed of by the PE Municipality, the proceeds 
thereof to be paid into the Native Revenue Account. 28 
The rationale for allowing the PECC to sell or lease portions of the New Brighton grant was 
that it would provide a means to finance the improvements which the Council wished to effect 
and ensure an annual income for the NRA which would offset administrative c9sts. Moreover, 
the NRA was to be credited with the considerable value of the land and other assets paid for by 
central government. Making allowances for depreciation, buildings were valued at £36 450 in 
1923. The Deal Party site was valued at £9 320, giving a total of £45 770. 29 If the value of 
the site and buildings on Cradock Place are added, it can be adduced that the Union Government 
handed over land and buildings worth nearly £50 000 free of charge when New Brighton was 
transferred to the PEM. Even though there was a shortage of accommodation and the existing 
housing stock was in a bad state of repair, there was nothing to suggest that the PECC was 
taking on an economic burden. Indeed, not only did New Brighton appear to be capable of 
fmancing itself, its NRA had been given capital assets by the Union government. 
The central and local states chose to ignore the concerns of New Brighton residents throughout 
the negotiation process. African opinion had been totally opposed to the Location being brought 
under the control of the PECC. At a public meeting held in New Brighton in May 1920, the 
residents expressed reservations about such a step for it was thought likely that the PECC 
would: raise rents; charge grazing fees for stock; charge for treatment and medicines at the 
dispensary and the Provincial Hospital; abolish the Periodical Court; replace the African police 
26 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, TC, PE to SNA, 26 Jan. and reply 25 Feb. 1921. 
27 CeA, NTS 2442 l/291, Transcript of an interview between the SNA and representatives 
of the PECC re transfer of NBL, 13 Dec. 1921. 
28 CeA, NTS 2442 11291, Note from SNA to MNA, 25 April 1922. 
29 CAD, 3/PEZ 11701, Insurance Schedule appended to TC, PE to Sec., Divisional 
Council, 15 Aug. 1923. 
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with white members of the SAP; and devise new forms of taxation. In short, residents wanted 
some sort of guarantee from the PECC that it would not unilaterally make changes to the 
administration of New Brighton. 30 Although by its own admission the central state's 
administration of New Brighton left much to be desired, residents reckoned that it had greater 
resources for the provision of essential services than the local state. The New Brighton 
community took the strongest exception to giving the PECC a free hand in disposing of a 
portion of the ground set aside for African occupation. It was thought that the leasing rather 
than the outright sale of the 977 morgen was more likely to guarantee income for the NRA in 
the long term. 31 A member of the Advisory Board likened the PECC to an elephant which 
pretended to be the mother of the pups of a jackal (i.e. New Brighton residents) and succeeded 
only in crushing them when they were thinking to get shelter. 32 The deep-seated suspicions 
harboured by the African population and projected by this analogy can, presumably, be 
attributed to the manner in which the Council had reneged on its promise to provide security 
of tenure when residents of the former municipal locations were relocated to a new single large 
location. Yet, such fears appear to have been allayed somewhat following a meeting between 
an Advisory Board deputation and members of the PECC's Finance Committee.33 In any event, 
it was realised by this time that the transfer of New Brighton to the PE Municipality was 
inevitable and all that remained was to try secure the best terms possible. 
Further delay in transferring New Brighton to the PE Municipality was caused by the insistence 
~e:( the Provincj~L~dministrator that. ~Or!£ten ·sho~ also be ~cl;-dedwilliih -thelllunicipality. , 
~rsten_was- a..Divisional Council area situated between the municipal bound~ies_ID!d New..sJ 
Brighton [see Figure 4.1]. Although the Administrator - like the local health authorities -
regarded Korsten as a slum and consequently a public health risk, the latter were not 
immediately prepared to take on the additional responsibility of administering the area. 34 The 
Administrator's objections were overcome by an agreement (which was not made public 
knowledge) that the inclusion of Korsten would be waived in the event of the Korsten Village 
Management Board being abolished and replaced by a Local Board under Ordinance No. 11 of 
1921. This would accord the CPA greater powers than it would otherwise have had over a VMB 
30 CeA, NTS 157 9711919/f348, Supt. NBL to RM, PE, and 1 June 1920. 
31 CeA, NTS 2443 4/291, Magt., PE to MNA, 27 June and reply, 31 Aug. 1922; Minutes 
of the NBAB, 24 Aug. 1922. 
32 CeA, NTS 2443 4/291, Minutes of the NBAB, 12 Sept. 1922. 
33 CeA, NTS 2443 4/291, Minutes of the NBAB, 19 Oct. 1922. 
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with respect to the provision of essential services and the enforcement of regulations. 35 The 
grant of the Location and the farms. Cradock Place and Deal Party to the PECC was approved 
in principle by Parliament in ~uly 1922. However, it could only be effected after the PE 
Municipal boundaries were extended to include New Brighton. This_ was duly_ done in June __ 
1923,36 and the control, administration and maintenance of the Location was vested in the 
PECC with effect from 1 August 1923.37 
The administration of New Brighton by the PE City Council, 1923-53 
New Brighton continued to be administered under the Cape's Native Reserve Location Act and 
the existing regulations remained in force. It was intended that the Location be brought under 
the Urban Areas Act pari passu with the proclamation of new regulations based on this Act. For 
reasons previously discussed, New Brighton was brought under the (amended) Urban Areas Act 
from 1 March 1933,38 and the new regulations took effect a month later. 39 The PECC held 
that these regulations for New Brighton were based on the NAD's 'Model Regulations' but some 
undoubtedly more closely resembled existing ones promulgated in terms of the Native Reserve 
Location Act. A perusal of the two sets of New Brighton regulations provides some indication 
of the accuracy of this statement .. 
During the ten year interregnum before the application of the Urban Areas Act, the procedure 
for promulgating regulations and establishing guidelines for the administration of New Brighton 
was regularised. Such matters were initially placed on the agenda of the Finance, Town Lands 
and General Purposes Committee. The low priority accorded 'native affairs' by this Committee 
was partly responsible for the controversy about conditions in the ~cation which caused the 
35 CeA, NTS 2442 11291, Prov. Sec. to Administrator, 17 Feb. 1923. 
36 Cape of Good Hope Provincial Gazette, Proclamation No. 140 of 15 June 1923. 
37 Government Gazette, Proclamation No. 175 of 17 Aug. 1923. 
38 Government Gazette, Notices No. 42 and 244 of 24 Feb. 1933. 
39 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/1517, Report of the Location Superintendent, 9 March 1933. 
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Council to dismiss its Superintendent and appoint a separate standing committee in 1926 to be 
known as the Native Affairs Committee.40 The Superintendent submitted a monthly report 
along with the minutes of the Advisory Board to the NAC. Copies of the NAC's minutes were, 
in_turn, attached to theagend~ circulated to City Councillors [See Figure 4._2: Floli! [)iagram _ 
Representing Administrative Changes in New Brighton]. The Superintendent reported back to 
the Advisory Board on the recommendations of the NAC and the resolutions of the Council. 
Consultation with the Board seldom went any further because the Council was under no 
obligation to explain its decisions to the Board for the latter had no statutory powers [see 
Chapter 8 for further discussion of Advisory Board]. 
The Urban Areas Act defined or prescribed the powers and duties of urban lodal authorities and 
their officials with respect to the African population within areas under their jurisdiction. 
Although New Brighton remained exempt for a decade, the remainder of the city had been 
included within the ambit of the Urban Areas Act from 1923. Under Section 11(2) of the Act, 
a Native Commissioner was appointed to Port Elizabeth with effect from 1 October 1928. He 
was entitled to inspect "any location, native village or native hostel and any premises upon 
which Natives are accommodated in any urban area falling within the magisterial district of Port 
Elizabeth". 41 This implied the continued operation of dual authority with respect to the 
administration of Port Elizabeth's African population. Thus the PE Municipality did not have 
complete autonomy as far as 'native affairs' was concerned, as administration was still subject 
to interference from the Departments of Justice and Native Affairs. 
The apparatus to administer locations usually consisted of a municipal Native Affairs 
Department or Native Administration Department (MNAD) headed by a Location 
Superintendent or (in the larger municipalities) a Manager of Native Affairs. The extension of 
the responsibilities of the staff beyond the confines of the Location did not work in practice. 42 
Nonetheless, there was an increase in personnel from 1923 to 1948 which is shown below: 
40 PE Municipality, Mayor's Minute for 1927, p.7; Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', 
pp. 164-5. 
41 Government Gazette, Notice No. 1865 of 26 Oct. 1928. 
42 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', p. 207. 
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TABLE 4.1 
Comparison of Native Administrative Staff, 1923 and 1948"3 
Location Administration Native Administration Department 
1923 1948 
Administrative 
Superintendent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * 1 
Clerk ........................ *1 
Clerks/Interpreters . . . . . . . . 4 
General 
Charwomen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
Maintenance 
Carpenter/Foreman . . . . . . . . . * 1 
Labourer ..................... 1 
Medical 
District Surgeon . . . . . . . . . . . . * 1 
Nurses ....................... 2 








Constables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Headmen ..................... _Q 
Total ......................... 42 
*Whites 
Manager of Native Affairs ........................... *1 
____ Assistant Manager _ _ ................. ,_._ .... , ... _* 1 
Sub-Accountant (Treasury) ................. *1 
Senior Clerks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *3 
Revenue Clerks ................................... *2/4 
Junior Clerks ............................... 5 
Social Workers ............................... 2 
Housing Supervisors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Artisans .................... ·/· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Senior Nurse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Nurses ....................................... 12 
Midwives ...................................... 6 
Foreman ....................... ·-· ............. 1 
Chief Headman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Assistant Chief Headman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Headmen ..................................... -11 
Total ....................................... 65 
The headmen listed in right-hand column were not charged with upholding law and order and 
were not therefore, strictly speaking, police. The SA Police (SAP) took over these functions 
from the beginning of September 1927. The Sergeant and two of the Constables were replaced 
by Whites. 44 By 1948 the SAP detachment consisted of a warrant officer and 4 White 
43 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/674, Questionnaire completed by Supt. NBL re Information about Native 
Townships, 25 Feb. 1923 and Mayor's Minute, Annual Report of the Manager of Native 
Affairs, New Brighton for the Year ended 31 Dec. 1948, p. 54. 
44 Mayor's Minute 1927, pp. 8-9; CAD, 3/PEZ 111276, Supt. NBL to NAC, 8 Sept. 1927. 
... 
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constables, as well as 6 African sergeants and 25 constables. Thus for comparative purposes the 
total staff in 1948 should be given as 101. As can be seen from the above Table, Whites held 
not only the senior administrative positions but comprised an increasing proportion of the staff. 
Regular representations made to the authorities that a greater number of Africans should be 
appointed were to no avail. 
As was the case prior to 1923, the Location Superintendent was responsible for the routine 
management of New Brighton affairs. As Manager of Native Affairs and head of the MNAD 
from 1937, his task became more bureaucratic in nature. An Assistant Superintendent helped 
with the day-to-day running of the Location. One Superintendent conceived of his role to be that 
of replacing the tribal chief in assisting the African to adjust to city life.45 As an 'urban chief 
by appointment rather than by virtue of any claims to legitimacy, the standing of the 
Superintendent vis-a-vis the community was regarded by a Government Inquiry as crucial to his 
success: I 
where the official [Superintendent or Manager of Native Affairs] has gained the respect 
of the Natives, is possessed of personality and experience, and is sympathetic yet 
impartial in his dealings with the Natives, there one finds a contented community .46 
In New Brighton the Superintendent was undoubtedly a pivotal figure. He obtained the co-
operation of certain community leaders and their followers by dispensing patronage. But the 
workings of clique politics will be the subject of further discussion in Chapter 8, and we must 
now return to strictly administrative matters. 
The first Superintendent to be employed by the PECC was the retired 63-year old ex-Magistrate 
William Gibbon Bellairs. 47 He had been able to take the position at short notice when the 
incumbent, Grattan, had declined to accept a transfer to the employ of the PE Municipality. 
Following the aforementioned controversy in 1925 when Bellairs had clashed with a prominent 
City Councillor and been made the scapegoat for the administrative shortcomings and poor 
conditions in New Brighton, the NAC resolved to dispense with his services and appoint a 
45 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/1517, Memo re 'Native Administration' by TC, PE to NAC, 27 Feb. 
1933 which includes report re 'Native Admmistration Department' by Supt. NBL, 18 
March 1931. 
46 GP S. - 42, para. 62. 
47 For biographical information see CAD, NA 512 291 for file on Bellairs early career in 
the Departments of Justice and Native Affairs; 3/PEZ 1/674 for job application and 
testimonials, and Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', pp. 160-2. 
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younger man. He was eventually forced to take retirement at the end of August 1926.48 
Bellairs's successor, James Percival ('Paddy') McNamee was 45 years old when he was 
appointed as Location Superintendent in New Brighton. Having been employed as Inspector of 
Grahamstown's locations for nearly ten years and being fluent in Xhosa, he met the only two 
qualifications for the position: "experience of Native Administration and a knowledge of Native 
languages". 49 He came not only with the recommendation of his previous employers but also 
that of Dr Loram of the Native Affairs Commission.50 A member of the Committee that 
appointed McNamee believed that he was likely to give meaning to the adage that "new brooms 
sweep clean". Unlike his predecessor, McNamee enjoyed the confidence of the PECC and was 
allowed to exercise a relatively high level of administrative discretion. 51 
In his very first report submitted to the NAC, McNamee advocated inter alia that firm steps 
' 
should be taken to prevent the abuse of the beer permit system. His conduct in refusing to 
renew permits and evicting transgressors was declared to be 'high-handed' and 'irregular', and 
he was accused of having meted out "unjust, unfair and harsh treatment" against residents. 52 
He also earned the nickname uGilifatyi (literally 'he who destroys barrels') on account of 
vigorous campaign to clamp down on illegal brewing in New Brighton [see Chapter 6 for 
further discussion of this theme]. Neither did McNamee escape charges of partiality in allocating 
houses or being party to corruption despite his claims to a clean administration. In fact, 
irregularities related to the allocation of accommodation continued throughout the 1930s. 
McNamee was, however, given a vote of confidence whenever maladministration was alleged. 53 
This established a pattern and McNamee continued to receive the backing of the Council for his 
aci.iuns during his lengthy period of service as Superintendent. 
48 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1489, Minutes of NAC, 3 Dec. and Bellairs to Mayor, PE, 10 Dec. 
1925. 
49 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1489, Municipal Notice No. 36 of 1926 .. 
50 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/674, Testimonials accompanying Grattan's letter of application for the 
position of Location Superintendent at New Brighton, 21 April 1923. Although a firm 
favourite for the post, he was passed over in favour of Bellairs because he could not take 
it up immediately. 
51 J. Robinson, '"Progressive Port Elizabeth": Liberal Politics, Local Economic 
Development and the Territorial Basis of Racial Domination, 1923-1935', GeoJournal, 
22 (1990), p. 301. 
52 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1276, Attorney L. Luyt to Supt. NBL, 16 April and Report of Supt. 
NBL, 19 April 1928. . 
53 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1281, Minutes of the NAC, 19 July 1933. 
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Certain safeguards against the abuse of the Superintendent's powers did exist. In 1934, New 
Brighton residents were granted the right to appeal to the Magistrate against "any action of the 
Location Superintendent or official of the Council charged with the administration of the 
regulations" .54 Although not anticipating undue interference from the Chief Magistrate in the 
. management of the Location, McNamee expressedreservatiOfi:S about ~is regulation because it 
might "create in the minds of the residents the idea of dual control" .55 But McNamee should 
have anticipated that this provision would have been invoked against him when he ejected 
Location residents for repeated violations of the conditions under which beer brewing permits 
were issued. It was alleged that McNamee used his powers as defined in New Brighton's 
regulations rather arbitrarily. The matter was referred to the Chief Magistrate who acted as a 
Court of Appeal. The ruling on the matter was regarded by McNamee as having important 
ramifications for the administration of the Location and it was recommended that the matter be 
taken to a higher court. 56 Unfortunately, I have been unable to ascertain whether the matter was 
referred to the Supreme Court and what the outcome of the case may have ~een. 
The Location Superintendent and his family resided in a house described as a 'sprawling 
classically colonial building' [see Illustration 3.4]. According to his son's memoirs, McNamee 
tempered his authority with genuine affection for and interest in the welfare of residents under 
his charge. 57 McNamee was, by all accounts, a paternalist who administered the location as if 
it were a private estate. He prided himself on his familiarity with the residents, many of whom 
he knew by name. But it became impossible to maintain a professional let alone a personal 
interest in residents who numbered about 26 000 by the time he retired in 1945. In testimony 
before the Native Economic Commission, McNamee claimed to have no knowledge of 
conditions beyond the confines of New Brighton and that all his time was taken up with location 
affairs. 58 But as Manager of Native Affairs, his successor was expected to be familiar with the 
conditions of Africans throughout Port Elizabeth. 
The third Superintendent (or Manager of Native Affairs) during the period under review was 
Charles Travis Boast. A former senior Public Prosecutor, he was appointed Acting Assistant 
Superintendent while the incumbent, D.B. Naude, was on active military service. When the 
54 Cape Provincial Gazette, Government Notice No. 383, 21 Sept. 1934, p. 605. 
55 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2115/8, Supt. NBL to TC, PE, 7 Nov. 1934. 
56 CAD, 3/PEZ 111281, Report of Supt. NBL, 13 March 1935. 
57 J.P. McNamee, jnr., Unpublished Memoirs (1988), pp. 3-4. 
58 University of Cape Town Manuscripts, BC 630, K. 26 Evidence of J.P. McNamee to the 
Native Economic Commission, Port Elizabeth, 24 March 1931, p. 5945. 
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latter returned, Boast remained on as Additional Assistant Superintendent. And when McNamee 
retired with effect from September 1945, Boast was promoted above Naude to the position of 
Superintendent. 59 Boast had a reputation for following the letter of the law but his integrity was 
beyond repute. 60 Yet, he prided himself on always being available to township residents and 
apparently spent much of his time in consultation with them. 61 
The Location Superintendent was effectively an interlocutor or liaison between New Brighton 
residents and the local authority. He served as Chairman of the Native Advisory Board (NAB) 
and was also responsible for the selection of the PECC's nominees to the NAB, who numbered 
half of the Board members for most of the period under discussion. 62 This augmented the 
Superintendent's personal influence enormously. McNamee, for his part, claimed to have the 
necessary qualities to act as an impartial overseer of the Board's activities. 63 The NAC 
evidently concurred, for it ignored the recommendations of at least two Government 
Commissions that the Location Superintendent should not hold this office.64 And when NAB 
members proposed that a City Councillor act as Chairman of the Advisory Board, it respectfully 
suggested that this should not be construed as a personal attack on McNamee, but that an 
important principle was at stake. In their view, a Councillor was not an employee of the PECC 
like the Superintendent and his independence would safeguard the status of the Advisory Board 
as trustees of the Location residents. 65 The only concession made by the NAC was that it would 
meet regularly with the Board in the absence of the Location Superintendent, to enable it express 
grievances without fear ofrecrimination.66 It was not until 1948 that the NAC agreed to amend 
the regulations so as to permit an appointee of the NAC to act as Chairman of the Advisory 
Board. 
59 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2115/16, Minutes of NAC Sub-Committee, 27 Jan. 1943. 
60 Interview with Meyer Kaplan, Milnerton, 11 Aug. 1992. 
61 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', p. 285. 
62 In terms of the regulations under the Urban Areas Act the Board consisted of 3 elected 
and 3 nominated members. In 1940 it was enlarged to 8 members of whom half were 
nominated, and in 1949 further enlarged to 12 members of whom 8 were elected. 
63 Cape Archives Depot (CAD), Port Elizabeth Town Clerk's Files, 3/PEZ 1/1280, Memo 
of Supt. NBL re Native Economic Commission Report, 5 Aug. 1932. 
64 Report of the Native Economic Commission 1930-32, U. G. 22 - 1932, paras. 14-16; 
Report of the Conference between Municipalities and the Native Affairs Department in 
1937, U.G. 56- 1937, 20. 
65 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15118, Minutes of the NBAB, 23 March 1944. 
66 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15118, Minutes of meeting between the NAC and NBAB, 13 Oct. 
1944. 
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The SAP's assumption of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in New Brighton 
in September 1927 had considerable administrative implications. The advantage of cutting costs 
with the transfer of policing duties to the SAP, was offset by some loss of autonomy over the 
location by the PECC. Whilst the PECC might still frame the regulations, they were to be 
enforced by the SAP and interpreted by the courts. Previously, the police force had been subject 
to the Superintendent who had virtually single-handedly exercised jurisdiction over the location. 
The SAP detachment was smaller than the Council's law enforcement force had been, and 
consisted of different personnel. The 9 Native constables- excluding those who had also served 
as headmen and remained in the employ of the PECC - were reduced to six but two white 
constables were appointed. The Sergeant-in-charge of the SAP detachment was newly-
appointed.67 The working relationship established between the Superintendent and the police 
was now on a new footing and the situation was fraught with difficulties. 
With the notable exception of the Location Superintendent, most of the personnel had requested 
that they be transferred to municipal employ when the PECC took over New Brighton. Six of 
the Native Constables continued to serve as headmen and assist the Superintendent in ensuring 
that regulations were observed. But their duty of having to collect rent opened an avenue for 
bribery and corruption. One headman who apparently fell prey to temptation was Henry Nginza, 
a petty chieftain who married the Nurse Dora Jacobs [see Appendix C for biographical 
information]. Affidavits were signed by three Advisory Board members and 19 residents of 
Nginza's ward that they had not been issued with receipts for rent payments which they made . 
• 
Nginza was suspended and finally dismissea in- 1-923 for misappropriating rent payments.68 
Headmen were subsequently instructed to pay all rents and other revenue directly to the 
Clerk/Revenue Officer. w Although applicants for the position of headman were closely 
screened and remuneration reasonable (i.e. salaries of £6.10.0 per month plus rent free quarters 
in 1928r0 , this did not prevent a number from trying to augment their incomes over the years. 
Nginza was not the only headman to be dismissed by the administration for such offences. 
The positions of Chief Headman and Assistant Chief Headman were instituted by the PECC. 
Although these post~ were always advertised and appointments made on merit, an important 
criterion in the selection of headmen was that they should command the respect of the residents 
67 CAD, 3/PEZ 111276, Report of Location Supt. to NAC, 8 Sept. 1927. 
68 CAD, 3/PEZ 11725, Solicitors McWilliams & Elliott to TC, PE, 26 April 1924. 
69 CAD, 3/PEZ 11702, Supt. NBL to TC, PE, 20 Nov. (with affidavits) and 26 Nov. 1923. 
70 CAD, 3/PEZ 111497, Minutes of NBAB. 12 April 1928. 
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of New Brighton. In fact, it became customary for the Chief Headman to be a man of royal 
extraction. When the Superintendent chose to ignore such customs it led to considerable 
dissatisfaction amongst interested parties. 71 
The appointment of I.P. Msimka as Chief Headman in 1932 caused a ruction in New Brighton 
which eventually resulted in an administrative crisis. There was public opposition to Msimka's 
appointment on the grounds that he was not a suitable candidate on account of doubts as to the 
legality of marriage to his common-law wife (who happened to be a sister of A.F. Pendla) 
without properly annulling a previous relationship, and was neither a regular churchgoer nor a 
tee-totaller. 72 McNamee defended the appointment on the grounds that the position of Chief 
Headman was in future to consist of mainly clerical work rather than direct involvement in 
community and domestic affairs as had been the case with his predecessor. Msimka had been 
employed as clerk-typist since 1923 and had performed his duties satisfactorily. Nor had 
McNamee received any complaints as to Msimka's sobriety, marital status and attitude to the 
public. Moreover, the Superintendent pointed out that the appointment had not been submitted 
to the Advisory Board for its approval because the Council was under no obligation to do so, 
and that the appointment of officials was not a matter for the general public. He also claimed 
that certain unsuccessful applicants for the post were "endeavouring to raise an agitation· against 
the appointment". 73 
One who fell into this category was the Headman Ellison Ntsonga. His services were terminated 
in November 1934 ostensibly for neglect of his duties, 74 but more likely because he had alleged 
that Msimk~ was trafficking in illicit liquor, frequenting shebeens and providing protection in 
return for bribes from illegal brewers. 75 Allegations of misconduct were also made against the 
Sergeant-in-charge of the SAP and other New Brighton officials, including the 
Superintendent.76 Four members of the Advisory Board called for Ntsonga's reinstatement 
because, amongst other things, he was "a very exemplary headman from the point of view of 
Christian character" and "a leading member in his church". McNamee threatened to resign if 
71 Evening Post, 25 Feb. 1953, p. 4 (Letter: 'New Chief Headman'). 
72 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1490, G. Dubula, Asst. Sec. Vigilance Committee to Mayor, PE, 22 
March 1932. 
73 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1490, Supt. NBL to TC, PE, 22 and 24 March 1932. 
74 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1281, Reports of Supt. NBL, 26 Sept. and 8 Nov. 1934. 
75 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1490, E. Ntsonga to TC, PE, 29 Oct. 1934. 
76 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1490, Supt. NBL to TC, PE, 7 Nov. and Minutes of NAC, 9 Nov. 
1934. 
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this request was acceded to. 77 Although the Superintendent won this particular round, the 
matter was not laid to rest. Subsequently, a public meeting resolved to make representation to 
the Council for Ntsonga's reinstatement. The NAC again stood by its Superintendent, but 
requested that McNamee make some effort to put an end to the feud between Ntsonga and his 
supporters and the Location administration. 78 McNamee stated that he would welcome an 
enquiry into the matter for he believed that a clique was intent on discrediting him and 
disrupting the administration. 79 The ramifications of these events for community politics are 
discussed in Chapter 8. 
When the PECC had assumed control of New Brighton, public assurances had been given by 
the then Mayor that the weekly Periodical Court would be maintained. Unbeknown to the 
Council, the local Magistrate had recommended that the Court be retained "until the municipal 
authorities had acquired a complete grip of, and control over, the affairs of the location". Acting 
upon this advice, the Department of Justice announced in 1925 that in future all cases would be 
held at the Magistrate's Court in Port Elizabeth. 80 The Superintendent echoed the Advisory 
Board's objections to the abolition of the Periodical Court in the following words: 
As an object lesson to the inhabitants of the Location ... the Court has a very wholesome 
effect and, being in their midst where they can and do attend in large numbers, cannot 
fail to have a strong deterrent effect upon evil doers or those prone to commit crime, and 
thus tends greatly to the preservation of law and order. 81 
Aside from its purported capacity for moral suasion, the Mayor objected to the abolition of the 
Court on the practical grounds that the logistics of having to have Location Police in attendance 
at trials would divert them from their ordinary duties in New Brighton. 82 As a result of these 
representations, the Periodical Court was granted a years reprieve. 83 A further six months 
reprieve was granted in September 1926,84 but it was eventually abolished at the end of March 
1927. 
77 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1490, Report of Supt. NBL to NAC, 20 Feb. and Minutes of NAC, 22 
Feb. 1935. 
78 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1498, Report of the Supt., NBL, 5 June and Minutes of the NAC, 7 June 
1935. 
79 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/9, Supt. NBL to RM, PE, 12 July 1935. 
80 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1275, Magt. to TC, PE, 14 Sept. 1925. 
81 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1275, Supt. NBL to TC, PE, 3 Sept. 1925. 
82 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1275, Mayor, PE to Minister of Justice, 17 Sept. 1925. 
83 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1275, Sec. for Justice to Mayor, PE, 7 Oct. 1925. 
84 CAD, 3/PEZ Mayor, PE to Sec. for Justice for Justice, 10 Sept. and reply, 17 Sept. 
1926. 
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Some four years later, the PECC made representations for the re-establishment of a Periodical 
Court in New Brighton. Apart from reaffirming the contention that the Court served as a 
restraining influence on residents who might be contemplating committing criminal deeds, it was 
held that more consistent sentences for the same offences would eventuate. 85 As from 
September 1931, a 'branch' rather than a 'periodical' court held weekly sittings in New 
Brighton and heard cases of a minor nature. 86 But two years later, a resolution at a public 
meeting called for the discontinuance of the court because it caused delay and inconvenience in 
the hearing of cases and increased charges had made it too expensive to defend cases. The 
Advisory Board suggested, instead, that representations should be made to the Magistrate and 
to the Side-bar of Port Elizabeth so as to address these questions. 87 Ironically, the Advisory 
Board itself expressed itself in favour of the abolition of the Court in 1935, only to have its 
recommendation rejected by the NAC. 88 A remark by Attorney J.H. Spilkin to the effect that 
the branch court was "nothing but a debt-collecting agency for the Superintendent", 89 may have 
reflected a common sense perception. For his part, McNamee was of the opinion that the efforts 
from time to time to have the New Brighton branch court abolished were instigated by certain 
(unnamed) legal practitioners. 
Conclusion 
Robinson has depicted the 'location strategy' as peculiar to Port Elizabeth. It's features 
included: registration certificates with which to control the entry of inhabitants, the allocation 
of houses, and the payment of rents; the division of the Location into wards with close 
surveillance of residents by headmen and the Superintendent himself; and the control of social 
and political activities. These features developed during the period when the Location was 
supervised by the central state and were not devised by the PE Municipality. In fact, New 
Brighton had many things in common with Ndabeni - the other Native Reserve Location. If 
there was anything unique about the administration of New Brighton, it was the sytem of 
domestic brewing which is described in Chapter 6. 
The 'location strategy' was part and parcel of an administrative nexus for controlling the daily 
lives of Port Elizabeth's Africans. The measure of it's success depended on the availability of 
85 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1279, Report of Supt. NBL, 5 March 1931. 
86 CAD, 3/PEZ 111280, Report of Supt. NBL, 24 Sept. 1931. 
87 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1280, Minutes of NBAB, 19 Sept. 1933. 
88 CAD, 3/PEZ 111498, Minutes of the NBAB, 31 Jan. and Minutes of the NAC, 15 
March 1935. 
89 CAD, 3/PEZ 111281, Report of Supt. NBL, 29 Jan. 1936. 
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accommodation in New Brighton and the elimination of of alternative areas of residence in the 
Municipality or on it's periphery. But we have seen that the inability of the PECC to provide 
housing for a rapidly growing population from the late 1930s undermined the effectiveness of 
this mode of regulation- in the absence of influx controls. Low wages, the parsimony of white 
ratepayers, relatively high rents and resultant African resistance all made reliance upon the 
'location strategy' increasingly difficult as slum areas mushroomed in the war years. In its 
place, the PECC was pressured into applying central state legislation to control African 
population growth in the town. The eventual compliance with the central state's form of urban 
control was accompanied by, and remained dependent upon, the refmement and extension of 
earlier spatial and administrative methods of domination.90 We will discuss the reasons for the 
Council's eventual capitulation on this matter in Chapter 9. 
90 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', pp. 227-228. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RENTALS, REVENUE AND THE COSTS OF REPRODUCTION: 
THE FINANCING OF NEW BRIGHTON, c. 1903-1953 
In 1903 the Select Committee on the Cape's Native Reserve Location Act annunciated the 
principle that neither government nor municipalities should make a profit out of locations. 
Conversely, locations were not supposed to be an economic burden on municipalities or their 
ratepayers.' Echoing this viewpoint, the Secretary for Native Affairs informed the PE 
Magistrate that: 
[T]he Prime Minister does not desire that the Government should make any profit out 
of the Location, [but] he considers it a reasonable proposition that it should pay its own 
way.2 
This remained the guideline for financing the Native Reserve Locations- New Brighton and 
Ndabeni- during the twenty years when they were administered by the central state. Thus the 
Port Elizabeth and Cape Town Municipalities were effectively relieved of much of the 
responsibility and financial burden for the reproduction of their respective African workforces. 
Elsewhere, municipalities established locations for their African populations which were largely 
self-financing. The practice wherby local authorities used profits from municipal beerballs to 
provide facilities for their African workforces originated in Natal but became fairly 
widespread. In some instances, municipalities used revenue derived from their African 
populations to reduce the rates of white ratepayers.3 The 1914 Tuberculosis Commission 
recommended that any surplus income "be strictly devoted to the betterment of the location 
and the improvement of conditions", 4 and should not be appropriated to the general rate 
account. 
The 1920 Housing Act made it the responsibility of municipalities to accommodate their poorer 
populations. The extent to which Africans could be housed in segregated locations depended 
on the provision of accommodation in areas proclaimed for that purpose. Given the widespread 
use of white labour, at union rates, in the construction of municipal housing and the low wages 
1 Cape of Good Hope, Select Committee Report on the Native Reserve Location Act, A.15 
- 1903, p. 6. . 
2 Central Archives, Pretoria (CeA), Native Affairs (NTS) 157 97/19/348, SNA to CC, 
PE, April? 1903. 
3 Union of South Africa, Report of the Tuberculosis Commission, U.G. 34- '14, para. 
240; Report of the Housing Committee, U. G. 4 - '20, p. 30. 
4 U.G. 34- '14, para. 252. 
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of African tenants, the charging of economic rentals by municipalities was virtua11y out of the 
question. Municipalities were able to obtain housing loans at rates of interest below current 
lending rates from the central state from 1932.5 With sub-economic rentals, it could be argued 
that the local authorities (and, indirectly, the central state) were being asked to subsidise the 
. poor wages paid by employers. 
The Urban Areas Act upheld the principle that the provision of housing and essential services 
for the country's urban African population should be borne primarily by local authorities. In 
the words of the SNA: 
[I]t is a fundamental principle of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act that each local 
authority is generally responsible for the housing and control of the Native population 
necessary to meet the labour demands within its own area. 6 
Municipalities were required to create a separate Native Revenue Account (NRA) which was 
to be credited with all the revenue derived from rents, registration fees, fines, beerballs (if 
i 
they existed). Estimates of expenditure which included administration costs stich as salaries of 
officials had to be approved by the Minister of Native Affairs. When read together, Sections 
8(6) and (7) provided that local authorities could meet a deficit on the NRA either by an 
advance or by a subsidy from general revenue, or by a combination of the two. This implied 
neither that the NRA should be self-balancing, nor that the Act underwrote 'financial 
segregation'. 7 In other words, the Urban Areas Act did not actually legislate for the financial 
self-sufficiency of the locations. 8 
In spite of the legislative situation, the stipulations of the Urban Areas Act with regard to the 
NRA were often deliberately ignored or abrogated. Most local authorities, including the 
PECC, were subjected to pressure by their ratepayers and sought to restrict expenditure on 
locations to no more than the revenue derived from residents. Alternatively, they relied on 
revenue derived from beerball profits to bolster the NRA. Because there were no beerballs in 
New Brighton, the administration placed much emphasis on securing rent payments. The issue 
5 R. Humphries, 'The origins and subsequent development of Administration Boards' 
(M.A., Rhodes University, 1983), p. 10. 
6 Cape Archives (CAD), PE Town Clerk's Files, 3/PEZ 1/1282, SNA to TC, PE, 15 
Jan. 1938. 
7 R.J. Randall, 'Some Reflections on the Financial Policy of Certain Municipalities 
towards the Natives within their Boundaries', South African Journal of Economics, 7 
(1939), p. 149; R.H. Smith, 'A Criticism', ibid., 8 (1940), pp. 272-3; Randall, 'A 
Reply', ibid., pp. 287-8. · 
8 Humphries, 'Administration Boards', p. 6. 
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of rents proved to be a constant source of friction between residents and the PECC. 
Employers, too, were generally unwilling to carry the costs of labour reproduction and resisted 
paying economic wages or subsidising housing for their African employees. Ratepayers, who 
were mainly white, also reckoned themselves to be under no obligation to subsidise essential 
and social services for cheap domestic labour. Thus Africans themselves rather than 
municipalities (and, by implication, white ratepayers) bore their costs of reproduction. The 
purpose of this chapter will be to ascertain exactly who paid for the reproduction of Port 
Elizabeth's African workforce. 
The Financin~ of New Brighton by the Central State, 1903-1923 
The PE Town Council declined to assume responsibility for the establishment of New Brighton 
from fear that it might prove a financial burden. A group of merchants saw the Municipality 
foregoing a potentially valuable asset or source of revenue as a location could be profitable or, 
at the very least, self-supporting. 9 But they were not either prepared to finance the scheme. 
In the event, New Brighton was established and financed by the Cape Colonial Government 
which made quite a substantial outlay. The farms known as Cradock Place and Deal Party 
were purchased at a cost of £20 000 after protracted negotiations with the owner, a certain Dr 
Galpin. 10 
In seeking to recoup some of its capital outlay, the Colonial Government set the exhorbitant 
rents of 30s. and 25s. for family accommodation and 8s. for single men in New Brighton. 11 
Although these rents included free medical and sanitation services, they were far in excess of 
the charges in existing municipal locations. In the latter, annual rates which comprised a site 
rent and charges for water, cleaning and latrines amounted to £1.8.6 per annum. 12 Unable to 
attract tenants and with (as yet) no means to compel Africans to leave Korsten, the Native 
Reserve Location Act Select Committee recommended that rents be reduced. 13 The authorities 
were compelled to make further rent reductions in the years that followed: 
9 Eastern Province Herald (EPH) 6 Sept. 1901 ('What PE Wants'). 
10 A. Mabin and M. Conradie (eds.), The confidence of the whole country: Standard Bank 
reports on economic conditions in Southern Africa 1865-1902 (Johannesburg, 1988), p. 
515. 
11 Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette, Notice No. 406 of 1903. 
12 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/1/2/1, Minutes ofthe Health and Location Committee, 20 Feb. 1903. 
13 A. 15- 1903, p. iv. 
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TABLE 5.1 
NEW BRIGHTON RENTALS 1903-1909'4 
Grade Description Monthly Rental 
1903 .l.20l 1907 .l.2Q2 
Married Quarters 
1st Two-roomed 251- 20/- 151- 8/-
2nd One-roomed 20/- 151- 12/6 61-
3rd Converted SMQ 17/6 12/6 10/- 51-
Single Men's Quarters 
3rd Dormitory room 8/- 6/- 6/- 3/-
The post-war recession and the termination of many casual labourers' contracts meant that 
there was a high turnover of tenants in New Brighton, including many of whom absconded 
when faced with prosecution for non-payment of rent arrears. 15 In spite of further reductions 
in 1905, the greater number of residents generated a substantial increase in revenue. Thereafter 
revenue declined commensurately with the reduction in population and reached its lowest level 
since the establishment of the location in 1909.16 The decline in revenue was partly due to 
further rent reductions in that year shown in the Table above. Rents remained at these levels 
throughout the remainder of the period that New Brighton was administered by the Union 
Government. 
Wages, too; remained static during this time but depreciated badly in real terms. Escalating 
prices and spiralling inflation made a huge dent in earnings. It was calculated that the cost of 
living index rose about 69% between 1914 and 1920.17 And price rises in Port Elizabeth were 
14 Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette, Notice No. 990 of 1903, No. 1372 of 1904, 
No. 1144 of 1907 and No. 414 of 1909. 
15 CAD, NA 656 2378, Inspector to ARM, NB, 23 Aug. 1905 and ARM, NB to SNA, 
14 Nov. 1905. 
16 Cape of Good Hope Government Blue Book on Native Affairs for 1909, G .. 28- 1910, 
p. 87. 
17 Union of South Africa, Office of Census and Statistics, Quarterly Return, S. P. 25 No. 
5 (January 1921). The c.o.l. index was calculated for an average white family on the 
basis of the following components: food 39,7%; fuel and light 4,4%; rent 22,6%; 
sundries 33,3%. As certain of these items are likely to have comprised a different 
percentage of the average black budget, these figures provide an unreliable lbut the only 
basis for c.o.l. calculations at this time. Cf. Labour World, 2 Oct. 1920 which suggests 
that official c.o.l. figures were underestimated by 20%. 
I 
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considerably above the national average. 18 According to the Schweizer Commission, the 
"increase in the cost of foodstuffs and other necessaries ordinarily consumed and used by the 
natives was 105% between 1914 and 1920" .19 In its calculations, a staple diet consisted of 
maize, maize meal, animal fat, a small quota of meat, sugar, tea and coffee. During this 
period, the national average retail price of food had risen 78% , and the cost of maize meal -
which made up the greatest part of the African's food budget - increased mvre than 200% . If 
necessities absorbed virtually the entire pay packet of average black wage earners, there was 
little chance of those earning the 4s. per day minimum wage to meet expenses such as rentals 
and transport. 
Revenue collected during the 1910s in New Brighton amounted to: 
TABLE 5.2 
REVENUE FROM NEW BRIGHTON LOCATION, 1910111-1919120 
Rents, etc. Judicial fines 
Year Amount(£) Amm.mt (£) Total 
1910/11 3 883 289 4 172 
1911/12 4 238 239 4 477 
1912/13 4 787 242 5 029 
1913/14 5 689 488 6 177 
1914/15 4 931 211 5 142 
1915/16 5 007 217 5 224 
1916/17 4 903 131 5 034 
1917/18 5 502 276 5 778 
1918/19 5 378 191 5 569 
1919/20 6 565 n/a n/a 
18 Union of South Africa, Official Year Book 1921, p. 338. 
19 Union of South Africa Parliamentary Papers, Report of the Commissioners appointed 
to enquire into the causes of, and occurrences at, the Native disturbances on the 23rd 
October 1920, and the general economic conditions as they affect the Native and 
Coloured population, Ans. 143- 1921 (Schweizer Commission), pp. 1-2. A table which 
has an itemised list of necessities included food and clothing, but made no allowance 
for rent and transport costs. This was based on the findings of a special committee of 
the PECC to investigate the cost of living for blacks. Their case studies concluded that 
the expenses (food, fuel, rent and train fare) of an average African family amounted to 
£1.4s.Od. and of a single man to 18s.6d. per week. See CAD, 3/PEZ 1/2/1125, 
Minutes of Standing and Special Committees, Dec. 1920, p. 499. 
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Although fines imposed on New Brighton residents by the periodical court for breaches of 
location regulations and other minor offences were paid into Public Revenue and did not 
accrue to the location, 20 they have been reflected in the above figures. The irrecoverable 
revenue written off on account of rent absconders seldom amounted to more than £100 per 
annum during the above period. 21 
Exact figures for the expenses incurred in administering New Brighton by the Union 
Government are unavailable because services were undertaken and paid for by various state 
departments and not all were charged to the location.22 However, it was estimated that 
administration costs approximated £4 350 per annum between 1910/11 and 1918/19, £5 032 
in 1919/20 and £6 000 was provided for in the estimates for 1920/21. These figures included 
the cost of supervision, sanitation, policing, medical services, maintenance and repairs, water 
and sundries, but no interest on capital outlay or depreciation. The central state also spent a 
total of almost £98 000 on the erection of buildings and other structures in the location.23 
From the information available, it would seem that revenue was sufficient to meet the 
administration costs of New Brighton (if capital redemption is excluded). 
The Port Elizabeth Municipality's Quest for a Self-Financing Native Revenue Account, 1923-
1936 
As the PECC had not been responsible for meeting capital costs and loan redemption with 
respect to New Brighton, it could afford to allow rents to remain at the levels set by the 
Government. The overcrowded conditions generated additional revenue because of the fact that 
the numerous (registered) lodgers paid the administration a fee of 3s. per month. 24 The 
arrangements for the accommodation of 'single' men also generated more revenue than was 
budgeted for. The two-roomed dwellings occupied by an average often 'single' men who paid 
4s. rent each meant that they fetched £1.16.0 per month. Comparable dwellings rented by a 
family fetched 9s. per month (or possibly £1 if there was a lodger). Thus rent accruals 
regularly exceeded the amount due on the housing stock, which meant that the NRA showed 
20 CAD, 3/PEZ 11701, Magt., PE to TC, PE, 17 Aug. 1923. 
21 Repon of the Native Affairs Depanmentfor the years 1913 to 1918, UG 7- '19, pp. 
17 and 88 (Annexure G); Letter from SNA to TC, PE (n.d.) cited in EPH 23 Dec. 
1920; PE Municipality, Mayor's Minute 1921, p. 6. 
22 CeA, NTS Vol. 2442 File 1/291, Supt. NBL to Magt., PE, 30 Aug. 1920. 
23 CeA, NTS, 2442 11291, SNA to TC, PE, 3 Nov. 1920. Figures also cited in Pon 
Elizabeth Adveniser, 24 Dec. 1920. 
24 CAD, 3/PEZ 111275, Report of Loc. Supt., 25 Jan. 1926. 
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a surplus. 25 
The 'Newtown' housing scheme which was erected to alleviate the overcrowding proved to be 
a financial headache. The PECC ignored the warning of the Housing Committee that it was 
impossible to develop a housing system for African workers "without entailing a loss on an 
economic basis". 26 As opposed to the houses in the Red Location which had been acquired 
from the Government free of charge, capital redemption constituted a large proportion of the 
costs of the new economic housing scheme. From a loan of £175 000 granted by the central 
Government over a four-year period for the purpose of erecting houses for workers, 27 the 
PECC allocated £28 000 to New Brighton. The sum of £9 959 was expended on the erection 
of the brick houses and cottages, as well as a SMQ. Interest on the unexpended balance was 
credited to the NRA. But the combination of the interest rate of 5% charged by the 
Government and the artificially high building costs as a result of the employment of white 
labour on the housing scheme, meant large overheads and capital redemption costs. It was 
probably envisaged that some of these costs would be offset by profits from a municipal 
beerball which was then in the offing [see Chapter 6]. 
Meanwhile, other steps were taken to reduce expenditure carried by the NRA. The PE 
Municipality bore the costs of maintaining a police force in New Brighton. The expenditure 
on wages and equipment for the years 1924-26 averaged in excess of £1 500 per annum. When 
the Department of Justice declared itselfuriwilling to reimburse these costs, the PECC was not 
prepared to continue policing the Location and the South African Police (SAP) duly assumed 
these duties from the beginning of September 1927.28 It was also suggested that white 
employees in various positions in the location administration be replaced by Africans, and th~t 
medical costs be reduced by arranging that the location hospital be subsidised by the CPA or 
be administered as a branch of Port Elizabeth's Provincial Hospital.29 Neither of these 
suggestions were acted upon. In 1928 and 1929, the PECC sold off portions of the Location 
land which had been transferred into its possession by the Central Government some five years 
previously. Fairly large areas were sold to the Cradock Place Industrial Sites and to the 
Eastern Province Cement Company for the sums of £506 and £3 339, respectively. The 
25 J. Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid: Territoriality and State Power in South African 
Cities- Port Elizabeth 1923-1972' (Ph.D., University of Cambridge, 1990), p. 182. 
26 Repon of the Housing Committee, UG 4- '20, para. 93. 
27 PE Municipality, Mayor's Minute 1927, p. 17. 
28 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, TC, PE to Magt., PE, 21 May 1927. 
29 EPH, 23 Feb. 1927, p. 5. 
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proceeds from the land sales were used to reduce the deficit on the NRA and the overdraft 
against the Capital Account for loans not yet raised. 30 But these ad hoc sources of income 
were not sufficient to offset the regular loss of revenue from rents in Newtown, which 
contributed to a deficit on the NRA. 
The large capital costs meant that rents set by the PECC for Newtown were much higher than 
those in the Red Location. Compared to rents in the latter of between 6s. and 9s. per month, 
the new brick cottages were rented at between 20s. and 30s. per month.31 Given that the 
average wage of an unskilled African labourer in Port Elizabeth was between 2s.6d. and 4s. 
per day at this time, and had actually declined in real terms since the wage agreement of 1920, 
it is obvious that such rents would comprise an inordinately large percentage of wages. When 
transport costs- that is, the cost of weekly train tickets from New Brighton to the city- were 
added to the budget, the amount available for food, clothing and other necessities was very 
small indeed. With the strictly controlled regime of domestic beer brewing confmed to the Red 
Location, not many women were able to supplement family incomes from this source either. 
In short, the relative comfort of Newtown houses was for most New Brighton residents 
unaffordable. 
The situation deteriorated still further as the Depression took hold. In reviewing the estimates 
for the 1927/8 fmancial year, the NAC recommended a 1s. per month increase on all grades 
of rentals (except those of the newly-constructed three-bedroomed cottages which had the 
highest rates). The rent increase was duly approved by the PECC,32 and Newtown rents were 










NEWTOWN RENTALS 1928/!Jn 
Description Monthly Rental 
Cottages (3-roomed) 30s. 
" (2-roomed) 20s. 
Houses (2-roomed) 20s. 
" (2-roomed with kitchen) 21s.6d. 
" (3-roomed) 22s.6d. 
" (3-roomed with kitchen) 24s. 
Single Men's Quarters 5s. 
30 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15/4, City Treasurer to NAC, 4 July 1930. 
31 Mayor's Minute 1926, Report of the MOH, p. 64. 
32 Mayor's Minute 1927, Report of the Acting MOH, p. 64. 
33 Mayor's Minute 1929, Annual Report of the Supt. NBL, p. 61. 
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The Location Superintendent argued that the rentals were excessive. He pointed out that if the 
redemption period for repayment of capital and interest should be extended from 20 to 25 
years, this would have amounted to a net reduction of one-third of the 30s. per month charged 
for the 3-roomed cottages. The NAC, however, discounted this suggestion.34 It did, however, 
agree to equalise rentals for accommodation for single men. Instead of the proposed 6s. per 
month rent in the new brick dormitory, a rate of 5s. per month was set for both the old and 
new SMQs- thereby effectively increasing rent in the former by 1s. per month. Other rents 
in the Red Location remained as before [see Table 5.2]. Thus Newtown residents paid £1.1.6 
for a two-roomed brick house with a kitchen, while those in the old location paid 9s. per 
month for a comparable wood and iron structure, although the latter was usually in much 
poorer condition. Such comparisons provide some indication of the disparities in rents which 
were so keenly felt by those resident in Newtown. 
The Advisory Board accepted the necessity for the increase and pledged to support the NAC 
chairman at a public meeting to be called for the purpose of explaining the reasons for the 
increase to residents. However, the Board also appealed to the PECC to use its influence to 
"prevail upon employers of Native labour to pay fair wages to their employees".35 An 
agreement was brokered by the PECC in late 1929 whereby most local employers agreed to 
a minimum daily wage of 3s.6d. for general unskilled workers, which was increased by 6d. 
per day the following year. 36 This did not amount to an increase; it was actually a return to 
wage levels agreed to a decade earlier and which had declined considerably in the interim. Nor 
was the wage agreement adhered to by employers.37 With the steady deterioration of the 
economic climate as the downturn turned into a full-scale Depression, the pressure on wages 
increased further. According to the BTI Cost of Living Inquiry ( 1931), wages and living 
standards in Port Elizabeth were well below but the cost of living index was well above the 
national average between 1925 and 1930.38 
The proportion of rent arrears on the new brick-buildings very soon exceeded that of the Red 
34 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1276, Report of the Loc. Supt., 19 April 1928. 
35 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/1, Minutes of NBAB, 15 and 22 Feb. 1927. 
36 CAD: 3/PEZ 1/1634 and 1/3/5/2/3, Minutes of proceedings of Meeting of Employers 
re Native Wages, 14 Nov. and Minutes of City Council, 27 Nov. 1929. See also 
University of the Witwatersrand, Rheinallt Jones Papers, AD 843/RJ, Cp 5.6.3. 
37 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', p. 183. 
38 BTl Repon No. 125 (Pretoria, 1931), p. 28; Conradie, 'Port Elizabeth as 
Industriesentrum', p. 481. 
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Location. Part of the reason was that the tenants intially consisted of the 'poorest of the poor', 
rather than the aspirant middle class who might have been better able to afford the higher 
rents. Many tenants had been removed from the tin kitchens which adjoined the cheapest grade 
of huts in the old location. 39 In light of the the obvious inability of such tenants to pay the 
rentals, McNamee was instructed by the NAC in July 1927 to endeavour to let the new 
cottages to the 'better type' of inhabitant of the location.40 Yet, three months later the 
situation was no better. McNamee reported that although those in the brick-blocks comprised 
only 111 out of a total of 3 137 rentpayers, they alone were responsible for nearly half the 
amount of rent outstanding for the month of October. This was the case even though special 
attention had been given to collecting rents in this grade, and despite the fact that more 
prosecutions had been instituted for non-payment of rents than in all the other grades put 
together. 41 
During the years that followed, Newtown residents made numerous representations to the 
authorities for financial relief. Proposals in these petitions included: (i) exempt lodgers from 
municipal levies; (ii) equalise rents in old and new portions of the location; (iii) decrease the 
cost of services provided; (iv) equalise the cost of services in both portions of the location; (v) 
reduce the costs of administration; (vi) reduce interest on loan obtained for housing scheme; 
(vii) extend the period in which the PECC repay capital loan; (viii) suspend capital repayment 
in the short term; (ix) reduce rents with losses to be carried by the General Rate Fund. These 
proposals will not be discussed at any length because they were all rejected by the NAC 
despite Newtown residents receiving the backing, at different times, of the Location 
Superintend~nt, Advisory Board and Vigilance Committee. For its part, the NAC was more 
concerned with reducing the deficit on the NRA. McNamee thus came under intense pressure 
from the NAC to reduce outstanding rentals and tried the following measures: 
(i) prosecution of rent defaulters; 
(ii) institution of weekly rather than monthly payment of rents; 
(iii) repatriation of those unable to pay rents to the reserves. 
Reference has already been made to certain of these measures in connection with the 
administration of New Brighton. Here we will confine ourselves to discussing their financial 
implications. 
39 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1276, Report of the Loc. Supt. 24 Sept. 1926. 
40 CAD, 3/PEZ 111276, Minutes of NAC, 29 July 1927. 
41 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1276, Report of the Loc. Supt., 19 April 1928. 
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The administration's campaign to prosecute and evict rent defaulters from New Brighton had 
mixed success. In the majority of cases, Newtown residents simply could not afford rents when 
living at or below the bread line. Moreover, there was the secondary consideration that by 
prosecuting rent defaulters who fell into this category, the authorities treated them as criminals 
as a fine with the option of a jail sentence was likely to be imposed. This effectively meant 
that rent defaulters were being penalised twice for a single offence. The likelihood of 
recovering both fines and rent arrears from such persons was remote because they were likely 
to abscond once the administration's intention to prosecute was known. And with little 
likelihood of being able to trace absconders, especially if they had left Port Elizabeth 
altogether, it meant that these amounts of outstanding rentals had to be written off as 
irrecoverable. Only in cases where offenders had the means to pay rents and wilfully chose 
do not to do so, was legal action likely to have the desired consequences. Otherwise, to evict 
rent defaulters from Newtown was self-defeating. Having provided the accommodation, it 
made no economic sense to have the houses standing empty. 
A ruling made in 1929 by the Cape Town Appeal Court with regard to the right of local 
authorities to prosecute defaulters for the non-payment of rentals had ramifications for the 
PECC's administration of New Brighton. Regulations under Section 23(3)q of Act 21 of 1923 
which imposed penalties for failure to pay rent framed by the Cape Town Municipality in 
respect of Ndabeni Location were deemed to be ultra vires. 42 The Supreme Court quashed the 
conviction of a rent defaulter on the grounds that whites were not jailed upon conviction for 
failure to pay rent. The ruling rejected the notion that a person unable to pay rent should be 
treated as a. criminal and implied that the local authority would be obliged to rely on civil 
action to recover rents from defaulters. Although New Brighton was not yet under the Urban 
Areas Act, it was then being considered and, in any event, similar provisions existed for New 
Brighton in terms of the Native Reserve Location Act. Not surprisingly, the PECC's right to 
prosecute residents of New Brighton for non-payment of rents was soon to be challenged in 
the courts. Amidst a fair amount of publicity and what was construed to be 'agitation' by the 
administration, plaintiffs also challenged the right of the PECC to charge the increased rentals 
and lodgers fees without proclaiming the amended regulations in the Government Gazette. 
42 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2115/3, Report of Supt. NBL, 19 Sept. 1929 citing article in lmvo 
Zabantsundu, 10 Sept. 1929. See also C. Saunders, 'From Ndabeni to Langa' in C. 
Saunders (ed.), Studies in the History of Cape Town, V. 1 (Cape Town, 1979) and M. 
Musemwa, 'Aspects of the Social and Political History of Langa Township, Cape 
Town, 1927-1948' (M.A., UCT, 1993), p. 53. 
103 
Eventually, the Superintendent was authorised to make an example of tenants with the worst 
records as far as defaulting on rentals was concerned by prosecuting and then evicting them 
amidst as much publicity as possible. 43 
In spite of the successful prosecution of two test cases of New Brighton tenants who had failed 
to pay rents in 1931,44 the Superintendent impressed upon the NAC that taking legal action 
against rent defaulters was seldom worth the trouble as only a small amount of arrears was 
invariably recovered. He also bemoaned the removal of the periodical court from New 
Brighton as it had been useful in dealing with rent arrears cases. Consequently, it was resolved 
that the Superintendent be authorised to exercise his discretion in dealing with offenders. In 
addition, it was decided to make representation to the Minister of Native Affairs about the 
possibility of re-establishing the periodical court in New Brighton.4~ The City Council took 
the view that judicial fines accruing from offences committed in New Brighton should provide 
a source of income for the NRA and not be paid into public revenue. The court was re-opened 
in September 1931 , over four years after having been abolished [see previous Chapter]. 46 
In late 1931 the PECC decided to make rentals payable on a weekly rather than a monthly 
basis in the belief that this would facilitate the collection of rents. Their thinking on the matter 
was implicitly racist for it presupposed that the proportion of wages which should be put aside 
for rents was wasted on beer, liquor and other non-necessities.47 In fact, the disposable 
income of the average New Brighton resident was negligible. Advisory Board members pointed 
out that weekly rentals would interfere with the operation of stokvels and other such mutual 
aid associations in the community. 48 The weekly collection of rents resulted in additional 
clerical work and its failure to reduce the non-payment of rents did not justify the continuation 
of the system. 
McNamee also investigated the possibility of having unemployed and destitute New Brighton 
43 CAD, 31PEZ 1131211515, Minutes of sub-committee appointed to investigate reduction 
of outstanding rentals, 7 Oct. 1931. 
44 CAD, 31PEZ 1131211515, Attorneys McWilliams & Elliott to TC, PE, 18 May 1931 
and Report of Loc. Supt., 22 Oct. 1931. 
45 CAD, 31PEZ 111279, Minutes of NAC, 6 Feb. 1931. 
46 CAD, 31PEZ 1 I 1219, Report of Supt. NBL, 5 March 1931 and I I 1280, Report of Supt. 
NBL, 24 Sept. 1931. 
47 CAD, 31PEZ 111490, Minutes of the PECC, 4 Nov. 1931. 
48 CAD, 31PEZ 1/1280, Minutes of the NAC's interview with NBAB deputation, 7 Dec. 
1931. 
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residents, who could not afford to pay rentals, repatriated to the 'native territories'. He 
claimed that he did not wish to summarily eject the jobless, widowers and others who had 
fallen on hard times, but that those with family in the reserves would have a better chance of 
subsisting. A request to obtain assistance in the form of rail warrants for the repatriation of 
such people to the reserves was, however, turned down by the NAD.49 
McNamee had interpreted his brief from the NAC as meaning that evictions on a large scale 
were to be avoided but that steps against a few offenders at a time should serve as an example 
to the many. In a bid to pre-empt accusations of arbitrariness in selecting people for eviction, 
McNamee disclosed that his method of dealing with rent defaulters followed certain guidelines: 
tenants in arrears were first warned to pay rents owing by headmen; this was followed by a 
printed notice which threatened criminal proceedings; thereafter, a summons was issued and 
the matter was dealt with by the Magistrate who determined a schedule for repayment of rent 
arrears; if the Magistrate's order was not complied with, then ejection was ordered. McNamee 
claimed that ejection was used as a last resort and that if tenants endeavoured to pay arrears 
then they were afforded every opportunity to continue in occupation of their dwelling. 50 
One of the reasons why McNamee favoured the application of the Urban Areas Act to New 
Brighton was that it simplified the method of dealing with rent defaulters, as it enabled the 
authorities to short circuit the procedure for evicting residents for non-payment of rents.51 
With the promulgation of new regulations in 1933, he introduced a harsher regime in order 
to ensure that all tenants capable of paying rentals should do so. Regulation 23 permitted 
eviction orders to be served on tenants who failed to pay rentals a month after their due date. 
If such a person failed to comply with the order, they faced prosecution and the imposition of 
a penalty. Three years after the regulations had come into force, the administration's new 
course of action against rent defaulters showed 'impressive' results. McNamee reported that 
he had taken the following measures between 1 April 1933 and 30 March 1936: 
(a) Orders issued to tenants to leave New Brighton 3389 
(b) Tenants who left after receiving order 97 
(c) Prosecuted in court for failing to obey order 487 
(d) Prosecuted for non-payment of rent 241 
(e) Ejected from New Brighton 119 
49 CAD, 3/PEZ 111279, Report of Loc. Supt. 16 April 1931 and 3/PEZ 111634, TC to 
SNA, 22 April 1931. 
50 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1280, Report of the Loc. Supt., 1 Dec. 1932. 
51 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1280, Report of the Loc. Supt., 16 Feb. 1933. 
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Given a population of 7 430 in mid-1935, the above figures suggest that more than half the 
principal occupants were served with evictions orders during these three years - although only 
a small percentage were actually evicted. 
McNamee became increasingly uncomfortable with his part in turning people out of their 
houses and the Location, and tired of the NAC's constant harping on the amount of 
outstanding rentals. He claimed to have done all in his power to minimise arrears but seemed 
unable to satisfy the NAC unless outstanding rentals were virtually nil. In his chagrin, he 
expostulated against the 'budget-watchers': 
The recovery of all monies accruing I have interpreted to be a feature of almost 
paramount importance in your policy - monies are to be collected at all costs, short of, 
say, turning a sick or dying person into the street. 52 
It obviously went against the grain that his self image as a fatherly figure who had the best 
interests of Location residents at heart should be compromised by his having to act 
peremptorily against rent defaulters. 
Throughout this period, the PECC remained committed to a self-sufficient NRA. But shortfalls 
from the new housing scheme contributed to the growing deficit on the NRA: 
TABLE 5.4 
NATIVE REVENUE ACCOUNT 1928-1936 




1928 774 774 
1929 1 596 2 370 
1930 523 2 893 
1931 285 3 178 
1932 313 2 865 
1933 2 139 5 004 
1934 699 5 703 
1935 2 185 7 888 
1936 482 7 406 
With the exception of 1929, the largest deficits were recorded between 1933 and 1935 after 
the economy was recovering from the Depression. By the latter year, the cumulative deficit 
52 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15/10, Report of Supt. NBL, 1 April 1936. 
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on the NRA was over £7 000. It is noteworthy that the smallest deficits were recorded during 
the depths of the Depression when unemployment for New Brighton residents was at its 
height. 53 On the other hand, rent receipts showed a fairly steady increase during the twelve 
months from June 1932 to May 1933. The average amount received was £896 per month, 
whereas during the following twelve months it increased to £1 200 per month - a difference 
of £304.54 Moreover, between the beginning of June 1933 until the end of February 1936, 
the amount of rent collected exceeded expenditure. 55 A partial explanation for this anomalous 
situation would seem to be that provision for bad debts for irrecoverable rents was not written 
off. 
The overall trend was that the deficit had steadily accumulated since 1928 when the PECC 
commenced charging economic rents for houses in Newtown. Yet, it insisted on this policy 
for it was not prepared to subsidise New Brighton rents from the General Rate Fund if this 
' 
meant that ratepayers were to bear the burden. The City Treasurer considered it 'unthinkable' 
that ratepayers of the city should be called upon to meet the deficit in the NRA for as long as 
it possessed 'realisable assets'. This was a reference to the Location land valued at 
approximately £12 000 (an amount in excess of the current deficit) still on the books of the 
NRA. 56 In response to a query as to how it proposed to rectify the deficit on its NRA in 
1933/7 the NAC had informed the NAD that: 
(a) the committee would not adopt the principle of charging to the general revenue of 
the city any deficit on the NRA; · 
(b) the deficit on the NRA was being carried forward free of interest and that included 
in the location grant was a large area of land which might be sold as industrial sites at 
any time on the account of location funds. 58 
Although prepared to reduce the rents of certain municipal houses oc~upied by poor Whites 
when it was found that tenants were unable to pay, the PECC would not do the same for New 
Brighton residents. By way of explanation for this discrimination, the NAC held that it had 
been unable to reduce rents because the Government had refused to reduce the 5% interest rate 
on economic loans; notwithstanding the fact that it was now offering money to municipalities 
at 2% interest with which to build sub-economic housing schemes for Africans. 59 
53 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15/9, Report of the City Treasurer to the NAC, 9 Jan. 1935. 
54 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15/8, Report of Supt. NBL, 18 July 1934. 
55 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15/10, Report of Supt. NBL, 1 April 1936. 
56 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15/7, Report of the City Treasurer to NAC, 24 Oct. 1933. 
57 CAD, 3/PEZ 111280, SNA to TC, PE, 26 Sept. and Minutes of NAC, 29 September 
1933. 
58 CAD, 3/PEZ 111630, Minutes of the NAC, 1 Dec. 1933. 
59 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15/8, Minutes of NBAB, 23 Aug. 1934. 
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Whilst the PECC's situation was not unlike that of its counterpart in Cape Town (where the 
municipality had taken transfer of Ndabeni from the central state), the latter's General Rate 
Fund subsidised the NRA. In fact, Cape Town was one of a number of centres - others 
included East London and Kimberley - where ratepayers bore part of the burden of financing 
the locations. 60 However, the PECC was not inclined to follow the lead of these 
municipalities. Instead, it had steadfastly refused to balance the NRA from the General Rate 
Fund. Having acquired assets of land and buildings from the Union Government when taking 
transfer of New Brighton, this - as opposed to, say, beerball profits - became a means to 
subsidise the city's cheap labour supply. Even when the NRA deficit increased steadily because 
of unemployment, ineffective measures for recovering rentals, and the fixing of Newtown rents 
at a rate higher than the average tenant could afford, the PECC still reckoned on being able 
to dispose of the remaining Location lands at some future date and thereby write off the debts 
incurred on behalf of the NRA. 
The Port Elizabeth Municipality's Subsidisation of the Native Administration Fund, c.1937-
lill. 
The announcement by the Government that as from 1 April 1934 sub-economic housing loans 
would be made available to local authorities under the Slums Act had been welcomed by PE's 
Medical Officer of Health (MOH). He expressed the view that if such provisions could be 
extended to the African population, it could provide a means of abolishing the slum areas in 
the city and creating a 'native' village.61 A joint meeting of the NAC and Health & Markets 
Committee felt that advantage should be taken of the Government's offer to loan money at a 
rate of 2% (as against the market rate of 3,75% with the Government and local authority 
sharing the loss equally) and that the Central Housing Board (CHB) should be approached to 
ascertain whether sub-economic loans could be extended for African housing schemes. The 
Board considered the scheme eligible for financial assistance out of loan funds for sub-
economic housing and approved the PECC's preliminary proposal in principle.62 Having been 
given the go ahead, the PECC then baulked at implementing the plan for it would have 
entailed ratepayers subsidising the housing of the African population. Accordingly, it toyed 
briefly with the idea of a 'Native Village' where tenants would be granted long lease as a 
60 See CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/9, Correspondence from the Town Clerks of Cape Town, 
Kimberley and East London to TC, PE dated 7, 3 and 15 January 1934, respectively, 
confirms that this was the case. 
61 Government Gazette, 29 March 1934; CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/8, Report of MOH, 4 
May 1934. 
62 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/8, Sec. for Public Health to TC, PE, 18 June 1934. 
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cheaper alternative. It then approached the CHB to waive the Council's share of the loss that 
they were meant to bear on the sub-economic loan, but this was refused. However, when the 
Slums Act was amended so that local authorities would be required to bear only half the 
amount of loss carried by the central state,63 the PECC adjusted its own policy in respect of 
the provision of African housing. 
This policy shift was occasioned partly by the government's insistence that the deficit on the 
NRA would have to be met annually from the Council's general account before funds for the 
McNamee scheme would be granted. First, £500 was provided in the 1937 Estimates towards 
reducing the accumulated NRA deficit. Secondly, the NAC recommended that the General 
Rate Fund carry the loss necessary to utilise the sub-economic loan for African housing.64 
Subsequently, in January 1937, the PECC adopted a resolution to the effect that "in future the 
general rate revenue account bear any deficit arising from the operation of the NRA" provided 
it was caused by housing.65 This resolution marked a departure from the PECC's previous 
policy of having a self-financing NRA. The newly-named Native Administration Fund was to 
be run on an entirely different basis. 
In a statement to the Wage Board in late 1939, Cllr Mrs E.M. Holland noted that the PECC 
was subsidising poor wages by providing sub-economic housing for unskilled workers. In 
advocating a 5s. per day minimum wage, she expressed the view that this would help shift the 
burden from the PECC to "those employers who should rightfully bear it". 66 Calculations by 
the MOH submitted to the Wage Board were cited as evidence that living costs for a New 
Brighton family of four amounted to £5.2.2 for food, plus £1.10.2 for rent, railfares, poll tax 
and other sundries, giving a total of £6.12.4. These figures made no provision for clothing, 
recreation and other necessities. 67 Thus even an across the board minimum wage of 5s. per 
day (the equivalent of about £6 per month) plus a cost of living allowance (cola) for unskilled 
workers advocated by the PECC, was insufficient for the average African family to make ends 
meet. Yet, the PECC welcomed Wage Board investigations not so much for the improvement 
63 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', pp. 210, 215-6. 
64 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1282, Report of Inspector of Native Urban Locations, 20 Oct. and 
Minutes of NAC, 13 Nov. 1936. 
65 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1282, Minutes of PECC, 13 Jan. and TC, PE to SNA, 25 Jan. 1937. 
66 University ofthe Witwatersrand, Margaret Ballinger Papers, A410 C2.3.9.1, Statement 
by Mrs E.M. Holland on behalf of PECC re Wage Board Investigation, 24 Nov. 1939. 
67 UCT Manuscripts: Ballinger Papers, BC 347, Al.N2 and C5.111.6.5 Statements by 
African General Workers' Union, PE and PE Joint Council to Wage Board investigating 
conditions of unskilled working trades in PE Magisterial District, 12 Jan. 1940. 
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they might bring to the wage levels of unskilled workers, but rather as a first step in resolving 
the question of who should bear the costs of reproduction of the working class. 
In December 1939 the Wage Board fixed a minimum wage of £1.10.0 per week or £6.10.0 
per month for 27 commercial and distributive trades. 68 A few months later, the PECC again 
passed a resolution which recommended that all wage determinations for a single class of 
labour should be the same throughout the Union. A bloc of councillors representing employers 
rejected Mrs Holland's call for a 5s. per day minimum wage. Instead, they accepted the 
argument that it was counter-productive to set a higher wage in Port Elizabeth than other 
centres because it would cause an influx of unskilled work seekers to the city. They held that 
a national minimum wage (rather than influx controls) would ensure an equal distribution of 
labour. Only two female councillors dissented and one, Mrs Holland, commented sarcastically 
that "it was wonderful to see the Council standing manfully for the employer" .69 
A very different standpoint was adopted by the SNA during a visit to Port Elizabeth in 
November 1941 in his capacity as Chairman of the Smit Committee. He was lavish in his 
praise of the generosity of the PECC in subsidising the sub-economic housing scheme of 
McNamee Village from general rates. He commended the Council's 'liberal' and 'far-sighted' 
policy for not being bound by the [in]capacity of the African population to pay for their own 
housing. 70 But in its Report, the Smit Committee recognised that practice of making sub-
economic loans available to municipalities as an incentive to underwrite housing schemes had 
been largely unsuccessful. Only 41 local authorities had undertaken such schemes, although 
there were -267 proclaimed locations. This reluctance on the part of municipalities was 
attributed to the widely held perception that these would still incur excessive losses which 
would increase NRA deficits or necessitate the subsidisation of township costs. The Smit 
Committee recommended that contributions from the general revenue accounts of 
municipalities be utilised to make up deficits on NRAs and that local authorities be compelled 
to provide housing schemes.71 However the massive urbanisation during the War put paid to 
68 Union of South Africa, Government Gazette, Notice No. 1572, 13 Oct. 1939, p. 121 
Determination 2079 of 22 Dec. 1939. 
69 Ballinger Papers, A410, C2.3.9.1, Letter from E.M. Holland to M. Ballinger, 29 
March 1940. 
70 Umtateli wa Bantu, 8 Nov. 1941 in University of the Witwatersrand, SAIRR Papers, 
AD 843/B 9.5. 
71 Repon of the Inter-Depanmental Committee on the Social, Health and Economic 
Conditions of Urban Natives, GP S7272, 1942-3, paras. 11, 102-3, 202, 173-4; Bekker 
and Humphries, From Control to Confusion, pp. 123-4. 
110 
virtually all future sub-economic schemes for Africans. 
Meanwhile, new tensions arose in New Brighton as a result of rent disparities. Rents in the 
new sub-economic scheme were fixed at 16s. and 14s. per month for three-and two-roomed 
houses, respectively, and 6s. per month for single rooms accommodating 4 single men; with 
an extra surchage of 1s.6d. for the the supply of electricity. 72 McNamee wished to afford 
long-standing residents of New Brighton, especially those who had been paying premium rents 
in the brick-buildings, the first option on the new sub-economic houses where provisional rents 
were as much as lOs. less than those in Newtown. But it was pointed out that former Korsten 
residents who had been relocated would be dissatisfied at having to pay the higher Newtown 
rents. 73 In order to try avert discontent, the PECC made known its intention of ultimately 
bringing rentals of economic houses in line with the sub-economic dwellings. 74 This was 
achieved progressively over a five-year period as the comparative rents for 1938 and 1943 
show: 
TABLE 5.5 
NEW BRIGHTON RENTALS 1938 AND 1943 
Grade Descri!2tiQn 
(a) Newtown 
E Cottages (3 rooms) 
F n (2 n ) 
F Houses (2 rooms) 
G n (2 II w /kitchens) 
H II (3 n ) 
I n (3 II w/kitchens) 
(b) McNamee Village 
AB Semi-detached (3 rooms) 
AC II (2 II ) 
AE 4 Rooms 






















72 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2115/18, Report of the City Treasurer, 6 Jan. 1944 re Native Sub-
Economic Housing Scheme (McNamee Village), citing SNA to Sec. CHB, 24 Nov. 
1936. 
73 CAD, 3/PEZ 111282, Minutes of the NBAB, 10 Feb. and 17 March 1938. 
74 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1283, Memo of TC for NAC, 11 Dec. 1939. 
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The above Table does not include rents in the Red Location, nor the SMQ (for either the old 
location and Newtown) for neither were changed during this period. 
In November 1943, a motion to increase rents in New Brighton was motivated by the argument 
that the PECC was experiencing a loss of about 3% or £37 000 per annum which was far in 
excess of the 1,25% envisaged in terms of the scheme. In terms of the provisions for the grant 
of loans for sub-economic housing, the Government and local authorities were to share losses 
in the ratio of 2:1. The Government reckoned that it would lose 2,5% on market rates by 
advancing loans at the rate of 0,75% interest per annum to local authorities. The local 
authorities, in tum, were required to lose 1,25% per annum. What happened in practice, 
however, was that local authorities often incurred greater losses. Opponents of the motion 
disputed these figures and the fact that any loss should be limited to 1,25%. Others held that 
any loss was easily compensated for in other ways, which was presumably an allusion to the 
degree of social control facilitated by having the majority of Africans resident in New 
Brighton. The motion was defeated by the narrowest of margins but the issue engendered much 
public debate and controversy. 75 
A review of the sub-economic scheme by the City Treasurer in January 1944 showed that the 
original estimates had been far too conservative. The estimate for 2 500 houses and 500 single 
rooms had been £550 100, whilst the expenditure as at 30 November 1943 in respect of 3 406 
houses amounted to £756 930. The largest component of the figure of £236 888, by which the 
expenditure had exceeded the estimate, was a sum of £179 670 for dwellings. (The cost of the 
provision of services approximated the original estimate far more closely). In the case of many 
contracts, the final cost per house exceeded the tendered price by more than 50%. Costs of 
below £150 per house in 1939, had increased to more than £200 in 1942 because of rises in 
the costs of materials and labour during the War. Thus the increase in expenditure on houses 
was not only due to the increased number erected but the per capita cost thereof. The original 
estimate had been fixed at about £183, whereas the actual cost had amounted to nearly £223 -
a difference of £40 per structure. According to the City Treasurer, the situation had been 
exacerbated by, inter alia, the increase in the costs of administration and health services for 
which no provision had been made in rents. In addition, the NRA had incurred a progressively 
larger loss on account of the reduction of rents in Newtown to 16s. so as to bring them in line 
with the rents in McNamee Village. The City Treasurer was adamant that only a general rent 
75 The Star, 11 Nov. 1943 and The Guardian, 18 Nov. 1943. 
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increase would salvage the situation. 76 
By 1944, the PECC's sub-economic housing schemes had come to a standstill after having 
built 5 486 dwellings of which 3 500 were for Africans. The Council declared itself no longer 
able financially to undertake further schemes under existing conditions nor was it willing to 
commit itself to new ones on the terms proposed by the Government, to be co-ordinated 
through the agency of the soon to be established National Housing and Planning Commission. 
The PECC's main objection was that the proposals could not guarantee that the loss to be 
borne by local authorities would not exceed 1,25% of the loan debt in the erection of sub-
economic houses. This, more than anything else, rankled with certain Councillors who 
regarded the failure of the previous scheme to underwrite losses as tantamount to a betrayal 
of trust by the Government. 77 Thus the PECC's rejection of the Government's new housing 
proposals was coupled to a growing dissatisfaction with the losses sustained on the sub-
economic housing schemes. 
TABLE 5.6 
LOSSES INCURRED ON SUB-ECONOMIC HOUSING, 1939-1945 
Year Ex~nditur~ Rev~n~ Loss P~rcentag~ 
1939 33 995 29 960 4 035 11,8 
1940 47 985 38 210 9 775 20,3 
1941 57 442 43 700 13 742 23,9 
1942 68 635 49·301 19 334 28,1 
1943· 81 222 51 561 29 661 36,5 
1944 80 894 54 917 25 977 32,1 
1945* 91 334 57 246 34 088 37,3 
*Estimated 
The cumulative deficit for the period totalled £136 532 and the contribution required from 
general rates was steadily increasing. The City Treasurer reckoned that when the sub-economic 
housing programme was completed and the PECC was meeting the total interest and 
redemption charges, the contribution required from general rates to meet the deficit was 
76 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15118, Report of the City Treasurer re Native Sub-Economic 
Housing Scheme (McNamee Village), 6 Jan. 1944; 3/PEZ 4/2/1111122, Report of City 
& Water Engineer to Housing & Slum Elimination Committee, 15 Feb. 1944. 






anticipated to be at least £43 000 per annum. This was estimated to be the equivalent to a rate 
of about 1hd. in the£ on the 1944 valuation of site and buildings in Port Elizabeth. Overall, 
the loss on the scheme was expected to be approximately 2,5% of the loans advanced for sub-
economic housing purposes, or effectively double that laid down by the Government. 78 But 
even if these estimates are accepted, ratepayers were making a relatively small contribution to 
subsidising the housing of Port Elizabeth's poorest classes. 
In June 1944, the NAC considered the feasibility of reducing the losses on the sub-economic 
scheme by increasing rentals in New Brighton. It initially considered increases to the lowest 
categories of accommodation in the Red Location might be preferable to the highest category 
of rentals in McNamee Village and Newtown. The Location Superintendent argued that 
discrimination against the very poor - even where their incomes were supplemented from the 
(illicit) sale of beer - could hardly be justified when their living conditions were appalling. 79 
The NAC fmally resolved to increase rents on all houses in McNamee Village by 4s. per 
month and to fix the rent of the newly-erected dwellings at £1 per month. If the NAC regarded 
tenants of the sub-economic houses better able to afford rent increases, they were sadly 
mistaken. A survey conducted the previous year of the incomes of 73% of householders in 
McNamee Village revealed that by far the majority (2 023 out of 2 724) earned less than £6 
per month. Of the total, the incomes of 325 households were supplemented by the earnings 
of children residing with them, and 182 householders were totally dependent on the earnings 
of children. A further 154 householders were unemployed with no visible income. 80 If an 
income of £6 per month was to be regarded as barely adequate to subsist, then rents of £1 
would entail increased privation for these residents. It was regarded by the PE Joint Council 
to be inappropriate that the 'underfed and underpaid' Africans should be singled out to help 
meet the deficit on the PE Municipality's budget. 81 
The rent increases were presented to the Advisory Board as a fait accompli. The 
Superintendent felt constrained to justify a general increase on the grounds that tariffs had been 
based on 1937 estimates of the cost of buildings which had increased enormously, as had the 
78 CeA, NTS 6369 197/313, City Treasurer's Report for the Year ended 31 Dec. 1944 
and Memo to NAD, 27 Sept. 1946. 
79 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2115118, Report of Supt. NBL, 7 July 1944. 
80 CeA, NTS 6371 197/313, Report of Supt. NBL, 23 Oct. 1943. 
81 CeA, NTS 6371197/313, Sec. PE Joint Council to Minister of Native Affairs, 22 Nov. 




cost of maintenace and services. Moreover, he noted that since the rentals had been fixed, 
wages paid to unskilled workers had been increased. He presented the Board with the scenario 
that if additional revenue from rent increases was not forthcoming there was every possibility 
that the PECC would refuse to build any more houses and that many Africans would continue 
to live under slum conditions. 82 When called upon to approve the new regulations necessary 
to implement the rent increases, members of the Board expressed their dissatisfaction with not 
having been consulted on the matter. It was unanimously felt that rents of £1 were beyond the 
capacity of New Brighton residents and that, if introduced, would give rise to malnutrition 
with an accompanying increase in the incidence oftuberculosis.83 Notwithstanding opposition, 
the PECC went ahead with its plans to apply for the rent increases. 84 
The proposed rent increases did not eventuate until 194 7 because of community resistance [see 
Chapter 8]. When further rent increases were mooted, residents made known their intention 
of refusing to pay these and threatened boycott action. 85 The PECC chose to ignore the 
likelihood of opposition and approved an average increase of 1s. per week on houses in 
McNamee Village although there were to be no increases to rents in the other parts of New 
Brighton [see Table 5.7]. In late 1951 the PECC proposed further rent increases in McNamee 
Village in order to reduce losses on sub-economic housing. It was also proposed that those 
unable to afford the new rents would be moved to cheaper houses in the lower rent group. Cllr 
G. Schafer, who was Chairman of the NAB, argued that in real terms the proposed 10% 
increases amounted to between 60% and 80% and could not be afforded by the majority of 
residents. He also contended that any attempts to rehouse McNamee residents in other portions 
of the location would have negative socio-political consequences, which would be more 
harmful than "any alleged losses on Native housing schemes". 86 The NAC decided to 
recommend that the Council postpone the rent increases until such time as new Wage Board 
determinatiqns for African workers had been made. The NAC's report argued that 
if the residents of New Brighton were to be able to meet the proposed increase in rent, 
wages should be adjusted to meet the increases. 87 
The majority of Councillors, however, took the view that a rent increase should not be 
contingent on wage increases as the PE Municipality had recently turned down a request for 
an increase by its own African employers.88 
82 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/18, Minutes of the NBAB, 27 July 1944. 
83 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15/19, Minutes of the NBAB, 7 Dec. 1944. 
84 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15/19, Minutes· of the NBAB, 7 Dec. 1944. 
85 UCT Manuscripts, M. Ballinger Papers, A410 B2.5.40, A.P. Mati, Sec. NB Vigilance 
Committee to Ballinger, 22 April 1946. 
86 EPH 6 Oct. 1951. 
87 Evening Post 21 Nov. and EPH 22 Nov. 1951. 
88 EPH 23 Nov. ('City Council Over Native Wages') and Evening Post 23 Nov. 1951 




The Council also rejected an increase in general rates on the grounds that it was unfair to 
expect ratepayers to subsidise the residentS of New Brighton. The proposed increase of 1hd. 
would have raised the rate to 6d. in the £. Yet it was contended that New Brighton residents 
were already paying higher tariffs for the provision of water than ratepayers in the city, and 
that overall they were paying the equivalent of a rate of 8d. in the £. 89 Nor was the PECC 
··--·-··- -- -- - .. - ---··· -- ··- -- --· -. --- ---·- -- ----·- . -
prepared to make comparable rent increases on the sub-economic housing schemes erected for 
Whites and Coloureds who were arguably better able to pay such increases. As it was, existing 
rents in McNamee were reckoned to be higher than for comparable houses for Coloured 
residents of Schauder Township. 90 In response to what he declared to be 'gross distortions' 
of the position, Schauder himself noted that rents had not been increased in the older portion 
of New Brighton since 1927. He also pointed to the discrepancies between rents paid by 
McNamee residents and those in the recently constructed austerity housing (Boastville) and the 
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See correspondence in EPH 1 Oct. 1951 (from Dick MjeJe, NB), 16 Oct. 1951 (from 
'Parent', NB) and 22 Oct. 1951 (H. WilJiams, Schauder Township). 
CeA, NTS 6369 197/313, TC to SNA, 3 Oct. 1951. 
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Schauder suggested that the opposition to the rent increases was stage managed by McNamee 
residents who represented a 'privileged group' intent on protecting their position to the 
detriment of others. These included residents of the new housing schemes who paid higher 
rents for poorer amenities and residents of slums outside New Brighton who might not be 
afforded the opportunity to acquire better housing if the non-payment of rents forced the PECC 
to halt housing and slum clearance projects.92 Although the social geography and stratification 
of New Brighton contributed to the creation of sectional group interests, there was considerable 
solidarity in the community against rent increases. 
A statement issued by the ANC in 1951 called upon the authorities to "erase the misconception 
that the African is entirely dependent upon their philanthropic charity". It pointed out that 
Africans bore the brunt of indirect taxation in the form of cheap labour. 93 Cheap labour 
benefitted Port Elizabeth's employers, both the authorities themselves and industrialists. Yet 
' 
sub-economic housing was made available to poorly paid workers by the authorities and not 
employers. From the perspective of the local authority, it was argued that "sub-economic 
housing ... is the adjustment we apply to inadequate wages" .94 The author of this statement 
went on to suggest that a housing tax should be imposed on businesses if the authorities were 
to continue to provide sub-economic houses and, accordingly, subsidise poor wages. The state 
appeared to concur with such a proposal as levies were imposed on white employers of African 
labour. The Native Services Levy Act (64 of 1952) established the principle that employers 
had a responsibility towards meeting the costs of providing certain services to the townships.95 
For the first time, the business sector which derived direct economic benefits from cheap 
African labour was called upon to contribute towards the costs of its reproduction. 
Conclusion 
Much of the (direct) cost of the reproduction of Port Elizabeth's African workforce was carried 
by the central state for the first two decades after the establishment of New Brighton. After 
the Municipality assumed responsibility for New Brighton, it sought to maintain a self-
balancing NRA. Neither the PECC nor ratepayers were to bear the costs of reproduction. 
Having acquired substantial assets as part of the transfer, the PECC was able to supplement 
92 EPH 6 Dec. 1951. 
93 The Guardian 18 Oct. 1951 . 
94 EPH 10 Dec. 1951 ('Native Housing Fallacy'). 
95 Bekker and Humphries, From Control to Confusion, p. 122. 
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NRA income by means of the occasional hiring or sale of location land not specifically 
earmarked for residential purposes. Some revenue was derived from the irregular payment of 
court fines into the NRA. But the absence of a municipal beerball, which provided the major 
source of revenue in many centres, meant that the Location was financed primarily through 
_ _ _the renting of municipally-owned dwellings. Ultimately, tQe _quest for self-sufficiency_ was ____________ _ 
undermined by the deficit which accrued to the NRA on account of the Newtown housing 
scheme. 
In 1937 the PECC decided that its sub-economic housing scheme would be partly subsidised 
from the general rate fund. McNamee Village came to be hailed as an example of how suitable 
and cost -effective accommodation for Africans could be provided with the judicious use of sub-
economic loans. The initial enthusiasm for the project was, however, dampened by escalating 
costs and the consequent losses sustained by the NAP. It was felt that the central government 
had reneged on its undertaking to restrict these losses and had passed the gr~ater burden of 
financing homes and essential services for Africans to the local authority and hence (indirectly 
to) ratepayers. For many municipalities, beer profits remained of crucial importance in meeting 
deficits on the NRA. For Port Elizabeth, however, this was never an option for reasons which 
we shall explore in the following Chapter. 
The PECC sought, instead, to extract additional revenue from New Brighton residents by 
imposing a succession of rent increases on New Brighton from the mid-1940s. The cumulative 
deficit on the NAP caused the PECC to reconsider it's subsidisation of sub-economic rents and 
make the African population liable for the costs of its own reproduction. Not that the PECC's 
- purported 'liberalism' extended to the financing of New Brighton-Indeed, Robinson has 
argued that the PECC was actually frugal and tight-fisted with respect to its management of 
the NRA.96 Although not altruistic, at least the PECC did not stoop to the fraudulent practices 
of the borough of Durban. 97 
96 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', pp. 219-226. 
97 P. Maylam, 'Municipal Fraud: the Operation of Durban's Native Revenue Account 
1908-1953', Journal of Natal and Zulu History, XI (1988), pp. 69-92. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PERMITTING PATRONAGE AND POLICING PRIVILEGES: 
DOMESTIC BEER BREWING IN NEW BRIGHTON, c. 1903-1945 
Much of the literature on sorghum or 'kaffir' beer in South African townships has been 
concerned with the efforts of the state to control its production and consumption, and 
resistance thereto. 1 The beerball is said to represent a distinct loss of autonomy on the part of 
urban Africans in shaping their own communities. 2 On the other hand, the shebeen has come 
to symbolise a site where state control of drinking habits and other leisure activities was weak. 
It was here that a vibrant popular culture acquired a subaltern status. 3 Thus, when home 
brewing is discussed, it is invariably in the context of efforts by the authorities to clamp down 
on illicit practices. As far as I am aware, there is not a single case study of a township where 
domestic brewing was officially sanctioned. 
The 1923 Urban Areas Act upheld the principle that prohibition should be the rule in African 
townships, although it also made provision for municipal or domestic brewing - but not a 
combination of these. Between 1923 and 1937, some 45 municipalities adopted domestic 
brewing as opposed to 8 which adopted monopolies. 4 The 1937 Native Law Amendment Act 
overturned prohibition in favour of the principle that African had a right to beer, either by 
means of municipalisation, or domestic brewing or through the agency of licensed premises. 
The first option remained exclusive but the latter two could be practised parri passu. In 
instances where municipalities failed to establish monopolies or license individuals to sell beer, 
they could not prohibit domestic brewing. 5 But the extent of support by local authorities and 
1 Most of the chapters in the recently published J. Crush and C. Ambler (eds.), Liquor 
and Labour in Southern Africa (Pietermaritzburg, 1992) are written in this vein. 
2 See, for example, W. Scharf, 'Liquor, the State and urban blacks' in D. Davis and M. 
Slabbert (eds.), Crime & Power in South Africa (Claremont, 1985), pp. 48-59 and P. 
Ia Hausse, Brewers, Beerhalls and Boycotts: A History of Liquor in South Africa 
(Johannesburg, 1988). 
3 See, for instance, E. Koch, 'Doomfontein and the African Working Class, 1914 to 
1935: A study of Popular Culture in Johannesburg (M.A. Thesis, University of the 
Witwatersrand, 1983); P. Ia Hausse, 'The Struggle for the City: Alcohol, the Ematsheni 
and Popular Culture in Durban, 1902-1936' (M.A. Thesis, University of Cape Town, 
1984); D. Coplan, In Township Tonight! South Africa's Black City Music and Theatre 
(Johannesburg, 1985). 
4 Repon ofthe Native Affairs Depanmentfor 1937, U.G. 48- '37, p. 35; S. Bekker and 
R. Humphries, From Control to Confusion (Pietermaritzburg, 1985), p. 120. 
5 J.D. Rheinallt Jones, 'Natives in Urban Areas', Race Relations, 4, 4 (1937), p. 87; 
A.L. Saffery, 'The Liquor Problem in Urban Areas', Race Relations, 1, 4 (1940), pp. 
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the police for beerhalls under a municipal monopoly was probably inversely proportional to 
the preference of urban Africans for domestic brewing.6 Many chose to introduce municipal 
monopolies despite opposition from the communities themselves because it presented an 
obvious means of balancing NRAs. 
Although Port Elizabeth periodically considered the introduction of beerhalls, it was one of 
the few major centres to continue allowing domestic brewing throughout our period. This 
chapter is concerned with why, how and under what circumstances domestic brewing was 
permitted in New Brighton. First, it will examine the attempts by the location administration 
to fashion a system which catered for the conflicting interests of different sections of the New 
Brighton community, as well as accommodate the views of outside pressure groups. Secondly, 
it will outline the PECC'S efforts to legalise home brewing by way of a permit system. And, 
fmally, the chapter will address the functioning and abuse of the system of home brewing, the 
latter largely by way of statistical evidence derived from police records. This will enable us 
to assess the validity of the constantly repeated assertion that New Brighton was 'a law-abiding 
community' as justification for the practice of domestic brewing. Moreover, it will also 
provide scope for a comparative evaluation of the merits of domestic brewing and beerhalls 
under municipal control. 
The Establishment and Operation of Dualism in New Bri~hton, 1903-1923 
New Brighton's unique combination of domestic brewing and prohibition originated during the 
time that the Location was administered by the Cape Colonial Government. Section 14 of the 
Native Reserve Location Act stipulated that no licence to sell liquor was to be issued to 
residents. Section 16 stated that it was an offence to bring intoxicating liquor into the location 
or be in possession thereof without a permit, which would only be issued for medicinial (and 
possibly ritualistic) purposes. Section 17 set out penalties for the contravention of these 
clauses. The defmition of intoxicating liquor in Section 1 of the Act included 'kaffrr' beer and 
89-91. 
6 Union of South Africa, Native Economic Commission, UG 22- 1932, para. 762 and 
Repon of the Native Affairs Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Working of the 
Provisions of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act Relating to the Use and Supply of Kaffir 
Beer, GP - S.42, paras. 2, 78. The Location Advisory Boards Congress (LABC) 
endorsed home brewing in 1934, 1936 and 1937. See University of the Witwatersrand, 
Rheinallt Jones Papers, AD 843/RJ B4.2.1, Minutes of the LABC, Pretoria, 21 Dec. 
1934 and Cape Archives (CA), Port Elizabeth Town Clerk's Files (3/PEZ) 1/3/2/15/11, 
Report of the Loc. Supt. to Native Affairs Committee (NAC) re LABC, 27 Jan. 1937; 
3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/12, Resolution 3/37 of the LABC, New Brighton, 19-22 Dec. 1937. 
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thus expressly forbade trade in or possession therof. But Section 16 of the Act provided the 
loophole for the introduction of domestic brewing. It was suggested that residents be issued 
permits to brew a limited quantity of 'kaffir' beer for their own consumption as it was 
regarded part of the staple African diet. 7 Domestic brewing was permitted on account of 
'administrative relaxation', a euphemism for a customary practice which was, strictly speaking, 
illegal. 
Part of the rationale for allowing domestic brewing (not unlike that for beerballs) was that it 
would serve to combat the illicit trade in and consumption of 'European' liquor in New 
Brighton. Despite exerting a disproportionate influence on the location administration through 
the Native Advisory Board, the proponents of prohibition could not withstand the demands for 
traditional beverages. The authorities were of the opinion that as long as the demand for 
traditional beer existed, it was preferable to have brewing under supervision. They reckoned 
that prohibition was unworkable and counter-productive, as those New Brighton residents long 
accustomed to drinking 'kaffir' beer would then frequent shebeens outside the Location. 
Domestic brewing was obviously favoured by a· good number of women who saw the financial 
incentives. A system of dualism could accommodate the interests of prohibitionists and brewers 
in a single locality. This exemplified the contradictory impulses of alcohol regulation: on the 
one hand, the desire to suppress African consumption altogether and, on the other, the effort 
to restrict consumption so that it conformed to and reinforced the objectives of social and 
economic domination. 8 
Spatially, New Brighton's system of dualism was demarcated by 'wet' and 'dry' areas. The 
'wet'· areas comprised 12 blocks of houses in the Red Location wherein tesidents were allowed 
to brew 4 gallons of beer per week. There were 9 blocks in the 'dry' area. Subsequently, the 
'wet' area was sub-divided into three sections of 4 blocks and permits were issued to each 
section in turn so that those who were eligible could obtain permits every third week. Permits 
were issued only to registered occupants of houses whose rent payments were up to date and 
not to lodgers. They were issued by the Location Superintendent on Monday mornings and 
expired on midnight the following Saturday so that brewing was effectively forbidden on 
Sundays. Under this rotational system, permit holders were allowed to be in possession of a 
maximum of eight gallons of beer per day. This quantity was considered adequate for three 
7 CAD, Native Affairs (NA), 734 348, ARM to SNA, 7 Aug. 1908 and Minutes of the 
NBAB, 24 Oct. 1908. . 
8 Crush and Ambler, Liquor and Labour, pp. 18-19. 
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households and was supposed to afford brewers the opportunity to reciprocate the hospitality 
of those with whom they had drunk beer during the two weeks when themselves not entitled 
to a permit. Although beer could not legally be sold, it would have been extremely difficult 
to prevent this. Migrants, many of whom were lodgers or later became tenants of the SMQ, 
could not obtain permits and congregated in the 'wet' areas for their social drinking. This had 
the effect of reducing the surveillance necessary to control revelry and anti-soci~ I behaviour, 
but it did not eliminate illicit brewing nor the trade in beer and liquor altogether. 9 The term 
'domestic' brewing was clearly a misnomer for the quantities allowed were beyond the 
consumption requirements of the average household. If anything, homes in the 'wet' area of 
New Brighton became part-time shebeens. 
The PE Ctiy Council's struggle to legalise dualism in New Brighton, 1923-1936 
An illegal system of home brewing had existed for a number of years when the PECC assumed 
control of New Brighton in 1923. The PECC was made aware of this state of affairs by the 
Union Government and advised to regularise the position as soon as possible by applying the 
Urban Areas Act. There was considerable debate as to what course the PECC should follow 
with regard to framing beer brewing regulations in terms of this legislation. It was faced with 
three possible options: (1) total prohibition; (2) domestic brewing subject to conditions 
prescribed by regulations; (3) the vesting in the municipality of the exclusive rights to 
manufacture, supply and sell 'kaffrr' beer within its area. 
The new Location Superintendent, W. G. Bellairs, had definite views on traditional sorghum 
beer. He reckoned that the nutritional value of the beer in its pure state and when taken in 
moderation was widely recognised. He held that domestic brewing and consumption was "a 
custom and privilege which . . . no Government has interfered with except in so far as to 
control, regulate and keep within proper limitli". The denial of this privilege would not only 
cause 'grave discontent', but "also defeat its own object by leading to a large increase in the 
consumption of brandy and other spiritous liquors and their introduction into the location in 
ever increasing quantities, leading inevitably to the physical, mental and moral deterioration 
and degradation of the inhabitants". He also cited the example of many 'better class or 
educated natives' who chose to live in the 'dry' areas and forego beer privileges as a sign of 
9 Eastern Province Herald, 6 June 1919 (letter from 'Straightforward'); Central Archives, 
Pretoria (CeA), Native Affairs (NTS), 2443 4/291, Superintendent of Natives to Magt., 
PE, 16 June 1919; Report of the Native Affairs Department for the years 1913 to 1918, 
UG 7- 1919, p. 18. 
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significant social change amongst urbanised Africans. Thus he advocated the continuation of 
the existing system of domestic brewing with the proviso that conditions for the grant of 
permits should be made more stringent if the need arose. 10 I have cited Bellairs's views at 
some length because they are representative of a viewpoint which was common amongst those 
with first-hand experience of rural African society. This was that 'kaffrr' beer was part of the 
African diet and should not be prohibited but strictly regulated. 11 Bellairs's experience in the 
Transkei probably accounts for his echoing the views of officials of the NAD who favoured 
domestic brewing of the traditional beverage of African peoples. 
Bellairs's views would undoubtedly have found support amongst many of New Brighton's 
residents. The Location Committee, for instance, argued that to implement prohibition after 
so many years of domestic brewing would be counter-productive. If not permitted to drink 
'kafftr' beer which had been allowed to ferment properly, people would take to various 
concoctions which could be prepared surreptitiously and more quickly. 12 The Advisory Board, 
too, expressed itself in favour of the continuation of the existing system of domestic brewing 
subject to regulation and control. 13 Although some Board members were themselves 
teetotallers on account of moral or religious convictions, they did not consider it wise to 
impose their principles on the majority of New Brighton residents. 
On the other hand, representations for prohibition were made by a number of pressure groups. 
In March 1924, a group of over 200 Christians from mission churches, as well as the Order 
of Ethiopia, passed the following resolution: 
That this meeting of members of the Churches in New Brighton regard the Kafftr Beer 
traffic in the Location as a danger to our young people and beg the Municipality to 
prohibit the manufacture and sale of Kaffir Beer. 14 
Similar petitions were submitted to the PECC by white ministers. 15 And the PECC also 
10 CAD, 3/PEZ 11725, Report on the Manufacture of Kaffrr Beer, New Brighton 
Location, which accompanied a letter from the Location Superintendent to the Town 
Clerk, PE, 26 May 1924. 
11 Ambler and Crush, Liquor and Labour, p. 18. 
12 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/556, Secretary Location Committee to Superintendent of Natives, 12 
Oct. 1925. 
13 CAD, 3/PEZ 11725, Minutes of NBAB, 28 April 1924. 
14 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/725, Resolution dated 30 March 1924 signed by Henry Newell. 
15 CAD, 3/PEZ 11725, Petitions from the Clergy of the Anglican Church, PE, 7 April 
1924 signed by J. Cowan, and from Ministers Fraternal of the Congregational, Baptist, 
Wesleyan, Dutch Reformed and Presbyterian Churches, 21 April1924 signed by J.M. 
Robert. 
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received a deputation from the Federal Woman's Christian Temperance Union led by Sister 
Dora Nginza [see Appendix C for biographical details] which probably represented the wives 
of the 'respectable' classes. 16 The temperance lobby constituted a formidable pressure group 
at the time but its influence appears to have waned from the mid-1920s as the state and local 
authorities came to favour controlled beer brewing. 
The publication of comments about conditions in New Brighton made by Superintendent 
Bellairs and two clergymen to the Port Elizabeth Rotary Club in August 1925 and the 
subsequent controversy that this sparked, had a significant bearing on the PECC's decision to 
consider a municipal monopoly. One of the clergymen reportedly stated that "he could not 
understand why the possession of Kaffrr beer should be regarded as a serious offence outside 
of New Brighton but not an offence inside the Location" .17 A sub-committee appointed by the 
PE Rotary Club - which included some prominent Councillors and the Chief Sanitary Inspector 
- released a report which confirmed previous claims that "Kaffrr beer [was] brewed in 
excessive quantities under little or no supervision" . 18 The extent to which the incumbent 
Location Superintendent could be blamed for the situation was a moot point. He had inherited 
the system from his predecessor and obviously only continued well-established practices. 
In the face of mounting pressure, Bellairs had to be seen to asserting a greater degree of 
control over brewing. Accordingly, he issued a warning to beer brewers that if they continued 
to abuse their privilege, the practice would be discontinued entirely. In addition, an African 
police corporal was engaged for the express purpose of exercising more effective control of 
the manufacture and consumption of beer in the location. 19 However, these measures and 
proposals for improvements were not sufficient to defuse the crisis, and Bellairs became the 
Council's scapegoat for its bad press and was dismissed from his position as Superintendent.20 
Clearly, the Council should have shouldered as much responsibility as its employee for what 
was perceived to be the administration's inability to control a socially destructive practice by 
certain interested parties. 
16 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/724, Minutes of PECC, 3 Dec. 1924. 
17 CAD, 3/PEZ 111275, Report by Superintendent NBL, 6 Sept. 1925. 
18 CAD, 3/PEZ 111275, Report of the Sub-Committee appointed by the PE Rotary Club 
to investigate the conditions of Native Life in and about the City, 3 Dec. 1925. 
19 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1275, Report of Superintendent, NBL, 22 Sept. 1925. 
20 The issues ranged more widely than beer brewing. See J. Robinson, 'The Power of 
Apartheid: Territoriality and State Power in South African Cities- Port Elizabeth 1923-
1972' (Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University, 1990), pp. 164-5, 190 n28. 
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The publication of the abovementioned Rotary report added to the public clamour for a 
municipal monopoly in New Brighton. It was suggested that: 
the Municipality undertake the sole manufacture and control and distribution of Kaffrr 
Beer, and that any profit therefrom shall be allocated and employed solely for the 
benefit of the Native population. 21 
The city's Medical Officer of Health (MOH) criticised the issue of brewing permits on a 
rotational basis because drinkers simply congregated in one portion of the location which 
"lends itself to all manner of evils". 22 A leading Councillor also objected to the congestion 
of drinkers in the 'wet areas' and expressed preference for a brewery erected by private 
enterprise but under municipal supervision. 23 The obvious appeal of the system for the local 
authorities lay in the fact that the Africans themselves rather than white ratepayers or 
employers would bear the cost of their reproduction. In addition to income derived from rents, 
fines and other fees, the profits from beer sales would be paid into the NRA and be used to 
pay salaries of administrators and provide facilities in the location. 
Whilst the Urban Areas Act had incorporated many features of the 'Durban system' ,24 the 
framers of the Act had recognised that beerballs were more suited to a 'floating' population 
(such as Durban with its togt labourers) than a stable one where family units comprised a 
significant section (such as Port Elizabeth). The municipalisation of beer brewing had only 
been experimented with in Natal, and in the Cape where conditions were very different there 
were not a single precedent for Port Elizabeth to follow. By contrast, the practice of domestic 
brewing was well established in New Brighton and any attempt to remove it was likely to meet 
with resistance. 
Nonetheless, the PECC's Native Affairs Sub-Committee showed itself in favour of 
municipalisation. At a meeting in December 1925, concern was expressed about the trend 
towards abuse of the permit system. Figures tabled at the meeting indicated that the number 
of convictions for illegal brewing had increased from 29 in 1921 to 135 in 1924, which meant 
21 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1275, Report of the Sub-Committee appointed by the PE Rotary Club 
to investigate the conditions of Native Life in and about the City, 3 Dec. 1925. 
22 PE Municipality, Mayor's Minute 1925, Report of the MOH, p. 56. 
23 CAD, 3/PEZ 111275, Undated report of Cllr H.J. Millard on New Brighton submitted 
to the NAC with that of the sub-committee appointed by the PE Rotary Club to 
investigate conditions of Native Life in the City, 3 Dec. 1925. 
24 P. Ia Hausse, 'Drink and Cultural Innovation in Durban: the Origins of the Beerball in 
South Africa, 1902-1916' in Crush and Ambler, Liquor and Labour, p. 105. 
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that the per capita conviction rate had increased from 5,5 to 16,5 per 1000. 25 Opinion was 
also swayed by the financial incentives of municipalisation. Another set of figures was tabled 
showing Durban's beerball profits which suggested that a municipal monopoly in New 
Brighton could defray the costs of administering the location quite considerably. On the basis 
of these considerations, the Sub-Committee recommended that a brewery should be established 
under the aegis of municipality. 26 The Council affirmed the principle that the manufacture and 
sale of 'kaffir' beer at New Brighton should be undertaken by the Municipality and, 
accordingly, a definite proposal should be formulated. 27 But the Council did not have the 
power to introduce a municipal beer monopoly whilst New Brighton was still administered 
under the Native Reserve Location Act; this could only be conferred in terms of the Urban 
Areas Act. 
In the interim, the PECC took steps to impose stricter controls on beer brewing. In June 1926, 
the Assistant Resident Magistrate (ARM) tried four New Brighton residents for contravention 
of beer brewing regulations in the periodical court. He came to the conclusion that "there were 
such exceptional circumstances in these cases that the accused should only be nominally fmed 
and that their privileges should be retained". The Location Superintendent protested on the 
grounds that the PECC had discretion to issue or not renew permits and contended that such 
a ruling was not within the Magistrate's province. He pointed out that in one case the accused 
had a previous conviction for a similar offence. Allegations that the Superintendent had tom 
up a letter setting forth the ARM's ruling in the case in front of some Africans and thereby 
undermined his authority were refuted but caused further recriminations. Ultimately, the N AC 
lodged an appeal against the sentence and resolved that the decision not to renew permits be 
adhered to. 28 
Bellairs's successor as Location Superintendent, J.P. McNamee, was expected to continue the 
PECC's tough approach to illegal beer brewing. He was instructed to take immediate steps to 
remedy the abuse of the permit system upon assuming office. He sought to close a loophole 
in the system which effectively allowed a permit holder to be in possession of more than 8 
gallons per day. A new condition was attached to the issue of permits which stipulated that the 
25 CAD, 3/PEZ 111275, Magt to Town Clerk, PE, 9 Oct. 1925. 
26 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Minutes of Native Affairs Sub-Committee, 3 Dec. 1925. 
27 CAD, 3/PEZ 111556, Council Minutes, 18 Dec. 1925; Mayor's Minute 1927, p. 8. 
28 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Messrs Krogscheepers & Strydom to TC, PE, 22 June 1926 and 
Minutes of NAC, 30 June 1926. 
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holder could not be in possession of beer in any of its stages of manufacture, as well as beer 
ready for consumption, at the same time. McNamee also undertook to exercise a close personal 
supervision over the blocks where beer was being brewed. 29 He earned the nickname 
uGilifatyi on account his habit of personally emptying containers when quantities of beer in 
excess of the regulation amount were found. 
When the NAC discussed the relative merits of the regulations pertaining to beer brewing 
under existing conditions and the Urban Areas Act, it was pointed out that only the latter made 
specific provision for the legalisation of domestic brewing. In other words, whereas the PECC 
treated beer brewing as a 'privilege' which could be entirely revoked consequent upon abuse 
of the permit system, in terms of the Urban Areas Act it would be regarded as a right which 
could only be denied individuals for contravening the regulations. 30 In reporting on the 
position, McNamee, like his predecessor, made it known that he favoured the legalisation of 
the system of domestic brewing under the Urban Areas Act rather than a municipal monopoly 
in New Brighton. Amongst other things, the Act made provision for those "not in possession 
of any honest means of livelihood" - meaning persons living from the proceeds of the sale of 
beer - to be ejected from the location. He was of the opinion that this and other measures 
would enable adequate control to be exercised over domestic beer brewing. 31 The NAC 
instructed its Chairman and the Location Superintendent to report back on the issue. 
The report by CUr T.C. White and McNamee expressed the opinion that it was "not opportune 
for the Municipality to create a monopoly in brewing Kaffrr Beer". It recommended, instead, 
the continuation of the existing system of domestic brewing provided that the conditions 
governing the issue of permits were strictly enforced. An additional suggestion was for the 
erection of eating houses in various parts of the city where African workers would be able to 
obtain lunch-time meals and beer with a low-level of alcohol under strictly regulated 
conditions.32 The NAC, however, chose to reject this recommendation and resolved, instead, 
that a building be erected in New Brighton For the brewing and supplying of Kaffrr Beer at 
an estimated cost of £5 000.33 The Council adopted the NAC's recommendation, although 
29 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1276 and 1/1556, Reports of the Location Superintendent, 19 Sept. and 
19 Oct. 1926; Minutes of the Finance Committee, 24 Sept. and 22 Oct. 1926. 
30 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/666, Minutes of NAC, 2 March 1927. 
31 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Memo of the Location Superintendent, 4 April 1927. 
32 CAD, 3/PEZ 111556, Report of T.C. White and J.P. McNamee re Kaffir Beer to 
NAC, 30 April 1927. 
33 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Minutes of the NAC, 6 May 1927. 
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four dissenting Councillors insisted on having their protests recorded. 34 
The PECC's approach to the municipalisation of beer brewing was cautious, informed as it 
was by the knowledge that there might be resistance to the introduction of beerballs in New 
Brighton. Although it included a sum of £4.000 for a beerball against the loan schedule.in i~ 
estimates for 1928,35 the PECC appears to have been especially wary that the capital outlay 
involved in such a project might not be recouped. Therefore it entertained the idea of granting 
a concession to a local brewery to manufacture beer under licence from the Council which 
would supply and sell it in the location. 36 But the response of the SNA to this proposal was 
to the effect that the NRA should "benefit by the brewing and sale of the beer, and did not 
contemplate independent contractors making an intermediate profit". Therefore, it was 
considered unlikely that the Minister of Native Affairs would approve the operation of a 
commercial brewery licensed by the local authority. 37 Although privatisation (to use an 
anachronistic term) was ruled out, the Council was still intent on securing a' municipal beer 
monopoly. 
The most obvious obstacle to the introduction of a monopoly was the illegality of the existing 
system of domestic brewing. Section 20 (2) of the Urban Areas Act stated that 
Where brewing is, at the commencement of this Act, permitted by law [emphasis 
added], domestic brewing shall after the commencement of this Act be permitted. 
Because brewing was not actually permitted under the Native Reserve Location Act, the 
existing system could not have been automatically legalised as provided for by Section 20 (2) 
simply by transferring from the operation of the one Act to the other. The alternative, as 
stipulated in _Section 20 (3) of the Act, was for the PECC to consult the_ Advisory Boil!d, pass 
a resolution and then obtain the approval of the Minister of Native Affairs who would proclaim 
the introduction of a municipal monopoly (as if domestic brewing had never existed). But 
before it was prepared to commit itself to municipalisation, the PECC sought an assurances 
from the Minister of Native Affairs that any objections of the NAB would not be allowed to 
stand in the way, even if this meant having to amend the Urban Areas Act. 38 The PECC also 
asked the Native Commissioner and District Commandant of the SAP to intercede with the 
34 CAD, 3/PEZ 111556, Minutes of Council, 18 May 1927. -
35 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Minutes of NBAB, 18 June 1928. 
36 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Town Clerk, PE to SNA, 20 June 1927. 
37 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, SNA to Town Clerk, PE, 20 July 1927. 
38 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/3, Magt. and NC, PE to TC, PE, 17 July 1929. 
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Government on its behalf. 39 In fact, it should not have been unduly concerned because there 
was little likelihood of the Minister of Native Affairs refusing a municipal application for the 
establishment of a beerhall. 40 The PECC only succeeded in further delaying the application 
of the Urban Areas Act which was a prerequisite for the approval of a municipal beer 
monopoly. 
From 1927, the SAP had assumed responsibility from the headmen for enforcing compliance 
with the terms of the beer brewing permits issued by the Location Superintendent. Complaints 
about the conduct of police in the course of their searches for illegal brewing activities and 
caches of beer soon surfaced. They had apparently shown no concern for the alleged offender's 
right to privacy and dignity, and had subjected them to offensive language and rough 
treatment. Arrests had been made in instances where residents had been found in possession 
of both beer ready for consumption and beer in course of preparation. The latter category 
included both isidudu (beer in its porridge stage) and unstrained beer. This was a contravention 
of the conditions under which new permits had been issued, which stipulated that: "No fresh 
brew shall be made until the previous brew has been consumed", even though beer could not 
normally be brewed in one day. 41 At a subsequent meeting when the matter was discussed, 
the Superintendent stated that no person could be prosecuted for being in possession of 
unfermented liquor, and that no single instance had been brought to his notice of a permit 
holder being unable to brew daily the prescribed allowance owing to this condition. However, 
he did agree to delete the word isidudu from permits issued in future. The NAB resolved that 
the issue and conditions under which permits were granted should be left to the discretion of 
the Superintendent. As far as police conduct was concerned, the Superintendent attributed their 
behaviour to 'over-zealousness'. The matter was not pursued further because it was pointed 
out that the PECC had no control over the SAP which was under the jurisdiction of the 
Minister of Justice.42 
In his Annual Report for 1928, McNamee commented on what he considered certain 
39 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, SAN to TC, PE to 5 Oct. 1927; Minutes ofNAC, 4 Nov. 1927, 
6 Oct. 1928 and 23 May 1929; TC, PE to Chairman of NAC, 26 Jan. 1928. 
40 Saffery, 'The Liquor Problem', p. 92. The NAD evidently refused to sanction a 
beerball in Umtata in 1944. See S. Redding, 'Beer Brewing in Umtata: Women, 
Migrant Labor, and Social Control in a Rural Town' in Crush and Ambler, Liquor and 
Labour, pp. 246, 251 n.30. 
41 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1277, Minutes of special meeting of the NBAB, 29 Nov. 1928. 
42 CAD, 3/PEZ 111277, Minutes of NBAB, 13 Dec. 1928. 
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unsatisfactory aspects of the system of domestic brewing in New Brighton: 
One undesirable effect has been to attract to New Brighton numbers of women who now 
occupy, solely for the purpose of brewing and selling beer, houses which were 
originally intended to accommodate bona fide native employees of the City. Other 
women, who upon loss of a husband, either by death or desertion, would in the 
ordinary course of events return to their homes in the territories, now remain on and 
subsist by selling beer to the detriment of themselves and their children.43 
As long as these women remained the principal householders and ensured that .:heir rentals 
were up to date, they were entitled to brewing permits. It was invariably women who were 
found in possession of quantities of beer in excess of their quotas and faced charges for 
contravening the conditions of their permits. There were also claims that many of the single 
women not only earned an income from the sale of beer but other practices such as 
prostitution. Certain community leaders believed that the evils associated with home brewing-
but not the practice itself- could be eliminated by issuing permits only to those households 
over which a man was head. 44 But this was hardly a viable option in a society where an 
increasing number of women were breadwinners and patriarchy was visibly under threat [see 
Chapter 7]. 
The denial of brewing permits and, therby, a means of subsistence, was utilised as a means 
of co-opting women brewers. In 1929, a certain Annie Mjekula led a deputation which met 
with the PECC and registered its protest at the denial of permits to a large group of women. 
Little more than three years later, she was commended by the Superintendent for keeping her 
side of a bargain in ensuring that privileges were not abused over the holiday season by way 
of excessive drinking or disorderly conduct. Mjekula had presided over a committee which had 
played a crucial role in safeguarding existing beer privileges. 45 Patronage was a subtle ploy 
to get brewers to police themselves or face the prospect of having their privileges summarily 
revoked. 
In July 1929, the NAC supported the Superintendent's suggestion that new tenants of houses 
in the 'wet' areas be denied beer brewing privileges as a way of gradually reducing the number 
of permits issued. 46 Permits would also be permanently witheld from those convicted of 
brewing on Sundays and those convicted of being in possession of intoxicating liquor other 
43 Mayor's Minute 1928, Annual Report of the Superintendent, New Brighton, pp. 93-4. 
44 University of Cape Town, BC 630 K. 26, Evidence of A.F. Pendla to the Native 
Economic Commission, 26 & 27 March 1931, pp. 6009, 6034. 
45 CAD, 3/PEZ 111280, Report of Loc. Supt., 26 Jan. 1933. 
46 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1277, Minutes of NAC, 18 July 1929. 
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than 'kaffir' beer manufactured from malted corn. In addition, it was decided to rigorously 
enforce the stipulation that those brewers convicted of having more than the regulation 8 
gallons in their possession be denied further permits. The administration had made known it's 
intent in this regard at a public meeting some two years previously, and McNamee felt that 
brewers had ample warning to get their houses in order. 47 By steadily reducing the number 
of those entitled to permits, it was reckoned that there would be less resistance when the time 
eventually came to establish a municipal monopoly. The campaign, however, came to nought 
when the PECC did an about face on the monopoly issue. 
The Durban riots caused the NAC to re-evaluate its position with respect to the establishment 
of a monopoly for the manufacture and supply of beer. When the NAC discussed the issue 
once again in October 1929, the perceptions of Councillors were undoubtedly influenced by 
the experience of Durban and the fear of a similar outcome if beerballs were imposed on the 
local African population. The collective and virtually unanimous change of mind was evident 
in the new brief given to the Location Superintendent. He was instructed to report on the issue 
of permits to allow beer brewing if and when the Location was subject to the provisions of the 
Urban Areas Act Act. 48 In a carefully worded report, McNamee outlined the pros and cons 
of domestic brewing and the monopoly system. He expressed the view that conditions in the 
Cape were different to those pertaining in Natal, and he noted the fmancial failure of beerballs 
in certain centres where beerballs not been well patronised. He implied that it was possible that 
Port Elizabeth's African population would boycott beerhalls.49 
In spite of the reversal of the NAC's position with regard to the municipal monopoly, the 
Superintendent continued the policy of witholding permits from those convicted of 
contravening the regulations or those recently allocated houses in the 'wet' area. By early 1930 
there were 704 principal occupiers of whom 551 were issued with brewing permits on a 
regular basis; 103 had forfeited the privilege through abuses; 14 new occupiers were not liable 
for permits; and 30 did not avail themselves of the privilege. 50 A deputation to the Advisory 
Board took issue with the principle of denying beer brewing privileges to certain householders 
in the 'wet' areas, and noted that those residents convicted of brewing without a permit were 
not only obliged to pay a fme or go to gaol, but thereafter they were not allowed to brew at 
47 CAD, 3/PEZ 111277, Report of Location Supt., 15 Aug. 1929. 
48 CAD, 3/PEZ 111556, Minutes of NAC, 18 Oct. 1929. 
49 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/3, Report of Location Supt. 14 Nov. 1929. 
50 CAD, 3/PEZ 111556, Report of Location Supt. to NAC, 10 April 1930. 
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all. In this way, "they were being twice punished for a single offence". 51 Having decided to 
revert to domestic brewing, the NAC decided to adopt a more flexible approach with regard 
to the issue of permits. It NAC adopted a motion that permits be re-issued to those convicted 
of having had less than 4 gallons in excess of that allowed and that all new occupiers of the 
'wet' area be allowed to apply for permits. This meant that certain past offenders would be 
given another chance to brew beer subject to specific conditions;52 The Superintendent was 
granted discretion to withhold the privilege of brewing from one or more beer blocks for any 
period up to six months in the event of any disorderly conduct or riotous behaviour occurring 
in the location. McNamee expressed reluctance to accept discretionary power to issue permits 
to those who had been convicted and had their permits cancelled, because his decisions might 
be seen to "savour of favouritism" .53 But his objections were overcome by the expediency of 
being able to dispense patronage. 
Meanwhile, the NAC approved draft regulations framed under the Urban Areas Act which 
provided for the continuance of the existing system of domestic brewing. 54 These regulations 
included the the provision that the brewing of kaffir beer for domestic consumption was 
permitted subject to the conditions stipulated in a permit to be isssued by the Location 
Superintendent. The permit specified the localities where beer might be brewed, the quantity, 
and the period for which the permit was valid. 55 No objections to these draft regulations were 
forthcoming from the NAB,S6 but the NAD had expressed last-minute reservations. It was 
decided to withhold the beer regulations rather than delay the promulgation of all the 
regulations any further. These were promulgated in August 1933,57 five months after New 
Brighton came under the provisions of the Urban Areas Act. But their implementation was 
uelayeli si.ili furi.her as another notice had to be issued in order to proclaim their retro;)vective 
inception from 1 April 1934.58 
These regulations did not satisfy the SAP's requirements for contolling illicit brewing. They 
51 CAD, 3/PEZ 111497, Minutes of NBAB, 6 March 1930. 
52 CAD, 3/PEZ 111556, Minutes of NAC, 14 March 1930. 
53 CAD, 3/PEZ 111556, Report of the Location Supt., 10 April and Minutes of the NAC, 
11 April 1930. 
54 CAD, 3/PEZ 11667, Minutes of NAC, 7 Aug. and Loc. Supt. to TC, PE, 19 Aug~ 
1931. 
55 CAD, 3/PEZ 111556, Minutes of NAC, 8 Sept. 1932. 
56 CAD, 3/PEZ 111280, Minutes of the NBAB, 12 July 1931. 
57 Government Gazette, Provincial Administration Notice No. 314, 4 Aug. 1933. 
58 Government Gazette, Notice No. 366, 23 March 1934. 
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had favoured the application of the Urban Areas Act to New Brighton because it allowed 
searches for illegal beer or liquor to be conducted without a warrant_59 The PECC was, 
however, wary of conferring powers on the SAP for it exercised no control whatsoever over 
the police. Their solicitors advised against granting the SAP power of entry into any dwelling 
in the location for any purpose as their powers in that regard were circumscribed by Statutory 
Police Regulations. It was also suggested that no regulations governing the search for illicit 
beer be made for there was no provision therefore in the principal Act. 60 The PECC 
disregarded this advice and decided, instead, to obtain the approval of the Minister of Native 
Affairs for regulations according the police power to search for beer without a warrant in the 
entire Port Elizabeth urban area. 61 These regulations, which were duly promulgated, 
empowered the Location Superintendent, any member of the SAP or officer duly authorised 
by the local authority to search premises where it was suspected that 'kaffrr' beer was being 
made, kept, supplied or sold in contravention of the Urban Areas Act or regulations framed 
thereunder. 62 
There was an immediate public protest in New Brighton on 9 October against this measure. 
A well attended meeting passed a resolution which condemned the PECC's decision to enact 
the regulation. It was stated that the regulation was unnecessary as "the law-abiding ... 
residents of New Brighton have authority, unlike other places, to brew kaffrr beer by 
permit". 63 When McNamee requested the NAC's advice as to how he should try defuse the 
opposition of location residents to the regulations, the rather lame retort was made that as they 
"were law-abiding the committee did not anticipate that there would be any cause of 
complaint".<!" The response of the SNA on the matter was equally platitudinous, stating that 
New Brighton residents "need have no fear that they will be put to any inconvenience or 
annoyance by the operation of the regulations". 65 
No sooner had the new beer brewing regulations come into force, than they were deemed to 
be inadequate to regularise the system of domestic brewing practised in New Brighton. One 
59 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/666, District Commandant, SAP to TC, PE, 13 Jan. 1930. 
60 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/4, TC, PE to McWilliams & Elliott, 31 March and reply, 1 
April 1930. 
61 CAD, 3/PEZ 111556, Minutes of PECC, 28 Sept. 1933. 
62 Government Gazette, Notice No. 1456 of 20 Oct. 1933. 
63 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Loct. Supt. to TC, PE 26 Oct. 1933. 
64 CAD, 3/PEZ 111556, Minutes of NAC, 10 Nov. 1933. 
65 CeA, NTS 5420 197/313, SNA to Chief Native Commissioner, King Williamstown, 









Saraham Gojo was charged with contravening the regulations in that she was found in 
possession of 'kaffir' beer on a Sunday - her permit having expired the previous day. In his 
review of the case and upon closer examination of the regulations in conjunction with the 
relevant sections of the Act, the Assistant Native Commissioner raised substantive objections 
as to the validity of the regulations. These were that Section 23(3)(k) of the Act did not permit 
the local authority to make regulations restricting days on which beer may be brewed or 
possessed, nor the areas in which beer may be brewed or possessed, and neither did it give the 
Minister power to sanction regulations restricting days and areas, and moreover that before any 
regulations so made and sanctioned could be held to be valid, Section 20(3) would require 
amendment. 66 In other words, the restrictions on domestic brewing stipulated on the permits 
issued by location administration were ultra vires and until such time as these were regularised, 
residents (under 21 years) could not be prevented from having beer. Although the defending 
attorney had not challenged the validity of the Notice nor the regulations framed under section. 
' 
23(3)(k) of the Act, the Supreme Court ruled that the conviction and sentence should be set 
aside. 67 
The Government's Law Advisers concurred with the views of the Assistant Native 
Commissioner. 68 Accordingly, the SNA recommended that another set of regulations which 
complied with the provisions of the legislation be proclaimed as soon as possible. The PECC 
enquired whether it was not possible to give effect to the principle of 'local option' in New 
Brighton whereby residents might be free to choose to live in an area where beer brewing was 
allowed or not indefinitely. 69 The SNA, however, rejected the proposal as 
it would result in total prohibition being permanently and indefinitely imposed on 
certain location residents residing in a specified area or ward. _ 
Moreover, he was of the opinion that it would conflict with Section 20(3) read with Section 
23(3)(k) of the Urban Areas Act in that 
66 CA, 3/PEZ 111556, Asst. NC to Magt., PE, 13 April1934 and Loc. Supt. to TC, PE, 
3 May 1934; CeA, NTS 5420 197/313, Memo: 'Reasons for Submitting Case (Rex v. 
Gojo) for Review', 17 April 1934. 
67 CeA, NTS 5420 197/313, Supreme Court, Eastern Districts, Rex v. Gojo, 26 April 
1934. 
68 CeA, NTS 5420 197/313, SNA to Sec. for Justice, 18 May 1934; Sec. for Justice to 
SNA, 4 June 1934; Actg. SNA to Sec. for Justice, 8 June 1934; Sec. for Justice to 
SNA, 16 June 1934; CAD, 3/PEZ 111556, SNA to TC, PE, 20 June 1934. 
69 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Notes of Interview between Council and Government 
Representatives re the Domestic Brewing of Kaffrr Beer at New Brighton Location, 3 
July and TC, PE to SNA, 5 July 1934. 
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the Minister may only declare that domestic brewing shall be permitted in a location or 
native viJJage and cannot in a notice thereunder impose restrictions as to localities 
within which, or the persons by whom, beer may be brewed, used or possessed in 
pursuance of the general facility granted. 70 
This reply effectively ruled out the continuation of the system of dualism which had been 
practised in New Brighton for many years. The PECC was now faced with a major dilemma 
as far as its policy was concerned: should it scrap dualism and allow home brewing anywhere 
in the location or should it seek an amendment to the law so that continuance of the system 
would be possible? 
In arguing the case for the retention of New Brighton's existing system of domestic brewing, 
the Location Superintendent stated: 
The present system has given every satisfaction not only to the majority of the Native 
inhabitants, but to the local authority and the administration. For years past there has 
been little disorderliness, riotous behaviour or crimes of violence. Drunkenness in 
native urban locations is reported to be on the increase ... [but] has defmitely decreased 
at New Brighton. 71 
In support of his contention, McNamee cited figures to show that prosecutions for the illicit 
possession of liquor had decreased from 7,4 per 1000 in 1928 to 0.75 per 1000 in 1933. 
Similarly, the conviction rate for drunkenness had dropped from 7,98 per 1000 to 2,98 per 
1000 during the same period. Although McNamee did not cite any comparative figures to lend 
further weight to his argument, those for Durban-Pinetown for the same period were on 
average three to four times higher. 72 Notwithstanding the ruling that regulations with respect 
to the brewing of beer had to apply to the location as a whole and not to any particular 
portion, the NAC remained convinced that the existing system should be continued. It 
appointed a sub-committee to inyestigate the possibility of having it regularised rather than 
scrapped. 73 
Although an amendment to the Urban Areas Act was one way of restricting beer brewing-to 
specific areas in a location, the NAD would not seriously entertain such a proposal.74 An 
internal memorandum of the NAD called New Brighton's dualism 'invidious'. It was clearly 
70 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, SNA to TC, PE, 17 July 1934. 
71 CAD, 3/PEZ 111557, Report of Loc. Supt. to NAC, 27 July 1934. 
72 Stakesby Lewis, Kaffir Beer Halls: The Failure of "An Experiment" (Johannesburg, 
1941), pp. 5-6. 
73 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of NAC, 10 Aug. 1934. 
74 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, SNA to TC, PE, 20 Oct. and Loc. Supt. to TC, PE, 7 Nov. 
1934. 
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not convinced of the merits of the system and pointed to the contradiction whereby 
[t]he basic idea of restriction is to prevent abuse and to apply total prohibition to an 
area in which the persons inhabiting it are least likely to abuse a privilege is somewhat 
illogical. To deprive such a person of the total right to have kaffrr beer on his premises 
for his use while his neighbour across the street may have liquor for possible abuse is 
open to objection. 75 
The NAC, for its part, was becoming increasingly frustrated and embittered by what it 
regarded as shoddy treatment by the NAD. Members maintained that New Brighton would not 
have come under the Urban Areas Act without the assurance that existing beer brewing 
practices would be safeguarded. It was felt that because the regulations had been submitted to 
the NAD for approval and the Council had made clear its wish to continue with its system of 
domestic brewing, it was owed some sort of explanation as to why regulations were only now 
declared ultra vires. 76 
In the meantime, the New Brighton administration carried on issuing beer brewing permits as 
if they were still valid. For the local authority there existed the danger that prosecutions for 
contravention of the regulations would not be upheld in court and so were quietly suspended. 
The fear was expressed that "if the Natives get to hear about the legal difficulty the location 
will fall into chaos". 77 The District Commandant of the SAP, too, sounded a number of 
warnings that the 'excellent control' formerly exercised by the Location Superintendent over 
beer brewing and related activities was fast being undermined.78 Under the circumstances, the 
NAC considered it imperative to have some legally enforcable regulations governing beer 
brewing in place as soon as possible. Accordingly, it approved a proposal of the NAD that 
beer brewin~ permits would be issued at the discretion of the Location Superintendent subject 
to any resident having being denied a permit indefinitely having the right to appeal to the 
Magistrate. Quantities and times when brewing was allowed could be specified, and the 
permits would only be valid in those (undefmed) areas of the location where expressly 
permitted. 79 
The Advisory Board recommended that provision in the new draft regulations be made for the 
75 CeA, NTS 5240 197/313, Internal memo of NAD (n.d.). 
76 CAD, 3/ PEZ 111557, Minutes of the NAC, 9 Nov. 1934 and 1\-temo by TC for NAC 
re 'Brewing of Kaffir Beer', 9 Jan. 1935. 
77 CeA, NTS 5420 197/313, Notes of interview between the Minister of Native Affairs 
and J.S. Young, MPC, PE, 30 Jan. 1935. 
78 CAD, 3/PEZ 111557, District Cmdt., SAP to TC, PE, 11 Dec. 1934 and 11 March 
1935. 
79 CAD, 3/PEZ 111557, Minutes of NAC, 15 March 1935. 
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restriction of domestic brewing in accordance with the boundaries of existing 'wet' areas. This 
would exclude the granting of beer brewing rights by the Magistrate to residents of 'dry' 
areas. 80 Notwithstanding this recommendation, the PECC approved the regulations without 
alteration. However, the NAD suggested amendments and the new regulations were fmally 
promulgated in January 1936.81 As a result of the delay, no regulations governing beer 
brewing in New Brighton existed for over 12 months - and this for the second time in the 
space of three years. Concerns that Port Elizabeth would experience a 'calamity' and 
"lawlessness would get the upper hand" proved unfounded. 82 New Brighton appeared to live 
up to it's reputation as a law-abiding community for there is no evidence that illegal brewing 
and criminal activities increased markedly during either of these periods. 
During 1936 beer brewing privileges were extended to a portion of the new brick blocks 
commonly known as 'Newtown'. This decision followed representations made to the Location 
Superintendent by a deputation of about 100 women. The matter was referred to the Advisory 
Board which, in tum, recommended that a survey be taken amongst residents of the brick 
blocks to ascertain their wishes. The result was that approximately two-thirds of the residents 
indicated a desire to have beer brewing in the area. Although there was opposition from one 
Board member to permitting beer brewing in areas where churchgoers resided, the majority 
felt that in the light of the survey they could not justifiably force their personal principles on 
the majority. This represented an about face on the part of the Board which had emphatically 
rejected the extension of domestic brewing the previous year. They were probably influenced 
by court opinions as to the illegality of withholding brewing privileges from this area and the 
potential for the issue becoming . a source of grievance if not addressed satisfactorily. In any 
event, the Board recommended that one-third of the brick blocks be set aside for brewing on 
the same conditions as pertained in the Red Location. This arrangement was subsequently 
approved by the NAC, but its implementation was delayed pending the appointment of 
additional headmen to provide surveillance in the area. 83 This was as far as the extension of 
beer brewing privileges went. 
80 CAD, 3/PEZ 111557, Minutes of NBAB, 28 March 1935. 
81 Government Gazette, Provincial Notice No. 6, 9 Jan. 1936. 
82 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Dist. Cmdt., SAP to TC, PE, 11 Dec. 1934. 
83 CAD, 3/ PEZ 1/1557, Report ofLoc. Supt. to NAC, 19 Feb. 1936; Minutes ofNBAB, 
2 March, 2 April and 28 May 1936; Minutes of NAC, 1 May 1936. 
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From voluntacy prohibition to the legalisation of dualism, 1937-1945 
The Native Laws Amendment Bill had included clauses suggested by the PECC which would 
have legalised New Brighton's system of domestic brewing,84 but these were omitted by the 
Select Committee from the final version of the Act. Thus there was no provision for dividing 
a location into two areas, one in which brewing would be permitted and the other 
prohibited.85 Moreover, the SNA confirmed McNamee's opinion that the deletion of Section 
23(3)(k) of the principal Act under which New Brighton's most recent regulations had been 
proclaimed meant that they would be rendered null and void. These would have to be 
substituted by regulations made by the Minister of Native Affairs- and not the local authority-
in terms of the amended Act. 86 
With little prospect of the continuation of the system of domestic brewing practised in New 
Brighton, the PECC sought to appraise residents of the situation and demonstrate that they had 
the interests of the community at heart. The Chairman of the NAC, H. Relton, explained the 
implications of the Native Laws Amendment Act at a meeting in November. The following 
resolution was carried: 
That this meeting of New Brighton residents resolves to request the City Council of 
Port Elizabeth to urge the Government not to disturb the present beer system which has 
been in existence at New Brighton for nearly thirty years, and which has proved a 
wonderful success. If New Brighton has the reputation of being one of the most law-
abiding locations in the land, then it is due to the system of controlling the consumption 
of Kaffrr beer. The wet and dry area system has proved satisfactory to all concerned 
and has made it possible for the officials and Police to maintain law and order without 
difficulty. 87 
Meanwhile, the PECC made urgent representations to the NAD for an amendment to the 
Urban Areas Act. A deputation was granted an interview with the SNA and the Inspector of 
Urban Locations. 88 But this proved to be of no avail because these officials maintained that 
there was no means of giving legal sanction to a system of 'wet' and 'dry' areas in terms of 
existing legislation. The set of regulations promulgated by the Minister and applicable to all 
84 See Sections 23 and 24(d) of the draft Native Laws Amendment Bill in Government 
Gazette, Notice No. 2401, 31 Dec. 1936. 
85 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2115111, Memo of Loc. Supt. re Native Laws Amendment Act, 14 
July 1937; Report of PECC Delegates (H. Relton and J.P. McNamee) re Conference 
on Native Laws Amendment Act, 22 Oct. 1937. 
86 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Loc. Supt. to TC, PE, 9 Nov. 1937 and SNA to TC, PE, 24 
Nov. 1937. 
87 CAD, 3/PEZ 111557, Report of Loc. Supt., 13 Nov. 1937 and Minutes of NAC, 16 
Nov. 1937. 
88 CeA, NTS 5240 197/313, TC, PE to SNA, 2 Dec. 1937 and reply, 3 Dec. 1937. 
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urban areas did not provide explicitly for the dualism of the New Brighton system, but (in the 
opinion of the SNA) would, by 'administrative adaptation', be allowed to continue.89 These 
regulations came into operation on 1 January 1938.90 
-The 'administrative adaptation' meant that New Brighton residents would have to agree to 
comply voluntarily with certain requirements if the existing system of beer brewing was to 
continue. Under the circumstances, the PECC could not afford to alienate location residents 
unnecessarily. Thus the timing of the announcement by the SAP of of a new 'hardline' policy 
with regard to liquor raids in locations was regarded as extremely unfortunate by the NAC. 
A SAP minute setting out guidelines for the information of local authorities cited a paragraph 
from the recently published Report of the V ereeniging Location Riots Commission in support 
of the statement that: 
the Police Force reserves to itself the right to raid any location at any time on being 
satisfied that it is in the interests of law and order that such a raid should take place. 
In such cases raiding will naturally take place regardless of any other considerations.91 
In actual fact, this statement disregarded the Commission's recommendations that responsibility 
for control of illegal brewing should rest in the first place with the municipal authorities, and 
that the SAP should only provide assistance upon request. It also ignored the fact that these 
recommendations were made in respect of a location where a municipal monopoly - and not 
domestic brewing- was practised. If applied to New Brighton, such an approach was thought 
to have been likely to cause 'agitation' amongst beer brewers. Accordingly, the NAC resolved 
to inform the local District Commandant that there was no necessity for police raids prior to 
the forthcoming holiday season.92 
Superintendent McNamee called another public meeting in New Brighton in January 1938 to 
explain the provisions of the new regulations with respect to the supply and possession of beer. 
A motion that unrestricted brewing, as provided for under the Native Laws Amendment Act, 
should be allowed was moved but apparently had no support. The overwhelming majority 
voted to adhere voluntarily to the old system of domestic brewing which confined the practice 
89 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, TC, PE to SNA, 11 Dec. and reply, 24 Dec. 1937. 
90 Government Gazette, Notice No. 2027, 31 Dec. 1937, amended by Govt. Notice No. 
14, 7 January 1938. 
91 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minute SAP 15/40/37 Commissioner, SAP to Deputy 
Commissioner, SAP, Tvl, 23 Nov. 1937 attached to Dist. Cmdt., SAP, PE to Mayor, 
PE, 29 Nov. 1937. 
92 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of NAC, 15 Dec. 1937. 
139 
to certain 'wet' areas. 93 The co-operation of residents at this juncture was, however, no 
guarantee that it would be forthcoming indefinitely. McNamee was well aware that with the 
imminent removal of Korsten residents to New Brighton, there was every chance that they 
would not be prepared to forego their rights to brew beer. They were to him an 'unknown 
quantity' from an area where illicit brewing and liquor trade was reputedly widespread despite 
its being outlawed. 94 He had no wish to leave the resolution of this matter to chance. 
Accordingly, the PECC sought to mobilise opinion in order to secure an amendment to the 
Native Laws Amendment Act which would legalise the system of dualism in New Brighton. 
Local MPs and the Native Representatives were petitioned to make representations to this 
end.95 But the PECC's hopes of achieving the necessary amendments to the Native Laws 
Amendment Act were dashed by the early parliamentary recess called because of the 
forthcoming general election.96 
As had been expected, petitions for the extension of beer brewing privileges to former 'dry' 
areas were soon received. Despite the resolution a few months previously by residents to 
adhere to the conditions governing domestic brewing, 27 registered occupiers of a single block 
sought to advance their claims to brew beer. The Advisory Board, which wished to preserve 
the existing system intact, resolved that the Superintendent should endeavour to arrange for 
transfers of the petitioners to the 'wet' areas. 97 This was, however, neither a practicable nor 
a long-term solution to the problem. 
In August 1938 the repeal of existing regulations governing powers of search for illicit 
possession or brewing of 'kaffrr' beer made further inroads into the functioning of the New 
Brighton 'system'. The amended regulations withdrew the powers of search from the headman 
who had exercised close supervision of beer brewing since its inception. 98 The advantage of 
93 CAD, 3/PEZ 111557, Report of Loc. Supt., 1 Feb. 1938. 
94 CAD, 3/PEZ 111557, Report of Loc. Supt., 8 Jan. 1938. 
95 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of NAC, 11 Jan. 1938. Copies of the memo are also 
located in the SAIRR Papers at the University of the Witwatersrand, AD 843/B 87.3.2 
and the Molteno Papers at UCT, BC 579 B25.5 attached to a letter from the TC, PE, 
7 March 1938. 
96 CAD 3/PEZ 1/1557, SNA to Col. A.P.J. Wares, MP, 17 March 1938 and M. 
Ballinger to TC, PE, 31 March 1938. 
97 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of NBAB, 30 June 1938. 
98 CAD, 3/PEZ 111557, Report of Loc. Supt., 10 Sept. 1938. The new regulations are 
to be found in Government Gazette, Notice No. 1403, 26 Aug. 1938. 
140 
having headmen conduct on the spot raids in instances where they came across illegal brewing 
during the course of their normal rounds, would now be offset by having to call in authorised 
officials or policemen for the purpose. Such unnecessary delay would cause the element of 
surprise to be lost and afford the parties time to secrete or destroy surplus beer. Accordingly, 
the PECC made representations to the NAD to modify the position so as to reinvest African 
constables and headmen with the powers of search formerly invested in them. The NAD was 
not prepared to make an exception even though it conceded that abuse of powers of search by 
headmen had not occurred in Port Elizabeth. 99 This was a debatable assertion, but it appears 
that complaints made with regard to the modus operandi of the police in conducting searches 
for beer in New Brighton were even more numerous than had previously been the case. 100 
The commencement of the construction of McNamee Village and relocation of people from 
Korsten brought home to the PECC the necessity of finding a solution to the unsatisfactory 
state of affairs with regard to the beer question. With little likelihood of the Native Laws 
Amendment Act being amended during the 1939 session of parliament either, the NAC once 
again entertained the idea of introducing a municipal monopoly. 101 The Advisory Board, too, 
was opposed to the extension of home brewing privileges to McNamee Village but was equally 
strongly opposed to any form of municipal control of beer brewing. Yet, it recognised that the 
new inhabitants of the location could not be denied the right to beer and that it was 
impracticable to transfer them to the old location. Under the circumstances, it recommended 
that the system of licensed houses for the manufacture and sale of 'kaffrr' beer be put into 
operation in McNamee Village. 102 
The Advisory Board's recommendation was turned down by the NAC,103 and so the debate 
about the merits of introducing a municipal monopoly was enjoined. The MOH, Dr Duncan 
Ferguson, came out in favour of this option. He made recourse to the standard argument that 
the income derived from municipal sales could be used for the advantage of the community 
as a whole. He reckoned that sorghum beer manufactured under controlled conditions and 
99 CAD, 3/PEZ 111557, Minutes of NAC, 13 Sept. and TC, PE to NC, PE, 23 Sept. 
1938. 
100 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of the NAC, 15 Nov. 1938. 
101 CAD, 3/PEZ 111557, Minutes of NAC, 6 Dec. 1938; Actg. SNA to TC, PE 13 Jan. 
1939. 
102 CAD, 3/PEZ 111557, Minutes of the NBAB 16 Feb. and 27 April 1939. 
103 D. Moodie, 'Alcohol and Resistance on the South African Gold Mines, 1903-1962' in 
Crush and Ambler, Liquor and Labour, p. 164 is incorrect when he states that New 






consumed in moderate quantities was preferable to unhygienic domestic brewing which 
provided scope for. the addition of 'harmful adulterants'. He recommended that the Council 
should come to a decision in this matter at an early date because "the vested interests of the 
domestic brewer are becoming more and more powerful". 104 However, Ferguson's argument 
was undermined by information that in both Grahamstown and East London the beerballs 
operated at a loss and caused a drain on their NRAs. The NAC instructed the Superintendent 
to visit Durban and Pietermaritzburg to investigate municipal brewing, as well as Bloemfontein 
where the NAC had recently recommended that domestic brewing be replaced by a system of 
licensed houses. 10~ 
McNamee's visit to beerballs in Natal served to reinforce his previously expressed opposition 
to municipal brewing. His report showed clearly that he did not favour any of the choices 
available to the PECC. These were: 
(a) abolish domestic brewing in the old location and institute municipal 
brewing for the whole of the urban area; 
(b) permit domestic brewing in the new village; 
(c) establish licensed houses in the new village and continue with domestic 
brewing in the old location. 
He noted that when beer brewing was made illegal, the manufacture of dangerous concoctions 
became more rather than less likely. As beer from malted 'kaffir' com took a few days to 
mature and would have to be secreted away in order to avoid detection, the obvious alternative 
was to provide additives which gave the brew instant 'kick.' Thus shebeens which were still 
frequented, -became more likely to sell such concoctions which, if anything, was likely to 
increase the incidence of drunkenness in areas where monopolies existed. McNamee also 
contended that beerballs were far more suited to towns like Durban with its large 'floating' 
population than to Port Elizabeth where about 80% of the population was living under 
conditions of family life. He commented that the PECC would encounter resistance from 
virtually the entire African community to the introduction of municipal brewing. 
As far as the second option was concerned, McNamee noted that proper supervision would 
necessitate the employment of an increased staff of headmen. Another implication was that 
domestic brewing would mean that the appearance of the newly-erected dwellings would be 
104 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, MOH to TC, PE, 27 July 1939. 
105 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2115/13, Report of Supt. of Natives, 18 Nov. and Minutes of NAC, 
21 Nov. 1939. 
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rapidly spoiled by the practice of beer brewing and its paraphernalia of smoke-blackened 
paraffin tins. Licensed houses would be an experiment because it had not previously been 
adopted by any local authority. (In the case of Bloemfontein, that City Council had decided 
to continue with its system of domestic brewing). Disadvantages were that only a limited 
_pumber of individuals who were granted licenses would be able to profit and that the 'evils' __ 
attendant on beerballs would not be dissimilar to those of licensed houses. McNamee, in the 
final analysis, still favoured the continuation of domestic brewing if confined to the old 
location. Despite the urgency of the situation, the NAC was not prepared to commit itself 
unequivocally to any of the options placed before it. Having reaffirmed its opposition to the 
introduction of the licensed house system, it now referred the matter back to the Advisory 
Board. 106 The problem was no nearer to resolution as it dragged on into the third year since 
the passage of the Native Laws Amendment Act. 
' 
Public meetings were held on successive Sundays in March 1940 in order to ascertain the 
views of residents as regards beer brewing. At the first of these meetings, residents of both 
the old and new portions of the location expressed their "opposition to the introduction of 
municipal brewing in no uncertain terms". At the second, the residents of McNamee Village 
unanimously agreed to refrain from applying for beer brewing permits to which they were 
entitled in order to obviate the possibility of municipal brewing being introduced. This 
compromise was welcomed by Advisory Board members as a 'generous gesture' on the part 
of these residents. 107 By voluntarily foregoing their right to brew beer, it could be argued that 
prohibition did not obtain in McNamee Village and that, therfore, the location administration 
was complying with the regulations proclaimed under the relevant legislation. On the other 
hand, the withholding of such permits wou!d not hold up to the scrutiny of the courts so that, 
in the last resort, the successful operation of the arrangment would be dependent on the co-
operation of residents. 
In 1939 residents of the brick blocks requested further extension of beer brewing privileges 
to their area despite the agreement of the previous year. A survey revealed that 107 out of a 
total of 183 occupiers wished to brew beer. McNamee considered that if this request was 
agreed to, it would be the thin edge of the wedge as far as brewing in the new village was 
106 CAD, 3/PEZ 111557, Report of Loc. Supt., 20 Jan. and Minutes of NAC, 23 Jan. 
1940. 
107 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15/14, Report of the Loc. Supt.~ 26 March and 111557, Minutes 
of the NBAB, 11 April 1940. 
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concerned. If this caused the new residents to reconsider their decision of the previous year 
and also request brewing privileges, the current system would break down. In that event, both 
he and the Council would probably regard a municipal beerball as preferable. 108 This threat 
was enough to convince the Advisory Board of the merits of maintaining the status quo. 
Unfortunately, I have not been able to ascertain whether or not a public meeting of brick block 
residents endorsed the Board's view. 
The appointment of the Native Affairs Commission to enquire into the working of the 
provisions of the Urban Areas Act relating to the use and supply of 'Kaffrr' Beer in July 1941 
proffered hope that the Government might reconsider the possibility of approving the operation 
of dualism in townships. The Commission's terms of reference made no specific mention of 
Port Elizabeth's situation, yet these were sufficiently wide in scope to investigate this 
question. 109 When giving evidence before the Commission, McNamee made a pitch for the 
local authority to be allowed to choose whatever system - or combination thereof - most suited 
the needs of the local African population. 110 He was apparently informed by a member of the 
Commission which visited New Brighton to observe the operation of the 'wet' areas frrst hand, 
that this experience had made them reconsider the objections to domestic brewing cited by 
numerous local authorities and location superintendents. 111 
In its report, the Commission was less enthusiastic about New Brighton's sytem of 'wet' and 
'dry' areas. The working arrangement was described as an 
exceptional example of goodwill and voluntary limitation of location privileges. But 
even this ideal system when carefully examined was found not to be flawless. In every 
dwelling inspected there were to be seen vessels for measuring the consumers' 
requirements, which told their own tale of surreptitious sale. That even this concession 
to the mercenary manufacturer was liable to abuse was evident from the fact that the 
location superintendent had been constrained to warn this class from time to time of the 
possibility of withdrawal of the system in favour of the exclusive municipal supply. It 
is this overhanging threat which contributes materially to the successful control of these 
areas. 112 
108 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of the NBAB, 20 March and of NAC, 8 April 1941. 
109 Government Gazette, Notice No. 94, 4 July 1941. 
110 Intermediate Archives Depot (lAD), PE, 25/117 No. 2, Liquor Supply to Natives (Mar. 
1941 -July 1961), Memo by J.P. McNamee to 'Kaffrr Beer Enquiry', PE, 15 Oct. 
1941. 
111 lAD 25/117 No.2, Minutes ofNBAB, 23 Oct. 1941. 
112 Report of the Native Affairs Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Working of the 
Provisions of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act relating to the Use and Supply of Kaffir 
Beer, G.P. - S. 42, para. 72. 
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Beer brewing was not regarded as a right but a privilege, to be earned or forfeited depending 
on whether community interests were place above those of individuals or not. Whilst this 
system was said to offer a method of 'voluntary control' with brewers policing themselves 
(para. 126), in the final analysis, it depended on threats and not trust. But more promising for 
New Brighton was the Commission's recommendation for the flexibility -to accord "local 
authorities ... discretion to adopt any system or combination of systems of mrnufacture and 
supply of kaffir beer" (para. 82). But until the necessary legislation was enacted, there could 
be no guarantee of the continuation of New Brighton's 'system as prohibition would still have 
to be adhered to on a voluntary basis. 
By all accounts, the illicit liquor trade and brewing of concoctions in McNamee Village by ex-
residents of Korsten was widespread. Neither the imposition of the maximum fines for those 
convicted of these offences, 113 nor the increased vigilance of the headmen and SAP seemed 
to have the desired effect of curtailing such activities. 114 It was not uncommon for as much 
as 200 gallons of concoctions such as qilika (honey beer) to be found in a single week. But 
larger volumes probably escaped detection. It was common practice to conceal the receptacles 
containing concoctions in the bushes surrounding the dwellings. When the headmen became 
wise to this, the brewers took to secreting these concoctions in well camouflaged holes in 
adjacent common ground. Prosecutions were also difficult because of the need to prove 
ownership of the receptacles found. More often than not, these and the contents were simply 
destroyed. 115 The police constantly blamed the headmen for not performing their duties, 
whilst the location administration urged the appointment of additional SAP personnel. 
Furthermore, the police steadfastly maintained that the only means to suppress ilJicit liquor 
dealing and brewing in New Brighton was a municipal monopoly. 116 
This proposal was tabled at an Advisory Board meeting in July 1944. The NAC's ploy was 
to exert pressure on the Board to "take some steps to influence the people against illicit 
brewing". The Board reaffirmed its preference for domestic rather than municipal brewing. 
It duly agreed to convene a meeting to point out the possible consequences of illicit brewing; 
that is, not simply the punishment of individual offenders but the possibility that the entire 
113 lAD, 251117 No.2, Report of Loc. Supt., 21 Feb. and 16 May 1942; Minutes of 
PECC, 11 March 1942; Senior Public Prosecutor to TC, PE, 17 March 1942. 
114 lAD, 25/117 No.2, Report ofLoc. Supt. 12 June and Minutes ofNAC, 15 June 1943. 
115 lAD, 27/117 No. 2, Report of Loc. Supt., 6 June 1944. 
116 lAD, 25/117 No.2, Dist. Cmdt., SAP to TC, PE, 20 June 1944. 
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community would be deprived of beer brewing privileges on account of the conduct of a few. 
The Superintendent promised that the administration would facilitate as far as possible the 
transfer of non-drinking residents of the old location to McNamee Village in cases where beer 
drinkers applied to move. And .the Board also recommended the extension of the 'wet' area 
in the old portion of the location. This was not acceded toby the NAC which seemed to take 
the view that more effective control was possible of beer brewing by restricting the 'wet' 
area. 117 
The PECC finally obtained the means to legalise its system of restricted domestic brewing by 
permit in New Brighton in 1945. Amendments to the Urban Areas Act (36 of 1944) introduced 
a provision whereby a dual system - domestic brewing and prohibition - was permitted. The 
urban local authority was able to stipulate that domestic brewing should not apply within any 
specified location or native village under its control. 118 After thirty or so years, New 
Brighton's system of dualism could operate legally for the first time. / 
There were still differences of opinion within the PECC with regard to the relative merits of 
domestic brewing and a municipal monopoly. In evidence given to the Kaffrr Beer Profits 
Enquiry which visted Port Elizabeth in late 1945, the City Treasurer attributed Port Elizabeth 
and Cape Town's rates, which were apparently the highest in the country, to the lack of 
revenue from beer profits which, in other centres, was spent on subsidising rentals and other 
administration costs. 119 The MOH advocated beerballs as a means of providing additional 
public amenities for New Brighton residents. Cllr Mrs Holland, Chairperson of the NAC, 
considered it 'iniquitous' that municipalites should profit from beerballs even if additional 
amenities were provided as a result. Cllr Schauder, who was Chairman of the PECC's Housing 
Committee and a member of the National Housing and Planning Committee, was an equally 
staunch advocate of domestic brewing. The n~w Location Superintendent, C. T. Boast, utilised 
memoranda and arguments employed by his predeccesor in support of the practice of domestic 
brewing in New Brighton. He and the two Councillors were convinced that residents would 
boycott beerballs if they were introduced to New Brighton. 120 Another argument against 
municipal beerballs was that "the negligible incidence of crime in New Brighton was attributed 
117 lAD, 251117 No.2, Minutes ofNBAB, 27 July and Minutes ofNAC, 3 Aug. 1944. 
118 Government Gazette, Proclamation No. 70, 19 January 1945. 
119 lAD, 25/117 No.2, City Treasurer to TC, PE, 27 Oct. and Minutes ofNAC, 29<kt. 
1945. 
120 University of the Witwatersrand, SAIRR Papers, AD 843/B 87 .2.2, Evidence given to 
Kaffrr Beer Inquiry, PE, 3 & 5 Nov. 1945. 
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in part to the fact that there was no organised sale of kaffir beer". 121 In the end, the PECC 
stuck with domestic brewing alongside prohibition, rather than opting for a municipal 
monopoly. 
Conclusion 
In spite of the obvious advantages of beerballs, the PECC never saw its way clear to 
introducing them. Having first agreed to a municipal monopoly in 1925, and confirmed its 
decision two years later, the PECC reversed this decision after the Durban beerball riots of 
1929. There was also the experience of others towns in the Cape like Grahamstown and East 
London where beerballs had been poorly patronised. During the 1930s and 1940s, the local 
authority presumed that the introduction of beerballs in New Brighton would more than likely 
be met with stiff opposition. It was argued that in the event of beerballs being boycotted, this 
would add to rather than relieve the fmancial burden of the NRA which was the main concern 
of the so-called 'budget watchdogs'. And with the paternalistic 'liberal' lobby/ also advocating 
home brewing, the PECC adopted a cautious approach to implementing a municipal monopoly. 
Thus beerballs were not introduced in Port Elizabeth at a time when they were becoming 
commonplace throughout the Union. 
The peculiarities of the system of dualism in New Brighton made it no easy matter to 
legitimate in practice. Domestic brewing was permitted in about two-thirds of the original 
Location but reduced proportionately as New Brighton was extended. It was allowed in about 
one-third of 'Newtown', but not in the SMQ nor in McNamee Village. The 'wet' areas 
eventually comprised about one-sixth of the entire location. Throughout the period 1923 to 
1945, the PECC made constant recourse to the argument that New Brighton was 'a law-abiding 
community' to justify domestic brewing. The administration appears to have come to believe 
its own propaganda. By permitting this practice, as \veil as providing sub-economic housing, 
it was contributing materially to the residents quality of life. This suited the residents 
themselves, especially the brewers with vested interests in the continuation of the system. But 
as criminality, and especially juvenile delinquency, increased after the Second World War, the 
utility of domestic brewing came to be questioned. The connection between crime and home 
. brewing will be explored further in subsequent chapters. 
121 lmvo Zabantsundu, 17 Nov. 1945. 
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SOCIAL RELATIONS AND CULTURAL PRACTICES 
IN THE NEW BRIGHTON COMMUNITY, c. 1903-1953 
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Bozzoli has noted that workers are not the only inhabitants of South Africa's townships. Citing 
Couzens, she added that "classes are squashed together not simply physically, but 
economically, socially, culturally, ideologically and politically, in their common experiences 
of segregated township life" .1 Social historians have usually identified the emergence of three 
distinct classes in early twentieth century urban African society: a petty (or aspirant) 
bourgoisie, a working class and a lumpenproletariat. The African underclasses appropriated 
the symbols of the dominant (white) and traditional cultures in varying degrees. Those workers 
who were firmly and securely incorporated into the urban workforce identified with and at 
least partially accepted Western cultural models, whereas the more vulnerable sectors - the 
under- and unemployed - identified with cultural practices of the countryside. Therefore the 
social and cultural fragmentation of the underclasses militated against the emergence of a 
homogeneous working-class culture. Indeed, given the fragmented and ambiguous nature of 
class formation, it is not at all appropriate to speak of class cultures. 2 
Many pioneering studies of working-class cultural practices in urban African society equated 
these with the 'popular' - that is, something 'of the people' which stands in opposition to 
ruling-class cultural and political hegemony. The concept 'popular' covered a range of class 
dynamics and cultural practices in the mediation of social relationships. According to Gramsci, 
the hegemonic power of the dominant classes defmed the parameters in which oppositional and 
subordinate cultural forces operate. The fact that these parameters are always contested, creates 
the central dynamic whereby common people forged lived experiences. Culture was thus a 
sphere of contestation between the discourse of the dominant and the common sense of 
subordinate cultures. For Gramsci, then, this ideological struggle was an important facet of 
B. Bozzoli, 'Popular History and the Witwatersrand' in B. Bozzoli (ed.), Labour, 
Townships and Protest: Studies in the Social History of the Witwatersrand 
(Johannesburg, 1979), p. 7. 
2 B. Bozzoli, 'History, Experience and Culture' in B. Bozzoli (ed.), Town and 
Countryside in the Transvaal (Johannesburg, 1983) and V. Erlmann, African Stars: 
Studies in Black South African Performance (Chicago, 1991), 'Introduction' and pp. 
56-51, 179. 
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resistance and part of the larger struggle for cultural and political hegemony. 3 Thus our 
conceptualisation of culture should be rooted in, but not reduced to, a complex social 
experience that includes political struggle. 
In the attempt to reconstruct everyday life of urban Africans, the community has been viewed 
as the basic unit of social analysis. But communities must not be regarded as synonomous with 
residential entities such as locations or townships which are the product of administrative 
decisions rather than joint action of residents themselves. The existence of a community 
capable of acting with common purpose cannot be simply assumed in instances where people 
have been economically, socially or culturally deprived. 4 The prerequisites of physical 
proximity and common experience are not sufficient in themselves to forge a 'sense of 
community'. Bozzoli has suggested that there is sufficient evidence from case studies to 
conclude that "communities do at certain points in history become manifest social entities, with 
important effects on class and ideological responses". s In her view, the community should be 
regarded as a concrete reality which may in certain circumstances enhance rather than 
contradict the class consciousness of its members. Communities can be partly 'imagined' in 
Benedict Anderson's sense,6 for they are always to some degree imaginery constructions of 
self. But identity is never exclusively individual. Rooted in the common experience of a group 
of people, it is a collective phenomenon. The existence of communities is founded on the 
social interaction among its members, which helps define social boundaries and produce a 
collective identity. 7 
It is obviously necessary to establish at the outset whether we can speak of a New Brighton 
community. This should not be construed to imply a quest for a homogeneous society. On the 
contrary, factors such as class, gender, age, kinship and ethnicity, as well as the degree of 
urbanisation all contributed to cleavages. Therefore it will be necessary to construct a profile 
3 J. Clarke, New Times and Old Enemies: Essays on Cultural StUdies and America 
(London, 1991), pp. 1-19; K. Tomaselli, 'The Lineage of Contemporary Cultural 
Studies: A Brief Historical Examination' in Rethinking Culture (Bellville, 1989), pp. 
22-26. 
4 R. Thornton & M. Ramphela, 'The quest for community' in E. Boonzaier & J. Sharp 
(eds.), South African Keywords (Claremont, 1988), p. 35. 
5 B. Bozzoli, 'Class, Community and Ideology in the Evolution of South African 
Society' in B. Bozzoli (ed.), Class, Community and Conflict: South African 
Perspectives (Johannesburg, 1987), p. 8. 
6 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (London, 1983), pp. 12-13. 
7 Thornton & Ramphela, 'Quest for community', p. 38. 
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of the community which is sensitive to social divisions. We will examine how social conditions 
influenced the lives and lifestyles of New Brighton's subordinate classes - both the working 
class and lumpenproletariat. Then we will study the elite culture of the middle class with 
particular reference to the function of education. And finally, we will analyse the role of the 
churches - particularly of the indigenous type - as institutions which articulated different forms 
of consciousness. We will attempt to establish the connection between these forms of 
consciousness which might have co-existed and interacted at any given time. New Brighton 
residents had multiple identities: they could be workers, husbands or wives, parents, 
neighbours or members of any number of church, civic, political or sports organisations. The 
purpose of this chapter, then, is to present a composite picture of changing social relations and 
cultural practices in New Brighton during our fifty year period. 
A Profile of the New Brighton Community 
Communities are dynamic and fluid, even when they are apparently most stable'. New Brighton 
was a particularly transient society. Apart from the usual coming and going of people, two 
successive generations of Africans were forcibly relocated there. These removals created a 
deep sense of violation and insecurity which disrupted the existing fabric of society. Such 
resettlement is invariably accompanied by an increase in anti-social behaviour and a decline 
in morality. The PE City Council, on the other hand, propagated the view that its slum 
clearance programme would promote social upliftment. It was argued that there was a direct 
correlation between improved living conditions in New Brighton - when compared with 
Korsten- and the apparent low crime rate. The provision of 'better class' housing was said to 
instil within residents some pride in their upkeep and a wish to maintain certain quality oflife; 
-although the incentive was obviously reduced because: thP. h0mes rem~.ined municipal property. 
When the sub-economic housing scheme for Africans \vas first mooted, the Superintendent 
suggested that: 
Persons removed from slum properties should not be grouped together in one place; 
rather they should be intermixed with New Brighton residents ... The danger of the 
newcomers looking upon themselves and being looked upon by others as a separate 
community with possible future faction quarrels will be avoided. 8 
This statement implied that 'outsiders' would become 'insiders' and not develop separate 
identities if they lived cheek by jowl with respectable residents of long-standing. In June 1938 
it was reported (rather prematurely) that "in 99% of cases the ex-slum dwellers have responded 
8 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/11, Report of Supt. NBL to NAC, 13 Dec. 1937. 
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morally, physically and socially to their greatly improved living conditions" [in McNamee 
VillageV It was envisaged that "a greater sense of responsibility and a healthy public spirit" 
could be fostered amongst the newcomers. 10 But social cohesion could not be forged 
overnight, nor from outside. Community formation was partly a product of demographic 
factors. 
Although a social and political construct, 'race' has consistently been conflated or confused 
with cultural and other non-physical characteristics in popular usage. The practice of residential 
segregation which had a lengthy history in Port Elizabeth prior to the creation of New 
Brighton, reinforced the significance of race as a form of identity. Although created solely for 
Africans, New Brighton always had small White and Coloured minorities. There were repeated 
calls by Advisory Board members for the removal of Coloureds from New Brighton. And 
when sub-economic housing was built for Coloureds at Schauderville in the late 1930s, 
immediate action was demanded on this issue. Conflict between the two communities was 
accentuated when after the removals of Africans from Korsten, expropriated sites were granted 
to Coloureds. Thus the existence of social divisions and the effects of residential segregation 
impinged on the collective identity of the New Brighton community. 
Port Elizabeth's African population was said to originate principally from the districts of King 
Williamstown, Middledrift and Peddie in the Ciskei, as well as the Transkei. By far the 
majority of residents were Xhosa-speakers. A municipal census conducted in 1931 revealed 
a high degree of ethnic and linguistic homogeneity in New Brighton. The ethnic/racial 
breakdown of the population was as follows: Xhosa 59,8%, Fingo 28%, Basuto 4,6%, 
Coloured 6% and Others 1,6%. 11 As was the case in Langa, the commemoration of 'Fingo 
Emancipation' Day and Ntsikana Memorial Celebrations 1940s was a source of tension 
between Fingoes and Xhosas. 12 Such cultural practices which promoted rival identities 
contributed to cleavages in the New Brighton community. 
9 EPH 11 June 1938. 
10 Mayor's Minute 1938, Annual Report of the MOH, pp. 46, 50. 
11 Cape Archives Depot (CAD), Port Elizabeth Town Clerk's Files, 3/PEZ 1/1280, 
Report of Supt. NBL to NAC, 6 Aug. 1931; City of Pon Elizabeth, Mayor's Minutes 
for 1932, Report of the MOH, p. 49 and Mayor's Minutes for 1933, Report of the 
MOH, p. 31. 
12 M. Musemwa, 'Aspects of the Social and Political History of Langa Township, Cape 





Anthropological writings on Xhosa-speaking communities in East London's townships regard 
the 'red/school' dichotomy as more significant than Xhosa/Fingo social divisions. The Xhosa 
in Town trilogy defined social relations primarily according to cultural criteria, regarding 
'school' and 'red' people (amaqaba) as readily identifiable cultural types within these 
communities. 13 The former aspired to eventual assimilation into a common society through 
a process of acculturation, whereas the latter participated in urban society only inasfar as it was 
necessary to sustain the subsistence rural economy and traditional culture. Although involved 
in labour migration, the 'reds' reject incorporation into the wider political economy. Mayer 
refers to the 'red' worldview as an ideology of resistance. Their apparent 'conservatism' is 
explained as an ideological expression of their rejection of white domination. It has to be said 
that cultural traditions constitute an adaptable resource for coping with changed circumstances. 
They can be reinterpreted, developed, or even 'invented' in order to accommodate modified 
social practices or serve as political resources. 14 It is probable that the urbanites referred to 
all newcomers to the township as 'red'; that this was essentially a distinction between 'insiders' 
and 'outsiders' rather than between binary opposites or ideal cultural types. 
The Red Location became synonomous with so-called 'red' or 'blanket' people although the 
composition of its population was actually little different from the greater Port Elizabeth area 
in the 1900s. It was estimated that 'single' men comprised over half of the town's African 
population, but that the percentage in New Brighton was lower. 1s We have seen in Chapter 
3 that from the 191 Os far more accommodation was set aside for families than 'single' men 
although a SMQ was built in the late 1920s. In 1938 New Brighton's adult population included 
1 411 'single' men and 30 'single' women out of a total of 7 714 persons. This meant that less 
than 19% of the population comprised 'single' persons. Nor did this proportion increase in the 
13 The three volumes Xhosa in Town: Studies of the Bantu-speaking Population of East 
London edited by Philip Mayer consisted of: D.H. Reader, The Black Man's Burden 
(Cape Town, 1961); P. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen (Cape Town, 1961); B.A. 
Pauw, The Second Generation (Cape Town, 1963). Although not jettisoning his 
culturalist assumptions and former categories, Mayer subsequently gave them more 
flexibility and attempted to situate them in the historical process. SeeP. Mayer, 'The 
Origin and Decline of Two Rural Resistance Ideologies' in P. Mayer (ed.), Black 
Villagers in an Industrial Society (Cape Town, 1980) and W. Beinart, 'Speaking for 
Themselves' in A. Spiegel and P. McAllister, Tradition and Transition in Southern 
Africa: Festschrift for Philip and Iona Mayer, Fiftieth Anniversary Issue of African 
Studies, 50, 1 & 2 (Johannesburg, 1991), p. 8. 
14 A. Spiegel & E. Boonzaier, 'Promoting tradition: Images of the South African past' 
in SA Keywords, pp. 40-57. 
15 CAD, NA 734 f348, Chief Inspector of Public Works to Labour Dept., CT, 2 Sept. 
1903 citing figures given by Civil Commissioner. 
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following thirtee~ years. In 1951 the number of adult males exceeded females by 2 656 which 
suggests that 'single' men or migrants made up about 7% of the total population [see Table 
7.1 below]. The Old Location became the temporary 'home' to a disproportionate number of 
migrants and the 'wet' areas were avoided by the 'respectable' classes and churchgoers. 
Accordingly, this neighbourhood had quite a different character to the other parts of New 
Brighton. Social geography thus served to accentuate certain cleavages in th~ community. 
As we have seen, New Brighton's population fluctuated considerably during the 1900s but 
assumed a much more permanent character during the following decade. A fairly reliable index 
of the degree of permanency can be gauged from statistics relating to gender. The ratio of 
male to female residents in New Brighton in 1904 was approximately 3:2 which was only 
marginally higher than that for Port Elizabeth and its peri-urban areas. By 1911 females 
comprised about 44% of the New Brighton population, which was on a par with the 
metropolitan area as a whole. Observations made during the 1910s suggest that the proportion 
of females and hence, the number of permanent residents increased. The Tuberculosis 
Commission, for instance, remarked that New Brighton's population comprised as much as 
five sixths of westernised or what it termed 'dressed Natives' .16 The trend was confirmed by 
the increase in the proportion of married persons and women with families by the end of the 
decade. 17 In 1935 it was estimated that 60,3% of the population was fully urbanised and 
29,3% semi-urbanised, with a meagre 10,4% being classified as 'rural natives' .18 New 
Brighton became a relatively stable community in which the family was the basic social unit -
a situation which was to change from the late 1940s. 
In Chapter 3 we noted that New Brighton's female population exceeded the number of males 
briefly during the Depression. This rather irregular occurrence can probably be attributed to 
the return of a significant number of male migrants to the reserves. Although women were 
often the first to be marginalised off the land when the reserves deteriorated, Table 3.4 
showed that female numbers remained steady whereas male numbers declined appreciably in 
the period 1928-1933. But after the Depression there was a recovery in the total population 
of New Brighton, and the sexual ratio returned to more typical proportions. In 1945 the 
16 Union of South Africa Parliamentary Papers, Repon of the Tuberculosis Commission, 
U.G. 34- 1914, p. 143. 
17 U.G. 7- 1919, pp. 18-19. 
18 CAD: 3/PEZ 1/3/2115/9 and 111635, Report of the Location Superintendent to 
Committee on Natives in Urban Areas, 25 Sept. 1935. 
I. 
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estimated population of 26 000 comprised 7 500 men, 7 200 women and 11 300 children, 
which meant that 49% of the adult population was female.'9 By 1951 over 46% of New 
Brighton's population above the age of five were females. And girls under the age of 18 
outnumbered boys by 674. The population of 36 760 in 1951 was made up as follows: 
TABLE 7.1 
NEW BRIGHTON'S POPULATION 1951 
Old McNamee 
Location Village Kwaford Boastville 
Adult males 4213 4 824 853 602 
Adult females 2613 3 578 845 800 
Boys under 18 830 2 540 195 319 
Girls under 18 854 3 150 284 300 
Children under 5 1 471 4 650 873 353 
Total 9 981 21 355 L05Q 2 374 
A survey of age distribution reveals that children comprised a fairly constant proportion of the 
New Brighton population throughout our period. In 1924 it was estimated that 41% of the 
Location's population were children under 16 years.20 By 1945 this percentage had edged up 
to 43% . The above Table shows that the percentage of the population under the age of 18 
years was about 43% in 1951. Not surprisingly, the proportion of children and juveniles in the 
Old Location was noticeably smaller than the other sections of New Brighton. 
The above profile of the New Brighton community is rather impressionistic. It confirms the 
existence of cleavages along the lines of class, culture or degree of Urbanisation, ethnicity, 
language, age and sex. But the social stratification has to be balanced against what New 
Brighton residents had in common. A ·common language and origins were important 
ingredients in community formation. On the other hand, urban Africans follow the associative 
rather than the cohesive principle of social organisation. The network character of social 
relationships is evident in ties of kinship, membership of churches and other voluntary 
associations. The abovementioned demographic factors contributed to the definition of socio-
cultural boundaries. 
19 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1896, Report of Supt. NBL, 5 March 1945. 
20 PE Municipality, Mayor's Minute for 1924, Report of the MOH, p. 28. 
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Social Conditions and a Culture of Survival in New Bri~hton 
The most obvious feature of urban African living was widespread poverty, especially in times 
of economic hardship, and the consequent struggle to survive. Like their counterparts on the 
Witwatersrand and elsewhere, residents of New Brighton developed a number of strategies to 
help cope with their poverty. Various means were found to distribute the meagre resources 
through the community, assisting those whose need was greatest at any particular time. Whilst 
migrants could still rely on home-boy networks or amakhaya, by far the majority of New 
Brighton's residents created their own social support networks in the city. Associations such 
as burial societies and stokvels were created. The former ensured that members and their 
families had decent burials, whilst the latter allowed members to take turns to use the monthly 
contributions of the club to purchase items such as clothing and furniture which their own 
earnings would not have permitted. The 'culture of survival' was essentially defensive, for it 
taught people to make do without challenging the system. Moreover, the strong sense of 
community engendered by the tradition of sharing and self-help could be - and was - exploited 
by employers who had an excuse for not having to pay a living wage. 21 
The failure of employers to pay a living wage also provided justification for urban Africans 
resorting to small scale illegal informal sector activities to make ends meet. Supplementary 
income was derived from keeping unauthorised lodgers, 'piece jobs', petty theft, trading in 
stolen goods, running shebeens and gambling dens, and prostitution. The moral condemnation 
of the community was generally reserved for the more serious instances of acquisitive crime 
such as burglary and robbery and the use of violence [see Chapter 8 for further disussion of 
criminality]: As self-help - of the legal and illegal type - was woefully inadequate, a few social 
welfare groups which operated in New Brighton provided some relief for the destitute. These 
groups were sponsored mainly by white philanthropic institutions such as the Native Welfare 
Society (later the PE Joint Council), Rotary and various churches. A certain Valentine 
Magniac ran a soup kitchen in the Location for a good number of years. In 1941 the PECC 
established the Adcock Home for the aged and infirm as part of the sub-economic housing 
scheme in McNamee Village. 22 However, many New Brighton residents escaped the social 
welfare 'safety net'. 
21 The concept of a 'culture of survival' has been borrowed from L. Callinicos, A Place 
in the City: The Rand on the Eve of Apanheid (Johannesburg, 1993), pp. 35-6. See 
also, A. Cobley, '"We All Die Together" - Crisis and Consciousness in the Urban 
Black Community of South Africa, 1948-1960' (M.A. Thesis, University of York, 
1981), pp. 51-52. 







On the Reef townships people escaped the hardships and frustrations of life in the distractions 
of drink and dance in shebeens during the inter-war years. The most vital feature of this 
working-class culture was the popular musical style known as marabi.23 There appears to have 
been nothing similar in New Brighton. This could be partly attributed to the fact that the use 
of private homes for entertainment was virtually out of the question. A regulation stipulated 
that no social gatherings were allowed (except in public halls, schools or churches, and then 
only with prior permission) after lOpm on weekdays, llpm on Saturdays and not at all on 
Sundays. 24 The consumption of beer for men was essentially a social act, "the affirmation or 
strengthening of ties with kith, friends or neighbours". 25 For many women, however, this 
cultural practice offered first and foremost a means of subsistence . 
The combination of the cumulative neglect of New Brighton by the authorities and the poverty 
of the majority of its residents created appalling living conditions. Consequently, standards of 
health were low, disease and illness rife, infant mortality rates high. The breakdown of the 
family was coupled with high rates of illegitimacy, and crime and violence became a way of 
life for many on the fringes of society. We will not be able to examine these trends 
comprehensively for our entire period but only for critical and limited periods as our data is 
not complete. 
We will commence with an examination of mortality rates in New Brighton for select years. 
23 E. Koch, 'Doomfontein and the African Working Class, 1914 to 1935: A Study of 
Popular Culture in Johannesburg' (M.A. thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 
1983); D. Coplan, In Township Tonight! (Johannesburg, 1985); C. Ballantine, Marabi 
Nights (Johannesburg, 1993). 
24 J. Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid: Territoriality and State Power in South African 
Cities - Port Elizabeth 1923-1972' (Ph.D. Thesis, Cambridge University, 1990), p. 
164. 




DEATHS IN NEW BRIGHTON FOR SELECT YEARS 
Ave. Total Mortality Infant* Mortality 
.. - .. - -- ---- _ .. Year. Annual Deaths .. Rate per __ Deaths .. Rate per __ . 
Population 1000 1000 Births 
1904 2 332 48 20,6 
1910 3 119 135 43,2 
1912 4 773 115 24,1 
1917 4 398 250 56,8 
1925 8 270 368 44,5 
1929 7 147 304 40,3 97 319,08 
1933 6 707 176 26,2 57 210,33 
1939 12 034 292 24,2 109 267,81 
1945 29 633 698 23,5 213,24 
1952 40 725 901 22,1 333 / 315,04 
*Under the age of 1 year 
The prevalence of Tuberculosis (TB), dysentery and enteric fever was ascribed to defective 
sanitation, 26 and these diseases were virtually endemic throughout our period. Whilst there 
is no clearly established correlation between overcrowding and the incidence of TB and other 
respiratory ailments, poor living conditions were likely to make people more prone to 
contracting such diseases. Packard has noted the susceptibility of of newly westemised 
Africans to TB and shown that the average mortality rate in New Brighton between 1904 and 
1912 was 5,9 per 1 000 people. 27 The overall mortality rate for all causes of death for the 
same period was 25,6 per 1 000. 28 Measures such as the fup~igation and limewashing the 
interior of buildings, the construction of extra latrines, the introduction of a dual pail system 
for stercus removal, and sanitary removals on Sundays did little to prevent the outbreak of 
diseases such as typhoid and gastro-enteritis caused by the squalor of New Brighton. 29 
Residents were also susceptible to contagious diseases and the influenza epidemic exacted a 
-·-- ····-· ··--
heavy tolL In the space of a single monthin lat~ 1918 at least 312 deaths occurred in~~--
26 Central Archives, Pretoria (CeA), NTS 2443 8/291, Report of Medical Officer of the 
Location to the MOH, 15 May 1916. 
27 R. Packard, White Plague, Black Labour (London, 1990), p. 62. 
28 Repon of the Tuberculosis Commission, U.G. 34- 1914, p. 144. 




The above figures show that mortality rates were particularly high amongst i fan In fact, 
= 
two to three out of ten children died before tile age of one year v1rtua y every year. This state 
_of affairs_ was_ caused_ by a Jack of suitable nutrition and inadequate posHJ~tal care, and_ 
possibly 'backstreet' abortions. However, I have found no evidence to suggest- as Mager and 
Minkley have done in the case of East London - that infanticide was a common practice. 31 
But it is probably safe to assume that unwanted pregnancies had become commonplace in New 
Brighton. 
More than one out of every two children were invariably illegitimate throughout our period. 
This pattern is discernible in the following statistical sample: 
TABLE 7.3 / 
BIRTHS IN NEW BRIGHTON FOR SELECT YEARS 
Year Popu- Rate per Illegitimate Rate per-
lation Births 1 000 ·Births centage 
1925 8 270 323 39,05 206 63,7% 
1929 7 147 344 48,13 
1933 6 707 271 40,45 153 56,5% 
1939 12 034 407 32,99 221 54,3% 
1945 29 633 891 30,07 268 30,1% 
1952 40 725 1 057 25,95 604 (_ 57,1% 
It must be said that the rate of illegitimacy in 1945 was out of keeping with the general trend 
which was in excess of 50%. Many of the children classified as 'illegitimate' were probably 
the products of customary unions which were not recognised for record purposes. But, equally, 
many children were the products of transitory sexual liaisons between 'unmarried mothers' or 
30 Calculation based on figures gleaned from various issues of EPH, 8 Oct. to 6 Nov. 
1918. 
31 A. Mager and G. Minkley, 'Reaping the Whirlwind: The East London Riots of 1952' 
in P. Bonner, et al (eds.), Apanheid's Genesis (Johannesburg, 1993), p. 238. Their · 
assertion appears to rest on a single case reported in the local press, although others 
might arguably have ·never been discovered or prosecuted. The marginally higher 
mortality rate of girls over boys can be attributed to numerous other factors and do not 
prove infanticide. 
158 
amakazana and their lovers. Rites of passage such as the extraction of penalties by young men 
for 'defiling' virgins and even the payment of lobola (bridewealth) came to be increasingly 
discarded in urban African society. 
High illegitimacy rates usually - but not inevitably - accompany a breakdown in family life. 
Many New Brighton children grew up in homes where neither the extended nor nuclear family 
was the norm. 32 In such circumstances, women usually bore sole responsibility for children 
for they were the constant in the household or family unit. Their earning power as beer 
brewers, prostitutes, washerwomen, and so on, conferred on them a degree of autonomy. 
Bonner's historical research on the East Rand has lead him to concur with the anthropologist 
Longmore that urban women were "schooled in self-reliance and self-sufficiency" .33 On the 
other hand, the need of a 'husband' to secure a house or some measure of protection meant 
that women were dependent on men in some ways. But, for the most part, there was invariably 
a reconstruction of the domestic economy and a shift towards matrifocality. 34 In the absence 
of a permanent male household head or a father figure, sons developed antagonism towards 
patriarchal authority figures - such as headmen - outside the family. It was, more often than 
not, these boys who received their education on the streets and became juvenile delinquents 
or tsotsis. 35 
The local authority regarded recreation as having the potential to keep young African males 
off the streets. It was believed that if their energies could be diverted into sporting activities, 
this would reduce the likelihood of juvenile delinquency and counter the emergence of gangs 
and organised criminal activities. The PECC had made provision for the following facilities 
by 1941: 
- 5 tennis courts; 
- 6 playing fields suitable for football and cricket; 
- 1 children's playing field equipped with swings and slide; 
- 2 playing fields allocated to wayfarers or girl guides. 36 
32 For a suggestive treatment of this issue see L. Bank, 'Beyond the Stereotypes: 
Households, Gender, and Poverty in Squatter Settlements in the Eastern Cape', Paper 
presented to the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, 1993. 
33 P. Bonner, 'Family, Crime and Political Consciousness on the East Rand, 1939-1955', 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 14, 3 (1988), p. 397 citing L. Longmore, The 
Dispossessed. A Study of the Sex Life of Bantu Women in the Urban Areas in and 
around Johannesburg (London, 1959). 
34 Pauw, The Second Generation, p. 162. 
35 Mager and Minkley, 'Reaping the Whirlwind', pp. 236-9. 
36 CeA, NTS 4506 585/313, Evidence of J.P. McNamee to Smit Committee, PE, 30 Oct. 
1941. 
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These facilities were by no means adequate for the recreational and sporting needs of the New 
Brighton population. In 1944 the Administration appointed its first sports organiser and social 
worker, A.Z. Lamani, who had trained at the Jan Hofmeyr School of Social Work which was 
run by the American Board Missionary, the Rev Ray Phillips.37 In 1947 a regular contributor 
to lmvo Zabantsundu commented on the neglect of social life for New Brighton's younger 
generation. 38 The erection of the 800-seater Rio Bioscope shortly thereafter served to provide 
some entertainment. The screening of numerous westerns, however, created something of a 
cult amongst the youth and the Bioscope became a popular venue for gang members to hang 
out. 39 Various writers have noted how tsotsi gangs appropriated the names and styles of 
cowboys learned from the watching of films. The choice of the name Apaches by a well 
known New Brighton gang was presumably a means of identifying with the 'underdogs' and 
subverting Hollywood-style heroism. 
It has been argued in much of the anthropological and sociological literature that anomie is 
connected with the dimunition of social control by parents and concomitant decline of 
behavioural norms in urban society. The growth of deviancy was evidenced by the increasing 
incidence of criminal activity, a penchant for lawlessness and violence, and the withdrawal 
from society through the abuse of dagga and drink. 40 The lumpen element or so-called 
'dangerous classes' consisted of the idle, unemployed and dissolute. Urban youths without the 
necessary education or skills to find operative or semi-skilled work, often chose not to seek 
employment which required hard manual labour. They joined gangs voluntarily or were 
coerced in to doing so, engaged in criminal activities and became the perpetrators of 
indiscriminate violence on their fellow residents. Such youth gangs created a tsotsi subculture 
which inverted the values and reappropriated the symbols of the dominant culture. They 
literally and figuratively carved out their own identities by adopting subversive lifestyles. The 
anomie situation in New Brighton will be examined further when we look at the background 
to the 1952 riot~ in Chapter 9. 
37 Interview with Mr Alfred Lamani, New Brighton, 14 Oct. 1989. 
38 Imvo 22 Nov. 1947 p. 4 ('New Brighton Lacks Social Improvements'). 
39 Evening Post 29 Nov. 1952 ('Facts behind growing gangsterism in towns'). 




Education and an Elite Culture in New Brighton 
Even the upper strata of the African community which consisted of petty traders, craftsmen 
and others of independent means, eked out an existence in New Brighton. The competition of 
a group of Jewish traders considerably reduced chances for successful entrepreneurial ventures 
in the Location. In fact, opportunities for self-employment and capital accumulation were few 
and far between. Education offered some prospects of upward social mobility for it provided 
the means for a limited number of Africans to escape from the ranks of labourers into the 
I salariat. Ministers, teachers, interpreters, clerks and other professionals who constituted an 
aspirant middle class or petty bourgeoisie, received relatively small stipends or salaries without 
regular increments. Although many of these white collar workers experienced declining living 
standards, they still enjoyed considerable social status on account of the value attached to 
education. As Bradford has remarked, education was "a central ideological symbol around 
which the middle classes coalesced, and through which they differentiated themselves from the 
masses" .41 The educated elite sought to emulate the cultural practices of the dominant whites, 
including their leisure time activities. This response was shaped by several decades of exposure 
to and absorption of a Western mission education. 
Functional literacy amongst Africans in the Eastern Cape was probably slighter higher than the 
national average. The proportion of those who were literate increased from an estimated 6,8% 
of the adult population in 1911 to about 9,7% in 1921 and 12,4% in 1931.42 Port Elizabeth 
had it's fair share of graduates from Lovedale, Healdtown and other mission colleges or 
educational institutions in the Eastern Cape, but had no tertiary institutions of its own. Local 
Africans would have had to go to Fort Hare in order to attain a university education. For most 
of our period, there was no secondary school in New Brighton either. The or>Jy secondary 
school which admitted African students was Paterson High School situated in Mount Road. A 
number of scholarships to attend Paterson were awarded every year to African pupils who 
attained the highest marks in Standard 5 in any of New Brighton's primary schools.43 
Although originally built for Africans, it increasingly assumed the character of a 'coloured' 
school as racially segregated education was enforced. The Advisory Board's request that a 
41 H. Bradford, 'Mass Movements and the Petit Bourgeoisie: the Social Origins of the 
ICU Leadership, 1924-29', Journal of African History, 25 (1984), p. 298. 
42 L. Switzer, 'Moderation and Militancy in African Nationalist Newspapers during the 
1920s' inK. Tomaselli & P. Eric Louw (eds.), The Alternative Press in South Africa 
(Bellville, 1991), pp. 34, 38, 41. 
43 CAD, 3/PEZ 111498, Memo ofTC, PE re 'Paterson High School Scholarships', 7 July 
1936. 
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secondary school be established in the Location was ignored for many years. 44 Meanwhile, 
many New Brighton youths who might have been in the classroom roamed the streets and 
contributed to the problem of juvenile delinquency. 
The first schools established in New Brighton were mission schools. They were run by the 
Anglican, Presbyterian and Wesleyan denominations who utilised church buildings as 
classrooms. In 1905 the Ethiopian Order was granted permission and government aid to 
establish a private school along the same lines as the mission churches.45 In the years that 
followed, the Advisory Board frequently debated the merits of enforcing compulsory school 
attendance in the Location and bringing the schools under the jurisdiction of the School 
Board. 46 A proposal that regulations be made to increase rents with the extra funds being used 
to pay the School Board as not all parents would be willing or able to pay fees if schooling 
was made compulsory, was turned down. 47 It was thus mainly the children of the occupational 
elite who attended school in New Brighton and only a minority went on to Paterson High or 
secondary schools elsewhere. 
In 1923 the schools run by the various churches were amalgamated and became known as the 
United Primary School. They were not under one roof and still operated in various church 
buildings. These buildings remained the property of the respective denominations who did not 
receive rent from either the Education Department or School Committee which comprised the 
resident Ministers. In addition, the public hall was also used for school purposes. Although 
under the jurisdiction of the Education Department which paid teachers salaries, the School 
Committee had a say in the management of the School.48 Later the United Pri~ary School 
was divided into Upper and Lower Primary Schools, each with its own School Committee. 
By 1936 there was a shortage of school accommodation in New Brighton. It was estimated that 
330 children of school-going age were not attending school. A report compiled by the Location 
Superintendent and submitted to the government stressed not only that the accommodation was 
44 CAD, 3/PEZ 111282, Minutes of the NBAB, 4 Feb. 1937. 
45 S.M. Burns-Ncamashe, 'An investigation into the provision of education by the Order 
of Ethiopia to Africans in the Cape Province between 1902 and 1952' (B.Ed., UCT, 
1954), p. 205. 
46 CeA, 2443 4/291, Minutes of the NBAB, 18 Feb. 1913; Supt. NBL to Magt., PE, 23 
Aug. 1915. 
47 CeA, NTS 2443 4/291, SNA to Magt., PE, 4 Jan. 1916. 
48 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1275, Rev J. Cowan to the Mayor, PE, 3 Feb. 1926. 
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inadequate, but in many ways unsuitable for educational purposes.49 The NAD was unable 
to provide any assistance in order to ameliorate the position owing to a lack of funds. Nor did 
the CPA make grants in respect of the erection of school buildings, it only paid rent grants 
subject to certain conditions.50 School accommodation in 1937 was as follows: 
TABLE 7.4 
SCHOOL ACCOMMODATION IN NEW BRIGHTON 193'!1 
I Buildin~: Floor Space No. of Square Feet Pupils 
Higher United School 
African Presbyterian Church 
Presbyterian Church of Scotland 







Lower United School 
Order of Ethiopia Church 
Anglican Church 
Anglican School Room 
Congregational Church 













The existing shortage of school accommodation in New Brighton was exacerbated by a further 
influx of children of school-going age from Korsten once the removals were affected. There 
were five denominational junior schools for Africans in Korsten which together accommodated 
over 1 860 pupils, as well as the Edward Street Native School (Methodist) in the city centre 
which had a roll of about 60 pupils. 52 It was planned to erect six lower primary schools, two 
higher primary schools and one secondary school at a total estimated cost of £38 800 to meet 
the educational requirements for New Brighton during the following ten years. There was 
considerable debate as to whether the provision of school accommodation for these pupils was 
the responsibility of the Government, the CPA or the PE Municipality. Initially, the PECC 
was prepared to construct school buildings subject to the expenditure being approved out of 





CAD, 3/PEZ 111281, Report of the Supt. NBL, I April 1936. 
CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2115/10, Memo re 'School Accommodation- New Brighton Village' 
by TC, PE for NAC, 4 June 1936. 
CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/11, Report on 'Native School Accommodation in Port 
Elizabeth' by J.D. Louw, Inspector of Schools, 27 Sept. 1937. 









of the maintenance of bui1dings. 53 However, the Central Housing Board ruled that it was not 
permissable for sub-economic housing funds to be utilised for this purpose. Instead, the NAD 
in conjunction with the CPA sought Parliament's approval for a loan of £20 000 to the PE 
District School Board for the construction of schools in New Brighton. The School Board 
subsequently requested transfer of the nine sites earmarked for schools in New Brighton.54 
The PECC, however, resolved that only four of the nine sites be transferred to the School 
Board as this was in keeping with the immediate educational requirements. 55 
Soon after this it was announced that the control of African Education would be transferred 
from the Cape's Department of Education to the Native Affairs Department. In the 
circumstances, the NAD refused to sanction further loans to the CPA for the erection of school 
buildings for Africans in urban areas. Both the PE School Board and the PECC protested that 
this was likely to cause further delay in the provision of schools in New Brighton.56 The 
PECC agreed to transfer or lease in perpetuity school sites to the NAD, to erect school 
buildings thereon and provide water and sanitary services at normal location tariff rates. 57 But 
this proposal was found to be in conflict with the Urban Areas Act and the NAD reversed its 
previous recommendation that the sites be leased to the School Board as the control of African 
education remained in the hands of the Cape Education Department. Accordingly, the NAD 
made a grant to the CPA for the erection of school buildings in New Brighton during the 1939 
fmancial year. 58 
By the time the Korsten removals got under way, no provision had been made for educational 
facilities in McNamee Village. The Bantu African Teachers Union demanded to know what 
53 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, Minutes of the H&SEC, 1 Dec.; Minutes of Sub-Committee 
Appointed to go into the Question of School and Church Sites - Korsten and New 
Brighton, 13 Dec.; Minutes of the PECC, 22 Dec. 1937. 
54 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, SNA to TC, PE, 11 June 1938; Sec. for Public Education to 
TC, PE, 20 Jan. 1939; Memo re 'Native Schools' for H&SEC, 28 Jan. 1939. 
55 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, Minutes of Joint Meeting of H&SEC and NAC, 30 Jan. 1939. 
56 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, Sec. Public Education to Sec. School Board, PE, 18 Feb.; Sec. 
PE School Board to TC, PE, 22 Feb.; TC, PE to SNA and Sec. for Public Education, 
28 Feb. 1939. 
57 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, Minutes of Joint Meeting of H&SEC and NAC with 
representatives of the NAD, Chief Inspector Native Education and Circuit Inspector, 
PE, 20 March; Report re 'Native Schools at Port Elizabeth' by C.W. Starke, Inspector 
of Urban Locations, 21 March 1939; Minutes of the NAC, 2 May and of the PECC, 
17 May 1939. 
58 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, SNA to TC, PE, 30 May 1939; TC, PE to SNA, 6 June and 
reply, 12 June 1939. 
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steps had been taken in order to "suppress hooliganism amongst the children who now roam 
the streets ... having been robbed of education" .59 The PECC resolved to grant the School 
Board the use of a group of eight new three-roomed houses and four two-roomed houses at 
reduced rentals to provide temporary school accommodation in McNamee Village.60 Certain 
Advisory Board members took exception to their exclusion from a Committee of only three 
ministers appointed to govern the temporary schools. These Board members expressed fears 
that any recurrence of denominationalism in the schools would be detrimental to educational 
standards. They did not wish to have a situation arise again where church affiliation and not 
qualifications was the prerequisite for teaching appointments. Rev G.B. Molefe [see below], 
a member of the Board and the School Committee, took the strongest exception to these 
remarks. So, too, did McNamee who attended committee meetings and gave the assurance that 
in appointing the twelve new teachers the question of their church denomination was never 
considered. 61 
I 
Despite the Government stipulation that no new denominational school in New Brighton would 
qualify for aid, the St Francis Xavier (Roman Catholic) Native School was erected in 1938 or 
1939.62 In 1940 the Church of Christ was granted permission by the PECC to utilise its 
church building as a school for the children of members. Permission was subject to the 
approval of the PE School Board and to renewal every twelve months.63 By 1944 the school 
had three teachers (only one of whom was certified) and 256 pupils. Teachers' salaries and the 
general running of the school was funded by monies raised by functions and from the church's 
various business ventures.64 Neither school received government aid even though the 
authorities had failed to erect adequate facilities to cater for the educational requirements of 
New Rriehton's_p.upils. 
Five schools under the jurisdiction of the School Board and catering for about 2 500 pupils 
were completed in McNamee Village in 1941. These consisted of one junior secondary school, 
two higher primary and two lower primary schools. [see Figure 3.3] A secondary school was 
59 CAD, 3/PEZ 111627, Sec. Bantu African Teachers Union to TC, PE, 5 June 1939. 
60 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1628, Minutes of the PECC, 28 Feb. 1940. 
61 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15/14, Minutes of the NBAB, 11 April 1940. 
62 University of the Witwatersrand, A 410 V.M.L. Ballinger Papers, B2.5.47 SNA to 
Ballinger, 13 Sept. 194 7. 
63 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1628 Minutes of the PECC, 14 March 1940, 12 March 1941 and 11 
March 1942. 
64 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1629, Memo accompanying application for Government recognition by 
Church of Christ, 27 Nov. 1944. 
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established largely as a result of the initiative of Rev Molefe, who was a qualified teacher. He 
commenced with seven Std 7 pupils in the New Brighton Presbyterian Church in 1942 and did 
most of the teaching himself. The following year, he registered these pupils for Junior 
Certificate and enrolled a further seventy in Std 7. With the backing of the local Inspector of 
Schools, Molefe managed to persuade the Cape Education Department to secure premises for 
a secondary school in New Brighton. The pupils took occupation of the classrooms in 1944. 
Molefe resigned from the ministry and became the principal of the Newell Junior Secondary 
School [see Illustration 7.1]. By 1948 the School was full and it was decided to convert 
Cowan Higher Primary School into another secondary school. This was done by sending over 
300 pupils and four staff members from Newell to Cowan. In the same year, Newell was 
upgraded to a High School and it had its first matriculants in 1950.65 
The local educated elite were readers of the African press but the New Brighton community 
, 
never had its own newspaper. There were a number of publishing ventures aimed at producing 
a newspaper for a local African readership during the period under consideration but theSe 
were all short-lived. I have found reference to the African Defender brought out by one J.B. 
Nyambolo in the late 1920s which appears to have run to only a few issues. That political 
maverick, S.M. Bennett Ncwana, who had acted as editor of the ICU's newspaper The Black 
Man in the early 1920s, resided in New Brighton for many years. During the late 1930s he 
published African Continent which appeared intermittently for a few years. The trade union 
organiser, A.Z. Tshiwula, edited Ndavela for railway workers in 1948. Probably the most 
widely read newspaper in New Brighton was Imvo Zabantsundu which Switzer has described 
as "essentially a community newspaper focusing on non-partisan news of general interest to 
the mission,...educated community in the Eastern Cape". 66 Regular coverage was provided in 
Imvo of New Brighton affairs by freelance reporters such as Tshiwu1a, Jimmy Pemba, W.W. 
Mabija and G. Soya Mama. In addition, W.W. Jabavu of the well-known familywhich mt 
Imvo worked as a full-time journalist in New Brighton during the 1930s and 1940s. Jabavu 
established a news agency for several African newspapers and reported regularly for Imvo and 
65 N. Hude and R. Kingwill, 'George Molefe: Memoirs and Tributes' (Unpublished 
manuscript, 1992); C. Hunter, 'Some Aspects of the African Mission Policy of tbe 
Presbytery of Adelaide/Port Elizabeth with special reference to the origin and 
development of the New Brighton Presbyterian Mission Church, 1898-1962' (Ph.D. 
thesis, Rhodes University, 1983), pp. 288-291 (Biographical sketch of Molefe); 
Interview with Mrs J. Molefe, New Brighton, 24 June 1991; EP Newspaper House 
Library: G.B. Molefe File; Indaba (supplement to Evening Post) 19 Oct. 1989. 
66 Switzer, 'African Newspapers during the 1920s' iri Tomaselli & Louw, Alternative 
Press in SA, p. 69. 
Illustration 7. 1 Rev George Molefe with a group of senior students at 
Newell High School (SA Panorama). 
Illustration 7.2 'Bishop' James Limba of the Church of Christ. 
(Church of Christ). 
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Umtateli wa Bantu. 
New Brighton's so-called 'school' people saw themselves as a progressive or non-tribal group 
and was regarded by others as 'black Englishmen'. They were bound together by numerous 
economic and cultural ties, and their voluntary associations comprised the institutionalised 
matrix of a distinct social class. A small public library housed in the T.C. White Hall was 
sponsored by the PE Joint Council. Reading and social clubs, debating societies, temperance 
organisations, itimiti (tea-meetings), and so on filled their social calendar. They also attended 
lectures, talks and educational films or slide shows which were often held in the public hall 
or church buildings. On such occasions most programmes had musical accompaniment which 
was provided by church choirs and bands. It would appear that New Brighton's middle class 
was too small and weak to support full-time professional bands. But then neither was jazz, jive 
or tula 'n divile (the Xhosa equivalent of marabi) the preserve of any particular class. Music 
which is often said to be a universal language, also serves to bridge class barriers. Musical 
performance and other leisure-time activities sometimes brought together mission-school and 
proletarian participants, and new cultural patterns and social institutions were developed within 
the framework of communal recreation.67 As such, recreation provided a meeting ground of 
working class commonalty and middle class elitism and could contribute to community 
• formation . 
• • • Owing to the restraints of space and a lack of information, this discussion of middle class 
• • culture has to be curtailed. But it is appropriate that we now consider the role of the churches-
both mission and independent- in New Brighton society. 
Cultural or Class Institutions? The Churches in New Bri&hton 
Structural functionalist explanations of the appeal of churches in urban African society have 
concentrated on their beliefs and practices with an emphasis on cultural adaptation. They have 
focused on the role of churches in synthesising western and traditional cultural practices and 
largely ignored the social formation in which they arise and exist.68 An equally reductionist 
materialist position holds that religious belief and practices of churches are simply the 
67 D. Coplan, 'The emergence of an African working-class culture' in S. Marks & R. 
Rathbone (eds.), Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa (London, 1982), 
p. 367. 
68 G. Krus, 'A Critical Review of the Study of Independent Churches in South Africa' 
in G.C. Oosthuizen (ed.), Religion Alive: Studies in New Movements and Indigenous 
Churches in Southern Africa (Johannesburg, 1986), p. 28. 
I 
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ideological expressions of particular classes. Thus it has been held that members of the mission 
churches were from the middle class, whilst the independent churches were 'working-class 
churches'. 69 People's experience as members of a class may and often do assume a religious 
form, therefore we must examine nature of the relationship between the class position of 
particular groups and their cultural expression. I have attempted a fairly extensive analysis 
along these lines with respect to the Church of Christ elsewhere, 70 and here I will extend the 
analysis to other churches in New Brighton. 
Previous chapters provide something of the context for relating the growth of the churches -
both mission and independent - which formed an integral part of the culture of the New 
Brighton community. 
The closure of Port Elizabeth's old locations caused considerable dislocation not only to the 
social fabric of these communities, but to specific church congregations. This can be illustrated 
with reference to the Anglican Church which had established St Stephen's Mission Church on 
Richmond Hill close to the centre of town in 1869. Many members of St Stephen's moved to 
New Brighton and worshipped in a dwelling until a new church building was erected after the 
grant of title in 1907. A wood and iron structure served the New Brighton congregation until 
the Red Location site was exchanged for one in McNamee Village. The erection of a more 
permanent brick building was completed in 1941. Meanwhile another church, also known as 
St Stephen's, was built in Mount Road in 1927 and continued to provide a place of worship 
for African Anglicans still resident in the city or Korsten. At least the first four or five priests-
in-charge of St Stephens were Whites and they were not permitted to reside in New Brighton. 
Although there were assistant African priests prior to 1944, Rev D.N. Mbopa was the first 
African priest-in-charge.71 Anglicans comprised the second largest congregation- behind the 
Methodists -in New Brighton for most of our period. 
For the reasons mentioned in Chapter 3, the semi-independent Ethiopian Order had been 
69 I. Mosala, 'African Independent Churches: a study in socio-theological protest' in C. 
Villa-Vicencio & J. Gruchy (eds.), Resistance and Hope: Essays in Honour of Beyers 
Naude (Cape Town, 1985), pp. 110-111. 
70 See my '"In the World but Not of It": 'Bishop' Limba and the Church of Christ in 
New Brighton, c. 1929-1949', Kronos, 19 (1992), pp. 102-134. 
71 Pamphlet to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of St Stephen 's Mission, New Brighton 
(Port Elizabeth, 1991) compiled by G.S. Mama, M. Joka, F. Magxaki and E. 
Makubalo. 
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granted a site with title in New Brighton by the Cape Colonial Government. The Order was 
affiliated to the Church of the Province of South Afica and under the ultimate control of the 
Anglican Archbishop. Tuckey holds that the membership of the Order was largely confined 
to Xhosa-speakers of the a11UIQu;nukwebe people from the Middledrift area. She maintains that 
in the urban centres it served mainly work seekers and migrant labourers, providing them with 
a 'home and a social centre' in the alien environment of the city. The Order drew members 
from the lower classes who had a smattering of education rather than from the educated 
elite. 72 The original wood and iron church building was burnt down in 1929 and it was the 
first congregation to erect a brick church building in New Brighton. 73 Its membership never 
approached that of the mother church, but it had a sizeable congregation. 
Of the 'Ethiopian' churches, both the Presbyterian Church of Africa and the African Methodist 
Episcopal (AME) Church were granted sites - but not title - in New Brighton by the Cape 
Colonial Government. The grant of these sites was made possible by the facfthat both these 
churches had been accorded Government recognition. From 1915 the Government agreed to 
consider applications from independent churches for sites on their merits. But this was still 
subject to the condition that 
the applicant body had, by the length of its existence, the magnitude and stability of 
its work and the suitability of its constitution, shown itself fit to be entrusted with the 
occupation of land for mission purposes.74 
The conditions for Government recognition of independent churches were more clearly defined 
by the Report of the Native Churches Commission of 1925. These included the stipulations 
that: the church should have been in existence for ten years and hav~ at least six 
congregations; the church should have a constitution, schools, buildings and other signs of 
growth; ministers should not-be licensed unless they had passed Std o and had 2 to 3 years 
training; and the church should have an "accepted ethical standard". 75 Under the 
circumstances, New Brighton remained very much a stronghold of the Methodist, Anglican and 
other Protestant missions during the period in which it was administered by the central state. 
The PECC (incorrectly) assumed that churches had only the right of occupation to sites in New 
72 C.F. Tuckey, 'The Order of Ethiopia: a study in African church independency, 1900-
1916' (BA Hons. thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1977), pp. 50, 59, 62. 
73 CAD, 3/PEZ 111665, Missionary-in-Charge to TC, PE, 15 Aug. 1929. 
74 Report of the Native Affairs Department for the years 1913 to 1918, U.G. 7- 1919, p. 
13. 
75 Report of the Native Churches Commission, U.G. 39- 1925, p. 37. 
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Brighton. In cases where there were no buildings but churches could substantiate their right 
of occupation, these were approved. Thus in 1927 the PECC permitted the Presbyterian 
Church of Africa to occupy a site on the same terms as those previously approved by the 
Colonial Government. 76 On the other hand, it refused to recognise the application by the 
Bantu Presbyterian Church of South Africa for a site when its representative could not 
substantiate the verbal claim that a site had previously been granted by the central 
government. n When the Bantu Presbyterian Church renewed its application for a New 
._ Brighton site seven years later, it was permitted to occupy the vacant Roman Catholic Church 
I site. The PECC agreed to the same conditions as those set by the Colonial Government, except 
that the Church was given only twelve months in which to erect a church building. 78 [See 
Appendix B for tabulation of church grants]. 
In 1934 the PECC decided to frame new conditions for the grant of church sites in New 
Brighton. Apart from the clause that churches would have twelve months to build, it was 
stipulated that: 
(a) churches would have no claim to title to the land which remained the 
property of the Council; 
(b) churches would have no right to lease or sub-let the site; 
(c) permission to use site would be cancelled if it ceased to be used for 
church purposes; 
(d) one month notice of evacuation need be given by Council which was 
obliged to pay compensation for buildings and other materials only if the 
church was not provided with an alternative site. 79 
The amended conditions were taken as being applicable to existing and new leases. But there 
were no q~lifications whiclr had to be met prior to making the application. Although the 
Government recognition was cited as a prerequisite, in practice the disposition and discretion 
of Superintendent McNamee was important for his recommendations were able to influence 
Council decisions. 
In return for its site leased to the Bantu Presbyterian Church, the Roman Catholic Church was 
allocated a new site by the PECC in 1935. The Catholics who had been meeting in private 
76 CAD, 3/PEZ 111665, Rev C.D. Kwatsha to TC, PE, II March and Minutes of the 
PECC, 20 April 1927. 
77 EPH 8 March 1927, p. 10. 
78 CAD, 3/PEZ 111665, Reports of Supt. NBL, 31 Jan. and 14 March 1934; Minutes of 
NAC 23 Feb. and 16 March 1934; TC, PE to C.G. Mgiza of Presbyterian Church of 
SA, 10 April 1934. 
79 CAD, 3/PEZ 111665, Solicitor Me Williams & Elliott to TC, PE, 12 April 1934. 
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dwellings, then proceeded to construct the St Francis Xavier Church. In the same year, the 
Council approved the grant of sites to the Bantu Church of Christ and the Bantu Methodist 
Church of South Africa. Both these indigenous churches were then utilising public facilities 
for services and sought to erect their own church buildings. They claimed to have memberships 
of 280 and 86, respectively. 80 The application by the founder of the Church of Christ, the 
self-styled 'Bishop' James Limba, was favourably received because he and his followers were 
regarded by McNamee as the most law-abiding people in New Brighton. 81 The Superintendent 
expressed the following opinion about the moderating influence of Limba: 
... the members of his flock, in regard to sobriety, orderliness, personal cleanliness and 
general good behaviour, are outstanding. The Reverend Limba himself is a man of 
exceptionally good character, anxious at all times to avoid giving offence to the 
authorities or contravening the law in any way, and these qualities he has apparently 
been successful in instilling in the minds of his followers. 82 
In other words, the authorities viewed Limba as a useful agent of social control. 
The Church of Christ, situated on the edge of the still-to-be-erected McNamee Village, was 
consecrated in a well-attended ceremony in August 1937. The brickbuilding with corrugated 
iron roof could seat nearly one thousand people. In spite of having no guarantee of tenure to 
the site which was leased from the PE Municipality, the Church committed an enormous sum 
(variously estimated at between £4 125 and £5 750) to the undertaking. 83 Permission was also 
granted by the PECC for the erection of a parsonage on the same site on condition that the 
Church paid a monthly tariff for the provision of municipal services. 84 The manse which was 
known as the 'Bishop's Palace' was completed in 1938 at a cost of £1 355.85 It was a large, 
expensively. furnished, modem house which was equipped with electricity. Both the church 
building and manse were imposing structures by the Location's standards. They conferred 
recognition on the Church of Christ. 
The growth of the independent churches in New Brighton during the 1930s would appear to 
have exceeded that of the mission churches. Although figures were not updated regularly, the 
80 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1665, Minutes of the PECC, 25 September 1935. 
81 CAD: 3/PEZ 1/1280 and 1/3/2/15/7, Report of the Supt. NBL to NAC, 16 Feb. 1933. 
82 CeA, NTS 1473 674/214, Testimonial by J.P. McNamee, 27 Nov. 1940 (Annexure 
E) in support of Petition by Limba for Recognition of the Bantu Church of Christ, PE, 
19 Feb. 1941. 
83 G.S. Budaza, 'TheNativeSeparatistChurchMovement' (M.A. Thesis, UNISA, 1948), 
p. 12. 
84 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1665, Minutes of the NAC, 6 August 1937. 
85 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, Divisional Council to TC, PE, 4 Jan. 1939. 
size of the congregations of various denominations in 1938 was as follows: 86 
TABLE 7.5 
NEW BRIGHTON CHURCH MEMBERSHIP, 1938 
Methodist Church of South Africa 
Church of England 
Presbyterian Church (of Scotland) 
Order of Ethiopia 
Presbyterian Church of Africa 
Congregational Union of South Africa (Basuto) 
Methodist Church of South Africa (Coloured) 
Congregational Union of South Africa 
African Methodist Episcopal Church 
Roman Catholic Church 
Bantu Presbyterian Church of South Africa 
Bantu Methodist Church of South Africa 
















Both the Church of Christ and the Bantu Methodist Church showed phenomenal growth since 
they had applied for sites three years earlier. The Church of Christ had by far the largest 
membership of the independent churches in New Brighton. The above figures include only 
those churches which had been granted sites and had erected church buildings thereon, and not 
the Seventh ·Day Adventists, the Ethiopian Catholic Church and Old Apostolic Church which 
had been refused sites by the Council. It is therefore likely that any number of small 
(especially independent) denominations which may have used private premises for services 
went unrecorded. 
Known church members comprised 4 617 out of a population of 7 715 (including children) in 
1938.87 Thus, nearly 60% of New Brighton's population claimed church affiliations. With its 
relatively permanent population, many of New Brighton's residents were second or third 
generation Christians whose parents had belonged to mission churches. Although it is likely 
86 CAD, 3/PEZ 111628, Report of Supt. NBL, 22 Oct. 1938. The same figures were 
given for all but the last four churches in 1934. See CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1281, Report of 
Supt. NBL to NAC, 14 March 1934. 
87 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2115112, Report of the Location Superintendent, 22 February 1938. 
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that some of these 'school people' would have joined the 'Ethiopian' churches, it is unlikely 
that many would have joined the Church of Christ or other indigenous churches. In fact, 
Mqotsi and Mkele state that many converts to the Church of Christ had not previously been 
attached to any Christian denomination. 88 The Church of Christ definitely targeted the new 
arrivals amongst the migrants because Limba is known to have preached regularly on Sunday 
afternoons in the vicinity of the SMQ in the Red Location. 89 It would appear that Limba 
attracted a considerable number of followers from amongst the newly proletarianised segment 
of New Brighton's burgeoning population in the 1930s. 
McNamee suggested that it would be advisable to place some check on the number of sites 
allocated for church purposes in McNamee Village. This reflected the Superintendent's concern 
that if churches continued to mushroom at present rates this would pose difficulties for his 
administration. He recommended that in future applicants should have: 
(a) at least ten existing churches; 
(b) a training school for clergy; 
(c) recognised ministers and duly appointed marriage officers.90 
Essentially, this meant compliance with the requirements that the Government laid down for 
recognition. While not appearing at all stringent, only seven indigenous churches had been 
accorded recognition by the Government by this time.91 The Superintendent's 
recommendations were adopted by the PECC, along with an amendment to the regulations that 
the period in which church buildings were to be erected be extended from twelve months to 
two years.92 
The PECC's assumption that all church sites in New Brighton previously allocated by the 
central government were granted subject to the right of occupation only was questioned by the 
Baptist Church in 1940. It claimed title to a site in the Red Location upon which the 
Municipality had erected buildings, and an investigation into the matter revealed that a number 
of church sites had been irregularly exchanged or transferred. When the Baptists refused to 
accept an offer of site in McNamee Village subject to the new conditions for church sites, the 
88 L. Mqotsi and N. Mkele, 'A Separatist Church: iBandla lika-Krestu', African Studies, 
5, 2 (1946), p. 108. . 
89 B. Pauw, Christianity and Xhosa Tradition (Cape Town, 1975), p. 305; Interview with 
Henry Johnson, New Brighton, 28 November 1991. 
90 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, Report of Supt. NBL to NAC, 10 Sept. 1938. 
91 R. Phillips, The Bantu in the City (Johannesburg, 1938), p. 254 fn 11. 
92 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, Report of the Supt. NBL, 22 Oct. 1938; Minutes ofNAC, 25 





Council held that it had forfeited its right to the site by virtue of the fact that it had not been 
used for the purposes of the grant for over thirty years. However, the original grant stated that 
under such circumstances the land would revert to the Government which indicated that it was 
not willing to take possession of sites not utilised for church purposes and transfer them to the 
PE Municipality. 93 Consequently, the Council resolved that: 
the Council adopt the policy that wherever possible sites in close proximity to those 
held by Deed of Grant be granted - in freehold - to church authorities owning land in 
the old New Brighton Location area (but which have not been utilised for the purpose 
set out in the Deed of Grant or, 
alternatively, in the event of land not being available in the immediate vicinity of the 
area presently owned in the old village, land be offered on a leasehold tenure in the 
new village on th same conditions as will apply to allocations to churches which have 
already been granted facilities of this nature. 94 
It was clearly not the intention of the PECC that land should be given to the church authorities 
in McNamee Village on a freehold basis in future, but only in exceptional c~ses such as the 
above. 
/ 
The Anglican, Baptist, Presbyterian and Methodist Churches negotiated sites in McNamee 
Village with a 25-year renewable lease in exchange for ones in the old part of the Location. 
These denominations expressed considerable misgivings about having to surrender freehold 
sites held by title in perpetuity in exchange for the lease of a site for a limited period. Apart 
from that of the Church of Christ which has already been mentioned, sites were also granted 
to the Bantu Methodist Church of Africa, Bantu Mission Field of Seventh Day Adventists, 
Independent Congregational Church of South Africa, and the African Methodist Episcopal 
Church. 95 In spite of the stipulated conditions, the grant of church sites by the PECC in New 
Brighton was a rather arbitrary process. The PECC would appear to have granted sites in cases 
where the applicant churches had connections with established white churches quite readily. 
A case in point was the grant of a site to the Assemblies of God in 1945.96 The formation of 
the church in New Brighton followed Nicholas Bhengu's 'Back to God Crusade'. Amidst 
93 CAD, 3/PEZ 111628, TC, PE to Prov. Secretary, 14 May and reply 8 Aug. 1940; 
Minutes of the NAC, 10 Sept. 1940 and 25 Jan. 1941; Messrs McWilliams & Elliott 
to TC, PE, 25 Sept. 1940. 
94 City ofPon Elizabeth, Mayor's Minuteforthe Year ended 31 August 1941, pp. 37-39. 
95 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1628, Supt. NBL to TC, PE, 18 Jail. 1940. 
96 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/19, Report of Actg. Supt. NBL, 11 May 1945. 
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reports that Bhengu was able to get tsotsis and hardened criminals to lay down their weapons 
and that "crime came to a virtual standstill" during the Campaign, the man later dubbed the 
'Black Billy Graham', was welcomed by the authorities. Although claiming initially to be non-
denominational in character, many of those converted during the Crusade did not return to 
their own churches but formed a body which affiliated to the white Assemblies of God which 
had been established in Port Elizabeth. 97 Bhengu's church though remained semi-independent 
and East London was to become the home of his mother church. Yet, the growth of the 
I Assemblies of God outstripped virtually all existing churches in New Brighton. 
Although Bhengu claimed to have been a mere vehicle for God's healing powers, he was 
known as umpilisi ('Divine healer') in Xhosa98 and derived considerable authority from his 
charisma. By contrast, Limba's authority rested on that accorded an African chief and he was 
called uTata ('Father') by his flock. The organisational structure of the Church of Christ 
closely resembled traditional Xhosa society with church membership replacing kinship. 
Accordingly, the relationship between Limba and his congregation is said to have reflected that 
between a patriarch and members of his extended family. 99 Limba did not forbid customs such 
as circumcision, lobola and polygyny for which he could find biblical justification. Instead, 
he incorporated them within the practices of the Church in amended form. In other words, he 
regulated these practices in the same way as a chief exercised control over customs which 
formed part of his public authority. And because Limba recreated the pattern of a hierarchical 
system under his own authoritarian leadership, he could be rightly termed the 'chief' of the 
Church of Christ in accordance with Sundkler's typology. 100 Epstein has cautioned against 
comparing leaders of urban-based AICs with traditional chiefs. He suggested that it was 'a 
profound methodological error for [it implies] the assessment of urban conditions against a 
model of the traditional tribal system' .101 But there appears to be ample evidence that Limba 
modelled the organisation of his church on traditional society, making innovative structural 
changes in order to reinforce his moral and spiritual authority. 
97 A. Dubb, Community of the Saved (Johannesburg, 1976), pp. 23-4. 
98 Imvo 8 Nov. 1947. 
99 Mqotsi and Mkele, '/Bandla lika-Krestu ', p. 109. 
100 B.Sundkler, Bantu Prophets (London, 1948), pp. 127-8. 
101 A.L. Epstein, 'Urban Communities in Africa' in M. Gluckman (ed.), Closed Systems 
and Open Minds (Edinburgh, 1964), p. 99. Cf. M. West, Bishops and Prophets in a 
Black City: African Independent Churches in Soweto, Johannesburg (Cape Town, 
1975), p. 48 and D. Chidester, Religions of South Africa (London, 1992), p. 136. 
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The Church of Christ also reproduced and redefined existing social hierarchies and gender 
relations of a patriarchal society. Whilst it may be that male dominance in both traditional 
African society and the Zionist churches is something of a myth, there was no sign of the 
informal power of women in the Church of Christ. Unlike the Zionist churches where women 
outnumber men, are the focus of healing activities, and control much of the resources through 
the manyano; there are not only proportionately many more males in the Church but they are 
dominant in most spheres of church activity. The fine line between the subservient and 
supportive roles of women is evident in their influence on decision-making. They are not, for 
instance, allowed to take part in discussions in church. Should a married woman wish to raise 
a point, her husband had to serve as her spokesman and introduce the matter as if it was his 
own idea. Males thus exercised a great degree of social control over women in the 
congregation. This subservience was based on a combination of social relationships in the 
patrilineal family and biblical (especially Pauline) teachings. Like the Assemblies of God, the 
Church of Christ justified the secondary status of females on the basis of the scriptures.102 
Dubb's depiction of the insularity of members of the Assemblies of God from the wider 
community has ready application to the Church of Christ. 103 He holds that the importance of 
in-group solidarity is twofold. In the first place it had the effect of maintaining the vitality of 
the church, and of ensuring that the changed lifestyle of converts would be sustained. 
Secondly, the Church provided its members with an alternative to the alienated existence of 
an urban location. It defined clearly what was good and evil and created a web of social 
relations within which the individual felt secure. 104 The strictures on customary male 
recreational- or leisure time activities (like drinking and smoking) promoted family life and 
attendance of church services, bible studies and prayer meetings. The lives of members became 
centred on church activities. Contact with outsiders was limited to a minimum and social 
interaction was mainly with fellow members of the congregation. Such solidarity was shared 
by members of both churches through the creation of separate identities. This was especially 
so with respect to the appearance of Church of Christ members which set them apart from 
outsiders. Like Limba himself, male members did not shave their beards and wore suits as a 
badge of respectability. 105 As in the case of the Assemblies of God, where there was also a 
102 Mqotsi & Mkele, 'iBandla lika Krestu', pp. 109-11; Pauw, Christianity and Xhosa 
Tradition, p. 308. 
103 Dubb, Community of the Saved, especially pp. 137-158. 
104 Dubb, Community of the Saved, p. 152. 
105 Budaza, 'The Native Separatist Church Movement', p. 17. 
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pattern of residential clustering of members, deacons in the Church of Christ were able to keep 
a close watch on the activities of members residing in their area. The intense interaction 
between members and between them and church officials had the effect of making it extremely 
difficult for individuals to break the rules of the church without being quickly and easily 
discovered. As a result of their way of life which differed from those of the people around 
them, members of the Church of Christ formed a close-knit and exclusive community in New 
Brighton. 
In the view of Buijtenhuis, religious movements (like Zionist churches) are not the expression 
of particular classes but of those who experience the destruction of traditional socio-cultural 
norms. Following Baechler, he employs the concept of 'counter-society' to explain the 
response of religious groups who renounce all power aspirations in a hostile social environment 
and instead retreat (in terms of organisation but particularly of beliefs, moral codes, ritual) to 
'a place to feel at home' - a phrase he borrows from Welbourn and Ogot. ul6 But this is not 
'retreatism' pure and simple. In my view indigenous churches provided something more than 
escape from the harsh realities of political domination, economic deprivation, rapid social 
change and cultural anomie in the townships. Withdrawal was not merely a defensive act nor 
are such churches necessarily politically passive institutions. In fact, the creation of alternative 
and autonomous structures effectively constituted rival power bases. In certain instances, these 
churches sought to empower members and the body corporate through economic self-
sufficiency. Members of these churches did not explicitly reject the dominant values of society 
but attempted to construct a new identity and form of consciousness. Thus any reference to, 
say, the Church of Christ as an 'alternative community' or 'counter-society' requires some 
qualification. 
Conclusion 
Social cleavages were, to some extent, offset by the shared experience of poverty and 
oppression. A growing awareness by all groups of a community identity was in the first 
instance due to the 'spatial ordering of society' by the dominant classes. All classes of Africans 
lived side by side and were readily identified by their race. Social gradations and class 
differences tended to diminish in a situation where all were subjected to an identifiable (white) 
external oppressor. In the face of such common experience a group identity could coalesce and 
become the basis for a collective response. The struggle against political and cultural 
hegemony by New Brighton residents often assumed an inward and defensive form. Survival 
was the first priority. Yet, the struggle was also manifest in community and national politics. 
106 F. Welbourn and B.A. Ogot, A Place to Feel at Home: A Study of Two Independent 
Churches in Western Kenya (London, 1966). 
CHAPTER 8 
COMMUNITY POLITICS IN NEW BRIGHTON 
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE ROLE OF THE 
ADVISORY BOARD, c. 1908-1953 
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Struggles of urban African communities have been primarily concerned with subsistence issues 
such as the cost of food, housing and transport. Mobilisation in such struggles has tended to 
be sporadic and difficult to sustain because of the vagaries of labour and political 
organisations. In the absence of a vibrant political society, vigilance and civic associations 
became key agents in mobilisation. Even statutory institutions such as advisory boards have 
played a significant role in community struggles. Although advisory boards were to all intents 
and purposes powerless, progressive organisations were prepared to use these 'institutions of 
the oppressor' to further their aims until as late as the 1950s. Moreover, in many instances 
! 
advisory boards had a symbiotic relationship with the more representative community-based 
institutions. This chapter will show that despite its questionable legitimacy and ambiguous role 
in community affairs, the Native Advisory Board (NAB) contributed in some measure to the 
formation of a dynamic political tradition in New Brighton. 
Advisory boards have often been portrayed as 'collaborationist' bodies and those serving on 
the boards summarily dismissed as 'stooges' or 'seiJ-outs'. Bloch and Wilkinson, for instance, 
state quite unequivocally that they were dominated by the 'most reactionary elements' of the 
African petty bourgeoisie, and "generaJiy became the vehicles for the often narrow grievances 
and aspirations of a disconnected petty bourgeoisie". 1 But other writers have noted the . 
inherently contradictory role of advisory boards in community politics. Kuper observed that 
participation in state-created bodies (like advisory boards) did not necessarily imply 
subordination and that such structures could provide opportunities for organising the people 
and undermining the structure of domination. 2 Stadler's appraisal also reflects this 
ambivalence. He states at one point that the limited forms of African representation in local 
bodies [such as advisory boards] ... seldom generated any substantial political support in urban 
African communities. Yet, at another point, he reckons that advisory boards "provided a locus 
for African political activity, and some significant community leaders used them as a power 
1 R. Bloch and P. Wilkinson, 'Urban Control and the Popular Struggle: A Survey 'Of 
State Urban Policy 1920-1970', Africa Perspective, XX (1982), 18. 
2 L. Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie. Race Class and Politics in South Africa (Yale, 
1965). p. 328. 
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base". 3 A more recent work by Cobley has gone some way towards providing a more nuanced 
and diachronic treatment of the petty bourgeoisie and of their role in community politics. 4 The 
apparent contradictions can be partly explained by the structurally ambiguous position of the 
African petty bourgeoisie and the changing nature of the advisory boards. 
Despite the burgeoning literature on the African middle class, the significance of the role of 
advisory boards in community politics has still to be thoroughly assessed. For what we lack 
are in-depth case studies of advisory boards which cover extended periods. 5 As far as Port 
Elizabeth is concerned, a study has been made of the operation of the board's successor -
community councils- in the townships during the 1970s. It also provides, by way of stressing 
the continuity between these bodies, a resume of NAB meetings between the 1920s and 1940s 
devoid of historical contextualisation. This study evaluated the behaviour of individual Board 
members with significant personal followings. These 'notables' built up systems of patronage 
based on a network of clients linked by a web of social relations resting on kiiiship and ethnic · 
ties, business interests and membership of political, church and sports organisations.6 This 
approach provides a point of departure for ·our examination of the functioning of the NAB 
against the background of the changing structural position of the petty bourgeoisie discussed 
3 A. Stadler, The political economy of modem South Africa (Cape Town, 1987), 112, 
116. 
4 A.G. Cobley, Class and Consciousness: The Black Petty Bourgeoisie in South Africa, 
1924 to 1950 (Westport, 1990), draws (as does this chapter) on a substantial literature 
which includes: L. Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie. Race, Class and Politics in South 
Africa (Yale University Press, 1965); P. Bonner, 'The Transvaal Native Congress 1917-
1920: The Radicalisation of the Black Petty Bourgeoisie on the Rand' inS. Marks & 
R. Rathbone (eds.), Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa (London, 1982) 
and H. Bradford, 'Mass Movements and the Petty Bourgeoisie: The Social Origins of 
the ICU Leadership 1924-29', Journal of African History, XXV (1984), 295-310. 
Another important recent contribution is C. Charney, 'Janus in Blackface? The African 
Petite Bourgeoisie in South Africa', Con-Text, 1 (1988), pp. 5-44. 
5 An exception is, C.J.P. le Roux, 'Rol van die Naturelle-adviesraad op plaaslike 
bestuursvlak in Bloemfontein, 1923-1948', Contree, 25 (1989), pp. 5-11. R. Bloch, 
'"Using the Institutions of the Oppressor": African Advisory Boards 1923 to 1948' 
(unpublished paper, University of Cape Town, 1978) includes a brief case study of the 
Ndabeni Advisory Board in the early 1930s. The following unpublished theses provide 
more than passing reference to particular boards: P. Ia Hausse, 'The Struggle for the 
City: Alcohol, the Ematsheni and Popular Culture in Durban, 1902-1936' (M.A., UCT, 
1984), pp. 205-216; L. Torr, 'The Social History of an Urban African Community: 
Lamont, c.1930-1960' (M.A., University of Natal, Durban, 1985), pp. 127-143 and 
H. Sapire, 'African Urbanisation and Struggles against Municipal Control in Brakpan, 
1920-1958' (Ph.D., University of the Witwatersrand, 1988), pp. 187-93, 341-4. 
6 M.de Jongh, 'Interaction and Transition: A Study of Conciliar Behaviour in a Black 
South African Township' (Ph.D. Thesis, Rhodes University, 1979), passim. 
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in the previous chapter. A discussion of the political culture and the formation of cliques in 
New Brighton during the 1920s and 1930s will follow. 
The chief concern of the final section of this chapter is to explain the radicalisation of 
community politics and concomitant politicisation of the NAB, which culminated in its 
resignation in 1952. Here, again, we will refer to Cobley's work. His notion of a 'great 
awakening' of advisory boards which he ascribes to their widening role in terms of the 1936 
Natives' Representative Act (NRA) is problematical. The conversion of boards into electoral 
colleges for urban areas under the Act may have galvanised politics in the northern provinces; 
but not in the Cape where Africans still participated - albeit in attenuated form - in wider 
(white) electoral politics. Secondly, Cobley associates this 'great awakening' of the boards with 
the participation of political organisations. But as he himself shows and others before him have 
done, 7 members of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) stood for advisory boards 
before the passage of the NRA. Moreover, Cobley fails to distinguish between those with 
known political affiliations contesting elections in their private capacities and those who stood 
for an organisation per se. After the collapse of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' 
Union (ICU) and with the African National Congress (ANC) moribund by the early 1930s, 
former officials of both these organisations elected to advisory boards were only accountable 
to local constituencies - or, in the case of nominees, to the local authority. That participation 
by the ANC and the CPSA in advisory boards during the 1940s and 1950s became more 
widespread, 8 was because these organisations determined to capture any forum capable of 
drawing in diverse groups in local communities into their ranks. It will be shown that the NAB 
in New Brighton was no exception. 
The Origins and Functioning of the New Brighton Advisory Board c.1908-1923 
It is a fairly common assumption that Native Advisory Boards were first established in terms 
of the Urban Areas Act of 1923.9 In fact, the first advisory boards predate this legislation by 
some fourteen years and forerunners of the Boards had been established in Port Elizabeth's 
7 Cobley, Class and Consciousness, pp. 207-8; J. & R. Simons, Class and Colour in 
South Africa, 1850-1950 (London, 1961), p. 484; P. Walshe, The Rise of African 
Nationalism (London, 1970), p. 364. 
8 For example, T. Lodge, Black politics in South Africa since 1945 (Johannesburg, 
1983), p. 78; D. Fortescue, 'The Communist Party and the African Working Class in 
the 1940s', International Journal Q{ African Historical Studies, XXIV, 3 (1991), p. 
489; D. Posel, The Making Q/Apanheid 1948-1960: Conflict and Compromise (Oxford, 
1991), p. 37. 
9 Stadler, The political economy Q{modern SA, pp. 106, 112. 
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locations even earlier. In 1890 the Town Council had sanctioned the formation of a location 
committee to confer with "on matters relating to the orderly conduct of the locations". 10 Six 
years later, the Council and the African community entered into an agreement which envisaged 
an arrangement akin to the advisory board system. Provision for the establishment of Advisory 
Boards were included in the Cape's amended Native Reserve Location Act of 1905}1 But. 
when regulations drawn up in terms of this legislation were discussed with New Brighton 
residents, no real interest therein was expressed. 12 Yet, before these regulations were 
promulgated, the Assistant Magistrates of Ndabeni and New Brighton consulted informally 
constituted boards on matters of interest to residents. 13 Advisory Boards were formed in both 
Locations in late 1908 and commenced. functioning the following year. 
Advisory Board regulations proclaimed under the amended Native Reserve Location Act 
stipulated the procedures for the election and nomination of candidates, voting, the holding of 
, 
meetings, and so on. 14 Only four of the six Board members would be elect6d by residents. 
In the event of there being more than four nominations for these positions, the Magistrate 
would be obliged to call a public meeting at which candidates would be elected by a show of 
hands - this was later changed to a ballot. From 1910 two members would be appointed by 
the Governor-General acting upon the advice of the Native Affairs Department (NAD) which, 
in tum, followed the recommendation of the Magistrate. Meetings were to be held on a 
monthly basis provided they were quorate. They were to be chaired by the Magistrate who was 
ex-officio an additional member of the Board with a deliberative as well as a casting vote. In 
New Brighton, the Superintendent soon took over the Magistrate's functions, including the 
selection of nominees to serve on the NAB. 15 
State officials nominated Advisory Board members so in the event of residents electing 
members whose policy was "reactionary [sic] and embarassing to the Officers of the Location", 
10 A. Odendaal, 'African Political Mobilisation in the Eastern Cape, 1880-1910' (Ph.D. 
Thesis, Cambridge University, 1983), p. 158. 
11 Eastern Province Herald (hereafter EPH), 8 Sept. 1902; J. Kirk, 'The African Middle 
Class, Cape Liberalism and Resistance to Residential Segregation at Port Elizabeth, 
1880-1910' (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1987), pp. 194-5, 222 
n.4. Kirk omits to mention that provisions for advisory boards were only made in the 
amended Native Reserve Location Act of 1905. 
12 CAD, NA 734 f348, SNA to ARM, NBL, 19 Dec. 1906. 
13 CeA, NTS 156 1703/f348, SNA to PM, CC, 4 July 1908. 
14 Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette, Proclamation No. 297 of 31 July 1908. 
15 CAD, NA 734 f348, Minutes ofthe NBAB, 3 June 1909. 
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the interests of the Government could be safeguarded. In addition, nominated members could 
"maintain a balance of power amongst the various tribes in the Location and ... ensure as far 
as possible their due representation". 16 The latter consideration suggests that the strategy of 
divide and rule was advocated. by the authorities in urban locations. In the case of New 
Brighton, this was to be used to exploit cleavages between the Fingoes and other Xhosa- _ _ 
speakers, residents of different areas in the Location, and between those entitled to vote for 
NAB members and those not. These strategies will be discussed below. 
It was the stated intention of the Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA) that Advisory Boards 
would be "thoroughly representative .of all classes of the community". To this end, it was 
regarded as inappropriate to grant lease and title holders the sole right to elect Board 
members. 17 Neither title nor long lease was granted in the Reserve Locations, but the right 
to vote and to stand as a NAB candidate was restricted to principal occupants whose rents were 
fully paid up. Thus lodgers were effectively precluded from participating in the elections even 
though they paid a fee to the Administration. Subsequent recommendations for the 
establishment of advisory committees representing all native residents in urban locations, 18 
were not to be realised. 
The Repon of the Native Affairs Depanment for 1911 conceded that there was "no local 
government [for urban Africans] in the true sense [but that the advisory boards] serve a most 
I useful purpose as a connecting link betWeen the Government and the residents of these 
locations" .19 In New Brighton, opinions as to the efficacy of the NAB were divided. 
Nominated members believed that it served a useful purpose, 20 but one elected member rather 
more cynically regarded his function as "nursing the Location for the Government". In his 
opinion NAB members were little more than Government functionaries and, as such, might 
as well be paid an honorarium for their services.21 The SNA's response to the request shows 
scant regard for the fact that certain members were well aware of the NAB's questionable 
legitimacy and sceptical of the degree of independence they exercised: 
16 CeA, NTS 156 1703/f348, ARM, Uitvlugt to SNA, 26 Feb. 1908. 
17 CeA, NTS 156 1703/f348, SNA to Surveyor-General, 31 March 1908. 
18 Transvaal Province, Local Government (Stallard) Commission Repon (Pretoria, 1921), 
pp. 52 and 95, Appendix VII. 
19 U. G. 10- 1913, p. 12. 
20 See, for example, statements by Rev Mcanyangwa recorded in CeA, NTS 2443 4/291, 
Minutes of the NBAB, 30 Jan. and 28 April 1914. 
21 CAD, NA 156 6224/f348, Minutes of the NBAB, 7 Sept. 1911. 
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[W]ere Government to sanction the grant of any pecuniary indulgence for their services 
it is quite possible that the confidence of the community in the Board as a whole might 
be weakened, and the Board itself not be as independent and untrammelled in its 
discussions and decisions.22 
Yet, a Repon of the Native Affairs Depanment issued in 1919 noted that the NAB had 
"assisted greatly in arousing interest and ensuring contentment in the administration". 23 
The NAB functioned relatively smoothly until it was engulfed by populist protest politics 
during Port Elizabeth's post-war crisis. As I have shown elsewhere, 24 the post-war years were 
characterised by the mobilisation of black workers under the banner of the PEICWU. During 
this time, the labour movement dealt directly with employers and the PECC, which served 'to 
highlight the NAB's irrelevance in addressing anything but minor complaints. With the 
heightened tensions in the aftermath of the shootings of October 1920, zs the Location 
Superintendent, no longer regarded the NAB as an unqualified success. He noted that it was 
an excellent institution for both individually and as a Board [it] acts as a brake on the 
hot headed and is a means of bringing to light any grievances which residents might 
have. 
On the other hand, he complained that "there is ... a section of the residents which regards the 
Board with suspicion and criticises it unmercifully". 26 This was hardly surprising because 
there were no elections for three successive years after 1918 and the NAB had simply been re-
appointed en bloc by the Superintendent. 27 Members' own frustration and disenchantment with 
the NAB was reflected by the frequent failure to hold meetings during 1920 and 1921 due to 
an inability to raise a quorum. In short, the composition of the NAB was fixed and its 
functioning .had become a sham. 
Under these circumstances, the establishment of a Vigilance Committee to look after "the best 
22 CAD, NTS 156 6224/f348, Actg. SNA to RM, PE, 22 Nov. 1911. 
23 Repon of the Native Affairs Depanmentfor the Years 1913 to 1918, U. G. 7- 1919, p. 
17. 
24 'From Populism to Unionism: the Emergence and Nature of Port Elizabeth's Industrial 
and Commercial Workers' Union, 1918-20', Journal of Southerrz African Studies, 17, 
4 (1991), pp. 680-716. 
25 See my 'The Port Elizabeth Disturbances of October 1920' (M.A. Thesis, Rhodes 
University, 1988), esp. pp. 125-6. 
26 F.A. Saunders, Municipal Control of Locations (Grahamstown, 1920), p. 14, Letter 
from E. Grattan to Dr F.A. Saunders, 28 April 1920. 
27 CeA, NTS 2443 3/291, Supt. NBL to Magt., PE, 17 Feb. 1922 and SNA to Magt., 
PE, 2 March 1922. 
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interests of the native community" was hardly surprising. 28 Its executive officers included a 
current (and a future) NAB member, and were moderates without ties to the by then divided 
PEICWU. The Vigilance Committee thus provided an alternative- but not officially sanctioned 
-forum for New Brighton residents to air their grievances. 
It also became customary for residents to elect a Chairman of Public Meetings (or Location 
Chairman) annually. In the event of anyone wishing to convene such a meeting, an application 
had to be motivated to the Location Chairman for the use of the public hall. Should he 
consider that a useful purpose would be served thereby, the application and agenda of the 
proposed meeting was referred to the Superintendent. When permission was granted for public 
meetings, these afforded residents an opportunity to discuss matters without the presence of 
officials. It remained the Location Chairman's responsibility to convene and chair the 
meetings, and to see to it that proceedings were conducted in an orderly manner. Moreover, 
' 
he had to report the outcome of the meeting to the Superintendent. Failing this, the Location 
Chairman stood to forfeit his position and residents the 'privilege' of holding further public 
meetings. Regulations made no provision for the position of Location Chairman, but Grattan 
and his successors reckoned that it provided training for responsible leadership. When the SNA 
questioned whether the procedure for holding public meetings did not "derogate from the 
authority of the Superintendent", Grattan argued that he remained the 'final authority' in 
Location matters. 29 Consideration was given periodically to legalising the position of the 
Location Chairman by way of additional regulations, but the closest it came to this was when 
the procedure for calling public meetings was placed on record in 1922.30 
Social Control and Clique Politics in New Brighton c.1923-1242-
The functioning of advisory boards was not prescribed by the Urban Areas Act which was 
enabling legislation. The Act stipulated only that the local authority could not make or 
withdraw regulations for a particular Location without prior consultation with the NAB. 
However, the NAD's 'model' regulations served as a guide for local authorities.31 Urban 
28 EPH 2 July 1921. 
29 CeA, NTS 2443 4/291, SNA to RM, PE, 15 April and Supt. NBL to RM, PE, 27 
April 1922. 
30 CeA, NTS 2443 4/291, Minutes of the NBAB, 23 March 1922; Saunders, Municipal 
Control, pp. 14-15. 
31 J.D. Rheinallt Jones, 'Native Urban Administration: the Functions of Native Advisory 
Boards', Race Relations, XII, 2 (1946), p. 53; L. Reyburn, The Urban African in Local 
Government: A Study ofthe Advisory Board System and its Operation, (Johannesburg, 
1960), p. 4. 
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Africans who qualified to vote for members of the Board or serve thereon, were supposed to 
learn the duties and responsibilities of (limited) citizenship.32 In deference to Stallardism, the 
boards were not accorded statutory powers as this might have implied future citizenship rights 
for urban Africans. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Superintendent liaised between the NAB and tht. Council. He 
submitted a monthly report along with the NAB minutes to the Native Affairs Committee. 
Copies of the NAC's minutes were, in tum, attached to the agenda circulated to City 
Councillors. The Superintendent reported back to the NAB on the recommendations of the 
NAC and the resolutions of the Council. He was was also responsible for the selection of the 
PECC's nominees to the NAB, who numbered half of the Board members for most of the 
period under discussion. 33 Such nominees were in the invidious position of having to reconcile 
the contradictory expectations of the community and the Council. They owed allegiance to the 
Council and were not free to determine their own priorities. 
After the hiatus of the early 1920s, the NAB performed its functions more successfully than 
its counterparts in other centres where the local authorities were seldom able to make boards 
fully functional. In 1927 McNamee reported that there was, amongst his fellow Location 
Managers and Superintendent, a general impression that 
when comprised of the right type of natives, [Advisory Boards] were helpful to the 
authorities. In several instances difficulties were overcome through the agencies of such 
Boards. 34 
To McNamee himself, the 'right type of native' meant those willing to co-operate with the 
authorities so that the NAB became a help rather than a hindrance to social control in the 
Location. Most of these came from the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie. With the necessary 
skills and acumen, some became major political brokers in New Brighton during this period. 
The Superintendent's position as Chairman of the Advisory Board augmented his personal 
influence in New Brighton enormously. McNamee claimed to have the necessary qualities to 
32 Cobley, Class and Consciousness, p. 206. 
33 In terms of the regulations under the Urban Areas Act the Board consisted of 3 elected 
and 3 nominated members. In 1940 it was enlarged to 8 members of whom half were 
nominated, and in 1949 further enlarged to 12 members of whom 8 were elected. 
34 CAD, 3/PEZ 11312/1511, Special Report on Conference of Managers and 
Superintendents of Urban Native Affairs, Johannesburg, 9-11 Nov. 1927. 
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act as an impartial overseer of the Board's activities. 35 The NAC evidently concurred, for it 
ignored the recommendations of at least two Government Commissions that the Location 
Superintendent should not hold this office. 36 And when members proposed that a City 
Councillor act as Chairman of the NAB, it circumspectfully suggested that this should not be 
construed as a personal attack on the incumbent, but rather that an important principle was at 
stake. In their view, a Councillor was not an employee of the PECC like the Superintendent 
and his independence would safeguard the status of the Advisory Board as trustees of the 
Location residents. 37 The only concession made by the NAC was that it would meet regularly 
with the Board in the absence of the Location Superintendent, to enable it express grievances 
without fear of recrimination. 38 It was not until 1948 that the NAC agreed to amend the 
regulations so as to permit a member of the NAC to act as Chairman of the NAB. 
As the primary interlocutor with the PECC, McNamee was able to establish extensive patron-
' 
client networks. The operation of these networks worked through McNamee's lackeys on the 
NAB, especially long-serving nominated members. The dispensing of patronage was used to 
co-opt individuals with standing in the community. McNamee maintained good relationships 
in an official capacity with influential figures such as A.F. Pendla, James Limba, P.J. Nikiwe 
and Rev G.B. Molefe. These individuals - for whom profiles are provided below - were 
generally acknowledged to have been "respected by their own people [as they] had rendered 
very valuable service to the community" .39 McNamee rewarded loyalty with special 
privileges, including preferential access to accommodation and the grant of licenses to trade 
or become proprietors of eating houses. The price exacted for this was collusion in effecting 
social control. Not all NAB members were prepared to comply and those individuals who 
-declined to become party to the system of patronage or simply fell- foul of the Location 
Superintendent were marginalised. Thus the Superintendent's attempts to co-opt residents cut 
two ways. 
35 Cape Archives Depot (CAD), Port Elizabeth Town Clerk's Files, 3/PEZ 1/1280, Memo 
of Supt. NBL re Native Economic Commission Report, 5 Aug. 1932. 
36 Repon of the Native Economic Commission 1930-32, U.G. 22- 1932, paras. 14-16; 
Repon of the Conference between Municipalities and the Native Affairs Depanment in 
1937, U.G. 56- 1937, 20. 
37 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2115118, Minutes of the NBAB, 23 March 1944. 
38 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15/18, Minutes of meeting between the NAC and NBAB, 13 Oct. 
1944. 
39 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2115118, Minutes of the NAC, 2 Feb. 1944; Eastern Province Herald 
(EPH) 3 Mar. 1944. 
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As we have seen, the allocation of houses in New Brighton by McNamee often occasioned 
charges of 'favouritism' on his part. Although the responsibility of the Location 
Superintendent, the NAB could make recommendations in this regard. 40 In 1928 it revoked 
a previous resolution to the effect that no unattached women should be allocated houses. It was 
resolved that applications of widows and women with children, who had been deserted by their 
husbands, should receive sympathetic consideration, provided such persons were earning an 
honest living.41 This the Superintendent was prepared to do, but reserved the right to use his 
own discretion in all cases. On another occasion, the Superintendent quashed a resolution of 
the NAB that all occupiers of double (i.e. two semi-detached two-roomed) houses in the old 
portion of the Location, excepting school teachers and ministers of religion, be given notice 
to quit one half of each such dwelling. 42 The proposed exemption of certain classes of 
residents from this resolution was in keeping with an earlier decision of the Board that the 
'more advanced type of Native' should be encouraged to take up residence in New Brighton 
and that special consideration should be given to fmding houses for such persons. This 
standpoint was contested on occasion, 43 but the majority of Board members - who were from 
this class themselves - felt justified in preserving their privileges. 
Perhaps the leading community figure of his generation was Andrew Frank Pendla. He was 
elected to the NAB in 1925, 1928 and 1930, and served as a nominated member from 1935 
until his death in 1944. He enjoyed the confidence of McNamee who regarded him as "the 
most capable board member - nominated or elected - that I have ever worked with" . 44 As a 
senior clerk and interpreter to the attorney, J.H. Spilkin, he was in a position to provide legal 
advice to the many residents who sought it; or, failing that, could refer people to his 
employer. Together with his position on the NAB, this enabled Pendla to establish 
individualised patron-client relations. As a tshawe (petty chief), Pendla derived much of his 
standing from lineage-type authority based on ties of kinship which still held sway in New 
Brighton. He suggested to the Holloway Commission that urban representatives of the chiefs 
sit on a separate body from the NAB and meet regularly with the local authority.45 His own 
40 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1279, Minutes of NBAB, 23 April 1931. 
41 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1277, Minutes of the NBAB, 11 Oct. 1928. 
42 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1497, Minutes of the NBAB, 7 Feb. 1929. 
43 See, for example, CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1497, Minutes of the NBAB, 16 May 1929. 
44 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15/18, Report of Supt. NBL, 15 Jan. 1944. 
45 University of Cape Town Manuscripts Collection, BC 630, K. 26, Evidence to the 
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ethnic support base was, however, augmented by a personal following. Although something 
of an opportunist whose political career ended with his being axed as President of the Cape 
African Congress in 1942, 46 Pendla was repeatedly elected to key positions on civic bodies 
by New Brighton residents. 47 
In a somewhat different category, but also very influential in New Brighton's affairs was 
'Bishop' James Limba, head of the Church of Christ. Limba was elected to the NAB for three 
consecutive years from 1931 to 1933 and then, again, in 1936. After standing down for a year, 
he became a nominated member for ten consecutive years between 1938 and 1947 until he 
declined further nomination following a constitutional dispute in the Church which amounted 
to a challenge to his leadership. During his years on the NAB, Limba availed himself of the 
opportunity to secure trading licenses for a number of commercial ventures and these were 
well patronised by his followers who kept him in fine style. Limba's was the only application 
for a site in New Brighton by indigenous churches to have been approved during McNamee's 
term of office. The Location Superintendent reckoned Limba and his followers to be amongst 
the most law-abiding residents of New Brighton and, obviously, useful allies in affecting social 
control. 48 
The only woman who wielded comparable influence in New Brighton was Sister Dora Nginza 
(nee Jacobs), the well-known District Nurse and matriarchal figure. She earned the praise 
name Aa! Nobantu!! (Mother of the People) not only on account of all the children she brought 
into the world but also due to the respect in which she was held. This was augmented by her 
marriage to ·Henry Nginza, a tshawe of the amaRarabe royal family. Following the death in 
46 University of the Witwatersrand, Church of the Province Archives, A.B. Xuma Papers, 
Letters from Xuma to Pendla of31 December 1941 (ABX. 411231a), Pendla to Xuma, 
15 January 1942 (ABX. 420115a), Nikiwe to Xuma, 5 March 1942 (ABX. 420305), 
Xuma to Pendla, 16 Sept. 1942 (ABX. 420916c), Xuma to Nikiwe, 18 Sept. 1942 
(ABX. 420918c) and Nikiwe to Xuma, 22 Sept. 1942 (ABX. 420922b); Walshe, The 
Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, 390-1. 
47 Cape Archives, PE Municipality, Town Clerk's Files; ImvoZabantsundu, 8 April1930; 
T.D. Mweli Skota, The African Yearly Register (Johannesburg, 1931), 237; T.Karis 
& G. Gerhardt (eds.), From Protest to Challenge, V. 4: Political Profiles (Stanford, 
1977), 126; A. G. Cobley, 'On the Shoulders of Giants': the Black Petty Bourgeoisie 
in South Africa (Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1989), 340; Interviews with 
Blanch Matsolo (nee Pendla), Hillside Location, Graaff-Reinet, 1 May 1992 and J.H. 
Spilkin, Port Elizabeth, 23 Jan. 1990 and 8 Feb. 1992. 
48 For further information , see G. Baines 'In the World but Not of It: 'Bishop' Limba 
and the Church of Christ in New Brighton, c.1929-1949', Kronos, 19 (1992), pp. 102-
134. 
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1943 of her husband, a former headman in the Location [see Chapter 4], Nginza served as the 
urban representative of Paramount Chief Archie Velile Sandile of the Ciskei. Her support for 
the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act alienated her from 'progressive' organisations such as the 
ANC.49 But her influence was confmed largely to the more traditional and conservative 
segments of the community despite her involvement in civic, church, cultural activities, and 
occasional non-party political matters. She was held in esteem not only by McNamee, but a 
succession of medical officers of health. However, as an employee of the Location 
administration, Nginza was precluded from serving on the NAB.50 
Educators, clergymen and other members of the 'respectable classes' often served as nominated 
members of the NAB. Prince John Nikiwe was a school principal until his retirement in 1944 
and a Methodist lay preacher. He served as an elected member of the NAB between 1922 and 
1928 and thereafter as a nominated member for an almost unbroken period of 35 years. He 
served on the executive committees of the PE District Native Welfare Society (later the PE 
Joint Council). Nikiwe was also on the executive of both the local and provincial branches of 
the Cape African Congress at various times between the 1920s and the early 1940s.51 
When Rev G.B. Molefe took charge of the New Brighton Presbyterian mission church in 
1939, he was immediately convinced by McNamee to accept nomination to the NAB. He was 
to serve without interruption for almost thirty years. A graduate of the South African Native 
College (Fort Hare), he boasted an M.A. from Columbia University, New York. He later 
resigned from the ministry to become principal of the frrst secondary school in New 
Brighton. 52 The presence of nominees like Nikiwe and Molefe on the NAB went a long way 
49 G. Mbeki, The Struggle for Liberation in South Africa (Cape Town, 1992), p. 78 makes 
a non explicit reference to Nginza. 
50 Repon of the Native Affairs Depanmentfor the years 1919 to 1921, U.G. 34- '22, 15; 
Newspaper House Library File on D. Nginza; McNamee, Memoirs, 16-18; Weekend 
Post 19 Nov. 1991; Interviews with Dr P.D. Jabkovitz, Rondebosch, 1 Jan. 1990 and 
G. Pemba, Swartkops Valley, 31 March and 31 July 1992. 
51 PE Municipality, Town Clerk's Files; Newspaper House Library File; Interviews with 
G. Soya Mama, New Brighton, 10 August 1989 and J. Graham Young, Port Elizabeth, 
23 August 1988. 
52 C. Hunter, 'Some Aspects of the African Mission Policy of the Presbytery of 
Adelaide/Port Elizabeth with special reference to the origin and development of the 
New Brighton Presbyterian Mission Church, 1898-1962' (Ph.D. thesis, Rhodes 
University, 1983), pp. 288-91; N. Rude and R. Kingwill, 'George Molefe: Memoirs 
and Tributes' (Unpublished manuscript); Interview with Mrs J. Molefe (nee Mbelle), 
New Brighton, 24 June 1991; Indaba (supplement to Evening Post), 19 Oct. 1989; 
Newspaper House Library File. 
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towards ensuring that it would co-operate with the Location Superintendent and the local 
authority. In their dealings with white officials, they typified the servility of of the 'old guard' 
leaders who became uneasy with the increasingly strident demands of the younger generation 
in the 1940s. Both Nikiwe and Molefe were undoubtedly co-opted by McNamee. 
The administration's divide and rule strategy occasionally fuelled tension between Xhosas and 
Fingoes. There were persistent claims that McNamee preferred to nominate Fingoes to the 
Advisory Board. 53 In an item published in Imvo Zahantsundu in 1930, it was alleged that such 
tactics were being employed to sow seeds of division in the community. It was held that 
members of the NAB had secured election through chicanery and by virtue of their support by 
a vote of 'pals' in a very low poll. 54 Threatened with a case of libel, the newspaper publishers 
decided to retract the contents of the article. 55 Whatever the truth of the matter, the existence 
of cliques was a feature of Advisory Board politics. 
During the 1930s, NAB meetings assumed a far more confrontational edge and personal 
antipathies overshadowed much of the proceedings. Meetings often saw heated exchanges 
between McNamee and certain elected members. The Superintendent resorted to the technique 
of using the rules of meeting procedure to maintain control of the proceedings. On occasion 
speakers were warned to adhere strictly to procedures which had not been observed for a 
number of years. On other occasions, he silenced outspoken members by ruling their criticisms 
and motions 'out of order.' In 1935, for instance, McNamee ruled out of order a motion for 
more Xhosa members on the Board. 56 By March 1939 there was so much ill feeling amongst 
Board members, as well as between certain members and the chairman, that a meeting was 
adjourned until such time as there was a 'change of atmosphere' . 57 
The election of the disaffected former Headman Ntsonga [see Chapter 4] to the NAB in 1935 
had brought the simmering tensions to the fore. McNamee contended that Ntsonga was a 
"malicious and vindictive individual" who had caused trouble ever since his election to the 
NAB and that he was in league with two other Board members in attempting to disrupt the 
53 de Jongh, 'Interaction and Transaction', pp. 103, 120-1. 
54 Imvo Zabantsundu 16 Oct. 1930 ('Ezase New Brighton'). 
55 Imvo 11 Nov. 1930. 
56 de Jongh, 'Interaction and Transition', pp. 103, 120-1. 
57 de Jongh, 'Interaction and Transition', pp. 103, 122. 
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administration of New Brighton. 58 These were Wilson Jabavu and A.Z. Tshiwula. 
The journalist and photographer, Jabavu, had been nominated as member of the NAB in 1932 
but had subsequently fallen out with McNamee over the Superintendent's part in dismissing 
Ntsonga. For his part, McNamee took exception to the manner in which Board proceedings 
were being reported in the press. Jabavu won election to the NAB in the years 1937-42 and 
1945, during which time NAB meetings were punctuated with tensions on account of the 
mutual recriminations between these antagonists. Tshiwula was elected to the NAB on three 
occasions (1935, 1939 and 1949), served as Margaret Ballinger's election agent in Port 
Elizabeth when she became the Native Representative for the Cape Eastern Circle, and was 
himself nominated as a candidate for the NRC in 1942. He also became an organiser for the 
Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) in the 1940s in which capacity he had a 
rather chequered career. 59 The origins of Tshiwula's dispute with McNamee lay in the 
Superintendent's attempt to disqualify him from the 1938 NAB elections by branding him an 
'agitator' on account of his record of criticising the administration for malpractice.60 
The chief cause of Tshiwula's complaints concerned the partiality shown by McNamee in the 
allocation of houses in New Brighton. Given sole discretion in the matter, the Location 
Superintendent failed to process applications for houses strictly on a frrst-come-frrst-serve 
basis. Exceptions were invariably made in 'deserving cases' such as ministers, teachers and 
other members of the 'respectable classes' whose standing in the community made it 
imperative for them to have the best accommodation available. But an even more blatant form 
of patronage was the practice of giving preference to prospective applicants for houses who 
were prepared to pay off rent arrears owing by previous tenants. This rather unscrupulous 
practice was condoned by the NAC which pressurised McNamee to reduce the levels of 
outstanding rentals in the Location. The way in which beer brewing permits were allocated 
also fuelled the acrimonious wrangle between the Superintendent and a clique whom he 
believed was intent on confronting him at every turn. 61 
58 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/9, Supt. NBL to RM, PE, 12 July 19~5. 
59 T.D. Mweli Skota, African Yearly Register, 25. See University of the Witwatersrand, 
Xuma Papers, ABX. 420917b, A.Z. Ximiya to A.B. Xuma, 17 Sept. 1942. For further 
details about Tshiwula's activities as a union organiser, see J. Cherry, 'The Making of 
an African Working Class: Port Elizabeth 1925 to 1963' (M.A. thesis, UCT, 1992), 
73-75, 78-82. 
60 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1498, Tshiwula to Chief Magt., 15 Nov. 1937. 
61 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15/9, Supt. NBL to RM, PE, 12 July 1935. 
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In 1938 Tshiwula published letters in the press wherein he alleged that the administration had 
compelled would-be tenants to pay rent owing by previous defaulters who had absconded from 
the location. He also claimed to have been a victim of extortion himself. He refused to 
produce evidence of his claims before the NAB on the grounds that he had submitted the 
matter for legal opinion and it was sub judice. McNamee repudiated the allegations and 
maintained that in cases where such payments had been made, this wa~ done so voluntarily. 62 
Tshiwula renewed his allegations of corruption against the administration before the Smit 
enquiry which visited Port Elizabeth in 1941. On this occasion he submitted sworn statements 
to the commissioners to substantiate his claims. 63 McNamee denied the allegations but 
promised that the affidavits would be investigated. He noted that previous enquiries had found 
nothing to substantiate irregularities on the part of headmen who were responsible for 
collecting rent arrears. 64 But the dismissal of a number of headmen following disclosures of 
bribery and corruption which had not been made public knowledge, suggests that any claims 
to a clean administration had a hollow ring to them. McNamee obviously·resented the fact that 
the commissioners should have seriously considered what he construed as efforts by Tshiwula's 
clique to impugn him and the administration. 
The inconsistency of the Superintendent's actions also opened the door to charges of 
favouritism. In some instances, he allowed individuals or special interests groups to make 
direct representation to him and, if he saw fit, placed such matters before the NAC. In other 
instances, McNamee insisted that they follow the correct procedures, which meant consultation 
with the NAB as the proper body to make representation with the authorities. In 1928, when 
an unofficial body which styled itself the 'New Township Committee' came into being and (in 
McNamee's words) endeavoured to "usurp the functions of the properly constituted Advisory 
Board by dealing with matters of general interest" (i.e. the equalisation of rents), he rejected 
it as being 'self-appointed'. 65 But on another occasion five years later, McNamee granted an 
interview to a deputation of women about the issue of beer brewing permits. In defence of his 
actions to the NAB, McNamee explained that he was always prepared to listen to the 
complaints or troubles of any section of the public or any individual, male or female. He 
62 Intermediate Archives Depot (lAD), Port Elizabeth, PE Town Clerk's Files, 25/104 
No.3, Minutes of the NBAB, 28 Feb. 1939. 
63 Central Archives, Pretoria (CeA), Native Affairs (NTS), 4506 585/313, Evidence of 
A.Z. Tshiwula, Port Elizabeth, 29 Oct. 1941. 
64 CeA, NTS 4506 585/313, Evidence of J.P. McNamee to Smit Enquiry, Port Elizabeth, 
30 October 1941 . 
65 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2115/2, Report of the Supt. NBL to the NAC, 6 Sept. 1928. 
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added that "on no single occasion had any attempt been made ... to usurp the functions of the 
Board" .66 McNamee implied that the all-male NAB was being chauvinistic or discriminating 
against women. But even though women had no forums for airing their particular grievances, 
the NAB was being more consistent than the Superintendent by insisting that it should provide 
.. the sole channel of communication with the local authority. When another deputation 
representing 'Newtown' residents was given an audience by the NAB in 1932, their spokesmen 
argued that any section of the community should have the right to make direct representations 
to the NAC and PECC. The NAB unanimously rejected this demand on the grounds that 
affording residents direct access to the local authority without the intercession of the NAB 
would provide an opening for 'agitators'; and' that the NAB would suffer a loss of prestige, 
be rendered irrelevant and then might as well be abolished. 67 
The principle that all matters of public interest were the concern of the NAB became difficult 
to uphold when that body itself was representative of only a small section of th~ New Brighton 
community. In the first place, the Superintendent's nominees who owed allegiance to the 
Council were not answerable to the community at all. Candidates with the right connections 
and politics, rather than a concern to make the Board broadly representative of the community, 
were criteria for nomination. Secondly, Board members were sometimes over representative 
of certain areas in the Location. The high levels of rent arrears in 'Newtown' during the 
Depression years implied that the occupiers of these buildings were practically disenfranchised. 
In order to compensate for this, the Superintendent was instructed to nominate representatives 
from this area to the NAB. 68 The proposal that a ward system, whereby all sections of the 
Location would be accorded equal representation, be introduced was to be made on a number 
of occasions by the NAB but only adopted by the NAC eventually in.J950.69 Thirdly, Board 
members were elected by registered tenants whose rents were not in arrears. This effectively 
excluded most women, lodgers and grown-up children living with their parents. It is difficult 
to ascertain precisely how many residents were entitled to vote, but the figures given for some 
elections suggest that those who participated comprised a very small percentage of residents. 
Thus, for one reason or another, the Board could never claim to be properly representative of 
the New Brighton community. 
66 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1280, Minutes of the NBAB, 11 Aug. 1933. 
67 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/7, Minutes of the NBAB, 1 Dec. 1932. 
68 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1498, Minutes of the NAC, 17 Feb. and 19 May 1933. 
69 lAD, 25/104 No.3, Minutes of the NBAB, 29 May 1941 and 24 Aug. 1943; 25/104 
No.4, Minutes of the NBAB, 24 Jan. 1950 and Minutes of the NAC, 11 July 1950. 
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Public meetings remained crucial for the airing of community grievances and, accordingly, the 
position of Location Chairman carried much responsibility. When Pendla, the incumbent in 
1932, refused to permit the holding of a meeting he deemed not to be a matter for public 
interference, his decision had serious ramifications for the standing of the NAB. The aggrieved 
persons subsequently appealed to the Mayor and sought legal advice on the matter, but were 
not allowed to go over the heads of the NAB. Although Board members queried the wisdom 
of Pendla's decision, they did not question his right to make such a ruling. 70 After a public 
meeting in 1933 ended in a fracas, the NAB recommended that the time had come for either 
the Superintendent or Board members to assume responsibility for convening and chairing 
future public meetings. 71 Regulations to this effect were drafted but not promulgated. The 
position of Location Chairman was reviewed again in 1935, but this time the NAB was not 
prepared to approve a motion that the Superintendent be appointed to officiate at public 
meetings. 72 By the time that the NAB voted to abolish the position of Location Chairman, 73 
the practice of the Chairman of the Vigilance Committee presiding over public meetings had 
obtained official sanction. 
The Vigilance Committee (or Civic Association as it later became) was more representive of 
the New Brighton community than the NAB for members were elected by all residents in 
public meetings. More often than not, the two bodies had an overlapping membership. Pendla, 
Tshiwula and Jabavu were frequently elected as Chairmen of the Vigilance Committee. Thus 
to depict vigilance committees as rivals of the advisory boards is too simplistic. The American 
Board missionary, Ray Phillips, who reckoned that vigilance associations were apt to be more 
radical than .advisory boards and lacked reliable leaders with integrity, whereas the latter had 
the support of level-headed, responsible type of detribalised Africans, 7• inaccurately sees them 
as representating opposing blocs. In the case of New Brighton, the relationship was more 
complementary for they sometimes co-operated on issues. When the Vigilance Committee 
petitioned the PECC on behalf of residents, the NAC always referred it to the NAB which was 
regarded as the proper channel for such representations. In some instances, the NAB supported 
the Vigilance Committee, whilst at other times the latter was forced to bypass the NAB and 
seek direct access to the NAC or even the full Council - which was seldom possible. 
70 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/5, Minutes of the NBAB, 21 April and 6 June 1932. 
71 CAD, 3/PEZ 111280, Minutes of the NBAB, 2 March 1933. 
72 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1281, Minutes of the NBAB, 17 May 1934. 
73 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1281, Minutes of the NBAB, 19 July 1934; DeJongh, 'Interaction and 
Transformation', p. 120. 
74 R. Phillips, The Bantu in the City (Lovedale, 1938), p. 342. 
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The aforegoing analysis suggests that it would be more accurate to speak of competing cliques 
than opposing moderate and radicals blocs in New Brighton. These cliques did correspond to 
some extent to cleavages between nominated and elected Advisory Board members. But neither 
the cliques nor the patron-client networks established by Board members during the 1920s and 
1930s survived the radicalisation of New Brighton politics in the following decade. 
The Politicisation of the New Brighton Advisory Board in the 1940s 
Because many local authorities either failed to establish advisory boards or ignored them where 
they existed, the Native Laws Amendment Act (36 of 1944) compelled these authorities to set 
up boards whose functions were to consider and report upon any regulations which the urban 
local authority proposed to make or adopt, and take the initiative in recommending regulations. 
And Section 19(5) of the Urban Areas Consolidated Act (25 of 1945) obliged local authorities 
to submit estimates of the NRA to advisory boards before adopting them. 75 But these 
stipulations still only served as broad guidelines governing the constitution and functioning of 
advisory boards by local authorities. It was incumbent upon the local authorities to defme the 
modalities for constituting advisory boards within the broad parameter set by the 1923 Urban 
Areas Act and its subsequent amendments. 76 
Further reforms to the advisory board system envisaged during the 1940s were rejected as 
being contrary to the precepts of 'Stallardism'. For instance, the suggestion that local 
authorities implement a system of direct municipal representation for urban Africans was 
ignored. 77 Davenport holds that after the 1946 miners' strike and the adjournment sine die of 
the Natives Representative Council in the same year, the Government contemplated 
democratising the advisory board system so as to make it more representative without making 
it more powerful. 78 A scheme for reconstituting the advisory boards drawn up by the 
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Johannesburg Joint Council, 79 probably influenced the thinking of the then Secretary for 
I 
Native Affairs, D.L. Smit. Evidence in Smit's private papers reveal a far-reaching proposal 
for the conferment of self-government upon urban Africans by linking all local advisory boards 
to an Advisory Boards Congress and granting them representation in the NRC which would 
exercise executive and administrative authority in respect of African locations and 
townships. 80 The Native Laws (Fagan) Commission also recommended the upgrading of 
advisory boards into urban councils or some other form of self-government. 81 However, 
nearly all the municipalities that submitted evidence to the Commission expressed opposition 
to extending decision-making powers to advisory boards, 82 and the new Nationalist 
Government was not compelled to jettison established practices. 
The reform of the Advisory Board system was proposed against the background of the 
radicalisation of urban African politics. Many of the features of this 'new radicalism' described 
by Cobley were common to New Brighton and other communities throughout the country. The 
rising cost of food, housing and transport; as well as inadequate services and amenities caused 
overcrowding, increasing crime and violence. Subtle variations in class position within the 
community afforded scant protection against the ravages of socio-economic distress. Certain 
members of the petty bourgeoisie continued to co-operate with the authorities and put their 
faith in institutions like the advisory board, but others had moved by the mid-1940s towards 
a new readiness to support, though not necessarily to lead, direct action. Yet, the often 
ambivalent attitude of some advisory board members demonstrated that this radicalisation 
remained patchy and partial. In these circumstances, the petty bourgeoisie, found themselves 
challenged by a new generation of populist radical leaders who sought to capture the advisory 
board as a means of establishing a platform in community politics and exerting pressure on 
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In late 1943 the CNETU nominated four officials- Isaac Mfuku, Phineas Sandia, B. Ncapayi, 
and A.O. Malakane - as its candidates for the forthcoming NAB elections. The CNETU 
secretary, Councillor Mohammed Desai, 84 who was a member of the CPSA and the Indian 
Congress, became their campaign manager. 85 Their programme included demands for 
ownership of location houses after an unbroken occupation for a certain period, the erection 
of further houses on a leasehold basis, as well as better sports and recreation facilities. Also 
on their agenda was a demand for the abolition of the NAB and for New Brighton to become 
a separate ward within the PEM and residents to be giVen "the same rights and privileges as 
those in other townships in the city". 86 Demands for direct municipal representation for New 
Brighton residents was not without precedent, but it assumed a new urgency as the PECC had 
deprived many Africans of the municipal franchise through the loss of property rights in 
Korsten. 
At a well attended election meeting on 15 November 1943, the trade union candidates were 
reportedly accorded a unanimous vote of confidence by those in attendance. Desai, with his 
usual rhetorical flourish, warned the people not to heed "the filthy anti-Communist and 
anti-Christ propaganda", 87 which he apparently believed to be the work of local capitalists 
aiming to discredit the CNETU candidates. The actual opponents were the sitting members of 
the NAB who contested the election on a single ticket and had unsuccessfully objected to 
Desai's 'interference' in the election. 88 All but one of the CNETU candidates (who was 
disqualified) were returned by a large majority. Sandia claimed that the outcome of 
This election clearly indicates the growing class consciousness of the Port Elizabeth 
workers .... The election was fought on a clear programme and working-class principles. 
I may add that this election is a moral victory for the [emphasis in the original] 
working-class organisation, the Communist Party .... 89 
It is unlikely that the CNETU canvassed residents on shopfloor issues and was undoubtedly 
premature to speak of shared worker consciousness. Nor is it exactly clear what part the CPSA 
played in the victory, but there was considerable overlapping of membership and a working 
alliance between the two organisations. However, it was the first occasion on which the 
84 Desai won re-election in the 1944 Council elections and served until1947. For details 
of his rather chequered career as a union organiser, see Cherry, 'The Making of an 
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CNETU's capacity to mobilise residents was put to the test. It is difficult to assess their level 
of popular support in an election where figures of voters are not available. But if the number 
of voters registered in New Brighton for Native Representative elections is anything to go by, 
the poll was large and the trade unionists won convincingly. 
Early in 1944, Desai caused a rumpus in a City Council meeting when he claimed that 
prominent Councillors were responsible for disseminating 'anti-worker propaganda and 
sabotage' in New Brighton. He predicted that if the Council continued colluding with 
employers against workers, there was every likelihood that violence and bloodshed such as had 
occurred recently at Marabarastad would follow. 90 The Councillors responded with counter 
charges that communist 'agitators' were responsible for any disaffection. McNamee 
categorically denied Desai's charges but added that NAB members had "expressed concern at 
the possible introduction of communism into New Brighton" .91 The NAB declared Desai's 
assertion to be totally unfounded.92 And an editorial in the Eastern Province Herald 
denounced the "extravagant but empty promises held out to the Native residents by an active 
band of agitators working under the aegis of the Communist Party". 93 Spokesmen for the 
CNETU denied that their candidates for the NAB elections had been controlled or financed by 
the CPSA or that previous elections had been apolitical. 94 
The fears that the authorities harboured about the ramifications of the politicisation of the NAB 
soon appeared to to have been justified. The NAB lent its support to the 1944 anti-pass 
campaign even though Port Elizabeth's African population was not subject to any form of 
influx control. But the endorsement was only given after taking precautions to ensure that the 
NAB was not seen to be associated with communism. When communications from the PE 
District branch of the CPSA called upon the NAB to identify with Africans elsewhere and lend 
its support to the anti-pass campaign, it hesitated before doing so. The majority of Board 
members wished to ignore the request,· but Sandia who had himself been elected on the 
CNETU/CPSA ticket argued that it was the issue rather than the source of the communication 
which mattered.95 Only when the NAB had received similar requests for support from various 
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other organisations, were they prepared to give their unqualified support to the anti-pass 
movement.96 The nominated members of the Board - consisting of Pendla, Limba, Nilciwe and 
Molefe - were clearly struggling to come to terms with the changes in the tempo and character 
of both community and national politics. 
The Advisory Board and Community Struggles: Resistance to the 1945 Rent Increase 
The PECC's decision to implement rent increases in New Brighton in 1945 without consulting 
the NAB highlighted its dilemma with regard to the question of participation in and 
identification with community struggles. At a mass meeting on 14 January 1945 held under 
the auspices of the ANC, residents passed a resolution deploring the PECC's decision to 
increase rents and called, instead, for the reduction thereof by 6d. in all sub-economic 
townships in Port Elizabeth. 97 A call for a demonstration to protest against the rent increases 
was supported by all political and labour organisations. The NAB could not afford to be seen 
' 
to be acting against the community's wishes, but it was equally wary of ruling out further 
consultation with the PECC on the matter. In the ensuing debate about the best course of 
action to be taken by Board members, Rev Molefe stated: 
... the demonstration was the voice of the people, not of the Board. This movement was 
not started by the Board, although that particular body sympathised with the people in 
making this form of protest... The masses therefore should carry on and this Board 
should await the City Council's reply. 
It would appear that Molefe thought that the Board should take a backseat rather than try 
hijack this expression of the popular will. Jabavu expressed the opinion that the NAB should 
participate in the demonstration as representatives of the people. But Molefe's motion that 
members of the NAB should participate in their private capacities as a protest against the 
increase of rents was carried. 98 The attitudes of Board members towards the demonstration 
reflected an ambivalent perception of their standing vis-a-vis the community. Nominated 
members would appear to have seen themselves merely as a channel for representing legitimate 
grievances to the authorities, whilst elected members saw themselves as being at the forefront 
of popular protest. This suggests that their identification with the community in subsistence 
struggles infused the Board with greater legitimacy. 
On 27 January, a public demonstration organised by the ANC and CNETU was staged against 
96 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/18, Minutes of the NBAB, 27 Apr. 1944. 
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the rent increases. A large crowd marched from New Brighton to the Feathermarket Hall, from 
where it was diverted to the Donkin Reserve, and a resolution was passed which condemned 
the proposed rent increases as "a retrogressive step and a black blot on the liberality of Port 
Elizabeth". Aside from questioning the way in which the supposed loss on McNamee Village 
was calculated,- it argued that this could be remedied by wage rather than rent increases.99 An 
editorial in the EP Herald dubbed the demonstration a 'misconceived occasion' used by 
'agitators' to further political ends. It argued that the average African worker had received 
increased wages in recent years and was much better off than when he "lived in Korsten and 
paid extortionate rent for noisome hovels and worse". 'IX? The march was also denounced by 
Cllr Adolf Schauder who sounded a refrain that was to be heard often: 
the cause of Native progress had been set back ten years by the procession ... and 
caused resentment amongst many friends of the Native people who have worked for 
years to make Port Elizabeth a model of liberalism in the Union. 
Having insisted on. the rent increases himself, Schauder felt compelled to defend them with the 
argument that New Brighton would still have the cheapest rates in the country relative to the 
amenities provided. 101 
Under threat of a rent boycott, the proposed rents increased were postponed. However, the 
PECC resolved that the tenants of houses under council schemes would, as from 1 September 
1945, pay rents on a weekly instead of a monthly basis. As had been the case when a similar 
abortive experiment had been made in the early 1930s, it was held that this would facilitate 
the payment of rents by workers who were paid on a weekly basis. 102 A deputation submitted 
a memoran<Jum to the Mayor on behalf of New Brighton residents. It was argued that the 
percentage of Africans who were paid monthly should not be underestimated; that in cases 
where families had more than one income that money was set aside and pooled in order to pay 
rents at the end of the month; that it was customary for family budgets to be done on a 
monthly basis; and that weekly rentals actually were a subterfuge for increasing rents. The 
introduction of the principle of weekly rent payments had two added implications: it would 
disqualify certain Africans from the municipal franchise and eligibility to vote at NAB 
99 CeA, NTS 6371 197/313, ANC and CNETU Resolution attached to letter from P.M. 
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elections; as well as increasing rents on account of the four extra weekly payments per 
annum. 103 
Once again, the measure was introduced without prior consultation with residents or their 
representatives. The NAC's unwillingness to accede to the NAB's request for an interview 
caused a souring of relations between the two bodies: Even nominated Doard members 
expressed strong objections to the fact that the Council had ignored the NAB when it had not 
been prepared to rubber stamp its decisions. The usually circumspect Rev Molefe complained 
that there was no co-operation and if the NAB was to serve as an effective link between the 
people and the Council, it would have to be appraised of Council's intentions before the latter 
passed final and binding resolutions. Jabavu remarked that the Council was showing a 
dictatorial attitude and making high-handed decisions. 104 The PECC's intransigence added 
to the problems of the moderate Board members who were already hard pressed to justify 
making further representations to the local authority knowing that the outcome was a foregone 
conclusion. 
With little prospect of the PECC backing down on weekly rentals, labour and political 
organisations requested the intervention of outside parties. The Executive Committee of the 
SAR&H Non-European Staff Association approached the local System Manager to put its case 
to the PECC, 105 and the ANC urged the Minister of Native Affairs to veto the proposal. 106 
A resolution passed at a mass meeting of New Brighton residents held on 26 August criticised 
the PECC's lack of consultation on the matter and reiterated many of the aforementioned 
deputation's objections. 107 This was followed by mass meetings held under the auspices of 
the newly-formed Committee for the Restoration of the Franchise which condemned the change 
from monthly to weekly rentals as "an attempt by the Council to increase rents and to deprive 
the Africans in New Brighton of their civic vote". 108 
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The implementation of the system of weekly rentals could not be enforced until both the 
Minister of Native Affairs and the Provincial Administrator had approved amendments to 
existing regulations which stipulated tariff structures. Upon being advised by the SNA against 
taking 'precipitate action' and upbraided for not having referred the proposal to introduce 
weekly rentals to the NAB, the PECC passed a resolution that rentals would be calculated in 
such a way that the aggregate of weekly payments would be no more than that payable on a 
monthly basis. 109 When a meeting between the NAC and NAB was finally held, Board 
members remarked that arrear rentals under the monthly system had been negligible and that 
weekly payments were likely to cause hardships. The Chairman assured the Board that it had 
not been the intention of introducing weekly rentals to deprive anyone of the franchise, but that 
financial considerations alone had played a part in the decision. The NAC, however, declined 
to depart from its previous decision and suspend weekly payments. 110 I have found no 
evidence to show that a threatened general strike in protest against the PECC's arbitrary 
handling of the rent issue ever occurred, but the episode illustrates the NAB's increasing 
involvement in community politics. 
The radicalisation of community politics, 1946-1953 and the Advisozy Board's Crisis of 
Leeitimacy 
CNETU candidates were elected en bloc in the elections for the NAB in the 1946 and 1947. 
In the 1946 election they defeated candidates of the Civic Association."' But the following 
year the CPSA nominated its own candidates, and the sitting CNETU Board members refused 
to share the platform with them. 112 There appears to have been no other candidates, so the 
communists_ did not exactly split the left-wing vote. Yet some prominent members of CNETU 
actively supported the Communist candidates, thereby straining relations between the two 
organisations. But if the working class alliance in New Brighton appeared to be in disarray, 
a resurgent ANC was set to become a major contender in future NAB elections. 
The New Brighton ANC branch had gone from bad to worse in the early 1940s under the 
leadership of the 'old guard'. At the beginning of the decade, Molefe had reported to ANC 
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110 CA, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/19, Minutes of meeting between NAC and NBAB, 25 Sept. and 
Minutes of NBAB, 27 Sept. 1945. 
111 The Guardian, 6 Dec. 1945 ('Progressives Score Victory'). 
112 The Guardian, 14 Nov. 1946 ('Advisory Board Elections at PE'). 
202 
President-General, Dr A.B. Xuma, that Congress was "absolutely dead except in name" .113 
When Pendla and other executive members of the Cape African Congress were suspended in 
1942, the provincial headquarters were moved to Cradock under Rev James Calata. Nikiwe 
and Molefe continued to serve on the executive of the local branch of the ANC but were 
slowly alienated by the uncompromising militancy of the Youth League (CYL) at the local and 
national level, and the ousting of Xuma as President-General. Molefe finally resigned from the 
ANC because of his unwillingness to endorse the principles of the Programme of Action. 
Instead, he endeavoured to promote racial reconciliation through the offices of the SA Institute 
of Race Relations and the Moral Re-Armament movement. They also both served on the 
executive of the PE Joint Council, with Molefe acting as President during the latter years of 
the War. It has been suggested that the collapse of the PE Joint Council immediately after the 
War "seems to have been tied up in part with the radicalization of local politics in New 
Brighton" and the waning influence of long-standing Advisory Board members. 114 Both 
Nikiwe and Molefe continued to serve as nominated members of the NAB, except that the 
former declined nomination for three consecutive years from 1947. By the end of the decade 
they had been completely marginalised. 
Instead of the appearance of new petty bourgeois leaders, the ANC 'old guard' was supplanted 
by trade unionists with working class backgrounds. 115 An exception was, A.P. Mati, a former 
trading partner of Pendla who turned his talents to union organisation. He retained a position 
on the ANC executive committee and, along with Raymond Mhlaba, won election to the NAB 
in the early 1950s on an ANC/CPSA ticket. 116 Mhlaba himself had progressed from being 
an organiser of the Laundry Workers Union to become secretary of the local branch of the 
CPSA and ANC chairman in 1947. 117 The activist, Gladstone Tshume, who was also a 
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member of the CPSA, the CNETU and the ANC, unsuccessfully contested the 1948 NAB 
elections. 118 Lodge observes that "by 1950 politics was in the hands of working-cJass leaders 
to a degree which clearly distinguished Port Elizabeth from any other centre. "119 Under its 
new leadership, local ANC branches were not only rejuvenated but became more attuned to 
national political currents. 
In 1947 the ANC Working Committee had forwarded a resolution proposed by the Africanists 
which recommended to the annual conference that all elections under the Native Representative 
Act, including advisory boards, be contested on a boycott ticket. 120 However, the moderates 
Jed by Xuma with the support of the communists, repudiated this strategy in favour of one 
with a greater degree of flexibility. 121 The whole question was reviewed at the 1949 national 
conference when the Programme of Action was on the agenda. A memorandum argued that 
the boycotting of 'dummy' institutions should remain a strategy and not be elevated to a 
r 
principle. It argued that: ! 
... It is essential to realise that mere membership or participation in the political, social, 
cultural and other institutions established by the oppressor does not necessarily imply 
collaboration with the oppressor. CoJJaboration must depend on the nature and function 
of the institution and also the activities of members within the institution. It is possible 
under certain conditions to use the institutions of the oppressor as an auxiliary force for 
the downfall of the ruling class. 122 
Nonetheless, the newly-elected President-General of the ANC, Dr J.S. Moroka, pledged the 
organisation to a policy of non-collaboration with the Government and the boycott of advisory 
boards, the NRC and indirect parliamentary representation. 123 But local ANC branches were 
still not completely bound by this decision or chose to ignore it. 124 
In the case of New Brighton, Mhlaba and a number of ANC coJJeagues had won seats on the 
NAB in the 1949 elections. It would appear from Mbeki's account that this was in line with 
:1 strategy of supporting the election of the branch chairman to the NAB with a mandate to 
raise general grievances at its meetings and provide regular report backs at open-air meetings 
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as to the progress made. 125 Within a few months, Mhlaba gave expression to popular 
disillusion when he stated that "the people are beginning to realise that the Advisory Board is 
useless because the Council is not prepared to act on the recommendations of the Board". 126 
But despite this frustration and the 1949 ANC Conference resolution, Mhlaba stood for and 
won re-election to the NAB the following two years. It was not until 1951 that he resigned 
from the NBAB. Mhlaba's letter of resignation cited, amongst other things, the fact that the 
NAB had no executive powers and that its recommendations were ignored and disregarded by 
the local authority as reasons for its powerlessness. He noted that "as long as Africans had no 
real legislative powers, their struggle would be an ex[tra]- parliamentary one" .1%7 
Participation in the affairs of the NAB had shown at first hand that there was nothing to be 
gained thereby. Mhlaba acknowledged having been influenced by the debate which the 
Programme of Action had precipitated about participation in 'dummy institutions'. He claimed 
to have been given no directive by the national executive of the ANC to resign, and his 
decision followed that of the local branch to boycott government institutions. 128 This position 
may have reflected the increasing influence of the CYL, of which Mhlaba was a member, ,on 
the decisions of the New Brighton ANC branch. 129 However, none of his colleagues in the 
ANC followed his lead in resigning from the NAB. 
Meanwhile, in 1951 the ANC opposed further rent increases in New Brighton. The 
organisation distributed circulars calling upon residents not to pay the increases and held a 
number of mass meetings to register protest against the PECC's 'unreasonable' and 
'unrealistic' decision. At one such meeting, it was unanimously resolved to mandate the ANC 
to make all representations and submissions on behalf of residents and to use all means to 
defeat the Counci!'s decision. 130 On another occasion, a group of a.few hundred women 
marched on the administration offices to demand an interview with the Mayor, J.C.K. ('Boef) 
Erasmus, with regard to the rent increases. 131 The Mayor subsequently paid a visit to New 
Brighton where he was met by a large group of women who protested against the proposed 
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rent increases. 132 Somewhat inconsistently, the PECC determined that C1lr Schauder should 
not accept an ANC invitation to address a public meeting on the rent issue and declared that 
it would recognise representations made only by the NAB. 133 As had been the case in both 
1945 and 1947, the NAB came out unequivocally against the proposed increases, as well as 
the way in which the PECC was attempting to foist them on residents without consultation. . 
Despite charges that both the NAB and ANC served narrow interest groups, there appears to 
have been considerable solidarity on the rent issue amongst New Brighton residents. 
During the crisis precipitated by the New Brighton riots of 18 October 1952 [described in the 
next Chapter], neither the PECC nor the Ministers of Justice and Native Affairs, who made 
fleeting visits to Port Elizabeth, deigned to meet the NAB. Consequently, all eight elected 
members as well as one nominated member, tendered their resignations from the NAB. They 
expressed their indignation and dissatisfaction with the failure of both the PECC and 
/ 
Government to consult them and added that t 
It is ... our considered opinion that it would be dangerously treacherous to continue to 
serve on a segregatory institution in which the African people throughout the Union 
have ceased to repose any confidence ... [and] . . . that served as the last vestige of · 
collaboration with Authorities that be. 134 
The resignation of the majority of NAB members stemmed from the realisation of its 
powerlessness to tackle the problems confronting the local community in light of the denial of 
representation in the body politic. 
Nikiwe and Molefe were two of the nominated NAB members who did not resign. With a 
number of other moderate community leaders, they made their own representations to the 
PECC. They argued that the dismissed workers had faced two alternatives: either the loss of 
work or the loss of life and limb; and precisely because they had been intimidated, they should 
be reinstated. They stated that such an act would reduce the tension between the ANC on the 
one hand, and the PECC and commerce and industry, on the other. But despite the plea that 
such an act "would restore the spirit of goodwill that has existed for the last thirty years" ,m 
their faith in the PECC proved to be misplaced. 
132 EPH 3 Nov. 1951. 
133 Evening Post 26 Oct. 1951. 
134 lAD, 25/104 No. 4, Minutes of the NBAB, 28 Oct. 1952; EPH 30 Oct. and Advance, 
6 Nov. 1952. 
135 lAD, 25/169 No. 7, Minutes .of Council-in-Committee, 13 Nov. 1952. 
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New Brighton residents consequently decided to boycott the forthcoming NAB elections and 
resolved that "in the future [the African National] Congress is going to be the only mouthpiece 
of the people". A Field Officer employed by the SAIRR considered it "quite conceivable that 
this decision [would] be carried out in view of the solidarity of the people" .136 In the event, 
his prognostication proved incorrect for the NAB was reconstituted and it proved difficult for 
the ANC to sustain the momentum of the Defiance Campaign and membership levels after the 
riots. Although the NAB weathered the crisis and continued to function, it did so without the 
slightest vestige of popular legitimacy. 
Conclusion 
Although the NAB had constantly to face the question of its credibility in the New Brighton 
community, its greatest crises coincided with upheavals in the wider body politic. The low 
levels of participation during the disturbances of the early 1920s foreshadowed the deeper crisis 
of 1952. Between these flashpoints there was a gradual increase in the political temperature. 
Although the 1930s proved to be relatively quiescent with the authorities able to co-opt the 
most influential community figures, the subsequent politicisation of the advisory board turned 
it into a potential ally of civic, political and labour organisations. The challenge posed to the 
local authority by the board was obviously limited in that it had no real power to act. Yet, as 
Posel has pointed out, protests by advisory boards 
underlined the breadth and intensity of African dissent. The very bodies created by the 
state for the purposes of co-opting support from moderate Africans were joining the 
throngs of the disaffected. 137 
The paradox of advisory board politics was thus twofold: these statutory bodies were being 
used to subvert local authorities at precisely the time when their legitimacy was increasingly 
being called into question, and the political training acquired by Board members contributed 
in some measure to making New Brighton a stronghold of the increasingly radicalised ANC. 
This issue will be explored further with reference to the 1952 Defiance Campaign and the New 
Brighton riots in the next chapter. 
136 University of the Witwatersrand, Rheinallt Jones Papers, AD 843/RJ Aa 12.20.2, RR. 
182/52 Report of Field Officer, W.B. Ngakane, re PE Riots and Events that Followed, 
24 Nov. 1952, para. 11. 
137 Posel, Making of Apanheid, p. 38. 
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The New Brighton riots occurred whilst the Defiance Campaign was running its course in Port 
Elizabeth. One argument about the causes of the riots lays stress on understanding the political 
climate in which they occurred. It was held that the acts of defiance had unleashed pent up 
forces which the ANC was unable to control; that the ANC's mobilisation of township 
residents was accompanied by a lack of discipline in the organisation's ranks. Another view 
is that an increase of serious crime in New Brighton created a climate conducive to the 
breakdown of law and order and so contributed to the violence of that day; that the criminal 
element did not cause the riots but took advantage of the situation. The killing of whites by 
Africans were motivated by revenge rather than political gain. Both these viewpoints will be 
considered as we attempt to unravel the relationship between the Defiance Campaign and the 
outbreak of violence on 18 October 1952. 
The first section of this Chapter will subject the perception that New Brighton was a law-
abiding community and that crime was scarcely a problem to closer scrutiny. It is my argument 
that a major contributory factor to the riots was the growth of a subculture of violence amongst 
the marginalised sections of the New Brighton community, especially the youth. The 
increasingly youthful character of New Brighton's population and inadequate provision for 
education combined to push a growing number of juveniles onto the streets. They rejected the 
norms and values of society, as well as any notion of communal solidarity. A profile of those 
implicated in the riots will show that many had probably already been drawn into subliminal 
or criminal activities. At the risk of overstatement, it will be suggested that New Brighton's 
youth was little different from most other townships where tsotism had become a major social 
problem by the 1940s. 
Some recent historical work on gangs and tsotism in urban African society has been informed 
by subcultural theory. 1 This paradigm is concerned to explain why and how marginal groups 
A number of papers presented at the 1990 Wits History Workshop show evidence of 
the influence of subcultural theory. These include: A. Mager and G. Minkley, 'Reaping 
the Whirlwind: the East London Riots of 1952' in P. Bonner, et al (eds.), Apartheid's 
Genesis (Johannesburg, 1993), pp. 229-251. Other papers by Dugmore, Glaser and 
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appropriate the products of capitalist society and create their own subversive lifestyles. In the 
case of youth subcultures, the assumed primacy of age as a social relation is replaced by 
analyses of the intersection of age and gender with class, without giving specific weighting to 
any one set of social relations. This is more nuanced than the notion of 'youth culture' which 
suggests a non-existent homogeneity amongst youth. Notwithstanding the assertion to be found 
in much of the literature on the so-called 'lost generation' of the country's Jlack youth, I do 
not regard youth to be primarily a political construct. 2 It is a social category which can be 
fashioned for political purposes but has broader application. 
The second section of this chapter will seek to understand whether there was any connection 
between the Defiance Campaign and the riots. My account of the course of the campaign is 
necessarily selective and partial. The next section on the public reaction to the riots will enable 
us to examine the causes thereof. This will be followed by an evaluation of the consequences 
of both the Defiance Campaign and the New Brighton riots for Port Elizabeth's history. 
The Increase of Crime and Subculture of Violence in New Brighton 
The perception that New Brighton was a law-abiding community persisted until the riots of 
1952.3 Margeret Ballinger claimed that "Port Elizabeth has the most law-abiding community 
in its New Brighton township of any community in the country" .4 The absence of pass laws 
in Port Elizabeth, regarded as a contributory factor in the criminalisation of Africans in other 
centres, undoubtedly meant that fewer New Brighton residents were forced to spend spells 
behind bars: Similarly, it was believed that provision for domestic beer brewing meant that 
residents of New Brighton need not break the law in order to observe their traditional social 
drinking habits. Yet, a considerable number would have been sent to jail for contravention of 
Location regulations, especially for brewing excessive quantities of beer, as well as the failure 
to pay rents or poll-tax. 
During the 1920s, there was incidents in New Brighton of tsotsi-type activities and 'faction 
Jeffrey were published in African Studies, 51, 1 (1992). 
2 J. Seekings, Heroes or Villains? Youth Politics in the 1980s (Johannesburg, 1993), p. 
xi. 
3 South Africa Outlook 1 Dec. 1947, p. 188 ('PE and its African Population'). 
4 EPH 6 Feb. 1948 ('Mrs Ballinger on Native Housing'). 
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fights'. 5 On one such occasion in 1922, there was purportedly a fight between 'red' and 
'school' youths. 6 Yet overall crime rates were still relatively low, as the figures for a limited 
period show. 
TABLE 9.1 
New Brighton Crime Statistics, 1928-1934' 
Prosecutions for 1928 1929 1930 1931 1.2J2 1933 
Possession of liquor 55 58 27 22 18 5 
Possession of dagga 12 20 12 10 7 7 
Drunkenness 58 41 44 41 30 20 
Riotous behaviour 110 66 35 41 27 32 
Public violence 1 1 1 
Resisting Arrest 11 7 10 9 
Assault (common) 68 38 40 72 43 48 
Assault to harm 24 28 13 17 26 22 
Rape 2 5 2 3 1 
Other major crimes 23 10 13 12 10 5 
Totals 364 273 197 228 161 140 
POPULATION 7 394 7 147 7 327 1...Qll 6....521 6..J.ill. 
Prosecutions for all crimes were always less than 50 per 1 000 persons during the entire five-
year period; and were as low as 21 per 1 000 in 1933. There was not a single prosecution for 
murder in this period. Although a good percentage of crimes possibly went unreported, it is 
safe to say that crime statistics in New Brighton were relatively low. 
When the Korsten removals were under way in 1939, the Superintendent warned that some - -
criminals with particularly bad records were amongst those moved to New Brighton. 8 
McNamee's prognosis that crime levels in the Location would rise were to be borne out. From 
5 M. de Jongh, 'Interaction and Transaction: A Study of Conciliar Behaviour in a South 
African Township' (Ph.D. Thesis, Rhodes University, 1979), pp. 111, 112, 116. 
6 Imvo 16 May 1922. 
7 CA, 3/PEZ 111557, Report of Loc. Supt. to NAC, 27 July 1934. I have extracted 
population figures from the Annual Reports of the Location Superintendent in the 
Mayor's Minutes for the respective years. Cf. Saffery, 'Liquor Problem', p. 94. 
8 CAD, 3/PEZ 111283, Report of Supt. NBL, 14 Jan. 1939. 
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the 1940s complaints about tsotsis became fairly frequent in Advisory Board meetings and 
concerns were expressed by the NAC about the increasing levels of violence. Following a 
stabbing incident in 1943, the Location Superintendent maintained that a large number of boys 
over the age of 18 years who refused to work were the chief problem: 
They are the principal seducers of young Native girls. They corrupt the morals of 
school girls and boys, and are often the leaders of gangs of young hooligans.9 
The Superintendent proposed to enforce a regulation that stipulated that the adult sons of 
registered occupiers of houses be obliged to take out lodger permits. This was viewed as a 
preventative measure to combat crime. By making them pay for their accommodation, it was 
reckoned that these 'wont-works' might be pressurised to secure employment. It would appear 
that gang members were unemployed youths who fllled up their time with criminal activities, 
as well as schoolgoers who welcomed the diversions that organised crime offered them during 
their leisure hours. It should be emphasised though that this was never a large group, although 
its ranks swelled from the late 1940s. 
Such gangs operated mostly under cover of darkness and made much of the .Location unsafe 
by night. Street lights in the Red Location which had fused during the Second World War 
were not repaired for many years. 10 It would appear to be no coincidence that it was during 
the War years when a blackout was being enforced that the number of reports of violent crimes 
increased measurably. And statistics demonstrate an even greater increase in violence in the 
post-War period. Prosecutions for assault, for instance, increased from 222 in 1945 to 596 in 
1949, or 7,49 to 16,6 per 1 000. The rate of assaults wavered for a few years thereafter but 
in 1953 numbered 840 or 18,4 per 1 000. Every year from 1949, without fail, the 
Superintendent remarked on the rise in juvenile delinquency in the Location." Although I 
9 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1896, Minutes of NBAB, lO May and Report of Supt. NBL to NAC, 
20 May 1943 (The quote is from the latter). 
lO Imvo 29 May 1948, p. 1 ('Housing Shortage at P.E.'). 
11 Mayor's Minutes for 1949, 1950 and 1952. See Reports of the Manager of Native 
Affairs, for these respective years. 
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have been unable to ascertain the incidence of other serious crimes in New Brighton during 
this period, there are indications that the Location was far from being the exceptionally law-
abiding community that its stau?chest apologists claimed. 
Residents requested that more meaningful measures be taken to combat hooliganism in New 
Brighton. At a public meeting in 1944 fears were expressed that the leniency of sentences 
imposed on perpetrators of serious crimes such as assault, homicide and murder did not serve 
as a deterrent. The Advisory Board was to request the permission of the Magistrate for the 
community to: 
(a) form committees in the various wards of the Location; 
(b) create a civilian guard, members of which should be vested witJI powers 
of special constables. 12 r 
When these proposals came to nothing and recourse to the law appeared to be to no avail in 
stamping out hooliganism, older Location residents resorted to vigilantism. In an incident in 
September 1947, one person was shot dead and five others injured when a group of senior 
residents clashed with abakwetha (manhood initiates) who had apparently molested and thrown 
stones at some washerwomen returning home. 13 At the subsequent trial of 49 persons on 
charges of public violence, the Chairman of the Vigilance Committee testified that a decision 
had been taken that parents should punish their own children for unruly behaviour. The 
incident had been the culmination of a series of fights between the older inhabitants and groups 
of youths who had been terrorising the Location. On this occasion, tpe intervention of the 
police had caused an escalation of the conflict. 14 On other occasions, the police were roundly 
criticised for being conspicuously absent when they were most needed. Not all New Brighton 
residents agreed that vigilante action was the best way to deal with the twin problems of 
delinquency and criminality. But it seems clear that a breakdown in traditional authority was 
accompanied by an increasing disregard for what was seen as the white man's law by many 
New Brighton youths. The law lost its social sanction and certain types of crime came to be 
regarded as morally neutral. 
12 CAD, 3/PEZ 113/2/15/18, Report of the Supt. NBL, 15 April 1944. 
13 EPH 2 Oct. 1947 ('Disturbance at New Brighton'). · 
14 EPH 24 Oct. 1947 ('NB Disturbance'). 
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Although there were a number of white officials and traders with families resident in New 
Brighton until the 1950s, the criminal elements invariably targeted other Africans, especially 
the elderly, who were more vulnerable to attack. A well known resident of the Red Location, 
Jimmy Pemba, recounted having been attacked and robbed twice. He held that 'decent' 
Africans (such as policemen on night duty, ministers, teachers, nurses, etc.) who qualified 
should be permitted to own guns for self-protection against gun or knife-wielding criminals and 
thugs." But only Whites were entitled to firearms. A white trader who assumed control of 
the family business (a butcher and general dealer) in New Brighton in 1939 recounted that at 
the time the Location was 'peaceful'. He and his wife could walk the streets without any 
reason to fear being attacked or molested. He decided to move to town in 1945 and purchase 
property in a white suburb, partly on account of his increasing concern for the safety of his 
family. Thereafter, he commuted by motor car into New Brighton on a daily basis and also 
took to carrying a firearm as a precaution. He never had cause to use it and was one of the 
few white traders to remain in New Brighton after the 1952 riots. 16 
The nature of much of the criminal activity described above reveals significant generational 
cleavages in New Brighton. But the locus of much of the delinquent and criminal activities is 
equally significant. The aforementioned stone throwing incident, for example, occurred in the 
vicinity of the SMQ in the Red Location. In this, the oldest part of New Brighton, rooms and 
even floor space was rented out to lodgers. Not only was there acute overcrowding, but people 
slept between dwellings in the open air. It was also the only part of the Location where beer 
drinking was allowed. Despite the Administration's efforts to exert strict control of brewing, 
there was no way to put a stop to the operation of shebeens nor to prostitution. There are no 
figures which allow us to make a comparison of statistics for drunkenness and criminal 
activities in the various parts of New Brighton. But the Red Location, with its deplorable and 
overcrowded living conditions, was no better than the slums which the PECC had sought to 
eliminate in Korsten. Amidst this widespread immiseration, the Red Location appears to have 
become a haven for the criminal and delinquent elements amongst New Brighton's youth. 
These tsotsis were maladjusted juveniles, brought up for the most part by unmarried mothers 
who often eked out an existence through beer brewing or prostitution. The grinding poverty 
led to schooling in lives of petty crime as the lack of facilities made their chances of education 
15 EPH 30 Oct. 1947 (Letter from Jimmy J. Pember). 
16 Interview with Joseph Henen, Mount Croix, PE, 27 April 1993. 
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and employment slim. Many graduated to gangs where they found outlets for their frustrations 
in smoking dagga or violence such as rape, murder and other serious crimes. As with East 
London, 17 the criminal element was inclined to align itself with township radicals and 
militants. They not only directed their anger against Whitt.::> and moderate Africans in the 
Location, but resorted to violence and intimidation against the ANC leadership in an effort to 
steer the organisation in the course of its choosing. 
The Defiance Campai~ in Port Elizabeth 
Public meetings were held all over the country on 6 April 1952 to unveil the defiance 
campaign. In Port Elizabeth, a large crowd endorsed the plan for groups of volunteers to court 
arrest by deliberately defying certain discriminatory and unjust laws. A special provincial 
conference of the ANC convened at New Brighton on 12 April agreed to push ahead with the 
campaign. The following day, a large crowd attended a public meeting in New Brighton 
chaired by Raymond Mhlaba, of the local ANC branch. Not only were the decisions of 
conference unanimously endorsed, but a large number of volunteers were enrolled for the 
defiance campaign. 18 
On 31 May the national executives of the ANC and SAIC met in Port Elizabeth to confirm the 
26 June, the second anniversary of the National Day of Protest, as the date for the launch of 
the defiance campaign. This decision was announced by the ANC President-General, Dr J.S. 
Moroka, at a mass meeting of nearly 3 000 held in New Brighton the following day. 
Attendance at the township meeting had been restricted to Africans because the PECC had 
invoked a seldom used regulation prohibiting other race groups from entering the township. 
Moroka led the people in taking a pledge to fight for freedom even if it brought suffering and 
death. The solemnity of the occasion was heightened by prayers which gave the meeting the 
appearance of a church meeting and not a political rally. 19 The PE African Ministers' 
Association, an affiliate of the Interdenominational Ministers' Association, declared its support 
for the campaign. 20 The support of the churches was, indeed, a remarkable feature of the 
campaign in Port Elizabeth. 
17 Mager and Minkley, 'Reaping the Whirlwind', p. 231. 
18 The Guardian 24 April 1952 ('Cape Africans Ready for Campaign'). 
19 Clarion 5 June 1952, p. 1 ('June 26 is D-Day') and p. 4 ('Plans for Resistance'); 
Benson, Struggle for a Birthright, p. 144. 
20 Kuper, Passive Resistance, p. 14 7. 
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On 25 June women spent the day and night in prayer in preparation for the launch of the 
campaign the following day. 21 It became a feature of the campaign that women met for prayers 
prior to their menfolk going into action, a practice in keeping with African custom. This is not 
to suggest that women played only a supportive role. On the contrary, a sample group of 
resisters in the Eastern Cape suggests that women made up as much as 42% of participants and 
that the ANC Womens' League was actively involved in the campaign in numerous ways.22 
Christian teachings arguably played an important role as a source of restraint in the conduct 
of volunteers for the defiance campaign. 23 In Port Elizabeth, as elsewhere, neither people with 
criminal records nor the unemployed were accepted as volunteers. 24 They were respected 
members of the community and were taught to adhere to a code of discipline in non-violent 
protest action. Dr J.L.Z. Njongwe, acting President of the Cape ANC (in the absence of Z.K. 
Matthews) and chief organiser of the campaign in the Eastern Cape also appealed to the public 
not to participate spontaneously or independently because the campaign should be carried out 
by organised and trained volunteers who would defy unjust laws and submit to arrest 
willingly. 2S The volunteers complied 'religiously' with the instructions of the ANC leadership 
to conduct themselves in an exemplary fashion and public co-operation proved to be equally 
forthcoming. 
Early on the morning of 26 June, Mhlaba led a batch of 30 volunteers through the 'Europeans 
Only' entrance of the New Brighton railway station. They were duly arrested, refused bail and 
remanded in custody. Further defiers followed the example of the first group. During the first 
week of July, four groups totalling 85 resisters defied apartheid regulations and joined their 
comrades in· the new North End jail which was reportedly almost full. 26 Mhlaba was sentenced 
to 2 months hard labour or a fme of £10, with half the sentence suspended for 6 months. The 
remainder of the first group were sentenced to £6 or 30 days with half the sentence suspended. 
Fines were not paid and all the volunteers served their jail sentences. 27 
The trial of a group of 19 volunteers who had requested to be served at counters marked 
21 Benson, Struggle for a Binhright, p. 146. 
22 Carter, 'Defiance Campaign', pp. 78 and 89 #17. 
23 Carter, 'The Defiance Campaign', p. 83. 
24 EPH 15 July 1952. 
25 Roux, Time Longer than Rope, p. 387. 
26 Clarion 10 July 1952, pp. 1 and 8. 
27 Clarion 11 July 1952, p. 1 ('First Resisters Sentenced in PE'); Benson, Struggle for a 
Binhright, pp. 146-7. 
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'Europeans Only' at the North End Post Office on 5 July had a rather different and unexpected 
outcome. It turned out that they had simply defied practices which they and the police thought 
had the force of law. Because . there was nothing in the postal regulations which made 
segregation legally enforcable, they were tried in terms of the Post Office Act of 1911 which 
made it an offence to obstruct the course of Post Office business. As they had simply stood 
in queues to buy postage stamps, they were deemed to have committed no offence and 
acquitted. Similar charges against another 54 defiers were consequently withdrawn. 28 
There was a steady increase in :he number of defiers arrested in Port Elizabeth as the 
campaign got into its stride. The first month saw 389 arrests, the second 666, and the third 
738.29 Despite juveniles (under 21 years of age) being sentenced to corporal punishment and 
warnings by a local Magistrate that future offenders would receive heavier sentences, the 
number of volunteers showed no sign of abating. The first all-woman batch of 32 defiers, led 
by 'Nompie', pregnant wife of Dr Njongwe, were the first to receive the heavier sentences. 
They were sentenced to 40 days imprisonment with the option of a £8 fme, half suspended for 
six months, for using the 'Europeans Only' entrance of New Brighton railway station. 30 
Civil disobedience was combined with strike action in Port Elizabeth. Six strikes involving 850 
workers took place in a period of three weeks. 31 Volunteers returning to work after having 
served their prison sentences would be refused re-employment. Workers, encouraged by certain 
ANC activists, would then target such employers with strike action. They sought (in the words 
of Fine and Davis) "to tum the [defiance] campaign into a springboard for trade union and 
community organisation". 32 Dr Njongwe criticised those who wished to drag "side issues ... 
into the defiance of unjust laws campaign" . 33 This possibly suggests that Njongwe did not 
wish to allow local issues to distract from the objectives of a national campaign. These 
differences of strategy was one reason for the emergence of divisions within the ranks of the 
local ANC. 
28 The Clarion 24 July 1952 ('Post Office Apartheid Can't Be Enforced'); Roux, Time 
Longer than Rope, p. 388. 
29 Carter, 'Defiance Campaign', p. 97, Appendix III. 
30 The Clarion 31 July 1952 ('Mass Support for Defiance Campaign'). 
31 EPH 13 Aug. 1952 cited in Lodge, Black Politics, p. 45; Robinson, 'The Power of 
Apartheid', p.' 246. 
32 Fine and Davis, Beyond Apanheid, p. 125. 
33 EPH 14 Aug. 1952, cited in Lodge, Black politics, p. 54. 
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Carter provides a further clue as to the nature of these divisions when he mentions that three 
[unnamed] former members of the CPSA who held office in the ANC were involved in an 
ideological dispute with Njongwe. 34 The three were probably Mhlaba, Gladstone Tshume and 
Caleb Mayekiso [see Appendix C for biographical information]. Njongwe's right hand man 
was Robert Matji, the then ANC Provincial Secretary and the only full-time officer in the local 
ANC. 35 The credit given Njongwe and Matji for making Port Elizabeth a strong centre of the 
Defiance Campaign by some observers, has since been downplayed. 36 Lodge also sees the 
conflict between Njongwe and the left-wing leadership in Port Elizabeth in ideological terms, 
as "illustrative of the limitations of mainstream Congress radicalism". 37 This is, presumably, 
a reference to Njongwe's Youth League credentials. The local CYL had a very different 
character to its counterpart in the Transvaal where Njongwe had cut his political teeth. The 
latter had a reputation for being anti-communist. By contrast, the presence of communists in 
the former caused it to be known as the 'Red' Youth League. 38 Yet, Lodge holds that the 
communist influence was not necessarily divisive. He appears to have accepted at face value 
a statement by Z.K. Matthews that communist influence in the Eastern Cape during the 
Defiance Campaign was insignificant. 39 But Matthews, who was in the United States at the 
time, was kept informed of developments through the correspondence of his son, Joseph. 40 
The younger Matthews was himself national secretary of the CYL and would appear to have 
worked closely with Njongwe and Matji in organising the Defiance Campaign in the Eastern 
Cape. 
34 Cart~r, 'Defiance Campaign', p. 83 . 
35 I was informed that Robert Matji was believed to have left town and feigned illness to 
avoid having to lead the first group of New Brighton volunteers. Interview with George 
Pemba, Swartkops Valley, 31 July 1992. But my information suggests that he led the 
group of volunteers who attempted to defy apartheid at the North End Post Office [see 
above]. Thereafter, it is likely that he deliberately avoided arrest because he was a key 
organiser of the defiance campaign. 
36 J. Lewin, 'The Rise of African Nationalism' in Politics and Law in South Africa 
(London, 1968), p. 47; Gerhart & Karis, From Protest to Challenge, V. 4: Political 
Profiles, p. 117; Carter, 'Defiance Campaign', p. 84; Lodge, Black Politics, pp. 51-52, 
61. Interestingly, the glowing references in Mary Benson's African Patriots (London, 
1963) pp. 167-8, 178 and 206 to the part played by Njongwe and Matji in the Defiance 
Campaign were omitted in The Struggle for a Binhright. 
37 Lodge, Black politics, p. 61. 
38 T. Orie, 'Port Elizabeth in the 1940s-1950s: the Tripartite Alliance?', Paper presented 
to the Conference on 'Port Elizabeth's Place in South African History and 
Historiography', Vista University, Port Elizabeth, 1992, p. 9 
39 Cited in Karis, Protest to Challenge, V. 2, p. 420. 
40 Cory Library, MIC 407 Karis-Carter Microfilm (CAMP}, Reell2A, 2: XM 65: 47/3-
20, Correspondence from Joe to Z.K. Matthews, 29 July 1952 to 7 January 1953. 
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In order to blunt the defiance campaign, the state resorted to charging the ANC leadership with 
offences such as treason and sedition. Fifteen prominent figures in the Eastern Cape were 
charged in September under the Suppression of Communism Act, or alternatively with 
incitement to public violence in terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act. Of the 11 arraigned in 
Port Elizabeth, only Raymond Mhlaba and Gladstone Tshume had previously been members 
of the CPSA. Amongst the non-communists charged were Dr Njongwe, Robert Matji, Joe 
Matthews and Adam Mati; Dr V.K. Moodaley, Senior Vice-President of the Cape Indian 
Congress (PE); and the only woman, Florence Matomela. But charges under the Riotous 
Assemblies Act against these ANC leaders were dropped by the Magistrate who stated that he 
was not aware of a single instance of violence having marred the passive resistance campaign 
in the city. 41 The action of the state against the local ANC leadership did little to dampen the 
enthusiasm of Port Elizabeth's African community for the defiance campaign. 
Figures cited by Joe Matthews suggest that membership of the ANC in Port Elizabeth swelled 
enormously during the Defiance Campaign. He reckons that the membership of the New 
Brighton branch alone increased from 2 700 to 13 000 within the space of Jess than a month. 
It was not the only local branch which provided volunteer groups and showed significant 
growth during the Campaign. By early September, ANC membership in Korsten and 
Dassieskraal stood at 5 000 and 3 000, respectively. 42 But membership in itself is no 
guarantor of the success of the campaign. More likely than not, numbers were swelled by new 
recruits who paid one-off subscriptions than those who regularly paid monthly dues. It was the 
volunteers who comprised the core membership of the ANC, and many of them sacrificed their 
jobs and much else by serving prison sentences for defying the law. Yet much of the 
campaign's success rested on the visible support of t.'1e masses and their-identification with the 
goals of the Defiance Campaign. 
By the middle of October the number of arrests in Port Elizabeth was approaching the 2 000 
mark and exceeded the total for all the major centres outside the Eastern Cape. 43 All accounts 
41 People's World, 2, 9 and 16 Oct. 1952. 
42 Cory Library, MIC 407 CAMP, Reel 14A, 2:XM 65: 47/4 and 4717, J. to Z.K. 
Matthews, 5 Aug. and 3 Sept. 1952. 
43 T. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 (Johannesburg, 1983), p. 46 bases 
his figures on D. Carter, 'The Defiance Campaign - A Comparative Analysis of the 
Organization, Leadership and Participation in the Eastern Cape and the Transvaal', 
University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Collected Seminar Papers 
on the Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, V. 2 (1970-1), p. 
97, Appendix III. They differ slightly, but not significantly, from those of Kuper in 
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of the defiance campaign have noted its success in the city, but only as part of a regional 
phenomenon. 44 But the particular dynamics of politics in Port Elizabeth set it apart from other 
centres in the Eastern Cape, which must be explored. Lodge has pinpointed factors which 
made Port Elizabeth an easier environment for African political organisation than other centres. 
These include: the relatively relaxed administrative framework, especially the absence of influx 
control measures; the ethnic and linguistic homogeneity of the workforce; the existence of a 
large concentration of African industrial workers .and the strength of trade unionism; the 
leadership roles played by trade unionists and communists in the local ANC. He also identified 
reasons for high levels of dissatisfaction amongst Port Elizabeth's African population in 1952. 
These included: the fragility of the freedoms allowed by the paternalistic PE Municipality; the 
widespread and desperate poverty, especially of recent arrivals from the city's rural hinterland 
where conditions were fast deteriorating; under- and unemployment with few Africans finding 
employment in industry; and inadequate housing. 45 
With much of the above I have no argument. But it is necessary to qualify certain of Lodge's 
observations. For one thing, his characterisation of the local state in Port Elizabeth is not 
altogether accurate. Following Robinson, we have questioned the pedigree of Port Elizabeth's 
'liberalism'. Here it needs to be stressed that influx control and labour registration measures 
were not, in the first instance, aimed at curtailing political activities. Other statutes such as the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act and the Suppression of Communism Act existed for that 
purpose. Besides, there were other ways to control political activities in New Brighton. A 
regulation gave the Manager of Native Affairs the right to prohibit non-residents from 
entering, and thereby attending political meetings and rallies. This regulation had, on occasion, 
been used to forbid those deemed by the authorities to be 'agitators' from engaging in political 
activities in the township. 
Passive Resistance, p. 123 and B. Hirson, 'The Defiance Campaign, 1952: Social 
Struggle or Party Strategem?, Searchlight South Africa, 1, 1 (1988), pp. 70-102. 
44 R. Fine (with D. Davis), Beyond Apanheid: Labour and liberation in South Africa 
(Johannesburg, 1990), pp. 118-126. 
45 Lodge, Black politics, pp. 47, 50 and 'Political mobilisation during the 1950s: an East 
London case study' inS. Marks & S. Trapido (eds.), The Politics of Race, Class & 
Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa (London, 1987), p. 318. Cf. L. Kuper, 
Passive Resistance in South Africa (New Haven, 1957), p. 124.T. Karis, From Protest 
to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa 1882-1964, v. 
2: Hope and Challenge 1935-1952 (Stanford, 1973), pp. 418, 420 for similar lists of 
reasons as to why the Eastern Cape had a strong tradition of resistance. 
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The inference of a line of continuity between the nineteenth century wars of dispossession and 
the mass action of the 1950s - and which is to be found in much of the literature46 - is 
problematicaL A tradition is not simply something handed down from one generation to the 
next. It is reappropriated by each generation and vested with new meanings by different 
communities. Political consciousness is shaped more by personal and collective experience than 
the politics of memory. As Carter has remarked 
The extent and continuity of politicization from these [i.e. ANC, ICU, Vigilance 
Associations] and other sources should not be unduly stressed any more than the 
importance of these antecedents in acting as a catalyst to resistance in the Eastern Cape 
in 1952.47 
Triumphalist and telelogical models of resistance have little explanatory value because they 
suggest non-existent continuities of resistance. It is necessary to go beyond asking whether Port 
Elizabeth's militancy was exceptional and assuming that the response of other regions to the 
defiance campaign was normative. 
Hirson concedes that the close relationship between trade unions and the ANC was a crucial 
factor in the comparative success of the Defiance Campaign in Port Elizabeth - but not in other 
centres in the Eastern Cape. 48 There is a need to reassess the relationship between working-
class and national or community-based struggles. Even though working-class activists held 
office in the local ANC and the CPSA and undoubtedly played crucial roles as individuals in 
these organisations, organic working class leadership cannot be given all the credit for the 
interaction with trade unions. It is my opinion that Orie has overstated the strength of the 
alliance between CNETU, the ANC and the CPSA. 49 Communist and non-communist trade 
unionists had fallen out with one another over, amongst other things, the contesting of 
Advisory Board elections. In fact, the groundwork laid by the trade unions in the 1940s 
referred to by Lodge, appears to have been largely undone by the end of the decade. Cherry 
has confirmed that the membership of the CNETU and its affiliates in Port Elizabeth was 
46 A. Odendaal, 'African Political Mobilisation in the Eastern Cape, 1880-1910' (Ph.D. 
Thesis, Cambridge University, 1984). For examples in work related to Port Elizabeth, 
see A. Odendaal, 'Even White Boys Call Us "Boy"!: Early Organisation in Port 
Elizabeth, with particular reference to the African and American Working Men's Union 
in the 1890s', and Orie, 'The Tripartite Alliance?', Papers presented to the conference 
on 'Port Elizabeth's Place in South African History and Historiography', Vista 
University, Port Elizabeth, 1992. Many newspaper articles and other popular writings 
also make similar assumptions. 
4 7 Carter, 'Defiance Campaign', p. 77. 
48 Hirson, 'The Defiance Campaign', p. 97. 
49 Orie, 'The Tripartite Alliance', passim. 
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exaggerated and, more importantly, has questioned its organisational ability. Desai's corruption 
stood revealed and CNETU had effectively collapsed by 1947.5° Carter argues (correctly in 
my view) that the unions gained more from the ANC during 1952 through increased 
membership than the latter benefitted from trade union assistance in mobilising support for the 
campaign. 51 
We have seen in the previous Chapter that a rejuvenated ANC leadership in Port Elizabeth 
helped prepare the ground for the Defiance Campaign. A new generation of working class 
leaders eclipsed the 'old guard' leadership of the ANC in New Brighton in the late 1940s. 
Moderate community leaders - some of whom served as nominated members of the Advisory 
Board - had been increasingly marginalised. On the other hand, the experience gained by 
candidates who contested Advisory Board elections on party tickets or those who participated 
in the vigilance/civic association, provided some political training. The mobilisation of the 
community during the nationwide 1944 anti-pass campaign served as something of a 'dress 
rehearsal' for the Defiance Campaign. Even community struggles such as the 1949 bus 
boycott, and the 1945 and 1951 tent boycotts helped consolidate an ANC power base in New 
Brighton. The ANC leadership was able to rely on its record of co-operation with existing 
trade union and community organisations to bolster participation in the national campaign of 
protest against discriminatory and unjust laws. 
The defiance campaign suffered (in the words of Roux) its 'first major setback' with the New 
Brighton riots. 52 The well-disciplined passive resistance of the volunteers was overtaken by 
the fury of mob action. ANC leaders firmly declared their intention of continuing the 
campaign in a peaceful, disciplined and non-violent manner. To have done otherwise would 
have amounted to a tacit admission of complicity in the riots. It was stated that there would 
no deviation from the doctrine of passive resistance, although fears were expressed that further 
violence might erupt. 53 In fact, the dominant current in the ANC leadership responded to the 
violence of the masses and the police by withdrawing from both mass struggles and from 
further acts of defiance which might trigger violence. 54 The local campaign was virtually 
50 Imvo Zabantsundu 29 Nov. 1947 ('PE Trade Unions are Dorm::nt'); J. Cherry, 'The 
Making of an African Working Class: Port Elizabeth, 1925-1963' (M.A., University 
of Cape Town, 1992), p. 89. 
51 Carter, 'The Defiance Campaign', p. 89 #19. 
52 Roux, Time Longer than Rope, p. 391. 
53 Roux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 390-1. 
54 Fine & Davis, Beyond Apanheid, p. 122. 
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paralysed as a result. In the month following 18 October, only 93 individuals were arrested 
for acts of defiance in Port Elizabeth. 55 Although both Njongwe and Matthews spoke of 
extending the campaign to the rural areas, 56 this proved to be nothing more than rhetoric. If 
the success of the defiance campaign in Port Elizabeth was undermined by the outbreak of 
violence, further occurrences in Kimberley and East London on 8 and 9 November, 
respectively, delivered the coup de grace. 
The Course and Nature of the 1952 New Bri~hton Riots 
Leo Kuper's Passive Resistance in South Africa provides the most extensive account of the 
New Brighton riots. 57 The standard accounts of black politics have made little more than 
·passing reference to them. 58 More specialised works on Port Elizabeth's history have added 
little additional information, but they have contributed to our historical perspective on the 
riots. 59 An attempt will be made to reconstruct the events of 18 October 1952 from the above 
secondary accounts, newspaper reports, official and unofficial documentation, memoirs and 
oral testimony in a little more detail than has hitherto been the case.60 However, the available 
55 Evening Post 3 and 7 Nov. 1952; Carter, 'Defiance Campaign', p. 97, Appendix III. 
56 Hirson, 'The Defiance Campaign', pp. 97-8. 
57 Kuper, Passive Resistance, pp. 133-4. 
58 Benson, TheStruggleforaBinhright, p. 151; Roux, Time Longer than Rope, p. 391; 
Lodge, Black politics, p. 59; G. Mbeki, The Struggle for liberation in South Africa 
(Cape Town, 1992), p. 74. 
59 J. Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid: Territoriality and State Power in South African 
Cities- Port Elizabeth 1923-1972' (Ph.D., Cambridge University, 1990), pp. 247-250; 
T. Orie, 'Biograhical Study of Raymond Mhlaba' (M.A. Thesis, UCT, forthcoming). 
Orie's account is, unfortunately, altogether too reliant on oral sources and is riddled 
with factual errors. Neither works adds much to our understanding of the nature of the 
riots. 
60 Apart from secondary sources previously mentioned, this account of the riots is based 
on the following contemporary documents: a confidential report (R.R. 182/52) of a 
Field Officer, W.B. Ngakane, for the SAIRR re 'Port Elizabeth Riot and Events that 
Followed', 24 Nov. 1952 which comprised an addendum to a Report by the Director 
on Visits to Port Elizabeth, East London and Kimberley in connection with the Riots 
(R.R. 9/53) located in the University of the Witwatersrand's A.D. Rheinallt Jones 
Papers, AD 843/RJ, Aa 12.20.2 and two memoranda from SAP District Headquarters, 
PE to Adjunct-Commissioner, Grahamstown, dated 19 Nov. 1952 and 8 Jan. 1953 
respectively, both entitled 'Naturelle Onluste: New Brighton: 18/10/52' supplied by the 
SAP Museum Archives. This has been supplemented by various newspaper reports; a 
two-part investigative journalistic article by Matthew Nkoana published in Golden City 
Post, 29 July and 5 Aug. 1956; the unpublished Memoirs of Paddy McNamee (jnr.), 
pp. 42-43; and oral testimony from a number of interviews. I have failed to trace the 
Evidence at the Preparatory Examination of William Gova and 126 Others, Magistrate's 
Court, Port Elizabeth and the Judgment in Regina v. William Gova and 10 Others cited 
by Kuper, Passive Resistance, pp. 133-5. Unfortunately, the records of proceedings of 
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evidence is by no means exhaustive and contains certain discrepancies and, accordingly, this 
account must be regarded as preliminary. 
At about half past three on the afternoon of Saturday 18 October, a railway worker notified 
the police that a tin of paint had been stolen from his office at North End station by two 
Africans who boarded the bombella train. A waiting railway constable tried to apprehend the 
suspects upon their arrival at the New Brighton station. They resisted arrest, a scuffle ensued, 
and other passengers who had witnessed the incident went to their assistance. The constable 
used his revolver on his assailants, firing twenty-one shots, killing one and wounding two in 
the process. (He was later commended by a Judge for his courage and devotion to duty in the 
face of the serious danger posed by hostile Africans to life and property).61 
Meanwhile, a considerable crowd had converged on the New Brighton station. It consisted not 
merely of passengers who had disembarked from the train, but a large contingent of young 
people from the nearby Red Location who had heard the shots and ensuing commotion. One 
source suggests this might have been on account of an ANC Youth League meeting scheduled 
to be held at Emlotheni on the afternoon of 18 October but which was cancelled at the last 
minute because of the funeral of a headman. 62 I have not been able to verify this but it is 
clear that prominent figures in the local CYL happened to be out of town as they were 
involved in canvassing support for the Defiance Campaign.63 But Joe Matthews's remark that 
"the Youth League fellows failed utterly to pacify the mob", 64 suggests some attempt at 
intervention by the CYL. 
Buildings at the railway station and an incoming train were peppered with stones and other 
missiles by the crowd [see Illustration 9.1]. At least two sources testify that several whites 
at the station were spared.65 Nor were the homes of whites in the vicinity of the station 
attacked. But when police reinforcements arrived on the scene, they were greeted by a hail of 
Preparatory Examinations in the Archives of the Port Elizabeth Magistrate between 
1931 and 1970 have been lost or 'weeded'. 
61 Kuper, Passive Resistance, pp. 133-4. 
62 Memo from SAP District Headquarters, PE, to Adjunct-Commissioner, Grahamstown, 
19 Nov. 1952, pp. 4, 9. 
63 Interview with Raymond Mhlaba, Fordville, 11-12 Jan. 1990; Evening Post 20 Oct. 
1952 ('ANC Plea on Bus Service'). 
64 Cory Library, MIC 407 CAMP, Reel 14A, 2: XM 65: 47/12, J. to Z.K. Matthews, 5 
Nov. 1952. 
65 SAIRR Report RR 182/52 para. 1; McNamee Memoirs, p. 42. 
Illustration 9.1 New Brighton Railway Station Office after 
Stone Throwing, 18 Oct. 1952 (SAP Museum Archives, Pretoria). 
Illustration 9.2 Burnt-out truck of William Laas. 
(SAP Museum Archives, Pretoria). 
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stones and petrol bombs. An order to fire was given and in the face of the salvo the crowd 
departed the scene, taking its dead and injured with it. 
In headlong flight, the mob vented its anger upon the first white person which it encountered 
nearly a kilometre from the station. With cries of "Afrika" (popularised by the Defiance 
Campaign), the mob attacked and killed W.M. Laas, who had given two fellow workers a lift 
home. The unfortunate victim was stabbed repeatedly and his vehicle destroyed [see 
Illustration 9 .2] . Nearby, the trader Abraham Isaacson was forced to take refuge in his store 
when the crowd began to pelt it with stones. The police, who had been alerted to this incident, 
arrived upon the scene. They fired on the crowd and again several more persons were 
wounded before the crowd dispersed. 
The discovery of the mutilated body of a white victim resulted in further SAP reinforcements 
being rushed to the New Brighton police station and patrols being sent into the township. Apart 
from isolated incidents of stone throwing, an eerie calm prevailed. With the onset of darkness, 
the police retired from the township partly because they did not feel safe and partly because 
they believed law and order had been restored.66 Unfortunately, the lull was to be followed 
by further blood-letting. 
At about 8 p.m., the screening of the ftlm 'the Gun-Fighters' was about to commence at the 
Rio Bioscope, when a number of youths entered the building and ordered everyone out. The 
African patrons beat a hasty exit, but a group of five whites found themselves trapped in the 
bioscope's projection room when the building was set alight [see Illustrations 9.3 and 9.4]. 
The group consisted of the bioscope manager, Rudolph Brandt, and his wife, Edith; a 
technician, Gerald Leppan, and his fifteen year-old assistant, Karl Bernhardt; as well as 
Lappan's thirteen year-old son, Brian. They had chosen to ignore an earlier warning that their 
lives were in danger. When they attempted to leave via the fue escape, they were set upon and 
stabbed. The three adult males were killed and their bodies mutilated. Brian Leppan incurred 
only minor wounds as he managed to escape to the nearby house of a headman, from where 
he was smuggled out of the Location to safety by a clergyman.67 Mrs Brandt was assaulted 
and raped, and only saved from certain death by the timely arrival of the police. The police 
66 SAIRR Report RR 182/52, para. 2. 
67 The two men, E. Mlanlandle and Rev S.Z. Hlaula, priest-in-charge of St Stephen's 
Anglican Mission, were later rewarded for their bravery by the PECC. See Golden City 




Illustration 9.3 Rio Bioscope and Brandt's burnt-out car. 
(SAP Museum Archives, Pretoria) . 
Illustration 9.4 Burnt-out Rio Bioscope. 
(SAP Museum Archives, Pretoria). 
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were greeted with a hail of stones and retaliated by firing on the crowd. 
Sporadic attacks on private and public property in New Brighton continued throughout the 
night. Marcow's General Dealer's Store was set alight and totally burnt out [see Illustration 
9.5]. The section of the Administration Building which housed the Post Office, was also 
partially destroyed by fire [see Illustration 9.6]. Another target of attack were milk depots, 
and at least four were razed to the ground. Fire engines and ambulances entering the township 
had to have police escorts. Much of the township was plunged into darkness but a strong 
police presence finally brought an end to further incidents. 
During the course of the night, the police in the city had been strengthened by the arrival of 
reinforcements from the district. New Brighton was cordoned off by well-armed policemen 
who controlled exit and entry into the township. More armed policemen patrolled the outskirts 
of the white suburbs. For some, who were old enough to remember, it probably evoked 
images of a 'black peril' scare of some magnitude which had gripped the city in the wake of 
the 1920 shootings. 68 On that occasion, an angry crowd in New Brighton had apparently 
sought to avenge the deaths of their own people and threatened the life of the then 
Superintendent. Despite the fears expressed by white officials and traders then resident in the 
Location, there had been little looting and damage to property. Although circumstances were 
vastly different between 1920 and 1952, the tension and panic of black and white Port 
Elizabeth residents was just as real. 
The consequent breakdown in trust between Whites and Africans in New Brighton itself as a 
result of the riots was almost complete. This was so because of the gruesome nature of the 
killing of whites, who were regarded as being well disposed towards Africans. Most traders 
and officials would not have concurred with the SAIRR Report which averred that "there was 
no open hostility to ... Europeans" .69 Isaacson and two other traders who had been in New 
Brighton for at least a generation left the township immediately. 70 Some traders cut their 
losses and sold to African buyers, 71 but a few continued with their businesses until their leases 
68 For an account of the aftermath of the 1920 shootings, see my 'The Port Elizabeth 
Disturbances of October 1920' (M.A. thesis, Rhodes University, 1988), pp. 123-139. 
69 SAIRR Report RR 182/52, para. 5. 
70 Evening Post 21 Oct. 1952. 
71 Jimmy Pemba, for instance, bought the stores of Gordon, Feinberg and Meyer. 
Interview with George Pemba, Swartkops Valley, 31 July 1992. 
Illustration 9.5 Remains of Marcow 's General Dealer 's Store. 
(SAP Museum Archives, Pretoria). 
Illustration 9.6 Burnt-out Post Office. 
(SAP Museum Archives, Pretoria). 
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lapsed. 72 White officials, too, were not prepared to run the risk of remaining in New Brighton 
and vacated their houses. 
The cost of the New Brighton riots can be measured in material, as well as psychological · 
terms. A police estimate gives a figure of £23 772 as the total for damage to buildings and 
vehicles. 73 Apart from the damage to public and private property in New Brighton, eleven 
lives were lost. Apart from the four Whites named above, there were seven Africans killed in 
the riots. The injured or wounded consisted of two Whites and 24 Africans. The identities of 
the African victims and of the 127 persons charged with offences ranging from murder and 
rape, to public violence and arson may also provide some clues as to the the causes of the 
riots, and to this we now tum. 
Reactions to and causes of the New Brii!hton riots 
This section will attempt to evaluate the immediate and underlying causes of the New Brighton 
riots. Our starting point will be with the analysis of the press coverage, which was largely 
concerned with apportioning blame for the riots. As the Government refused to appoint a 
commission of enquiry to investigate the riots, unsubstantiated reports and ex pane statements 
on the riots abounded. Had an inquiry been instituted, the affair would have been sub judice 
and editors might have refrained from publishing these. Instead, the debate was conducted in 
the press and gave rise to much speculation as to the causes of the riots. 
·The police and official versions of the riots were given prominence in the national press. It 
was held that the railway policemen responsible for discharging the frrst shots at his assailants 
had acted in self-defence. The police reinforcements who had arrived on the scene had fired 
on the crowd in order to protect government property. A police statement emanating from 
Pretoria had alleged that the attack on the New Brighton railway station was planned. It 
claimed (without foundation) that the two suspects whom the police had attempted to arrest for 
the theft of paint had escaped and made a report to a meeting in the location, after which 3 
000 Africans attacked the station. 74 But in a secret memorandum, the District Commandant 
of the SAP in Port Elizabeth admitted that they had found no evidence that the unrest had been 
72 Interview with Joseph Henen, Mount Croix, PE, 17 April 1993. 
73 Memo from SAP District Headquarters, PE to Adjunct-Commissioner, Grahamstown, 
19 Nov. 1952, pp. 8-9. 
74 Evening Post 20 Oct. 1952 ('All Quiet Today at NB'); People's World, 23 Oct. 1952 
('Police Terror Blamed'). 
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planned beforehand. 75 
Press reports of the New Brighton riots expressed outrage at the indiscriminate attacks on 
innocent Whites. They dwelt on the latent and powerful anti-white sentiments of the rioters and 
the racial character of the mob violence. The rampaging mobs, according to The Star, attacked 
Whites and destroyed their property "because they were White, and not for any offence they 
had given". 76 And the Pretoria News reckoned that the incident was "the first major riot of 
Natives based on no more than a murderous impulse to kill the White man" .77 Even local 
ANC leaders, in disassociating themselves from the acts of the rioters, issued a statement 
which condemned the "unfortunate, reckless, ill-considered return to jungle law". 78 By 
equating these acts with 'barbarism' and 'savagery', they only served to reinforce racial 
stereotypes of Africans. To Whites, Africans became the 'enemy' -the 'Other' or the 'them' 
of common parlance. Such images came to be etched indelibly on the collective memory of 
the white public. 
Coverage of the riots gave little consideration to the fact that several Africans had been killed 
before the mob turned on whites or symbols of white authority. Dr Njongwe pointed out that 
the "the statements .. made by the police differed considerably from the story of the start of 
the riot which was generally accepted in New Brighton". This version suggested that it was 
a spontaneous reaction to "seeing one of their number shot dead by a railway policeman for 
resisting arrest". Thus, the immediate cause of the riots was the unwarranted shooting of the 
suspected thief or an assailant by the railway policemen, and the readiness of police 
reinforcements intent on dispersing the crowd outside the station to shoot rather than first try 
other methods. Njon~we added that although the unofficial version was not necessarily correct 
in every respect, the obvious way to ascertain what had sparked the riots was to institute an 
inquiry.79 
Although the Government refused to appoint a commission of enquiry to investigate the riots, 
at least three ministers arrived at prima facie conclusions with regard to the ca~ses of the riots. 
The Minister of Justice, C.R. Swart, asserted categorically that: 
75 Memo from SAP District Headquarters, PE, to Adjunct-Commissioner, Grahamstown, 
19 Nov. 1952, pp. 4, 9. 
76 The Star, 20 Oct. 1952. 
77 Pretoria News, 20 Oct. 1952 ('Towards A State of Siege?'). 
78 EPH 20 Oct. 1952, cited in Karis, Protest to Chnllenge, V. 2, p. 485. 
79 Evening Post, 22 Oct. 1952 ('NB Riot/ANC Leader Wants Inquiry'). 
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We are satisfied that what happened at New Brighton is one of the direct results of the 
defiance campaign and the dangerous game being played by a number of leaders of the 
African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress. 80 
And the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr H.F. Verwoerd, was equally quick to connect the riots 
i 
with the defiance campaign. But he added a twist to the argument, and stated that the riots 
. were an indirect result of Port Elizabeth's liberal treatment of its African population. Verwoerd 
contended that the riots were the result of the failure to implement measures such as influx 
control, registration of service contracts and curfew regulations. He claimed that the riots held 
a 'double lesson' for the PECC because the defiance movement had been launched from and 
the first violence of the campaign had occurred in its 'model village'. 81 In short, Verwoerd 
held that it was the reluctance of the PECC to apply urban apartheid fully that had caused the 
riots. 
From another perspective, apartheid could be regarded as a cause of the riots. Margaret 
f 
Ballinger argued that any explanation for the riots should be sought in the extension of controls 
by the Nationalist Government and not their absence. She remarked that "[t]he Natives of Port 
Elizabeth had more to lose in the way of personal liberty than those of other cities2". 82 The 
local ANC leadership also pointed out "the danger of the doctrine of apartheid, which made 
differences between individuals immediately assume a racial character". 83 And Robinson has 
pointed, more specifically, to railway apartheid as having precipitated the riots. She writes that 
the riot. .. was the direct result of the generally aggressive and unpleasant behaviour of 
railway officials who had given the residents of New Brighton cause for complaint over 
several decades. 84 
Because of its proximity and symbolic importance, the New Brighton railway station was 
chosen as the site for the first act of defiance in Port Eliabeth. It would seem to be more than 
coincidence that it was the site of the outbreak of violence nearly four months later. 
Another variant of this argument laid the responsibility for the riots squarely on the shoulders 
of the police for their use of excessive force. In a strongly worded statement, the working 
committee of the ANC indicted the Nationalist Government for using the police to prop up the 
80 EPH 22 Oct. 1952 ('Swart Warns Rioters of Stem Action'). 
81 EPH 21 Oct. 1952 ('Verwoerd Blames PE for Native Riots'); The Star, 23 Oct. 1952 
('Port Elizabeth Warned by Minister'). 
82 The Star 21 Oct. 1952. 
83 EPH 20 Oct. 1952 ('We Had No Part in It, says African Congress'). 
84 Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', p. 248. 
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superstructure of white domination, rather than preserve law and order. The police were 
blamed for provoking the riots: 
It was the policy of using the police to terrorise Non-Europeans that had brought about 
an explosive and dangerous situation. 85 
This statement resembles Lodge's explanation which is predisposed towards precipitating 
factors. In his view, the riots (in Port Elizabeth and East London) "arose essentially out of the 
increasingly tense relationship between black and police which the [defiance) campaign had 
generated". 86 
In spite of the ANC denial of instigation or involvement in the riots, it was maintained that 
the heightened politicisation of New Brighton's people was a contributory factor. Both the 
Afrikaans and English press - supporters of the NP and the opposition UP, respectively -
suggested that ANC leaders could not escape responsibility for the riots, as they were 
themselves aware that violent consequences could flow from the organised resistance of the 
Defiance Campaign. The Pretoria News, for instance, stated that the ANC leadership 
may be sincere in their wish to wage a purely non-violent campaign but they have no 
means of ensuring that the mass of Natives roused to unified resistance will follow their 
passive lead. 87 
Another editorial likened the Africans subjected to the propaganda of the Defiance Campaign 
to a child with a lethal weapon who was liable to kill itself or others if not properly directed. 
With their sense of grievance sharpened by such propaganda, "their reaction, at moments of 
stress, was unpredictable and not necessarily pacific". 88 Thus many political commentators 
in the English press echoed the Government view that the climate created by the campaign 
contributed to the 'unrest'. In so doing, they helped the Government to mobilise public opinion 
against passive resistance. Indeed, most Whites did not draw a distinction between the riots 
and the campaign. 89 They would have given little credence to Kuper's conclusion that "there 
was no evidence to connect the resistance movement with the disturbances nor was violence 
at any time advocated by the resisters as a means of struggle". 90 
85 EPH 21 Oct. 1952 ('ANC Claims Govt Uses Police to TerrJrise Non-Europeans'); 
People's World, 23 Oct. 1952 ('Police Terror Blamed'). 
86 Lodge, Black politics, p. 45. 
87 Pretoria News, 20 Oct. ('Towards a State of Siege?'). 
88 Natal Wimess, 21 Oct. 1952 ('Port Elizabeth Disturbances'). 
89 SAIRR Report RR 182/52, para. 6. 
90 Kuper, Passive Resistance, p. 133. 
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Certain commentators argued that passive resistance had contributed to the defiance of legally 
constituted authority and promoted a breakdown of law and order. It was reckoned that anti-
social or criminal elements took advantage of the situation to give vent to their destructive 
proclivities.91 Contemporaneous investigative journalism and oral traditions both suggest that 
the rioters were mainly delinquents and tsotsis. 92 The ages of those shot and killed by police 
during the riots were between 21 and 43. As with East London, 93 an overwhelming proportion 
of those tried for offences ranging from public violence to murder stemming from the riots 
were juveniles between the ages of 13 and 21 years. Of the 127 accused, there were 20 
females. The oldest was 41 and the youngest 12 years. The average age of the group was less 
than twenty years. 94 Unfortunately, I do not have at my disposal information relating to 
schooling, employment, previous convictions, family structure, accommodation, area of 
residence, and leisure time activities of the persons charged which might have enabled the 
construction of a more complete profile of the rioters. 
Although the' African urban youth problem' was by no means unique to New Brighton, it was 
not something for which the PECC could escape responsibility altogether. Thus the PECC felt 
constrained, especially in the light of the Government's criticisms of its policies, to show that 
the riots were not a result of neglect or omission on its part. In its concern to deflect attention 
from the inadequate housing and poor living conditions in New Brighton, it latched on to any 
suggestion that responsibility for the riots could be attributed to agents provocateurs. A report 
by the director of the SAIRR observed that white witnesses in Port Elizabeth had testified that 
'strangers' had entered the township prior to the riots. The implication was that 'outside 
agitators' rather than 'our own Natives' were responsible for instigating the riots.95 Similarly, 
a document tabled at the meeting of the Cape Province Municipal Association claimed to have 
'defmite proof' that the riots had been instigated by 'agitators' . 96 This information was never 
made public knowledge and dismissed as 'mere propaganda' by A.Z. Lamani, the New 
Brighton Village Chairman, and hotly denied even by conservative spokespersons such as 
Sister Dora Nginza and Rev G.B. Molefe.97 As with all such claims of 'agitation' in the . 
91 SAIRR Report RR 9/53, 12 Jan. 1953, para. 6. 
92 See, for instance, articles in Evening Post 29 Nov. 1952 and the four-part series on the 
East London and Port Elizabeth riots of 1952 in the Golden Ciiy Post of 15, 22 and 29 
July, and 5 Aug. 1956. 
93 Q. Whyte, 'African Youth in the Race Riots', The Forum, 2, 7 (Oct. 1953), pp. 58-9. 
94 Calculation based on 'List of Accused Persons' in CAD, PE Magistrate's Records, 
1/PEZ 1/2/2/3118, Criminal Record Book, A Court, 4 Nov. 1952. 
95 SAIRR Report RR 9/53, 12 Jan. 1953, para. 4. 
96 EPH 30 Oct. 1952 ('More Riots Planned for E. Cape Says Official'). 
97 The Friend, 31 Oct. 1952 ('Further Riot Plans Denied in P.E.'). 
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event of unrest, the PECC sought to draw attention away from itself and point the finger 
elsewhere. 
It has been shown that the riots were explained as a result of: racial animosity; the spontaneous 
outburst of pent-:up anger; a climate of contempt for the Jaw and increased politicisation caused 
by the defiance campaign; the work of outside agitators or a criminal element; deliberate police 
provocation; the result of apartheid, especially on the railways; and even Port Elizabeth's 
'liberal' policies towards Africans. This summary, however, cannot do justice to the complex 
relationship between th immediate and underlying causes of the riots. 
The Consequences of the New Brighton Riots 
The Ministers of Justice and Native Affairs both paid brief visits to Port Elizabeth shortly after 
the New Brighton riots. The former held discussions with the police and the mayor, and 
inspected the scene of the events. The latter did not deem it necessary to meei the the PECC 
and, instead, instructed the Acting Native Commissioner to convey an ultimatum to the effect 
that if the Council did not impose the required control measures, the Government would 
introduce legislation to force it to toe the line. The Pretoria News commented that "the riots 
have almost been welcomed by the Cabinet as a means of ending an experiment which showed 
signs of proving the Nationalist Party policy of strict control wrong". It pointed out that a 
number of other major centres such as Durban and Johannesburg had recently experienced 
disturbances despite the existence of full control regulations. By contrast, Port Elizabeth had 
"an enviable record of freedom from crime and racial strife" .98 But the Nationalist 
Government had no qualms about using the tragic occurrence to further its political and 
ideological aims. They seized upon the New Brighton riots as an opportunity to 'turn the 
screws' on the PECC in order to force it to impose stricter controls on political activity and 
conform with its policy for urban Africans. 
The embattled 'liberal' lobby sought to resist pressure from the central state to comply with 
Verwoerd's ultimatum, and a spokesman for the group predicted a 'long, uphill struggle' for 
Verwoerd.99 Schauder, defended the PECC's policies with the argument that: 
Proof of the success of our policy is that we have had only one night's disturbance in 
thirty years of racial peace and progress. This is a good record which cannot be 
equalled by any other large centre where restrictive policies are in operation and where 
98 Pretoria News, 24 Oct. (Editorial: 'Control and Still More Control'). 
99 Rand Daily Mail, 24 Oct. 1952 ('P.E. Prepares for Battle on Native Township Issue'). 
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disturbances are so frequent that they are no longer regarded as news. 
Nonetheless, New Brighton's image as a 'model' township with a law-abiding community was 
dealt a severe blow by the riots. Schauder himself conceded that the PECC's "progressive 
policy... has been undermined in one night". 100 Despite a previous warning that the riots 
might jeopardise the provision of further municipal housing, the PECC decided to re-direct 
funds set aside for a housing scheme for whites into Elundini Native Township, an extension 
of New Brighton. It claimed this was "an act of faith in the African community of Port 
Elizabeth"; a magnanimous gesture under the circumstances. But, in order to counter expected 
adverse reactions from white ratepayers, the PECC warned that it would be forced to 
reconsider its decision to go ahead with housing construction at Elundini if there was a 
repetition of the disturbances in New Brighton. 101 
But veiled warnings to the African population were not all the PECC issued. The publication 
of the transcript of an interview by the Evening Post with Dr Njongwe - who happened to be 
out on bail awaiting trial under the Suppression of Communism Act - provoked a hostile 
reaction from the PECC. It requested newspaper editors to exercise discretion in publishing 
reports relating to the riots. This amounted to an effort to impose censorship on the press to 
which the Evening Post editor, took strong exception. He argued that it was his duty to inform 
the public about the thinking of African leaders with respect to the riots in order to afford 
white South Africans an opportunity to acquaint themselves therewith. 102 
Representatives of New Brighton community and political organisations expressed concern that 
the riots continued to influence the thinking of the authorities. A joint statement issued by 
A.Z. Lamani, in his capacity as chairman of New Brighton Village Committee, and on behalf 
of the ANC, CYL, African Ministers' Council, Advisory Board and Vigilance Committee, 
condemned the "indiscriminate, wanton and careless" shooting-by SA and Railway Police and 
called for the appointment of an impartial commission of enquiry. And it was argued that the 
100 The Star, 21 Oct. 1952. 
101 Intermediate Archive Depot, PE (lAD), Native Affairs in the City (Feb. -Dec. 1952), 
25/169 No.7, Minutes of the Proceedings of the Council-in-Committee, 21 Oct. 1952; 
EPH 22 Oct. ('Council Discusses the Riots/Green Light for Elundini') and 23 Oct. 
1952 ('Council's Act of Faith in PE African People'); The Star, 22 Oct. 1952 ('PE 
Council warns Natives against further riots'). 
102 Evening Post, 24 Oct. 1952 (Editorial: 'That report'); EPH 24 Oct. 1952 ('Mayor Will 
Ask Press to Ban Certain Interviews'); Interview with John Sutherland, Port Elizabeth, 
27 Apr. 1993. 
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authorities "seem bent on perpetuating hostilities" by the heavily armed police patrols which 
engaged in an "extravagant display of firearms". Equally disturbing, was the frantic rush by 
white civilians to buy weapons. Such actions did nothing to restore peace and create goodwill 
between the people of Port Elizabeth. 103 
In protest at the continued strong police presence at New Brighton railway station and armed 
guards on trains and buses, the ANC launched a boycott of SAR&H transport which Dr 
Njongwe vowed would continue until the armed guards were withdrawn. 104 New Brighton 
residents had to either walk all the way to work or a few miles to the outskirts of the city, 
where they could board a municipal bus which would transport them to work. The boycott was 
lifted when the railway authorities negotiated the removal of the armed guards with ANC 
leaders. 105 Although a 'potentially explosive' situation was averted, the subsequent actions 
of both the local and central authorities perpetuated rather than eased the tension. 
On the evening of 28 October the PECC held a special meeting in order to formulate its 
response to the crisis precipitated by the New Brighton riots. A motion that the Minister of 
Native Affairs be requested to conduct a judicial inquiry into the cause of the riots was 
defeated. However, it was resolved to apply for permission to impose a curfew on Africans 
in the city between the hours of 9 pm and 5 am. New Brighton residents would not be affected 
by the curfew, but non-residents would not be allowed into the Location without a permit. In 
addition, the Council requested the Minister of Justice to enforce the Riotous Assemblies Act 
for three months and thereby effectively prohibit open air meetings. The voting on these issues 
was not unanimous and suggests that erstwhile liberals on the PECC were folding under 
pressure from the demands of the central state and white ratepayers. A fair amount of behind 
the scenes lobbying resulted in Schauder and the former trade unionist, Mrs Katie Gelvan, 
voting with the majority. Only three councillors, Mrs E.M. Holland and Messrs A. Dubb and 
G. Schafer, opposed the imposition of the restrictions. 106 The communist mouthpiece, 
Advance, commented that this "represented a craven capitulation of Port Elizabeth liberalism 
103 The Star, 24 Oct. 1952; Natal Witness, 25 Oct. 1952 ('Repressive Measures will 
accentuate racial hatred'). 
104 EPH 25 Oct. 1952 ('PE Expects Week-End of Tension'). 
105 EPH 29 Oct. 1952 ('Bus Service to NB Normal Again: Boycott Ends'); Cape Times, 
7 Nov. 1952 ('Port Elizabeth Test'). 
106 lAD, 251169 No. 7, Minutes and Proceedings of the Council-in-Committee, 28 Oct. 
1952; Rand Daily Mail, 30 Oct. 1952 ('Port Elizabeth Seeks 9 p.m.- 5 a.m. Curfew'). 
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to the Nationalists" .107 
Whilst the PECC was deliberating, a mass meeting at New Brighton heard ANC Secretary-
General, Walter Sisulu, declare that the "Council would be betraying the trust reposed in it 
for many years" by the city's African population if it introduced retrictive measures. This was 
to no avail. In response to the PECC decision, a meeting of the ANC Eastern Cape Regional 
Committee was convened and attended by 60 delegates from 15 branches said to represent over 
30 000 members. It was resolved to pursue strike action unless the PECC rescinded its 
decision to impose a curfew and ban political meetings. 108 The call for strike action was 
endorsed at meetings held in various venues on Sunday 2 November. A statement issued by 
the ANC condemned the PECC for "having allowed itself to be led on the road to fascism by 
suppressing African organisations, trade unions and the ANC". It was stated that the strike 
would continue until "God Almighty had changed the hearts of the City Councillors" and the 
ANC's demands had been met. 109 I 
The response of the Mayor, C. F. McArthur, to the ANC call for strike action was equivocal. 
Announcing that the Council would not be intimidated by the strike threat, he added that the 
success of the ANC activities largely implied intimidation by 'so-called leaders' of 'law-
abiding Africans'. He reckoned that the city had been targeted because 
The council's liberal attitude in the past has apparently been taken by certain Africans 
as a sign of weakness. Therefore, the impact of the resistance organisation was aimed 
at Port Elizabeth because it was anticipated we would yield to demands. 110 
Yet, McArthur privately approached the ANC leaders to call of the strike, which they refused. 
Further behind the scenes negotiations resulted in the ANC leadership_ agreeing to moderate 
its demands: to limit the strike to one day in return for which the PECC promised to restrict 
the operation of the curfew to three months and the ban on meetings to one month. 111 The 
compromise appears to have been initiated by the Mayor who met the executive committee of 
the ANC. 112 Njongwe agreed to it without consulting the rank and file ANC membership. 
107 Advance, 13 Nov. 1952 ('Port Elizabeth City Under Siege'). 
108 Rand Daily Mail, 3 Nov. 1952 ('New Brighton Natives Back Up Strike Threat'). 
109 Advance, 6 Nov. 1952 ('P.E. Africans Call General Strike'). 
110 Evening Post 6 Nov. 1952 ('We will not be intimidated'). 
111 Cape Argus, 8 Nov. 1952: Advance, 13 Nov. 1952 ('Port Elizabeth City Under Siege'). 
112 Benson, Struggle for a Binhright, pp. 151 and 155 states that ANC President-General, 
Moroka, had ordered that the indefinite strike be modified to a one-day stayaway. The 
Director of the SAIRR also discussed the issue with an unnamed Congress leader 
[Moroka or Njongwe?] and implied that a SAIRR representative might have played an 
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Advance hinted at some disquiet amongst ANC members with its remark that ."there was a 
strong feeling in the location that the strike should have continued indefinitely as planned" . 113 
The one-day stayaway was scheduled for Monday 10 November, two days after the curfew and 
ban on political meetings took effect. During the course of the weekend, Port Elizabeth was 
in a state of virtual siege. The police force was further augmented and citizens took 
extraordinary precautions to arm themselves in the event of violence. The hysteria of white 
residents was fuelled by news of riots in East London on the Sunday when two Whites, 
including a nun, were gruesomely killed. The day of the stayaway, however, passed without 
serious incident. The majority of the African workforce, according to Advance, "stayed quietly 
at home and spent the day in fasting and prayer" . 114 It was estimated that over 90% of Port 
Elizabeth's black workforce responded to the ANC's call. Many Coloured workers, 
particularly in the canning industry, participated in the strike. Most Indian shop owners heeded 
the SAIC call to close for the day. The wholly successful action underscored the level of 
support for the ANC and its allies, although there were the usual claims that this was due to 
intimidation. It also brought home to employers the vulnerability of the Port Elizabeth 
economy to strike action. 
The PEM itself refused to observe the spirit of the agreement negotiated by the Mayor with 
the ANC. When workers returned to their places of employment, they were victimised. The 
police were called in to drive them off PEM premises and Coloured scab labour was rounded 
up from neighbouring districts. An order went out to all heads of municipal departments that 
workers who had absented themselves from work should only be re-engaged if they were 
indispensable, and then only as new employers. m In other words, all participants in the 
stayaway stood to lose service benefits such as wage increments and cumulative leave. The 
PEM suspended between 600 to 800 general workers, as well as a further 500 trainees on the 
Elundini housing scheme. The Railways, Post Office and other state employers replaced 
African with Coloured unskilled labour which served to heighten tension between the 
important role in facilitating the compromise. See RR 9/53, 12 Jan. 1953, para. II 
cited in Lodge, Black politics, p. 61. 
113 Advance, 13 Nov. I952 ('Port Elizabeth City Under Siege'). See also SAIRR Report 
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I15 lAD, 25/I69 No. 7, PE Municipality, Suggested Circular to all Non-European 
Employees (undated); Cape Times, 11 Nov. I952. 
235 
communities. 116 Certain private companies also adopted a hardline attitude and dismissed 
workers who had heeded the stayaway call. It was estimated that a total of approximately 
4 000 workers were dismissed. 117 But scab labour proved unworkable and employers 
eventually had to reinstate most of the dismissed workers. 118 
The assurances by certain individuals who (according to the local authority) comprised "the 
moderate and level-headed residents of New Brighton ... of sufficient standing to have opposed 
the ANC openly", that the strike call would not be heeded proved to be ill-founded. There 
attempt at misrepresentation in order to curry favour with the authorities had miscarried. Yet, 
a deputation to the Mayor which included Rev G.B. Molefe, Rev S.Z. Hlaula, P.J. Nikiw.e 
and other nominated Advisory Board members was well received. The Consultative Mayor's 
Committee was set up and further discussions, which centred around grievances underlying the 
riots which the PECC considered it within its powers to address, followed. Council 
acknowledged certain shortcomings in its administration of the township and agreed to: 
(1) approach the Government to abolish segregation at the New Brighton 
railway station; 
(2) make representation to SAR&H for the erection of suitable bus shelters; 
(3) undertake to increase its African labour force and approach SAR&H to 
do the same; 
( 4) replace electric street lighting destroyed in the riots; 
(5) co-operate with the School Board and the Technical College Council to 
establish facilities for technical education at New Brighton; 
(6) consider the appointment of a welfare officer at New Brighton; 
(7) commence work immediately on the improvement of quarters for single 
men.ll9 
Neither the Committee nor this seven-point programme had the backing of New Brighton's 
political or civic organisations. As a critical report put it, the PECC "preferred to pay heed 
to the advice of men who were out of touch with the situation". 120 
The PECC became party to the Government's attempts to discredit the ANC with the 'taint' 
of communism by intervening in township politics. It was decided to disseminate anti-ANC 
propaganda to "counteract the blackmail of the agitators". A leaflet entitled "Twenty-Five 
Years of Bantu Progress in the Union's Friendly City" was distributed in New Brighton. In 
116 SAIRR Report RR 182/52, para. 8. 
117 Cape Times, 12 Nov. 1952; Rand Daily Mail, 12 Nov. 1952. 
118 Cory Library, MIC 407 CAMP Reel 14A, 2: XM65: 47/15, J. to Z.K. Matthews, 20 
Nov. 1952. 
119 Evening Post 18 Nov. 1952 ('Council-Africans Meeting'). 
120 SAIRR Report RR 182/52, para. 10. 
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it, the CYL was blamed for the recent spate of lawlessness, arson, murder and violence in the 
township. The CYL was even said to be in the employ of an unknown foreign power, an 
obvious attempt to associate it with Soviet communism. 121 Threats had been made on the life 
of Rev Molefe as he was regarded as a 'sell-out' by radical elements within the ANC. 122 The 
claim that members of the CYL were communists was not ridiculous as Mhlaba and other 
'named' communists were members of the CYL. But the PECC's involvement in 'dirty tricks' 
made it a willing partner to state repression. 
The New Brighton riots remained in the public eye because the trial dragged on in to the new 
year. The ANC engaged legal counsel on behalf of the accused, and the defence team was led 
by Sam Kahn. 123 Of the 108 persons eventually tried, five were found guilty of murder, of 
whom one was sentenced to death. Others were sentenced to terms of imprisonment of varying 
length after being found guilty on charges such as arson and public violence. 
During the period in which the local ANC leadership had been restricted under the Suppression 
of Communism Act, 124 a radical element in league with the criminal underclass threatened 
to subvert the organisation. The functioning of the New Brighton branch was hamstrung by 
the emergence of volatile dissidents in its ranks. The leadership was accused of 'cowardice' 
for having abandoned the defiance campaign after the riots. ANC meetings were apparently 
broken up by organised gangs (which included tsotsi elements) and leaders were subjected to 
assaults. Mhlaba has recounted that he was lucky to escape but that Gladstone Tshume, Caleb 
Mayekiso and others were victims of attacks. 125 The ANC executive issued leaflets in which 
it condemned these 'cowardly attacks' as the work of government agents provocateurs. One 
newspaper report citing a non-ANC source, attributed the dissension in the organisation's ranks 
to the purchase of white trader's stores in New Brighton by ANC officials from other 
centres, 126 which appears very unlikely. The ANC went public about its internal troubles in 
a bid to disassociate itself from the activities of the dissidents. Eventually, the organisation 
121 lAD, 25/169 No. 7, Mrs Eily Murray, LAO to the Mayor, PE, 11 Nov. 1952 and 
undated leaflet in Xhosa with English translation; Advance, 4 Dec. 1952 ('P.E. Council 
Blames Foreign Agitators for Riots'). 
122 Interview of Rev G.B. Molefe by David and Celene Hunter, 2 April 1980, pp. 9-10 
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123 Interview with Attorney Isadore Noach, PE, 3 Aug. 1993. 
124 Advance 13 Nov. 1952, p. 5. 
125 Interview with Raymond Mhlaba, Fordville, PE, 11-12 Jan. 1990. 
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expelled six members for breach of discipline and violation of policy. 127 
Meanwhile, the case against Njongwe and his co-accused reached the Supreme Court and the 
presiding Judge ruled that change need not be impo~cd by communistic doctrine to be 
construed as falling within the purview of the Suppression of Communism Act. 128 The 
accused were each sentenced to 9 months imprisonment, suspended for three years. Shortly 
hereafter, most of the ANC leadership in Port Elizabeth was banned by the Government. At 
the same time, the passage of the Criminal Law Amendment and Public Safety Acts gave the 
Government further wide-ranging powers to curb civil disobedience. Despite these 
circumstances, the Port Elizabeth township was probably the only place where theM-plan was 
implemented. This provided for the continuation of the ANC structures 'under conditions of 
illegality' through the creation of a cell system. 129 With the leadership having been forced 
to 'go to ground', the ANC had to rely on grassroots organisation. 
Conclusion 
The dividing line between lawlessness and protest was a thin one. It is my argument that the 
increase in crime in New Brighton from the 1940s was partly the result of the growth of a 
tsotsi element and a subculture of violence. The victims of the system became the villains. The 
rioters attacked symbols of white authority (i.e. policemen) and others associated with the 
system of white domination. The ANC was compelled to disassociate itself from this violence 
but still could not dispel white perceptions of complicity therein. After the suspension of the 
defiance campaign and the clampdown on the local ANC leadership, the latter became targets 
of violence by dissidents. But the alliance between the radicals and criminal element was short-
lived. Perhaps the real success of the ANC was that it weathered the crisis caused by the 18 
October riots and subsequent dissension in its ranks. New Brighton remained an ANC 
stronghold and the organisation sustained popular support beyond this period. 
The riots in New Brighton and elsewhere provided a pretext for the central state (with the 
compliance of local authorities) to clamp down on extra-parliamentary opposition. The 
outbreak of violence played a decisive role in the suspension of the defiance campaign. As 
127 EPH 15 July 1953 (' ANC Sacks Six for Violation'); Cory Library, MIC 407 Reel15A, 
2:XC3:41/74, G. Tshume, Sec. New Brighton branch, ANC to J. Calata, Sec. Cape 
ANC, Cradock, 16 July 1953; Hirson, 'The Defiance Campaign', p. 99. 
128 Prentice-Hall Law Repons, K. 61, pp. 171-3; South Africa Law Repons, p. 848, 
Regina vs Njongwe and others. 
129 Fine and Davis, Beyond Apanheid, pp. 125-6. 
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Kuper has remarked: 
Quite apart from their effect on the resisters, the riots provided the opportunity for the 
Government to take over the initiative and to assume far-reaching powers with some 
measure of justification. 130 
Whilst the government introduced a battery of repressive laws to combat civil disobedience, 
-- . ···-· - - . . - .. - - - .. - .. ·-.-. .. -- -· ·-·- -- -- ... --- --. -- ·-- --- - ··-·· - .. -- .... - -
the PECC applied the provisions of existing laws to suppress political activity in the township. 
It also made moves specifically to undermine the ANC in New Brighton. Early in 1953, the 
PECC introduced influx controls and labour registration for the first time. Robinson has argued 
that "the new legislation was not imposed entirely under central government duress". 131 The 
almost indecent haste with which the .PECC contrived to implement politically repressive and 
labour control measures suggest that it had shifted perceptibly to the right in its dealings with 
the African population. This reflected, amongst other things, a realignment of social forces in 
the city due to demographic changes and the hardening of racial attitudes amongst the city's 
white ratepayers. Port Elizabeth could no longer claim to be a 'progressive ,city. 
130 Kuper, Passive Resistance, p. 145. 





For many years, the PECC had pursued 'progressive' policies towards its African population: 
rejecting influx controls and labour registration, embarking upon a large-scale slum elimination 
programme and relocating those removed to sub-economic housing in New Brighton. This Port 
Elizabeth 'model' became increasingly difficult to sustain as a result of the massive post-war 
urbanisation, radicalisation of township politics and polarisation amongst the white population. 
Certain councillors, articulating the fears of a pro-Nationalist Afrikaans-speaking constituency, 
demanded conformity to central state policies towards urban Africans. They argued that influx 
control and registration had the potential for reducing the need to provide housing by expelling 
. 
those Africans deemed surplus to the city's labour requirements. This would appease white 
ratepayers who were unwilling to accept any fmancial burden in this regard. Other councillors, 
more attuned to the interests of local capital, were ambivalent. This was partly the result of 
the fear that the ANC, which had shown its capacity to mobilise the local African population 
during the defiance campaign and to stage a successful stayaway involving the majority of 
black workers, was capable of organising concerted resistance to the imposition of passes. 
Those councillors representing the local 'liberal' ideology were forced on the defensive and 
eventually capitulated in the aftermath of the New Brighton riots. These events marked the end 
of an era; a watershed in the history of Port Elizabeth. 
The Port Elizabeth 'model' comprised rather more than an absence of influx control and labour 
registration. The reluctance to regulate labour supplies went hand in hand with the 'location 
strategy', used to regiment the daily life of New Brighton residents. Aside from the spatial 
organisation, close personal supervision by the Superintendent and surveillance by the 
administrative staff identified by Robinson, 1 I have elaborated upon other features of the New 
Brighton's administrative system. Prominent residents who served on the Advisory Board were 
co-opted through the dispensing of patronage by way of trading and hawking licences, etc. 
granted by the Superintendent. Permission to brew beer in the 'wet' areas was also regarded 
as a privilege which was granted largely at the discretion of the Superintendent. Even the 
allocation of houses was dependent upon favouritism and having the right connections. In 
short, a system of clientelism in combination with the 'location strategy' enabled strict social 
1 J. Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid: Territoriality and State Power in South African 
Cities- Port Elizabeth 1923-1972 (Ph.D. Thesis, Cambridge University, 1990). 
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control to be exercised in New Brighton. 
In some respects, the administration and running of New Brighton differed little from other 
townships. The financing of the Location, as with Ndabeni, was given a headstart as a result 
of the transfer of capital assets - in the form of land and buildings - to its NRA. In New 
Brighton there were no beerballs to provide an additional source of revenue to supplement 
income from rents - which was never sufficient to balance the NRA. The system of dualism, 
whereby domestic brewing and prohibition existed in different sections of New Brighton, was 
difficult to enforce because it was not legalised until 1945. Rather than make explicit 
comparisons between New Brighton and other townships, I have identified distinctive features 
in the administration of New Brighton. 
Many of these features were developed during the period in which New Brighton was 
administered by the central state and influenced the formulation of a national policy of urban 
segregation. As many as eight features of the Cape's Native Reserve Location Act were 
included in some form in the Urban Areas Act. 2 Swanson has asserted that the Cape legislation 
"laid the ideological and institutional foundations of urban segregation". 3 Furthermore, it could 
be argued that the 'Cape system' was far more important than other centres in providing the 
basis for a uniform national policy because of the continuities in the personnel between the 
Cape's and the Union's NAD.4 These officials would undoubtedly have been swayed by their 
own experience of supervising Ndabeni and New Brighton. As Robinson has remarked, the 
administration of the Cape's 'model' locations 
played an important role in both the systematisation of 'urban native management' and 
its incorporation into the central state apparatus. s 
However, national policy also drew on the experience of other local authorities. A strong case 
has been made for Durban as a source of many of the controls which were built into the 
administrative nexus of the segregated/apartheid city. Allowance was made in the Act for a 
2 J. Kirk, 'The African Middle Class, Cape Liberalism and Resistance to Residential 
Segregation at Port Elizabeth, 1880-1910' (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 1987), p.194. 
3 M. Swanson, 'The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in 
the Cape Colony, 1900-1909', Journal of African History, 18, 3 (1977), p. 408. 
4 S. Dubow, Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apanheid in South Africa 
(Basingstroke, 1989). 
5 J. Robinson, 'A perfect system of control? State power and 'native locations' in South 
Africa', Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 8 (1990), p. 158 and 'The 
Power of Apartheid', p. 100. 
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municipal beer monopoly modelled on the so-called 'Durban system' which appeared to 
guarantee a self-financing administration. 6 Indeed, all of the major urban centres can probably 
stake a claim to having influenced the content of the Urban Areas Act. 
Ironically, Ndabeni and New Brighton were amongst the last major locations to come under 
the provisions of the Urban Areas Act and thus to adopt the model (sic) which they had been 
so instrumental in developing. The reason for this would appear to be tied to the extent to 
which Cape Town and Port Elizabeth sought to preserve the autonomy of the local state. For 
about twenty years, neither had direct administrative or financial responsibility for its African 
population. But the Union Government divested itself of these functions and the two 
municipalities assumed control of these locations in 1923. The PECC treated the African 
population administratively as part of the city, although New Brighton was spatially separate. 
This practice continued after New Brighton came under the Urban Areas Act. When the Bantu 
Affairs Administration Board Act came into force in 1973, the central government, without 
consulting either the PECC or African population, excised all townships from the municipal 
area in which they were situated and removed them from the jurisdiction of the local authority. 
Responsibility for the administration of New Brighton and Port Elizabeth's other townships 
was turned over to the East Cape Administration Board. The Act also created Administration 
Boards wholly answerable to the Bantu Affairs Department (successor to the NAD) which 
usurped the rights, functions and powers of local authorities in respect of urban African 
administration. 7 In so doing, this Act eliminated the duality of control which had characterised 
urban African administration since 19108, and that of New Brighton since its creation. In fact, 
the control of New Brighton had come full circle: from the central to the local state, and then 
back to the former. 
New Brighton never constituted Port Elizabeth's entire African community during our period. 
At times, the number of Africans in Korsten outnumbered their fellows in New Brighton. And 
there were always small numbers of Africans resident - many illegally - in the city itself. 
6 M.W. Swanson, 'Urban Origins of Separate Development', Race, 10 (1968), pp. 31-
40; 'The Durban System: The Roots of Urban Apartheid in Colonial Natal', African 
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62-63. 
7 D. Posel, The Making of Apanheid (Oxford, 1991), p. 248, n. 78. 
8 T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modem History (1987), p. 412. 
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Although the focus of this thesis has been New Brighton, related developments in Korsten, in 
particular, have not been neglected. Korsten routinely provided an alternative place of abode 
for those Africans intent on avoiding New Brighton. The invocation of the discourse of public 
~e~~~which had resulted in the closure of the old locations and the growth of Korsten in the 
.. ~:oos, was used to justify the removals_of_A · ans from K r · · aLe-.-.~ 
' 1930s. Korsten was partially cleared of Africans, but two decades later the position had 
returned to its former state when it had been described as a 'notorious shim'. In the late 1950s 
the PECC embarked on a further slum clearance programme in Korsten and Dassieskraal. 
Although municipal housing schemes for Whites and Coloureds were erected, much of the 
prime estate cleared of Africans and released for development is still unoccupied to this day. 
Once a bustling non-racial township where Africans could obtain freehold title, Korsten is 
today an ill-defined and underutilised combination of residential, industrial and commercial 
land usages. A comprehensive history of Korsten still waits to be written, 9 and would 
complement this study of New Brighton. ! 
New Brighton was regularly feted as a 'model' location. This was particularly so after the 
erection of McNamee Village. It was actually one of a number of townships in the country to 
be termed a 'model'. Others included Lamont Village near Durban, Langa Township near 
Cape Town, and Waaihoek near Bloemfontein. Indeed, the number of 'model' locations 
suggests that local authorities used their own arbitrary criteria for making such a claim. Their 
motives were certainly not altruistic but neither were they entirely self-serving. This public 
display of paternalism afforded local authorities the opportunity to be seen to be committed 
to the well-being of their African populations. The moving force behind Port Elizabeth's sub-
economic scheme, Schaudcr, once remarked that: 
Port Elizabeth prided itself on its fair and honourable treatment of Natives and on being 
the first town in the Union to undertake a genuine slum elimination scheme.10 
A visitor to Port Elizabeth in 1953 was informed by Schauder, that the city was "one of the 
best places for an African to live in, as South African towns went". He was also informed that 
New Brighton, which was "the finest township in the Union", had made "an ideal shop 
window of African urban life" for the 1946 Royal visit. 11 Schauder was the city's greatest 
9 J. Cherry, 'Blot on the Landscape and Centre of Resistance: A Social and Economic 
History of Korsten' (B.A. Hons. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1988) covers only 
the period 1931-1962, 
10 EPH 20 May 1948 ('Shanties at Korsten'). 





ambassador and publicist. He gave guided tours of New Brighton and Korsten to many VIPs 
who visited the city. This afforded him an opportunity to showcase the Council's efforts to 
provide social upliftment for the city's slum dwellers . 
. . Since the 1950s, New Brighton has been dwarfed by subsequent housing developments, site-
and-service schemes and squatter settlements which have sprawled out on Port Elizabeth's 
northern outskirts. Nowadays, a visitor could hardly fail to be struck by the old and dilipidated 
homes standing side by side with new modern ones. The variegated appearance of housing in 
the township reflects the neglect and parsimony of the authorities, as welJ as a lack of pride 
in homes not owned by the occupants. Much of the existing stock has been allowed to fall into 
a state of disrepair. The original ninety-odd-year-old structures in the Red Location have never 
been upgraded and are amongst the most unsightly places in Port Elizabeth's townships [see 
Illustration 3.2]. The makeshift dwellings have been repaired, where possible, primarily with 
sheets of corrugated iron so as to make them barely habitable. Except in those few cases where 
residents have made renovations, dwellings in other parts of New Brighton have remained 
largely unchanged. Kwaford, seen during a visit to Port Elizabeth in 1953, was reckoned by 
John Gunther to be the "most startling slum" in Africa. 12 It has since been upgraded and the 
houses made from timber crates have been replaced by fairly modern homes suitable for the 
upwardly mobile. But unemployment rates are conservatively said to be in excess of 50% 
amongst the African populace. The overwhelming impression of Port Elizabeth's townships 
is of poverty and squalor. 
The communities which feature in the works of geographers who to date have sketched 
residential development in P0rt Elizabeth's black areas, 13 remain relatively undifferentiated. 
There has been a tendency to portray the black population as hapless victims of an all powerful 
state - both local and central. In keeping with the premises of social history, this study has 
attempted to 'flesh out' the New Brighton community; to reduce the anonymity of individuals 
within the community. Aside from some relevant biographical detail provided in the text at 
appropriate points, Appendix C has more extensive notes on the lives of nearly all those who 
feature prominently in the body of the thesis. In this way, it is hoped that people can emerge 
as characters and not merely statistics in New Brighton's history. At the same time, it has been 
12 J. Gunther, Inside Africa (London, 1955), p. 486. 
13 See, for example, B. Taylor, Controlling the Burgeoning Masses: Removals and 
Residential Development in Pon Elizabeth's Black Areas, ISER Development Studies, 
Working Paper No. 51 (Grahamstown, 1991). 
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my intention to provide the community with a collective social identity. This has been 
weakened, to some extent, by my incomplete picture of cultural, sports and leisure-time 
activities in Chapter 7. There is scope for further research of these activities in the Xhosa-
medium newspapers like Imvo Zabantsundu and other sources. My research in this area has, 
of necessity, been partial because of a reliance on translators. 
Other themes raised in the course of this thesis also require further elaboration. These include 
relationships between the predominantly Xhosa-speaking African population of New Brighton 
and other minority groups. Despite the location being established with the express pupose of 
housing Africans, a small number of Coloureds and Whites resided therein. Available records 
do not shed much light on the lives or identities of the former. They were not assimilated or 
fully accepted because there were frequent demands for their removal to Coloured housing 
schemes, especially when accommodation was at a premium. There were also tensions between 
the African and Coloured communities in the city during the Korsten removals in the 1930s. 
On the other hand, their solidarity as exploited workers and oppressed peoples did find 
expression in the field of labour relations at various times. Examples of this include strikes I called by the PEICWU in 1920, the CNETU in the late 1940s, and the ANC in 1952. 
Generally, though, it was far easier to organise a single community than to mobilise across 
racial and spatial divides. 
There is far more information available on the white than the Coloured inhabitants of New 
Brighton. I have provided some information about the officials, especially the Location 
Superintendents, because of their crucial administrative roles. As the 'men on the spot' they 
comprised the 'frontline' of white rule. I have only made passing mention of the white traders 
in the New Brighton. These people, mainly Jews of east European origin and first generation 
immigrants to the country, had to learn both English and Xhosa. They constituted a community 
in their own right and sought unsuccessfully to establish a synagogue in the Location. Many 
raised families in New Brighton and passed on their stores to their children. All the white 
children were obliged to commute to town daily aboard the bombella train in order to receive 
their schooling. There was some social interaction between Whites and Africans, especially on 
the sports field, but otherwise they appear to have led separate existences. However, those 
Whites who grew up in New Brighton seem to have a residual memory of good relationships 
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with African residents being destroyed by apartheid. 14 Perhaps this thesis, in dealing largely 
with the pre-1948 period, might serve to question romanticised and selective perceptions of 
a bygone era. 
Port Elizabeth is not a microcosm of South African society and it has charted its own contours 
on the historical landscape. This study of the ftrst ftfty years in the history of New Brighton 
has sought to further our knowledge and understanding of the total history of Port Elizabeth. 
Given the existing lacunae in the fteld, much remains to be done before a comprehensive 
picture of the city's past can be constructed. But there are indicators that progress is being 
made. These include the increasing number of scholars researching aspects of the city's 
history; the publication of theses by Kirk, Robinson and Cherry in the forseeable future; and 
the holding of the frrst ever conference devoted to Port Elizabeth's history in 1992. The 
number of bibliographical entries in this . thesis is itself evidence of the growing corpus of 
literature on the city's history. Perhaps Port Elizabeth's place in South African history and 
historiography is now assured? 
This thesis has sought to make a modest contribution to South African historiography, and 
especially to the fteld of urban history. Its value lies frrstly in the exploration of new terrain. 
As a history of New Brighton, it joins numerous other works which have recovered the history 
of urban African communities. Although part of the oppressed and exploited South African 
underclasses, each community is unique and each study provides valuable insights into the 
range of human experience. This thesis has, I believe, also confrrmed the conceptual and 
methodological contribution that social history can make to South African historiography. In 
the face of the postmodemist challenge which has pronounced the collapse of the 'meta-
narrative' and decried totalizing systems of meaning, it is worth re-emphasising that narrative 
functions to locate subjects in a historical context and give meaning. The narrative constructed 
in this thesis is more than select fragments of the past, if less than History (with a capital 'H'). 
Like John Clarke, I believe we have arrived at 'the end of History' via a particular theoretical 
route. There has, however, been no end to history. u 
14 J.P. McNamee (jnr.), 'Memoirs' (unpublished, n.d.); Interviews with Meyer Kaplan, 
Minerton, 2 Jan. 1990 and J. Henen, Mount Croix, PE, 17 April 1993. 
15 J. Clarke, New Times and Old Enemies: Essays on Cultural Studies and America 
(London, 1991), pp. 20-41, passim. 
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APPENDIX A 
Note on Sources 
Given the relative paucity of secondary literature on Port Elizabeth's history, primary materials 
constitute the major source for this study. For the period during which New Brighton was 
administered by central government (1902-23), the files of the Native Affairs Departments of 
the Cape and Union Governments proved to be most useful. The records of the Port Elizabeth 
Town Clerk relating to the administration of New Brighton prior to circa 1945 are housed in 
the Cape Archives and of more recent vintage in the Intermediate Archives Depot, Port 
EliZabeth. These proved to be the most invaluable and extensive for my purposes. Yet, these 
records of both the local authority and the central state undoubtedly reflect the views of the 
ruling classes. 
I have found that Port Elizabeth's daily newspapers provided limited coverage of the affairs 
of New Brighton. The Eastern Province Herald, which was published throughout the period 
under consideration, provided extensive coverage to town/city council meetings, and even 
published the minutes of council sub-committees until the 1920s. The only reporting of local 
affairs by New Brighton residents was for newspapers with a primarily African readership such 
as Imvo Zabantsundu and Umteteli wa Bantu. Regular coverage of New Brighton's affairs in 
the local press only commenced with the publication from 1948 of a new daily in Port 
Elizabeth, The Evening Post. Otherwise, it was the left-wing press (eg. International, The 
Guardian and its successors) which provided occasional coverage of matters related to Port 
Elizabeth's African population. 
I have conducted over twenty interviews including some with current and former residents. 
Whilst this sample cannot be said to be reresentative of the community, the oral testimony has 
provided numerous insights into the character of individuals - both officials and prominent 
community figures. But it would be naive to believe that the voices of the people will speak 
for themselves any more than the documents tell the truth. And because by far the greater 
amount of information has been gleaned from official sources, it is to be expected that the 
voice of the community, and especially the illiterate underclasses, will struggle to be heard. 
In the fmal analysis, this thesis reflects both the strengths and weaknesses of the available 


















CHURCH SITES IN NEW BRIGHTON 
RED LOCATION 
ORIGINAL GRANTEE/ OCCUPIED BY (Date) COMMENTS 
LESSEE* 
Baptist Church Municipal buildings Exchanged for site in 
(erected 1927 -8) McNamee Village 
Roman Catholic Church Bantu Presbyterian Exchanged for Lot 35/B -
Church ( 1934) with occupation rights only 
Congregational Union of SA Edward Memorial -
Congregational Church 
Bishop of Grahamstown on Order of Ethiopia Original church burnt down 
behalf of the Order of 1929. Replaced. 
Ethiopia 
Basuto Independent Church Basuto Congregational Became known as Bantu 
Congregational Union of SA Church Independent Church 
Wesleyan Methodist Church Wesleyan Methodist 
of SA 
Salvation Army Presbyterian Church of Site never occupied by 
Africa ( 1927) Salvation Army. 
U nued Free Church of Presbyterian Church of Exchanged for Site in 
Scotland SA McNamee Village 
Wesleyan Methodist Church Vacant -
of SA 
Church of the Province of St Stephen's Mission Exchanged for Site in 
SA Church McNamee Village 
American Methodist AME.Church 
Episcopal Church* 
Roman Catholic Church* St Francis Xavier 
Mission Church 
Wesleyan Methodist* Wesleyan Methodist Coloured Mission 
Church of SA Church (Coloured) dismantled in 1941. 
Subsequently occupied by 




GQAMLANA, Rev Jarvis Wallace. 
Born 1882. 
Teacher at missions school at Fort Beaufort. 
Divinity student at Lovedale. 
Ordained and inducted at the Presbyterian New Brighton mission in July 1916. 
Wife died in influenza epidemic in 1918. 
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Delegate of the PE branch of the Cape Native Congress which evidence to the Godley 
Committee in February 1920. 
Nominated member of the New Brighton Advisory Board between 1917 and 1932. 
Member of the PE Joint Council. 
Died unexpectedly on 2 July 1932 at the age of 50. 
{Sources: PE Municipality, Town Clerk's Files; C. Hunter, 'Some Aspects of the African 
Mission Policy of the Presbytery of Adelaide/Port Elizabeth with special reference to the origin 
and development of the New Brighton Presbyterian Mission Church 1898-1962' (Ph. D. thesis, 
Rhodes University, 1983), passim.}. 
JABAVU, Wilson Weir (•Mtshetshi•) 
Born? 
Son of D.D.T. Jabavu and brother to John Tengo and Davidson. 
Moved from Korsten to New Brighton in 1929. 
Nominated to the Native Advisory Board in 1932 in place of the deceased Rev. Jarvis 
Gqamlana. 
Served as nominated of NAB between 1933 and 1935. 
Elected to NAB between 1937-42 and in 1945. 
A freelance journalist and photographer who contributed items to lmvo Zabantsundu and 
Umteteli wa Bantu. 
Died 1949? 
{Sources: PE Municipality, Town Clerk's Files; Communications from G. Soya Mama.} 
LIMBA, James Ngcanjini 
Born Ngqele, Middledrift district c. 1883. 
Primary education at Kabah Location, Uitenhage. 
Employed on railways at Kendrew Station until 1917. 
Moved to Ndabeni, Cape Town where he worked as a packer until 1928. 
Left Methodist Church in which he had been a lay preacher. 
Joined Charles Sigxabayi's Church of Christ (/banda lika-Krestu). 
Sigxabayi deposed as 'Bishop' in 1925? and returned to Transkei. 
Limba undertook preaching tour of Eastern Cape in 1928. 
Took charge of church congregation in Korsten. 
Moved to New Brighton where he built up large following. 
PECC granted site to Church of Christ in 1935. 
Church building and manse completed by 1937. 
School established on premises in 1940. 
Elected to NAB from 1931 to 1933, and 1936. Served as nominated member between 1938 
and 1947. 
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Established trading store, butchery and farming operations in the Alexandria district a"d 
Summerville, Sundays River area. 
Church of Christ's constitutional dispute regarding Limba' s successor and ownership of church 
property went to litigation at Grahamstown Supreme Court in· 1948. 
Died 1963. 
{Source: See references in my, 'Bishop Limba and the Church of Christ in New Brighton, 
c.1929-1949', Kronos, 19 (1992), pp. 102-134.} 
MATI, P.P. 
Proprietor of the Three Star Trading Co., McNamee Village, 1941-? 
Elected Village Chairman 1946. 
Member of the NAB 1950-2. 
Chairman of the PE ANC in the 1940s. 
Secretary of the ANC 1950-1. 
Secretary of the local branch of the SAR&H Workers' Union. 
Organiser of the Laundry Workers' Union and the African Commercial & Distributive 
Workers' Union. 
Banned in 1953 in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act for 2 years. Rearrested in 
1955. 
{Sources: PE Municipality, Town Clerk's Files; Luckardt & Wall, Organize or Starve!, p. 78; 
Cherry, 'The Making of an African Working Class', pp. 78, 215; Advance 5 Oct. 1953, p. 
3; Karis & Carter Microfilm.} 
MA Tn, Robert Mokxotho 
Born c.1923, Pretoria. 
Factory worker in Port Elizabeth (1947). 
Bookkeeper in a general store in New Brighton. 
Executive member of New Brighton ANC branch, 1947-51? Employed as full-time secretary 
in 1950. 
Provincial Secretary of the Cape ANC 1952-4. 
Defiance campaign organiser. Arrested under Suppression of Communism Act in Sept. 1952. 
Sentenced to 9 months suspended for 3 years. 
Banned in 1954 in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act for 2 years and forced to 
resign from the ANC and CYL. 
Escaped arrest for treason and fled to Basutoland in 1956. 
Joined Mokhela's Basutoland National Council, and later Marematlou Freedom Party. 
Still resident in Lesotho. 
{Sources: Karis & Carter, Political Profiles, v.4, pp. 77-8; Benson, African Patriots and The 
Struggle for a Binhright; Karis & Carter Microftlm.} 
MA YEKISO, Caleb J. 
Born 1913 at Idutywa, Transkei. 
Textile worker in Port Elizabeth. 
President of the local branch of the African Textile Workers' Union. 
Joined the ANC in 1942. 
Organiser of the PE bus boycott 1949 and strike of 26 June 1950. 
Arrested during 1952 Defiance Campaign. Served 14 days imprisonment. 
Tried for incitement to public violence or sedition in 1954 but acquitted. 
Member of the Cape Congress and ANC national executive, 1952-55. 
Elected to the executive committee of SACTU in 1955. 
Arrested in 1955 for organising illegal May Day meeting - convicted. 
Discharged from job during Treason Trial ( 1956-61). 
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Arrested in 1961 and again in 1963 for belonging to the ANC and imprisoned for 4 years. 
Died in detention 1969. 
{Sources: Karis & Carter, Political Profiles, v.4, p. 82; Benson, African Patriots, pp. 168-9; 
H. Joseph, If This Be Treason, pp. 176-7; Karis Carter Microfilm 2:XM 70:96/1; Sechaba 
(Aug. 1969), pp. 16-17.} 
McNAMEE, JAMES PERCIVAL 
Born 25 Jan. 1881, Ireland. 
Resident in Victoria East. 
Appointed Inspector of Grahamstown's locations in Apr. 1917. 
Assumed duties as Superintendent of Natives, New Brighton, in Sept. 1926. 
Eldest son drowned at New Brighton beach in Feb. 1927. 
Appointed as Justice of the Peace in 1932. 
Known as "uGilifatyi" to New Brighton residents. 
Sub-economic housing scheme and extension of New Brighton built 1938-43 named 
"McNameeville" in his honour. 
Resigned as Location Superintendent with effect from 1 July 1945 but retained in a temporary 
capacity for two extra months. 
{Sources: PE Municipality, Town Clerk's Files; J.P. McNamee, jnr., Memoirs; J. Robinson, 
'The Power of Apartheid', passim.} 
MHLABA, Raymond Mpakamisi 
Born Fort Beaufort, 1920. 
Completed J.C. at Healdtown in 1941. 
Moved to Sidwell, PE. 
Married Joyce Meke in 1943, by whom he had 8 children (who died in 1960). 
Lodged in New Brighton until granted house in 1949. 
Employed at Nanucci Dry Cleaners in 1942. 
Recruited to the Laundry Workers' Union and became active in CNETU. 
Sacked by Nanucci after 1948 strike. 
Joined the SACP in 1943 and served as district secretary for Port Elizabeth, 1946-50. 
Joined the ANC in 1944 and served as PE branch chairman, 1947-53. 
Secretary of Vigilance Committee in 1949. 
Served as ANC representative on NAB, 1949-51. Resigned. 
Played a leadership role in the 1949 PE bus boycott. 
As volunteer-in-chief for Port Elizabeth during the Defiance Campaign, he led the first group 
of volunteers through the 'Europeans Only' entrance of the New Brighton railway station on 
26 June, 1952. 
Arrested and sentenced to 30 days hard labour. 
Sacked by employers, a firm of concrete manufacturers. 
Joined firm of solicitors where he was employed until 1961. 
Banned in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act in June 1953. 
Elected to the Cape executive committee of the ANC in 1954. 
A defendant in the treason trial (1956-61). 
I • 
Detained during 1960 state of emergency. 
Joined Umkonto we Sizwe in Dec. 1961 and became a member of the high command. 
Detained after the Rivonia swoop in July 1963 and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Confmed to Robben Island until transferred to Pollsmoor Prison in 1982. 
Married common-law wife, Dideka Heliso, at a ceremony in Pollsmoor. 
Released in 1989. 
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{Sources: PE Municipality, Twon Clerk's Files; Karis & Carter, Political Profiles, p. 88 and 
Microfilm; Orie, Biographical study of Mh1aba (draft chapters of M.A thesis); Interview with 
Mhlaba, Fordville, 11 & 12 Jan. 1990; The Weekly Mail, 13-19 Oct. 1989; Interview by Brian 
Sokutu, EPH 23 Oct. 1989; Interview of Govan Mbeki and Mhlaba in Monitor, Dee. 1989, 
pp. 20-32 and EPH, 18 Jan. 1990}. 
MOLEFE, Mbanga James George Benjamin ('G.B.'). 
Born at Mbulwana, near Ladysmith, Natal on 15 Sept. 1901. 
After death of parents he was raised by his grandmother. 
His uncle, Josiah Mguni, put him through school at Newcastle. 
Obtained a teachers' certificate at St Chad's Training College, Ladysmith. 
Appointed principal at Esididini Primary School near Dannhauser in Natal in 1920. 
Transferred to Gordon Memorial Higher Primary School in Helpmekaar District, Natal in 
1923. 
Whilst teaching at Helpmekaar, he acted as an interpreter to Presbyterian minister, Rev. J.M. 
Matheson, during his visits to outlying churches. 
Enrolled at Lovedale Training School for training in the ministry for the Bantu Presbyterian 
Church in 1925. 
Completed his matric and theology diploma in three years. 
Principal of Fort Hare College, Dr. Alexander Kerr, convinced Molefe to study for a B.A . 
degree which he obtained in 1932. 
Travelling secretary of the Student Christian Movement in 1930. 
Married Jane Mbelle, daughter of the Supreme Court interpreter and linguist, Isaiah Budlwana 
Mbelle in 1934. 
Had three children, Thabiso, Tsepo and Boyce. 
Ordained in the Bantu Presbyterian Church in June 1932 and was appointed to Newcastle. 
Apart from· his ministerial duties, he established and served as the first principal of the 
Fairleigh Secondary School. 
In 1938 he was offered a scholarship to attend the Union Theological Seminary, associated 
with Columbia University in New York. 
Gained accreditation for his B.A. and wrote a thesis and exams for a M.A. degree which was 
awarded in May 1939. 
During his return trip to South Africa, he attended the General Assembly of the Church of 
Scotland and World Youth Conference in Amsterdam. 
On his return home in September 1939, he accepted an appointment with the Bantu 
Presbyterian Church in New Brighton. 
In 1940 he opened a night school for adults. 
In Jan. 1942 he commenced a school for Std 6 and 7 pupils in his church for those unable to 
attend Paterson High School in Korsten. 
He became the first principal of the newly-erected Newell Secondary School in 1944 and 
remained its head until his retirement in June 1959. 
In 1953 he was elected as the first black moderator of the Bantu Presbyterian Church (now the 
Reformed Presbyterian Church of Southern Africa). 





He retired from active ministry in 1974. 
He served as a nominated member on the Native Advisory Board (later PE Joint Advisory 
Board) in the years 1940-58, 1961/2-1968/9, ??-1977. 
Attended Location Advisory Boards Congress 1943-5, 1947-8, 1950. 
Executive member of the Locations Advisory Board of South Africa, 1947. 
President of the PE Joint Council (1943). 
Served as chairman of the PE regional committee of the SAIRR in 1952-3. 
As a member of the Moral Re-Armament Movement, he undertook tours of Europe, Asia and 
America in 1953, 1955 and 1959-60. 
Patron of the Eastern Province Bantu Rugby Union. 
Appointed as a commissioner of oaths in Port Elizabeth in 1957. 
Received the Freedom of Port Elizabeth's African Townships in 1973. 
Awarded an honorary doctorate in theology by University of Fort Hare in 1978. 
Died 14 July, 1986. 
{Sources: PE Municipality, Town Clerk's Minutes; Hude and Kingwill, 'G.B. Molefe: 
Memoirs and Tributes'; Interview of Rev G.B. Molefe, Port Elizabeth, 2 Apr. 1980 (by 
Celene and David Hunter); Interview with Mrs J. Molefe, New Brighton, 24 June 1991; The 
African Horizon, supplement to lnkokeli ya Bantu, Dec. 1941; Indaba, 19 Oct. 1989; C.F.D. 
Hunter, 'Some Aspects of the African Mission Policy of the Presbytery of Adelaide-Port 
Elizabeth with special reference to the Origin and Development of the New Brighton 
Presbyterian Mission Church 1898-1962 (Ph.D. Thesis, Rhodes University, 1983), especially 
pp. 288-291; E P Newspaper Library: G.B. Molefe file; UNISA Documentation Centre for 
African Studies: J.G. Molefe Accession.} 
NGINZA, Dora 
Born Dora Jacobs, on the farm "Baviaanspoort" in the Cradock district, 17 Oct. 1891. 
Trained as a nurse at Victoria Hospital, Lovedale, May 1915 to July 1919. 
Appointed as ftrst nurse at New Brighton on 1 Nov. 1919. 
Subsequently appointed Sister-in-Charge of New Brighton Clinic and District Nurse. 
Married Chief Henry Mnyaka Nginza in Feb. 1923. 
Chief "Mthunzi" Nginza installed as representative of Paramount Chief Velile Sandile of the 
amaRarabe in the Port Elizabeth urban area. 
Husband died in 1943 and Sister Dora served as acting representative of the amaRarabe. 
Installed as Paramount Chief Archie Velile Sandile's permanent representative in a ceremony 
in Oct. 1945. 
Led a deputation to the House of Parliament to interview the then Minister of Native Affairs, 
for an improvement of the position and status of the Paramount Chief of the amaRarabe and 
the allotment of land for the tribe in 1948. 
Member of the Edward Memorial Congregational Church. 
President of the Midland District of the Congregational African Women's Association. 
In charge of the Congregational United Girls' Auxiliary movement for many years. 
Awarded for public service by the New York Council of African Affairs. 
New Brighton residents who gave her the praise nameAa! Nobantu!! ('Mother of the people'). 
Retired on pension from the position of Sister-in-charge of the New Brighton Clinic on 31 
Dec. 1954. 
Retired as amaRarabe representative in 1963. 
Accompanied a Port Elizabeth delegation, which included Schauder and Molefe, to a meeting 
of the Moral Rearmament Movement at Caux, Switzerland in 1955. 
Died 21 June, 1966. 
{Sources: PE Municipality, Town Clerk's Files; EP Newspaper Library: Dora Nginza ftle; 
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Biographical Sketch on Souvenir Programme for Visit of Paramount Chief A. V. Sandile, to 
New Brighton, 31 May 1963 to celebrate Dora Nginza's retirement as urban representative of 
the amaRarabe; Weekend Post, 19 Nov. 1991; J.P. McNamee, jnr. 'Memoirs'; Interview with 
Dr P.D. Jabkovitz, Rondebosch, 1 Jan. 1990; The African Horizon (supplement to Inkokeli ya 
Bantu), Dec. 1941, p. 9}. 
NIKIWE, Prince John. 
Born Feb. 1884. 
Educated at Healdtown. 
Taught at Somerset East and Kimberley. 
Arrived in PE in 1915 to be principal of Wesleyan Methodist Mission Church which became 
the Upper United Higher Primary School. 
Appointed Principal of Edward Street (Richmond Hill Methodist) 
Coloured Higher Primary School in 1925. 
Founder member of the Cape African Teachers' Association. 
Retired in 1944 at the age of 60. 
Married Lily Ntsiko, also a teacher and civic leader in her own right. 
Served as circuit steward and lay preacher in the Methodist Church. 
Eating house proprietor which catered for SMQ (1930). 
Elected member of the NAB 1922-28. Served as a nominated member between 1929 and 1963, 
except for the years 1947-9. 
Retired from the Advisory Board in August 1963. 
Attended numerous Location Advisory Boards Congresses and was elected Vice President in 
1933 -a position he held for a number of years. 
He represented the Cape Native Congress in giving evidence to the Godley Committee on Pass 
Laws in Port Elizabeth in 1920. 
Secretary to the Cape African Congress in 1942 and possibly implicated in financial 
irregularities when Pendla was dismissed by ANC President, A.B. Xuma, in 1942. 
Member of the PE Joint Council. 
Died 4 Aug. 1966. 
Prince Nikiwe Township in Kwazakele named after him in 1969. 
{Sources: PE Municipality, Town Clerk's Files; Evidence of Godley Committe, PE, February 
1920; Interview with J. Graham Young, PE, 23 Aug. 1989; E P Newspaper Library: P.J. 
Nikiwe File; Communications from G. Soya Mama.} 
NJONGWE, Dr James Lowell Zwelinzima 
Born 12 Jan. 1919 in Qumbu, Transkei 
Completed B. Sc. degree at Fort Hare and M.D. at the University of the Witwatersrand in 
1945. 
Established medical practice in New Brighton in 1947. 
Elected treasurer of the New Brighton ANC branch in 1948. 
Member of the CYL. 
Elected to ANC nationa executive committee in Dec. 1949. 
Acted as President of Cape Congress in the absence of Z.K. Matthews, 1952-3. 
Arrested in Sept. 1952 under Suppression of Communism Act. Sentenced to 9 months 
imprisonment, suspended for 3 years. 
Negotiated limitation of Nov. 1952 strike in Port Elizabeth to one day with Mayor in return 
for re-instatement of dismissed workers. 
Contested ANC Presidency against Luthuli in Dec. 1952. Elected to National Executive 
Committee. 
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Elected President of Cape Congress in June 1954. 
Banned under Suppression of Communism Act in Dec. 1954 and forced to resign from ANC. 
Departed from Port Elizabeth in poor health and dire fmancia1 straits in 1955. 
Co-conspirator but not accused in Treason Trial. 
Retired from active politics in 1956'? 
Banned for many years until the final one expired in Dec. 1973. 
Re-established medical practice in Matatiele, Transkei. 
Died '?'? 
{Sources: Karis & Carter, Political Profiles, pp. 116-7; Benson, African Patriots, pp. 167-8, 
178, 206 and Struggle fora Birthright, p. 134; Kuper, Passive Resistance, pp. 141-3; Joseph, 
Tomorrow's Sun, p. 199; Fighting Talk (Oct. 1952), p. 12; Karis & Carter Microfilm 2:XN 
37:99; CeA, MJU v.139 ref. 121122/2/56}. 
NTSHINGA, James Hamilton Edward 'Tikini' 
Born c.1895, Grahamstown. 
Obtained primary education in Port Elizabeth. 
Employed as Clerk Interpreter at the Knight Central Mine, Germiston in 1910. 
Became Organising Secretary of the Bantu Young Peoples' Association in Germiston. 
Volunteered to join the British Red Cross Forces and served overseas during World War One. 
Returned to Port Elizabeth after the War and worked for 13 years as a sampler for the wool 
buyers, Messrs A.C. Forder & Co. 
Became interpreter clerk for PE attorney. 
Elected to the New Brighton Advisory Board, 1938-9. 
Appointed Headman in the New Brighton Native Administration in 1939. 
Resigned as member of NAB. 
Appointed Chief Headman in 1953. 
Appointed Bantu Inspector in 1955 when the post of Chief Headman was scrapped. 
Retired as Senior Assistant in the Bantu Administration Department in June 1970. 
Founder member and President of the PE Blind and Crippled League Movement, 1935-41. 
Manager of the Adcock Homes for elderly run by the Bantu Benevolent Society in conjunction 
with the PE Charity Organisation. 
Member of New Brighton Vigilance Committee (1936). 
Founder and managing director of the Mexican Vocal Company and the Midnight Rounders. 
Earned the title of "PE's leading entertainer". 
{Sources: The African Horizon, Dec. 1941, p. 20.}. 
PENDLA, Andrew Frank. 
Born ? in the Eastern Cape. 
Descendent of a sub-chief of the amaNgqika? 
Educated at St Matthew's College, Keiskammahoek. 
Employed for some years as an interpreter in the Magistrate's Court, Middelburg before being 
transferred to Graaff-Reinet. 
Employed as a postal official at New Brighton until his dismissal after five years service in 
1920 on account of alleged embezzlement. 
Appointed interpreter by the PE Municipality in June 1923. 
Employed as clerk/interpreter by Attorneys Scheepers and Spilkin. 
Engaged in various business ventures at different times: hawking, eating house proprietor 
( 1929), and a trading store ( 1940). 





as a nominated member from 1935 to 1944. 
Secretary of the Location Committee in 1925, Chairman of the New Brighton Vigilance 
Association in 1931-2 and Secretary of the Port Elizabeth and District Vigilance Association 
in 1931. 
Unsuccessful candidate of the Cape African Congress for the PE North seat of the Provincial 
Council in 1929 or 1930. 
Auditor to the Cape Native Voters' Convention (1930). 
Executive member of the PE Native Welfare Society which later became the PE Joint Council. 
President of the Cape African Congress in the early 1940s. Suspended by Xuma in Sept. 1942 
for opposing the ANC line on the Native Representatives elections and offering open support 
to National Party candidates. Pendla and Cape African Congress executive ousted by Rev. 
James Calata in elections in Nov. 1942. 
Thrice married: (1) Lilia Dwanya, by whom he had five children before being divorced; (2) 
Beatrice Makombi, who died in labour with their first child; (3) Joyce Vuzo, by whom he had 
one daughter. 
Died in Johannesburg, 25 Oct. 1944. 
{Sources: PE Municipality, Town Clerk's Files; Evidence to Native Economic Commission, 
PE, 26 & 27 March 1931, pp. 6006-26, 6030-42; Xuma Papers; Imvo 8.4.1930, p. 4; Skota, 
The African Yearly Register (1931), p. 237; T. Karis & G. Carter (eds), From Protest to 
Clulllenge, V. 4: Political Profiles (1977), p. 126; P. Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism 
(1970), p. 250; Klein (1978), pp. 59-60; Cobley, 'On the Shoulders of Giants', p. 340; 
Interview with Mrs B. Matsolo (nee Pendla), Graaff-Reinet, 1 May 1991; Interview with J.H. 
Spilkin, PE, 23 Jan. 1990; Communications from G. Soya Mama.} 
SCHAUDER, Adolf. , 
Born Austria, 16 December 19-£. 
Emigrated to Port Elizabeth ~ 1899. 
Served as medical orderly at the Prince Alfred Infirmary, Grahamstown and with the British 
forces during the South African War. 
Returned to Port Elizabeth after demobilisation and established a wholesale business in 
partnership with J .M. Patlansky. 
Later set up his own business and branched out into industrial chemical production. 
Married Frieda Shear in 1906 and had six children. 
Outlived his wife who died in 1953 and children, Gerald, Leon, Ray and Anne. 
Two surviving sons, Hyman and Ralph, ran the family business until very recently. 
Elected to Port Elizabeth City Council in 1923. 
Served continuously for 43 years until his retirement in 1966. 
Served as deputy-mayor (1938-40) and mayor (1940-42). 
Elected Chairman of the Housing Committee in 1935 and served for many years during which 
time he was the 'moving force' in the completion of the Schauderville and McNamee Village 
sub-economic housing schemes for Coloureds and Africans, respectively. 
Known as the 'Father of Housing' in Port Elizabeth. 
Member of the National Housing and Planning Commission, 1948-64. 
Founder member of the New Brighton Night School for Adult Education (1938) and of the 
Bantu Benevolent and Welfare Society ( 1948). 
Given praise name Sonceba ('He who strives for mercy') by the New Brighton community. 
Founder and first President of Midland Areas Development Association. 
Long-serving member of the PE Harbour Board and PE and District School Board. 
Representative of the PECC on the Executive of the Cape Municipal Association. 
Elected as Life Vice-President of the Cape Province Municipal Association, 1962. 
Member of Council of Rhodes University, 1946-66. 
Honorary Degree of Doctor of Social Science conferred by Rhodes University, 1967. 
Addressed Moral Re-Armament Congress at Caux, Switzerland in 1955. 
Member of the SAIRR. 
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Actively involved in the civic and religious affairs of Port Elizabeth's Jewish community, as 
well as social and philanthropic work. 
President of PE Orthodox Hebrew Congregation; Founder and President of PE Hebrew 
School; President and Hon. Life-President of PE Jewish Benevolent Society; Vice-President 
SA Jewish Board of Deputies, etc. 
Awarded Freedom of the City of Port Elizabeth, 1957. 
Died 4 March 1968. 
{Sources: PE Municipality Town Clerk's Files; H. Schauder, 'Adolf Schauder' in C.J. Beyers 
(ed-in-chief), Dictionary of South African Biography, V.5 (Pretoria, 1987), pp. 680-1; 
Interview with Mr Hyman Schauder, Port Elizabeth, 8 March 1992; E. Bernstein, '"Give Me 
the Strength to Help People": Adolph Schauder and his work for South Afriba [sic], Jewish 
Affairs, 20, 12 (Dec. 1965), pp. 11-15; Times Media Newspaper House File of clippings on 
A. Schauder; Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS 14 348, Citation for conferral of 
Honorary Degree of Doctor of Social Science, 1967.} 
TSHIWULA, Alfred Zacharia. 
Born in East London, 1890. 
Educated at St Matthew's College. 
Taught school for a short time. 
Became a special contributor and correspondent for The Daily Dispatch (East London). 
Elected General Secretary of the Cape Native Congress, 1919. 
Organised Congress branches in the Cape Province and Transkeian Territiories. 
Became a commercial traveller representing several Cape Town firms in furniture, instruments 
and jewellery. 
Employed as clerk(?) by Attorney Archibald Marock, 1937. 
Elected to the New Brighton Advisory Board in 1935 and 1939. 
Appointed election agent for Margaret Ballinger, Native Representative for the Cape (Eastern) 
district in Parliament during the 1937 campaign. 
Nominated by PE District for election to NRC in 1942. 
Formed the· African General Workers Union in 1939 and became its Organising Secretary. 
Organiser for CNETU in the 1940s. 
Secretary of the PE branch of the SA Railway & Harbour Workers' Union in 1943 which 
subsequently became known as the SAR&H Non-European Staff Association. Published the 
newspaper Ndavela ('I have appeared') on behalf of the Union. 
Dismissed as official of the Staff Association in 1947 after signing a·promissory note or IOU 
without necessary authorisation. 
Managed Masizakhe Co-operative, a trading store, on behalf of its directors Neil Boss, Adolf 
Schauder and ? Anderson from 1943. Dismissed after being accused of bad management and 
financial irregularities. 
Established estate agency in 1954. 
Set up a dry cleaning business in 1957. 
Died 1958. 
{Sources: PE Municipality, Town Clerk's Files; T.D. Mweli Skota, African Yearly Register 
(1931), p. 25; M. Ballinger, From Union to Apanheid (1969), pp. 147-8; J. Cherry, 'The 
Making of an African Working Class, Port Elizabeth 1925 to 1963' (M.A. thesis, UCT, 1992) 
pp. 73-75, 78-82; Ballinger Papers; Xuma Papers; T. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa 
since 1945 (1986), p. 50.} 
TSHUME, Gladstone Xala 
Born c.1912. 
Joined CPSA in Grahamstown in the late 1930s. 
Employed by pharmacy in Port Elizabeth. 
Elected chairman of CPSA in PE. 
Assisted in founding of Food & Canning Workers' Union. 
Became secretary of the Dockworkers (i.e. stevedores) Maritime Union. 
Organised PE dock workers strike in 1946. 
Secretary of African Textile Workers' Industrial Union. 
Volunteer during 1952 Defiance Campaign in PE. 
Banned for 2 years under the Suppression of Communism Act in Oct. 1953. 
Forced to resign from ANC, African Textile Workers' Union, etc. 
Defendant in Treason Trial ( 1956-61). · 
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Lay preacher in Methodist Church in New Brighton where his brother, Ben, was a minister. 
Died from a stroke on 6 Sept. 1957. 
{Sources: Karis & Carter, Microfilm 2:XT 17:96 and Political Profies, p. 159; Cherry, 'The 
IIIII Making of an African Working Class', pp. 84, 102, 124, 191, 215; Benson, African Patriots, 
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Prince John Nikiwe 
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Matthew John Dubula 
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J Ntshinga (resigned) 
W W Jabavu 
A Z Tshiwula 
G Dubula 
W W Jabavu 
N Nguna 
T Zokufa 
W W Jabavu 
Ndyebo Nguna 
Tamplin M Zokufa 
Robert M Tutshana 
W W Jabavu 
N Nguna 
T M Zokufa 
R M Tutshana 
A Ntshinga 
TN Ranuga 
P P Mati 
P J B Kwaza 
I M Mfuku 
Phineas M Sandia 
A 0 Malakane 
A Ntshinga 
P J Nikiwe 
W W Jabavu 
A F Pendla 
P J Nikiwe 
A F Pendla 
Rev J J Jolobe 
P J Nikiwe 
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Rev G B Molefe 
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Rev G B Moiefe 
1945 I M Mfuku P J Nikiwe 
PM Sandia Rev J Limba 
W W Jabavu Rev G B Moiefe 
A 0 Malakane Rev D Mbopa 
1946 I M Mfuku P J Nikiwe 
PM Sandia Rev J Limba 
W W Mabija Rev G B Moefe 
A Nkaphuka W B Ntshekisa 
1947 W W Mabija Rev G B Molefe 
P J M Sandia Johnson Marwanqa 
I M Mfuku W B Ntshekisa 
M Nkosinkulu Rev J Limba 
1948 C M Singapi Rev G B Molefe 
A Ntshinga W B Ntshekisa 
W W Mabija J B Marwanqa 
D Mtiya W W Mabija 
1949 A Ntshinga Rev G B Molefe 
W Ximiya W B Ntshekisa 
P J B Kwaza J B Marwanqa 
D L Mtiya W W Mabija 
W W Jabavu 
T J Tladi 
A Z Tshiwula 
R Mhlaba 
1950 A B Ntshinga Rev G B Molefe 
Raymond Mhlaba J B Marwanqa 
W Mgijima W B Tshekisa 
Rev A Tsekeletsa P J Nikiwe 
P P Mati 
M Bookholana 
W M Norongo 
I 
Wilson Ximiya 
1951 R Mhlaba (resigned) Rev G B Moiefe 
P P Mati P J Nikiwe 
A A Tsekeletsa J B Marwanqa 
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Mayors of Port Elizabeth, 1902/3-1952/3 
- Prior to 1913 the election of the Mayor took place in December each year. 
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I APPENDIX F The Native Affairs Committee 
-Established 3.12.1925 as a sub-committee of the Finance, Works & General Purposes 
Committee 
I 
-Upgraded as of 16.11.1926 as a fully-fledged committee 
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. . .. ·- .., Consisted of 7 Councillors from which it elected a chairperson on an annuaLbasis _ _ _ . _ .. _ .. 
- Term of ofJ:ice lasted from September to August 
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This bibliography has been divided as follows: 
I. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 
A. Official 
1. Cape Archives Depot, Cape Town 
2. Central Archives Depot, Pretoria 
3. Intermediate Archives Depot, Port Elizabeth 
4. South African Police Museum Archives, Pretoria 
B. Unofficial 
1. Cory Library, Rhodes University 
2. Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand 
3. Documentation Centre for African Studies, UNISA 
4. Jagger Library, University of Cape Town 
5. Newspaper House, Port Elizabeth 
6. Settlers Museum, Grahamstown 
II. PRINTED PRIMARY SOURCES 
A. Government Publications 
1. Cape of Good Hope 
2. Inter-Colonial 
3. Union 
4. Cape Province 
B. Port Elizabeth Town/City Council Publications 
C. Newspapers and other Periodicals 
III. SECONDARY SOURCES 
A. Published Works 
1. Books 
2. Booklets, Pamphlets 
3. Articles 





I. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 
A. Official 
1. Cape Archives Depot 
(i) Colonial Office 
co 7751 1819 
co 8258 587 
CO 8765 78c 
Korsten Village Management Board, 1903 
New Brighton: Illicit Liquor Traffic at, 1904 
Local Government and Health Branch: Correspondence 
(ii) Native Affairs Department 
NA 517 371 Papers relating to Port Elizabeth Native Locations, 1904-06 
NA 527 516 Church Sites in Port Elizabeth Native Reserve Location, 1902-04 
NA 533 617 Papers relating to the Native Reserve Location Bill 
NA 553 947 Settlement of Natives at Korsten, Port Elizabeth, 1900-01 
267 
NA 579 1334 Application for compensation in connection with removal of Natives to 
Reserve Location, Port Elizabeth, 1903 
NA 587 1435 Papers relating to trading stands and store-keepers, New Brighton 
Location, 1903-6 
NA 597 1524 Papers relating to the Administration of Natives, New Brighton and 
Ndabeni Locations, 1902-5 
NA 598 1525 Papers relating to Natives Living Outside Locations in Urban Areas, 
1901-6 
NA 600 1562 Papers relating to rent and rates, Ndabeni and New Brighton Locations, 
1901-6 
NA 601 1575 Inspector of Native Locations, W.H. Quirk, 1903-5 
NA 602 1594 Magisterial Staff, J.T.A. Verschuur, 1903-6 
NA 602 1616 Inspector of Native Locations, E. C. Allman, 1902-6 
NA 606 2196 Papers relating to hospital and medical matters generally, New Brighton 
Location, 1903-6 
NA 607 1673 Alleged harsh administration of the Native Reserve Location Act in Port 
Elizabeth 
NA 607 1675 Removal of Natives to New Brighton Location, 1902-3 
NA 607 1677 Papers relating to Locations, Port Elizabeth, 1903-5 
NA 607 1678 Papers relating to Location Rents, Port Elizabeth, 1903-5 
NA 607 1679 Periodical Reports of Progress, Native Location, Port Elizabeth, 1903 
NA 608 1680 Location Matters, Port Elizabeth, 1903-4 
NA 611 1763 Native Locations, Maitland and Port Elizabeth, 1903-4 
NA 611 1780 Grant of sites to Natives for erection of their own dwellings, New 
Brighton Location, 1903-4 
NA 614 1824 Wardsmen and Native Clerks, New Brighton, 1903-6 
NA 625 1988 Matters in connection with the Native Location Acts, 1893-1906 
NA 634 2184 Outbreak of Smallpox, New Brighton Location, 1903 
NA 635 2196 Wardsmen, Ndabeni and New Brighton Locations, 1903-4 
NA 636 2207 Right of access to Ndabeni and New Brighton Locations, 1903-4 
NA 648 2338 Irrecoverable rent and other revenue, New Brighton Location, 1904-6 
NA 656 2378 Population and Rent Returns, Medical Officers Weekly Reports, New 
Brighton and Ndabeni Locations, 1904-7 
NA 695 2707 Sanitary and Medical Matters, New Brighton Location, 1903-6 
NA 702 2845 Papers relating to Municipalities, 1905-6 
NA 734 348 Papers relating to the Administration of New Brighton Location, 1907-
11 
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NA 735 839 Papers relating to Government Farms, Cradock Place and Deal Party, 
Port Elizabeth, 1901-12 
NA 736 63 Medical Officers and District Surgeons' Reports, mainly from New 
Brighton Location, 1907-11 
(iii) Provincial Administration, Local Government 
PAS 2/821 L 78/C/37 PE Municipality. Influenza Epidemic 
PAS 2/821 L78/C/49 Korsten VMB: Correspondence with Epidemic Workers 
Health and Housing Association 1919 
PAS 2/821 L78/C/53 PE Municipality: Correspondence with Secretary of the 
Epidemic Workers' Association 
PAS 2/834 L811C/11 PE Municipality Boundaries. Inclusion of Cradock Place 
(iv) Medical Officer of Health 
MOH 14 50 Plague Records, 1901-2 
MOH 426/191 Inoculation of Natives at Port Elizabeth, 1901-3 
MOH 426/193 Natives and Inoculation; Strike of Natives at Port Elizabeth 1901 
(v) Justice 
JUS 19 2876/05 
JUS 65 20487/09 
JUS 69 20907/09 
JUS 86 21876/09 
JUS 109 23088/10 
JUS 115 23536/10 
JUS 116 23633/10 
Papers re W. C. Scully, Port Elizabeth 1905-11 
Native Reserve Location Trading Sites 1909 
Papers re Periodical Court at New Brighton, 1909 
Proposed Grant of Building Sites to Natives in New Brighton 
Location, 1909 
Papers re Periodical Court, New Brighton, 1910 
Postponement of Periodical Court, New Brighton, 1910 
Session of Periodical Court at New Brighton, 1910 
(vi) Archives of the Town Clerk, Port Elizabeth 
3/PEZ 1111111-52 Council Minutes: 1902-45 (miscellaneous) 









Minutes of the Health and Location Committee, 1902-10 
Housing and Slum Elimination, 1939-46 
Native Affairs, General, 1939-45 
Housing Schemes. McNamee Village, 1939-40 
Housing Schemes. McNamee Village, 1940-42 
Native Affairs. New Brighton. Housing Scheme 1936 
Native Affairs. New Brighton. General Matters, 1936-9 
Miscellaneous Correspondence Files reLocations; Native Advisory Board; Native Affairs in 
the City; Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923; New Brighton Location Departmental; Native 
Beer Supply; Public Halls, Church and School Sites, Public Meetings; Housing New Brighton 
Location; Census of Natives in all Areas; Plague and Infectious Diseases; Regulations; 
Sanitary Inspectors Reports, etc. as per Computer Printouts, 3/PEZ 13/10/1-2. 
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2. Central Archives Depot, Pretoria. 
(i) Governor-General 
GG 1193 50/1818 
(ii) Health 
GES 706 261113 
GES 901 588/13 
(iii) Native Affairs 
Ethiopian Churches. Miscellaneous Commissions: General -
Forward a Petition on behalf of Joe Dyanti and others requesting 
the appointment of a Commission to enquire into the affairs of 
the Bantu Church of Christ, 194 7 
Sanitation Korsten, 1929-31 
New Brighton Location, 1920-6 
NTS 157 97/19/048 
NTS 178 1177/14/345 
NTS 1473 674/214 
NTS 2442 11291 
New Brighton Location: Establishment of 1902-22 
New Brighton Location: Policing of 1918-23 
Bantu Church of Christ, 1930-59 
New Brighton Location, 1910-23 and 1923-38 (2 files) 
New Brighton Location Advisory Board Members, 1912-
36 
NTS 2443 3/291 
NTS 2443 4/291 New Brighton Location Advisory Board, Minutes of 
Meetings, 1912-22 
NTS 2443 8/291 
NTS 2444 13/291 
NTS 4324 185/313 
NTS 4511 585/313 
New Brighton Location: Sanitation 1913-23 
New Brighton Location, Irrecoverable Revenue, 1913-25 
Korsten Village Management Board, 1924-31 
Improvement of Economic Conditions of Natives in 
Urban Areas, Committee of Inquiry, Port Elizabeth, 
1942 
NTS 5420 197/313 Kaffir Beer Regulations, Port Elizabeth Municipality, 
1920-37 
NTS 6369 197/313 Location Regulations, Port Elizabeth Municipality, 1940-
7 
NTS 6371 197/313 Representations of Protests against Proposed Increase of 
Rentals at New Brighton Location, Port Elizabeth, 1943-
51 
NTS 6450 197/313 Influx of Natives into Urban or Proclaimed Areas, Port 
Elizabeth, 1949-57 
3. Intermediate Archives Depot, Port Elizabeth 
(i) Port Elizabeth Town Clerk's Files 
25/65 New Brighton Departmental, No. 11 (July 1945 -Jan. 1953) 







Native Advisory Board, No. 4 (Jan. 1950- Dec. 1956) 
Liquor Supply to Natives, No. 2 (May 1941 -July 1961) 
Cost of Living, No. 1 (Oct. 1940- Apr. 1944) 
Native Affairs in the City, No. 4 (Apr. 1945 - Dec. 1946) 
Native Affairs in the City, No. 5 (Jan. 1947 -Aug. 1948) 
Native Affairs in the City, No. 6 (Sept. 1948 -Jan. 1952) 
Native Affairs in the City, No. 7 (Feb. 1952- Dec. 1952) 
Census and Statistics, No. 3 (Aug. 1938- May 1955) 
Registration of Natives & Influx Control, No. 1 (Mar. 1944 - Sept. 
1953) 






4. South African Police Museum Archives, Pretoria 
Documents and photographs relating to the New Brighton riots of 18 October 1952. 
B. Unofficial 
1. Cory Library, Rhodes University 
MS 14, 477 G. L. Galpin Papers 
MS 14, 84 'Black Peril' Commission Papers 
MIC 407 Karis-Carter Collection 
2. Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand 
A 410 Margeret Ballinger Papers 
A 1312 W.C. Scully Papers 
A 1618 Skota Collection 
ABX A.B. Xuma Papers 
AD 843/B South African Institute of Race Relations Papers 
AD 843/RJ A.D. Rheinallt Jones Papers 
AD 1178 A. Lynn Saffery Papers 
AD 1433 Records of the Joint Council of Europeans and Africans 
3. Documentation Centre for African Studies, UNISA 
AAS 123 J.J.R. Jolobe Accession 
AAS 215 J.G. (sic) Molefe Accession 
MIC 5849-53 Abdurahman Family Papers 
4. Jagger Library, University of Cape Town 
BC 293 Stanford Papers 
BC 345 W. G. Ballinger Papers 
BC 347 V.M.L. Ballinger Papers 
BC 579 D.B. Molteno Papers 
BC 581 Forman Papers 
BC 630 Evidence of the Native Economic Commission 
BC ZA 83 Abdurahman Family Papers (Microfilm) 
5. Newspaper House, Port Elizabeth 
Files on: Bhengu, N. 
Boast, C. T. ( 1965-9) 
Gelvan, Mrs K. (1954-81) 
Limba, 'Bishop' J. 
Molefe, Rev G.B. (1953-80) 
Nginza, 'Sister' D. (1954-80) 
Nikiwe, P.J. 
Schauder, Cllr A. (1949-60) 
6. Settlers Museum, Grahamstown 
GM 69/35D D.L. Smit Papers 
II. PRINTED PRIMARY SOURCES 
A. Government Publications 
1. Cape of Good Hope Government 
(i) Parliamentary Papers 
G. 29 - 1903 Blue Book on Native Affairs for 1902 
G. 66 - 1903 Report on Public Health for 1902 
G. 11 - 1904 Blue Book on Native Affairs for 1903 
G. 12A- 1904 Blue Book on Native Affairs for half-year ended 30 June 1904 
G. 35 - 1904 Report on Public Health for 1903 
G. 35*- 1904 Report on Public Health for half-year ended 30 June 1904 
G. 12 - 1905 Blue Book on Native Affairs for 1904 
G. 19 - 1905 Report of the 1904 Census 
G. 39 - 1906 Report on Public Health for 1905 
G. 46- 1906 Blue Book on Native Affairs for 1905 
G. 36- 1907 Blue Book on Native Affairs for 1906 
G. 28- 1908 Blue Book on Native Affairs for 1907 
G. 33 - 1908. Report on Public Health for 1907 
G. 19- 1909 Blue Book on Native Affairs for 1908 
G. 43 - 1909 Report on Public Health for 1908 
G. 28 - 1910 Blue Book on Native Affairs for 1909 
(ii) Select Committee Reports 
A. 22 - 1902 Report on the Native Reserve Locations Bill 
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